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A b st r a c t
The overall aim of the thesis is to argue that important aspects of language are best 
understood by a ‘phenomenological’ approach and to assess the contribution this 
makes to philosophical understanding of language.
The principal task is to develop a tenable view of the role language plays in 
understanding the world, i.e. linguistic articulation, by drawing on three paradigmatic 
conceptions of language, each of which is ‘phenomenological’ in the sense of 
aspiring to describe accurately our experience of language. Since each paradigm 
accentuates certain aspects of linguistic phenomena, so that none is satisfactory by 
itself, the three are critically integrated to yield a more balanced overall picture. The 
first paradigm, the early Heidegger’s, is taken to set out a general framework for 
thinking of language and to identify two poles: language is understood to be grounded 
in everyday practice, yet ideally its forms serve to present features of the world as 
they in themselves are. The two further paradigms allow these poles to be filled out in 
greater detail. Thus Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language, which centres on 
creative expression and incorporates Saussure’s idea of language as a ‘system of 
differences’, is used to explain the way language presents its objects. Conversely, the 
later Wittgenstein’s view of language as interwoven with day-to-day human 
practice(s) is used to explicate the practical grounding of language.
The thesis then seeks to highlight and assess the broader philosophical implications of 
the resultant combined phenomenological approach. Focusing on Heidegger’s idea of 
‘prepredicative’ founding, it first examines the relationship between the 
presentational and practical feats identified by this approach and more standard Neo- 
Fregean semantics-based conceptions of language. Finally, it is considered whether 
this combined phenomenological view, in particular the ways it sees language use as 
constituting awareness of its objects, has realist or nonrealist implications.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
A  P h e n o m e n o l o g ic a l  A p p r o a c h  
t o  L a n g u a g e
Pour bien apprecier les actions des hommes, 
il les fau t prendre dans tous leurs rapports 
et c 'est ce qu ’on ne nous apprend point a faire.
Rousseau
The present thesis was motivated by certain kinds of experience. All of us, of course, 
have experience of language. But familiarity with our linguistic tools and the 
circumstances of their use means that words usually come to us as effortlessly as the 
actions they accompany or embody, so that by default we lack awareness of the ways 
language mediates understanding of the world and what it is about language that 
enables it to do so.
Speaking personally, such default experience of language was put in a 
different perspective by the experience of living and working for several years in a 
country whose language is not my own. One aspect of this were the everyday 
inadequacies that accompany an intermediate grasp of a foreign language. Even when 
able to ‘get by’, in the sense of coping with most common practical needs, second- 
language competence is typically characterized by inflexibility and brittleness. The 
link between pragmatic and linguistic competence is, however, ambivalent. On the 
one hand, syntactic and semantic errors very often do not impede you in doing what 
you want to do, and an interlocutor -  if need be, a sympathetic one -  will understand 
‘what you are saying’ even if your own words fail to say it. On the other hand, even 
slight changes in circumstances or unexpected variations on standardly ‘scripted’ 
procedures can bring a breakdown in pragmatic fluency by requiring linguistic 
knowledge that is off the beaten track. Indeed, such problems persist even with a high 
degree of fluency: Long after we can make ourselves understood without difficulty, 
limitations in grammatical flexibility and a restricted vocabulary can mean that our 
powers of articulation -  our ability to articulate thoughts -  lack subtlety and 
precision, leading us to feel inhibited in the exercise of our intelligence.
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Default experience of language contrasts not only with cases in which we are 
palpably deficient as second-language speakers, but also with situations in which we 
are forced to reflect upon and extend understanding of our first language. This 
typically becomes particularly clear in what might be called ‘interfacing situations’ 
between two languages. For example, in teaching your first language to foreigners, 
you rapidly become aware of the difficulties of explaining the way we use words in 
terms of both grammar and meaning. Or again, when translating from a foreign 
language into a first language you often encounter lacunae and vulnerabilities in your 
ability to find the right words -  those carrying relevant connotations and conveying 
appropriate contrasts. Such experiences have a sobering effect. You become aware 
that you have a limited grasp of your first language too, no matter how effortless 
‘mastery’ of it might otherwise seem. However, sensitivity to such limitations does 
not depend on the contrast with a second language. There are other examples of more 
careful, skilled or creative use of language in which reflective awareness of the 
expressions to be used plays a central role. Poetry, literary or legal writing would be 
obvious examples in which the choice of particular words is of the essence; but 
demands of the same kind can arise in personal or emotionally delicate 
communication. In such cases we are careful about our choice of expression because 
we expect to be held in some way accountable for the potential implications of our 
words.
Though clearly an extreme case, the difficulties encountered in translation and 
in reflective use of language came for me to be epitomized in Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophical prose. Heidegger’s writings are characterized by the inseparability of 
the articulation of his thoughts from the interpretation of individual words. 
Unsurprisingly, this is difficult to convey in translation, since the difficulties 
concerned emerge precisely through Heidegger’s exploitation of peculiarities of 
German. But to give some indication of what is involved consider, as one example of 
many, Heidegger’s characterization of modem technology as ‘das Ge-stelV (VA 23). 
Being based on the idiomatic German word ‘Gestell’, meaning framework, rack, or 
shelf, this is immediately suggestive of both constraint by a rigid framework and the 
commodification of an environing world to be stored up on shelves. Beyond this, 
however, Heidegger weaves a rich web of association relying on its stem ‘stellen’ (to 
put or place). First, he contrasts the way in which earlier generations had ‘bestellt’ -  
meaning: to tend, or care for -  the land with the way modem technological practices
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makes demands on (herausfordern) nature. For these too the land is something to be 
‘bestellt’, but now in the word’s sense of ordering or demanding something (VA 18). 
Above all the term ‘Ge-stell’ serves to signal an intimate link between the nature of 
modem technology and the modem-age world-view, one supposedly already 
expressed in a series of established idiomatic locutions involving ‘stellen’. Thus 
rather than tending and caring, modem technology is a way of producing (her-stellen) 
that exhibits a confrontational, predatory mind-set: entities are to be tracked down or 
hunted (nach-stelleri), fixed by observation (fest-slellen), seized or secured for our 
ends (sicher-stelleri)} This in turn is linked with modem-age thinking’s 
ontologization of the subject-object distinction, following which the way objects of 
thought are presented or modelled (dar-stellen) takes on the specific character of 
putting objects before (vor-stellen; ‘representing’ to) consciousness.
Heidegger typically, as in this example, both exploits the established meaning 
of words and simultaneously gives them a highly idiosyncratic meaning within the 
framework of his theory, while relying on, so to speak, ‘etymological’ clues in the 
form of words as an indication of their meaning. The intended experience is that his 
key terminology should acquire a peculiar expressive intensity, with Heidegger’s 
suggested interpretations of terms apparently resonating with their familiar 
established sense. This approach has both its admirers, who are sympathetic to 
Heidegger’s claims to be bringing out the deep ‘original’ sense of words, and its 
detractors, who dismiss it as mere punning or ‘word play’. Without wanting to 
adjudicate the philosophical expediency or otherwise of this approach to philosophy, 
it seems to me that the way Heidegger exploits expressive potentials in the (German) 
language does reveal something significant about the way language works more 
generally -  though not, pace Heidegger, that this has anything to do with the recovery 
o f ‘original’ meanings.
As already suggested, this brief catalogue of non-default linguistic 
circumstances is drawn from personal experience. Although in itself that fact is of no
1 These terms all occur in Heidegger’s description o f the Ge-stell in the essay ‘The Question 
concerning Technology’: cf. VA 19, 24 (herstellen); 22, 25 (natural science ‘stellt der Natur ... nach’); 
11, 18, 26 (feststellen); 27 (‘sicherzustellende Best£nde’). In ‘Science and Contemplation’ Heidegger 
tersely characterizes calculative modem science as a ‘nachstellend-sicherstellendes Vorgehen’ and 
explains that ‘Das nachstellende Vorstellen, das alles Wirkliche in seiner verfolgbaren 
Gegenstandigkeit sicherstellt, ist der Grundzug des Vorstellens, wodurch die neuzeitliche Wissenschaft 
dem Wirklichen entspricht’ (VA 53, 51 f.).
2 VA 24 f. For this view o f ‘Vorstellen’ cf. HW  91 ff.
6
philosophical interest, the experiences sketched are. First, because they are kinds of 
experience that are generally available, so that anyone in the right circumstances is 
likely to have them. Second, although these experiences contrast with default, pre- 
reflective experience of language, there are no extra ingredients involved. The ways 
we fail of linguistic competence and the factors we draw on in extending our 
understanding of language, or in making highly reflective or expressive use of 
language, should all somehow be either in play or latent in all language use. Such 
experiences can therefore be expected to shed light on what is involved in language 
use more generally, and in this sense to be of interest to or illuminated by philosophy 
of language.
This expectation, it seems to me, is not met by many common approaches in 
contemporary philosophy of language. To take perhaps the most obvious example, 
one would look in vain to Quine’s views about translation for insight into the 
difficulties posed by understanding or rendering in another language the nuances of 
Heidegger’s language use. Quine’s behaviouristic view of radical translation simply 
does not articulate the kind of factors that would enable one to understand 
Heidegger’s linguistic practices -  nor indeed to explicate the standards of pragmatic 
adequacy or expressive subtlety alluded to in the examples above.3 To be sure, Quine 
is not alone. Indeed most philosophical approaches to language allow themselves to 
be guided by antecedent assumptions about what language should be like -  the degree 
of systematicity or form it should have, the epistemological function it is desired or 
perceived to play, how it connects with philosophy of mind or metaphysics etc. -  in a 
way leaving them peculiarly insensitive to the factors that speakers might perceive to 
be at work in different kinds of linguistic phenomenon. So, while I am not suggesting 
that such approaches lack value, it seems that there is a need at least to explain how 
such theories relate to the various kinds of experience speakers can have of language.
A significant step in the right direction is provided by Charles Taylor’s (1985, 
218) distinction between ‘designative’ and ‘expressive’ conceptions of language. 
Whereas designative conceptions concentrate on referential or extensional aspects of 
language, ‘expressive’ conceptions focus on language’s ‘power to make things 
manifest’ (Taylor 1985, 238). While stressing that, since they address quite different 
questions, there is no conflict between these two broad approaches to language,
3 Curiously, Quine (1969a, 80) distinguishes his interests from what he disdainfully refers to as 
‘ordinary unphilosophical translations’.
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Taylor (1985, 252) nonetheless suggests as a deficiency of the designative view that it 
does not ‘take account of the matrix of activity within which the connections between 
words and their referents arise and are sustained’. By contrast the nondesignative 
approach -  which he also refers to as the ‘HHH’ (Herder, Humboldt, Hamann) 
conception -  holds out the prospect of a richer philosophical understanding of 
language by treating language as a ‘speaking activity’ which Taylor characterizes in 
terms of three key features. Thus language is taken to be a medium through which (a) 
things are formulated or articulated, and so brought to explicit awareness, (b) subject 
matter is ‘put in the public space’, and in which (c) characteristically human concerns 
are constituted (Taylor 1985, 256 ff). Taylor goes on to associate the nondesignative 
approach with a series of further theses -  e.g. that language is holistic, is always the 
common property of a ‘speech community’, or is somehow mysterious due to a link 
with ‘subject-related properties’ -  which one might disagree with. But I want to 
suggest that the particular virtue of the nondesignative approach, in the minimal form 
just sketched, lies in identifying a general perspective and a corresponding set of 
questions. Language, on this approach, is a process of articulation in the public space 
that plays a constitutive role in human actions and thought. The right questions to ask 
in understanding its speaking activity are what makes up linguistic articulation, what 
it is for language to express or realize meaning, or wherein its power to make things 
manifest lies.
In broad terms the present thesis aims to address these questions, and to do so 
in a way that accords properly with the various kinds of experience speakers can 
come to have of language. This latter requirement establishes a sense of priorities that 
I think is best summed up by describing the approach to be taken as a 
‘phenomenological’ one. Before considering how the remainder of the thesis 
addresses the nature of linguistic articulation, it will therefore be helpful to say 
something about what it is for a conception of language to be ‘phenomenological’.
*
The term ‘phenomenological’ is commonly used in two not obviously confluent 
ways. On the one hand, it is frequently used to refer to the intellectual tradition 
initiated by Edmund Husserl and associated with some kind of basic methodological 
commitment, such as a descriptive return to ‘things themselves’, intuition as a source
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of validity, or reliance on the ‘phenomenological reduction’. This use is complicated 
by the fact that even among this tradition’s authors there is no clear consensus as to 
what that commitment is, making it something of a commonplace that there are as 
many kinds of ‘phenomenology’ as there are ‘phenomenologists’.4 On the other hand, 
‘phenomenology’ also has an established use in English-speaking philosophy, 
epitomized in the expression ‘getting the phenomenology right’, on which it simply 
conveys the need for accounts of something to be ‘true to appearances’, i.e. to tally 
with the way that thing seems to us. To some extent both uses of the term are relevant 
to the present thesis. However, I will take the second sense -  subsequently referred to 
as Phenomenological Accountability, or simply PA -  to be the defining feature of a 
‘phenomenological’ approach. In the case of language, PA translates into the 
requirement that a conception of language be descriptively accountable to the way 
linguistic processes appear to speakers. That is, its various features should be 
motivated by the need to reflect the complexity of (linguistic) phenomena, such that 
without them it would not be possible to describe these phenomena accurately.5
In the nature of the case, PA is a somewhat vague -  though not altogether 
empty -  requirement. Despite this, it can be clarified and qualified in several ways. 
Most obviously perhaps, the notion of phenomenology, or appearances, relevant here 
is not the first-personal sense found in philosophy of mind. That is, the concern is not 
with phenomenal aspects of consciousness (for example, pain) to which one agent 
might have ‘privileged access’. Linguistic phenomena, as most famously argued by 
Wittgenstein, take place in a public space, so that it is to generally available 
experience that a phenomenological conception of language answers.
The role of initial appearances, or default experience, is somewhat ambivalent. 
For our default experience of language, as already noted, is that language lacks 
salience: rather than appearing to us in any specific way, our experience of language 
is usually submerged in experience of the world more generally. Yet at the same time, 
to talk of ‘descriptive accountability’ to the way things appear to be seems to imply 
that default (or original) experience has a character of its own, one to some extent 
determinate, of which we can be made aware, and in respect of which it hence makes
4 For example, despite advocating phenomenology as ‘a mode o f  doing philosophy’, Dermot Moran 
somewhat awkwardly concedes that ‘phenomenology cannot be understood simply as a method, a 
project, a set o f  tasks; in its historical form it is primarily a set o f people’ (Moran 2000, xv, xiv).
As Crane puts it ‘a phenomenological idea’ is one ‘which emerges in the process o f reflecting on 
what [e.g.] mental life is like’ -  as something we cannot see how to do without (Crane 2001, 17, 23; cf. 
3,8 ).
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sense to talk of accountability.6 There is no real conflict here. Even though we might 
usually lack focal awareness of certain features of language, we can still be 
accountable to default experience in the sense that we would recognize the possibility 
(or necessity) of redescribing that experience as including them, once pointed out, 
without any sense of distortion.
However, as outlined above, not only does experience of language come in 
different varieties, but non-default experiences of language can enrich our 
understanding by drawing attention to otherwise unnoticed features. This suggests 
two possibilities for the phenomenology and a corresponding conception of language. 
One would be to view experience of language overall as a juxtaposition of various 
kinds of linguistic phenomenon, descriptions of which would be collected to form a 
phenomenological conception of language. The second would be to see the variety of 
possible experiences of language as subject to a unifying constraint on an appropriate 
conception of language: namely, that since in each case it is language that is 
experienced, the same factors should be present in all these different modes of 
experience. This implies that, though quite different kinds of formative factors, or 
structurations, might be involved in accounting for various phenomena, they should 
be considered properly part of language only insofar as they must be thought of as 
present in all linguistic experience. On this approach -  which is intended here -  the 
task for a satisfactory conception of language is to make clear what those formative 
factors are and how their interplay can issue in respectively differing phenomena.
If phenomenology is defined in terms of descriptive accountability to 
experience and seeks to identify structures underlying different kinds of phenomena, 
then it might be wondered how it differs from science. Is Chomskian Universal 
Grammar, say, part of what I am calling ‘phenomenology’? In fact, although this 
conviction plays no role in this thesis, I believe there should be continuity, of the kind 
Merleau-Ponty assumed, between phenomenology and science. There is, however, a 
difference that might be described metaphorically in terms of surface and depth: the 
intention here is to map features of the experiential surface rather than the underlying 
structures of linguistic phenomena. The relevant sense of surface is secured by the 
thought that phenomenology is descriptively accountable to the way linguistic
6 This, I take it, is the point o f Husserl’s distinction between the ‘flow o f experience’ (Erlebnisstrom) 
and reflective acts in §78 o f  his Ideas /. Though he emphasizes that it is ‘through reflectively 
experiencing acts alone that we know anything about the flow o f experience’ (Husserl 1992b, 168), the 
knowledge attained is knowledge o f the original flow o f experience.
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phenomena appear to speakers. Phenomenological features of language are such that 
any speaker would be expected to recognize them, at least once they are pointed out, 
rather than involving extended processing, reasoning or systematization in the way a 
scientific theory does. Through this link with noninferential familiarity 
phenomenology remains distinguished as a descriptive undertaking.7
But given this superficiality, so to speak, why should phenomenology be of 
philosophical interest? Isn’t the point of philosophy to get beyond appearances to 
underlying reality? An initial response to this is that one should be wary of the 
assumption that reality and appearances stand opposed. In particular, since language 
is artefactual, existing only in virtue of speakers’ somehow understanding it, it is 
doubtful that this assumption can be made about language. Furthermore, given this 
artefactual status, a phenomenological conception of language can be expected at 
least to articulate conditions of adequacy for theories that probe ‘below’ the surface 
of phenomena. Nevertheless, it is to some extent implicit in a phenomenological 
approach of the kind outlined here that philosophical theses are the end result rather 
than the starting point of enquiry. Although a certain description of phenomena may 
be loaded with metaphysical or epistemological implications, the whole point of a 
phenomenological approach is to extract such theses from an understanding of 
phenomena. With this in mind, the philosophical interest of a phenomenological 
approach to language should be expected to emerge in the course of the thesis, and 
will be addressed, so to speak, head on in the final chapter.
At this point it might be thought that the conception of phenomenology just outlined 
is difficult to reconcile with the term’s historical application to the phenomenological 
movement. For straightforwardly to invoke the idea O f experience makes 
phenomenological accountability look like some sort of empirical philosophy, of the 
kind phenomenology might be thought to oppose. While this is perhaps true of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, I think the view suggested here is consistent with 
Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s later focus on the importance of lived experience. 
Though it is not possible to show this in detail here, I want to indicate very briefly the 
plausibility of a reconciliation with the historical sense of ‘phenomenological’ by
7 Cf. Heidegger’s characterization o f phenomenological ‘description’ as avoiding determinations that 
are not directly exhibited (SZ 35). Husserl’s talk o f ‘evidence’ and ‘intuition’ similarly relies on the 
idea that phenomenological data are non-inferentially accessible (e.g. Husserl 1992c, 58 [§24]).
11
considering how two non-assimilable features of Husserl’s position came to be 
rejected by his successors.
The first is that, although he was in some sense committed to describing the 
structures of conscious experience, Husserl distances himself from straightforward 
appeals to experience of the kind suggested by PA. This is because both everyday and 
scientific experience are characterized by what he terms the ‘natural attitude’, the 
background assumption that the world as a whole exists (Husserl 1992b, 61 [§30]). 
The problem, as Husserl saw it, with this assumption is that enquiry remains 
empirically conditioned, i.e. in some sense answerable to facts, or the contingencies 
of the actual world. Husserl thought, however, that the explanatory task of philosophy 
cannot be bound in this way and requires a modified form of experience in what he 
calls the ‘transcendental field of experience’ (Husserl 1992c, 28 [§12] ff). This is to 
be distinguished by both its ‘purity’ -  i.e. that ‘no experience, qua experience [...] 
can take on the function o f justification’ (Husserl 1992b, 20 f. [§7]) -  and its 
extension of the notions of experience and description -  via those of eidetic intuition 
and eidetic variation -  into the realm of the possible (cf. Husserl 1992c, 70 ff. [§34]). 
Hence the need for and the importance of the so-called ‘phenomenological 
reduction’: Although Husserl’s phenomenology relies on the investigator’s 
experience, the reduction comprises the set of moves -  disregarding the distinction 
between actual and potential, and attending to the (‘eidetic’) form of mental contents 
-  needed reflectively to transform natural experience into its pure equivalent.
By contrast, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty eschew the phenomenological 
reduction and instead emphasize the accountability of phenomenology to the 
experience humans usually (in the natural attitude) have. Thus Being and Time is 
built around -  what claims to be -  a description of ‘inauthentic? everyday disclosure 
of the world and acknowledges that empirical (or ‘vulgar’) intuition is an 
‘unavoidable presupposition’ in securing the ‘mode of access that genuinely belongs’ 
to ontological enquiry (SZ 37, cf. 31). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty relies constantly, as a 
matter of course, on scientific findings and generally insists on the need to found 
phenomenological analysis in the ‘lived world’: ‘in a word phenomenology’ is ‘the 
decision to demand from experience itself its proper sense’ (PdP iii, 338). Underlying 
these appeals to lived experience is a fundamental disagreement about the 
relationship between the actual and the possible. Husserl holds that “‘in itself’ the 
science of pure possibilities is prior to that of actual realities and makes this [science
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of actual realities] possible as a science’.8 Heidegger’s opposition to this view comes 
to a focus in the notion of Dasein: such (human) entities not only cannot be thought 
of as actualizing timeless or unconditioned possibilities, but themselves form the 
ontological precondition for the being of possibilities (as Dasein’s projects or plans).9 
And because Dasein is always conditioned by history and empirical facts, this is 
tantamount to saying -  against Husserl -  that possibilities, experience, and 
phenomena are always empirically conditioned. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s approach 
‘preserves’ from empiricism ‘the character of facticity’: ‘That is also why 
phenomenology is a phenomenology, that is to say, studies the appearance of being 
to consciousness, instead of supposing its possibility to be given in advance’.10
This disagreement over the status of the possible is linked with a second point 
of difference between Husserl’s views and those of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, 
namely the supposed ontological basis of intentionality. Despite having aspired to 
metaphysical neutrality in his Logical Investigations, Husserl later came to consider 
phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism, and so to postulate an 
ontological realm of transcendental subjectivity (and later intersubjectivity). One of 
Heidegger’s principal objections to Husserl is that he needed, but lacked, some 
conception of the mode of being (Seinsart) of what he was calling ‘transcendental 
subjectivity’.11 The crux of Heidegger’s objection, which he saw as consequence of 
Husserl’s requirement of ‘presuppositionlessness’, is that radical enquiry into the 
nature of intentionality -  i.e. enquiry that claims to be discovering its own conditions 
of possibility -  cannot fail to address the nature of its ontological setting (cf. PGZ 
123). Heidegger was moved by this (as I shall call it) ontological realizability 
condition, to drop the idea of a transcendental subject and instead to think of 
intentionality as being constituted by concrete mortal agents v(Dasein). This move is 
again paralleled in Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the ‘image of a constituted world’ 
implicit in the idea of an ‘absolute constituting consciousness’ in favour of a focus on
g Husserl 1992c, 74 [§34]. -  Similarly in Ideas I he claims that the ‘old ontological doctrine that 
knowledge o f “possibilities” must precede that o f actual realities [ Wirklichkeiten], is in my view, as 
long as it is correctly understood and made use o f in the right way, a prodigious truth’ (Husserl 1992b, 
178 [§79]).
9 SZ 143 f. -  POggeler (1989) argues powerfully that disagreement over the nature o f modality was 
central to Heidegger’s break with Husserl from 1927 onwards.
10 PdP  74. See in particular Merleau-Ponty’s treatment o f ‘our freedom’, which ‘does not destroy our 
situation, but is geared to it’ (PdP 505, cf. 496 ff.).
11 This formulation o f Heidegger’s challenge is found in correspondence with Husserl during their 
1927 collaboration on the Encyclopaedia Britannica article (Husserl 1968, 601 f.).
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10embodied agency. ‘No philosophy’, he explains, ‘can ignore the problem of finitude 
on pain of not knowing itself as philosophy’ (PdP 48). In each case transcendental 
subjectivity is rejected as an ultimately unintelligible assumption, and replaced by a 
notion of concrete and finite subjectivity whose experience is recognizable -  without 
‘purification’ via the reduction -  as corresponding to our own in the ‘natural attitude’.
As a historical thesis it could be argued that these differences are part of 
Heidegger’s, and perhaps Merleau-Ponty’s, attempt to be more consistently 
phenomenological than Husserl himself was -  and in this spirit suggested that they 
are part of a dialectic internal to phenomenology guided by the idea of 
phenomenological accountability. But for the present purposes, since the following 
will draw on their views extensively, I have simply attempted to illustrate that it is 
plausible to think of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty as sharing commitment to PA in 
the dual sense that they (a) take phenomenology to be accountable to an ‘unpurified’ 
notion of experience in the ‘natural attitude’, and (b) posit forms of agency in which 
we can readily recognize ourselves.
*
In view of the motivations set out above, the overall aim in the following chapters is 
to develop a phenomenological conception of the context and processes of linguistic 
articulation and at least to indicate the philosophical interest of the resultant position. 
The development of this view will draw extensively on three authors -  Martin 
Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Ludwig Wittgenstein -  with the aim of 
fusing their respective conceptions of language into an unified view. This strategy is 
guided by several convictions. First and foremost it seems to ®e that each of these 
authors’ conceptions of language captures something important about the 
phenomenology of language. But although according recognizably with certain 
aspects of our experience of language, each is also characterized by corresponding 
inadequacy or one-sidedness which yields either a vague or distorted picture of the 
whole. Accordingly, the aim here is critically to combine these three visions of 
language into a single overall view that is more balanced than each of its respective 
component positions. This, so to speak, exegetically committed strategy also requires
12 PdP  51, cf. 172: ‘Experience o f the body forces us to recognize an imposition o f sense which is not 
that o f  a universal constituting consciousness’.
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a second kind of balance, between fidelity to and instrumentalization of the respective 
authors’ views. Generally speaking my aim has been to capture accurately key 
aspects of each author’s work, but to be guided by the task at hand rather than by the 
specific philosophical aims of each author. The phenomenological position I want to 
develop will therefore emerge by working through three views of language towards 
which -  as should become clear -  I am broadly, but not totally sympathetic. This 
approach has considerable potential to disappoint: to some it will too short on the 
exegetic side, to others too long. My aim, at least, has been to strike the right balance, 
that is, to do justice to the merits of each position while maintaining sufficient 
direction to avoid mere commentary.
The first chapter centres on Heidegger’s conception of language in Being and 
Time (1927) with the aim of identifying a framework for a phenomenological 
conception of language, that is, a set of views about language which seems insightful 
and broadly correct, but stands in need of greater development. This Heideggerian 
framework, as I call it, operates at two levels. At a general level the concern is with 
an overall picture of the metaphysical situation of language. Thus chapter I starts by 
focusing on Heidegger’s account of what he calls the ‘ontological “place” of 
language’, attempting to unravel apparently conflicting tendencies affecting the status 
of language in Heidegger’s discussion. It is argued that several features of the 
resultant overall picture are motivated by the need for phenomenological enquiry to 
cohere with lived experience and should therefore generally characterize a 
phenomenological conception of language. Thus, in addition to rejecting the idea that 
language can be understood reductively as a ‘formal’ system of signs, Heidegger is 
led, I claim, to a view of language that eschews any contrast between an ‘inside’ and 
an ‘outside’ and instead sees it as embedded in or distributed over the wider world. 
As they parallel his nondualist view of Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’, these general 
phenomenological commitments are summed up by talking of language as ‘language- 
in-the-world’.
A central and distinctive feature of Heidegger’s overall picture is the claim 
that the content of propositions, qua predicative judgements, is to be understood as 
founded in a ‘prepredicative’ grasp of the world. In fact, as I show, his view of 
language allows that language use can itself be an expression of prepredicative 
understanding alone. As opposed to the highly general commitments just mentioned, 
these claims provide a specific focus for assessing the differences between
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Heidegger’s and more mainstream philosophical views of language, which usually 
think of language’s functioning primarily in terms of propositions and (predicative) 
judgement. To facilitate later assessment of these differences, several features of this 
general claim that propositional content is founded in prepredicative factors are 
identified. Thus prepredicative factors are interpreted as being functionally and 
structurally presupposed in propositional content, and as somehow shaping while 
remaining irreducible to inferential properties.
At a more specific level the Heideggerian framework involves a proposal as to 
how the articulatory feats and the function of linguistic signs should be understood. 
This is developed by considering the ambivalent attitude Being and Time takes 
towards routine language use (‘idle talk’) and how this can be accommodated by its 
conception of language. In doing this Heidegger’s earlier view of philosophical 
concepts as ‘formal indications’ is drawn on to shed light on what he sees as the 
proper revelatory function of signs. The ambivalence can then be explained, I argue, 
by the development of this earlier view into a conception of signs as instruments in a 
dual sense. Linguistic signs, on this view, are instruments in both the generic sense of 
being tools for pointing out features of the world in an articulate manner, and in the 
differentiated sense of tools used to perform particular tasks in practice. 
Corresponding to these different modes of instrumentality I propose a distinction 
between presentational sense and pragmatic sense, reflecting two different ways in 
which the use of language is involved in understanding the world. On this 
Heideggerian model the articulatory feats of linguistic signs are to understood in 
terms of these two kinds of sense which they unite.
The following two chapters operate in parallel to develop the views 
adumbrated by the Heideggerian framework at both the general and specific level, 
chapter II focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language around 1950. In 
general terms this treats language as a form of embodied expressive behaviour and 
highlights the need to understand its functioning without appeal to any completely 
constituted and fully determinate pattern of meaning. Although these general 
commitments lead Merleau-Ponty to, as I claim, an exaggerated emphasis on creative 
expression, the idea of ‘indirect’ sense he develops can be used to explicate the idea 
of presentational sense suggested by Heidegger’s conception of linguistic signs. The 
notion of indirect sense is explored by considering both Merleau-Ponty’s integration 
of Saussurean linguistics into his earlier view, and his use of modem painting as a
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model for the expressive function of language. Whereas the former provides a 
detailed picture of the structure presentational sense can be understood to have, the 
latter provides an innovative model for the presentational function of linguistic signs. 
A characteristic feature of Merleau-Ponty’s views, establishing a clear parallel with 
Heidegger’s, is the attempt to understand the functioning of language in terms of 
prepredicative factors underlying conceptual meaning. Part of the task of this chapter 
is therefore to identify the positive aspects, the justification for and the limitations of 
the inchoately rational function Merleau-Ponty sees as characterizing indirect sense. 
The chapter concludes by setting out how the notion of presentational sense, qua 
indirect sense, provides a phenomenologically plausible way both of dealing with 
certain difficulties inherent in Heidegger’s view of language and of understanding 
several kinds of linguistic experience, such as careful or innovative use and the 
relevance of etymology to meaning.
A feature common to both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of 
language is that while both point to the foundational importance of pragmatic use of 
language, neither provides a detailed account of the relationship between human 
practices and linguistic articulation. In chapter III this omission is made good by 
drawing on the late Wittgenstein’s conception of language, the defining feature of 
which is taken to be the emergence of the language-game analogy. At the general 
level Wittgenstein’s -  as I describe it -  ‘praxeological’ conception of language is 
characterized by the intrinsic link between language use and patterns of human 
activity. However, in contrast to Wittgenstein’s earlier model of language as a 
calculus it is also, as I attempt to show, characterized by severed shifts resulting in a 
more relaxed view of language as a rule-governed activity. First, having been 
dissociated from the calculus model’s ideal of full determinacy, the notion of rules is 
reconfigured, acquiring a more empirical feel and being gauged to language-game 
relative standards of determinacy. Second, the scope of rules becomes subject to a 
number of constraints on the language-game analogy, so that linguistic competence 
can be understood more broadly than on a fully rule-governed algorithmic model. By 
understanding these shifts, I argue, the notion of rules implicit in the language-game 
analogy is the key to a phenomenologically appropriate notion of the sense linguistic 
expressions have as means to particular ends in practice, and hence of pragmatic 
sense.
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While it is fairly uncontroversial to think of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty as 
kindred spirits and as phenomenological authors, there are two potential problems in 
assimilating Wittgenstein to my approach here: first, whether Wittgenstein can be 
thought of as a ‘phenomenological’ thinker; second, whether his view can be 
assimilated to the idea of prepredicative sense suggested by the Heideggerian 
framework. In response to the first I outline how, although Wittgenstein cannot be 
accurately described as a phenomenological author, the maturing language-game 
analogy led him to a pattern of commitments and a conception of linguistic processes 
that are readily assimilable to a phenomenological conception of language. In 
response to the second, I argue that parallel commitments in the conditions he applies 
to rule-following and his view of the finite nature of justification allow the 
identification of a minimal sense of linguistic competence that can be considered 
prepredicative in Heidegger’s sense.
By the end of the third chapter it should be clear how Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Wittgenstein’s views can be integrated into a unified phenomenological conception of 
language within the Heideggerian framework identified by the first chapter. This 
unified position can, as hinted above, be seen as providing an answer to the kind of 
questions Taylor identifies by offering both a general picture of linguistic activity, 
and a specific view of the articulatory functions of linguistic signs as instruments 
characterized by presentational and pragmatic sense. However, having endeavoured 
to maintain a grounding in linguistic phenomena, this unified conception also sheds 
light on the catalogue of experiences outlined above by identifying the kind of 
features that can be appealed to both in gauging a speaker’s pragmatic fluency and in 
justifying the expressive or articulative adequacy of choosing particular words.
A phenomenological view of the kind developed here can hardly fail to have 
philosophical implications. Without claiming to exhaust such possibilities, the closing 
chapter IV aims at least to indicate its significance in a broader philosophical and 
discursive context by addressing two issues explicitly. First a contrast is made 
between the phenomenological approach here and what I call the ‘semantics 
approach’, characterized by general -  broadly Fregean -  assumptions about the 
primacy of the propositional and the subpropositional workings of language that are 
more or less standard in contemporary philosophy of language. I then attempt to 
assess the relationship between these two approaches by taking up Heidegger’s idea 
that propositional content is founded in prepredicative factors. Having considered
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how the two approaches differ, and how this foundational claim is to be understood, 
Donald Davidson’s proposal for an empirical theory of interpretation is discussed as 
an example showing how the need for a phenomenological conception of language 
arises within the semantics approach. I then outline how the semantics approach 
might view the phenomenological conception here as a partial theory of the 
background of abilities speakers require to exhibit semantic competence. One 
possibility is then that the phenomenological conception of language can be 
accommodated by the semantics approach in the sense of providing a well-behaved or 
weak foundation. That is, the need for a phenomenological conception of language is 
admitted on the assumption, the condition perhaps, that it simply fills out a picture of 
language’s functioning which is already modelled adequately by formal semantics. 
Against this, I argue that a somewhat stronger foundational claim can be made on 
behalf of the phenomenological conception developed here. By indicating how 
presentational and pragmatic sense resist assimilation to the functional picture 
implicit in the semantics approach, it is claimed that these capture aspects of 
linguistic functioning not adequately captured by the semantics approach and hence 
make a distinct contribution to philosophical understanding of language.
The second issue, concluding the thesis, is whether or not the 
phenomenological conception of language developed here has realist or nonrealist 
implications. This question arises naturally, as the preceding chapters’ emphasis on 
the involvement of presentational and pragmatic sense in constituting both thought 
and characteristically human concerns might seem to imply a form of idealism. At the 
same time, the latter’s intimation of some kind of enclosure within language runs 
counter to my general emphasis on the embeddedness of language as language-in-the- 
world. Given the obvious parallel with Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, this 
issue is considered in the light of the approach to realism and idealism found in Being 
and Time. Against this background I attempt to show how the constitutive and 
mediative roles of language can be understood as not introducing a potentially 
refractive or distortive breach in our contact with the world. Finally it is argued, in 
Heideggerian spirit, that by rejecting an inside-outside opposition, perhaps the most 
significant implication of a phenomenological conception of language is to enable a 
position beyond the traditional alternatives of realism and idealism.
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C h a p t e r  I
A  H e id e g g e r ia n  
F r a m e w o r k
The aim of this chapter is to extract the framework for a phenomenological 
conception of language from the analytic of Dasein in Being and Time (SZ). Broadly 
speaking, this Heideggerian framework will comprise two levels: one general, one 
specific. At the general level the aim will be to build up a clear and tenable overall 
picture of the role Heidegger sees language having in the broader phenomenon of 
disclosure, before considering what characterizes it as a phenomenological 
conception of language. The more specific level will focus on the function Heidegger
sees linguistic signs having in the phenomenon of disclosure, so to speak, on the way
1 ^linguistic signs work.
Before going any further, however, I want to make several comments about 
the approach to be taken here. To begin with, although Heidegger’s interest in 
language is subordinate to his overall project (the question of being), the following 
exegesis assumes that his conception of language can be understood and assessed 
independently of this project. My talk of a ‘Heideggerian framework’ is then intended 
to signal both a broadly affirmative approach to Heidegger’s views and that these are 
in need of some filling out. An important reason for the latter is that SZ deals with 
language only in a dispersed and fragmentary manner. Indeed Heidegger there 
concedes that language’s mode of being has been left largely open, claiming only to 
identify its ‘ontological “place”’, and himself later hinted that •S'Z’s treatment of 
language comprises its ‘basic deficiency’ (SZ 166; US 93). This prompts the question: 
why look to SZ at all, rather than to later writings in which Heidegger’s interest in 
language was more conspicuous? The principal reason for this is SZ*s emphasis on 
the foundational role of purposive understanding, and so implicitly the pragmatic 
dimension of language, which must be central to understanding the relation between 
language and lived human experience. Since this disappears completely from view in
13 Although here revised and extended, this chapter develops material originally included in my 
previously submitted MPhil thesis ‘The Conception and Role o f Language in Being and Time'. In 
particular sections 1 .(i), 3 and 4 below partially reproduce text used in the earlier thesis.
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Heidegger’s later writings, it seems to me that, schematic as it may be, SZ furnishes a 
far better point of departure for a phenomenologically accurate conception of 
language. However, because SZ’s treatment of it is peripheral and somewhat 
schematic, the exegetic task cannot be simply to reproduce a conception of language 
that Heidegger in fact, or need have, expounded in precisely this form. Rather there is 
inevitably a need to fill in some gaps and for some interpretation, for which reason 
the framework that emerges might strictly speaking be viewed as Heideggerian rather 
than Heidegger’s. While exegetic fidelity is certainly an aim, this qualification is a 
convenient reminder that my approach is intended to be primarily accountable to 
neither the aims nor letter of Heidegger’s texts, but to their value for a 
phenomenological conception of language.
Finally, Heidegger’s crafted and idiosyncratic use of language gives rise to 
another question of fidelity, and to two equally unsatisfactory tendencies in the 
literature. On the one hand, rightly discerning that his terminology is often highly 
deliberate and attuned to his views, many of Heidegger’s more sympathetic readers 
adhere to or mimic his terminology as closely as possible. This tendency is 
particularly problematic when writing about Heidegger in languages other than 
German, and often yields cumbersome, artificial and nonidiomatic -  if not simply 
unintelligible -  rendition of his views.14 On the other hand, rightly interested in the 
philosophical value of his position, many writers -  especially those in the so-called 
‘analytic’ tradition -  immediately paraphrase Heidegger’s views using ‘standard’ 
vocabularies from contemporary philosophy of mind or language, and so risk effacing 
their distinctive physiognomy.15 Without denying the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of these tendencies, my aim here will be to strike a balance by 
preserving the contours of Heidegger’s analyses without excessive reliance on 
hermetic jargon and bringing out their broader philosophical significance. A potential 
difficulty in doing this is that some of Heidegger’s terminology naturally invites 
confusion with less technical, less specific concepts. Where the risk of such confusion
14 In translating Heidegger there is an acute tension between -  in Ashton’s (1971, 22) apt 
characterization -  two forms o f literalism, the first a standard ‘word-for-word’ approach, the second a 
‘radical one o f  digging up the roots o f words, no matter what their dictionary sense and current usage’. 
Sympathetic readers o f  Heidegger are often drawn to the latter.
To provide just one example, Heidegger’s analysis o f Dasein deploys a number o f  terms (e.g. 
Erschlossenheit, Sinn, Bedeutung, Bedeutsamkeit) that might lay some claim to be translated as 
‘meaning’. However, as each is intended to have a specific role in Heidegger’s analysis, to equate any 
o f them with meaning -  quite apart from that term’s potential ambiguity -  would be precipitous and 
potentially misleading.
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seems significant, I will resort to capitalizing certain terms (e.g. Understanding, 
Affectedness, Articulacy) so as to identify reference to Heidegger’s specific use of 
them. This apparently clumsy measure has the advantage that non-capitalized use of 
such terms can be assumed not to allude to specifically Heideggerian nuances and so 
deployed in interpretative paraphrase.
The following chapter comprises five sections, of which the first two are 
concerned with the general level of the Heideggerian framework’s overall picture of 
language. The first section sets out in general terms how the phenomenon of language 
is dealt with in SZ's analysis of how human understanding of the world takes on 
determinate form, suggesting how apparent tensions can be reconciled to yield a 
coherent general picture. The second considers what distinguishes this as a 
phenomenological conception of language and offers a preliminary clarification of its 
broader philosophical relevance, focusing in particular on the foundation role claimed 
for ‘prepredicative’ factors. Starting -  in the third section -  with SZ*s ambivalent 
view of the role of language in everyday understanding, the subsequent three sections 
aim to bring out the disparate factors involved in Heidegger’s view of the functioning 
of linguistic signs, and so to develop the Heideggerian framework at a more specific 
level. To understand the basis of this ambivalence the fourth section reviews 
Heidegger’s earlier notion of ‘formal indications’ as a paradigm of the function 
Heidegger saw signs having in phenomenological enquiry. The final section shows 
how this, together with the foundational function of purposive understanding 
discussed in the first section, can account for S'Z’s ambivalence about language, 
before bringing out how the apparently conflicting requirements underlying this 
ambivalence are combined in SZ’s conception of signs.
1. The context of language
The context within which SZ locates language is set out in its ‘preparatory’ analytic 
of Dasein. The term ‘Dasein’ is central to Heidegger’s thinking and its precise 
interpretation is a potentially delicate matter, but for the present purposes it can be 
taken simply to refer to humans as bearers of understanding of the world. The 
proximal aim of the ‘preparatory’ analysis is to set out in general terms the structure 
of the understanding that Dasein embodies. The topic of language makes a fairly late 
entry into Heidegger’s discussion, featuring as the terminus ad quem of the processes 
in which what he calls ‘Significance’ takes on articulate form. Considering briefly
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how the latter is characterized is therefore the natural place to start in properly 
appreciating S T s conception of language.
(i) The articulation o f Significance: The concept o f ‘Significance’ (Bedeutsamkeit) is 
introduced in Heidegger’s description of the ‘worldliness of the world’ (SZ 63), 
which centres on a contrast between ‘Things’ and ‘Equipment’ and aims to show that 
the being of Equipment is somehow prior to that of Things. Heidegger understands a 
‘Thing’ (Ding, res) to be an entity individuated in terms of (determinate) properties; 
he terms the being, or mode of existence, of Things ‘Vorhandenheit’, which I shall 
render as ‘Thingness’ (often ‘presentness-at-hand’ or ‘occurentness’).16 The paradigm 
for entities appropriately characterized in these terms are inanimate natural objects: to 
be, as a natural Thing, is just to be present in the world with certain properties. 
Conversely, on Heidegger’s distinction, ‘Equipment’ (Zeug, 7tpdypaxa) refers to 
entities as encountered in (practically) dealing with one’s environment and as
• •  17individuated with regard to ‘what they are for’, i.e. their purpose. Heidegger labels 
the equipmental way of being ‘Zuhandenheit’, which I shall render as ‘Handiness’ 
(often ‘readiness-to-hand’ or ‘availability’), and treats the hammer as paradigmatic of 
this way of being.
Employing the Equipment/Things distinction, Heidegger somewhat 
polemically rejects the idea that the ‘worldliness of the world’ is to be understood as 
the totality of Things, hence as a naturalistic (physicalistic) whole, and instead urges 
that the primary being of entities -  their ‘Ansichsein’ or ‘in itselfness’ (SZ 71, 75, 87) 
-  lies in their equipmental being, or Handiness. This issues in the claim that ‘the 
world’ is an instrumental nexus, not the sum total of Things, but a whole of
16 SZ  42 and passim. Thingness, or ‘reality’ (Realitat, ‘res-ality’; cf. SZ 67 f.) is an important technical 
term for Heidegger referring to entities the being o f which can be characterized in terms o f  essence and 
existence: essence is a properties-based determination o f what the entity is (its ‘whatness’), existence 
denotes its presence or absence in the actual world. According to Heidegger, this way o f  conceiving 
entities is a traditional legacy o f ancient ontology informed by the idea o f (artisinal) production, since 
such production is guided by an antecedent notion (the ‘essence’) o f  what is to be made (cf. GP  1 OS- 
172). Heidegger believes that this essentia-existentia model cannot be intelligibly applied to all kinds 
o f  entity, most notably to humans (SZ 42, 151), so that a broader palette o f ontological categories is 
needed to characterize adequately other ways o f being.
17 SZ 68. As Heidegger puts it, ‘Zeug ist wesenhaft “etwas, um zu . . . ’” I am rendering this ‘um zu’, as 
well as Heidegger’s talk o f an entity’s ‘Wozu’ (e.g. SZ 78), as what an entity, as Equipment, is ‘for’. 
These terms are often rendered as the ‘the in order to’, the ‘to which’, or the ‘towards which’. 
However, what an entity ‘is for’ idiomatically renders Heidegger’s equally idiomatic talk o f its ‘um zu 
. . . ’ or ‘Wozu’.
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1 8instrumental relations (Verweisungen ) between entities. It is this ‘structure of the 
world’, as the purposive or instrumental whole in terms of which humans make sense 
of their environment and themselves, that Heidegger calls ‘Significance’ (SZ 86 f.).
This notion of the world -  as an instrumental rather than a naturally causal 
nexus -  is perhaps a somewhat unusual one, according to which ‘worldliness’, as 
Heidegger puts it, ‘is [...] itself an existentiale’, i.e. a structural feature of Dasein, of 
humans as understanding beings. So in the following explanation that ‘world’ 
principally refers to ‘that “within which” a factical Dasein [...] “lives’” both 
ambiguity and considerable suggestiveness are at work (SZ 64 f.). For while hinting at 
engagement with the traditional external world problem -  which he indeed intends to 
solve in passing -  what Heidegger actually means in talking of the ‘world’ and its 
‘worldliness’ is the lived world, the ‘world of our involvements’ (Taylor 1995, 107), 
and the fabric of this world as experienced}9 This appears to suggest that the 
distinction between Thingness and Handiness reflects a straightforward 
phenomenological claim about the way entities are first encountered in lived 
experience of the world, viz. that purposive understanding precedes objective 
understanding of entities. But Heidegger sees the distinction as ontological, between 
two ways of being, rather than as a merely phenomenological difference. He states 
explicitly that Handiness ‘may not [...] be understood as a mere character of grasping 
[als blofier AuffassungscharakterY and that claims to ontological priority are bound 
to respect the ‘ontological sense of knowing’, and hence the ‘sequence of discovering 
and appropriating dealings with the “world”’ (SZ 71). In other words, Heidegger 
claims that ontological priorities cannot neglect epistemological priorities, that the 
order of being is bound by the experiential order of awareness of being.
An obvious question is how natural entities fit into this picture: How do such 
entities -  supposed to be as they are ‘in themselves’, independently of and prior to 
human understanding -  depend on Handiness? To be sure, Heidegger tries to 
accommodate this concern by distinguishing Seiendes from Sein, the ontic from the
18 This term is usually translated as ‘references’. I prefer ‘instrumental relations’ here to avoid 
confusion with the more common semantic notion o f reference.
19 Cf. Kant’s definition o f  the world as the ‘sum total o f all appearances’ (Kant 1983a 336, 408 [B 391, 
4461). Due to his rejection o f basic subject-object opposition, Heidegger would deny that determining 
the world as experience entails the possibility o f external world scepticism (cf. IV.4 below).
20 Heidegger’s frequent talk o f how things appear to us ‘zumeist und zunSchst’ might appear to support 
this idea. But note that this locution usually indicates how things strike us, inadequately, as inauthentic 
Dasein.
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ontological: ‘That which is [Seiendes] is independently of experience, knowledge and 
grasping through which it is disclosed, discovered and determined. Being [Sein], 
however, “is” only in [Dasein’s] understanding’ (SZ 183; cf. 212, 230). What this 
means, I suggest, is that although what is natural does not depend causally (ontically) 
on understanding, to talk of what is natural determinately, e.g. as natural entities, 
depends (ontologically) on a perspective of individuation and hence on 
understanding. This would explain Heidegger’s objection to the intelligibility of 
Things being ‘in themselves’ (SZ 75 f.) and his suggestion that what it is to be an 
entity with properties requires an account of how they are (initially) encountered. Yet 
there is also a quite subtle sense in which the distinction between Thingness and 
Handiness can be upheld ontologically. For Heidegger plausibly claims that any 
awareness of the properties of Things (including natural entities) results from their 
being somehow involved in human practices, and that this involvement constitutes an 
addition to or modification of their way of being, such that (in Heidegger’s terms) 
Things of which we are aware will always have an Equipmental aspect to their being 
(SZ 70). In other words, ‘nature’ can be known only through human practices, which 
themselves modify its mode of being to that of Handiness. Nevertheless, whether or 
not Heidegger can satisfactorily deal with natural entities is not of immediate 
importance to his conception of language.21 For linguistic entities (e.g. words, 
sentences) are clearly materially present entities which (nevertheless) have an 
irreducible ontological dependence on the way they are experienced as being. This 
fact, without yet implying anything about the extent to or the way in which the 
Thingness/Handiness distinction might apply to language, renders problems specific 
to natural entities irrelevant.
It might also be wondered whether Equipment and Things really comprise 
distinct modes of individuation: Isn’t what an entity ‘is for’ a determinate property, so 
that to grasp it as Equipment is already to grasp it as a Thing? It will be most 
convenient to consider this difficulty, the basis of the distinction between Thingness 
and Handiness, later in discussing Heidegger’s view of predicative Statements. But it 
is worth noting both its motivation and what is at stake. Heidegger is resisting an 
overtheoreticization of basic human experience according to which explicit awareness
21 I think Carman (2003, 155-203) is generally right to emphasize what he calls Heidegger’s ‘ontic 
realism’ about natural entities. Nonetheless, in the final chapter I argue that Heidegger’s principal aim 
was to eliminate the polar opposition between realism and idealism by criticizing their shared subject- 
object opposition.
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of the properties of environing entities is required to use them practically. And his 
distinction is surely based on a genuine phenomenological feature. After all, one can 
hammer in nails without knowing how much the hammer weighs or what it is made 
of; bum wood without a degree in organic chemistry; build stone huts without 
geological expertise etc. The question is whether such differences can be accounted 
for simply by saying that practice ordinarily requires less knowledge than 
corresponding theory or expertise, but knowledge of the same kind, or whether a 
different and distinct kind of knowing -  something akin to Ryle’s ‘knowing how’ -  is 
involved.22
Heidegger’s discussions of language are embedded in the stratified account of the 
development of Significance into articulate forms of expression which he offers as an 
analysis of the ‘existential constitution of “the there’” in SZ §§28-34. Since Dasein is 
its respective ‘there’ (list selbst je sein “Da”’) and ‘Dasein is its disclosedness’ {SZ 
132 f.), these sections amount to an analysis of disclosure -  where ‘disclosure’ is the 
term Heidegger generally uses in talking about the apprehension of the world. Being 
‘disclosed’ encompasses two principal aspects -  being taken to matter, 
paradigmatically to humans, and being in some way comprehended -  reflected in 
Heidegger’s identification of ‘Affectedness’ and ‘Understanding’ as general 
ontological features of human being (which he calls ‘existentiales’). Heidegger’s talk 
of ‘Affectedness’ (.Befindlichkeit) is supposed to convey the first aspect: i.e. that 
Dasein finds itself in the world and that it constitutively, and pre-reflectively, feels or 
‘finds itself somehow P  Correspondingly, Heidegger suggests that this feature of 
disclosure has a specific function in that various modes of Affectedness -  especially 
‘anxiety’ -  reveal Dasein to itself, as mattering to itself, by presenting it as the ‘entity
22 Cf. Ryle’s (1949, 25 ff.) distinction between dispositional ‘knowing how’ and propositional 
‘knowing that’. Incidentally, given Ryle’s early awareness and eventual adoption o f  many o f  
Heidegger’s views (cf. Murray 1973), it is plausible that Ryle’s distinction was influenced by 
Heidegger’s view o f purposive and predicative awareness (see also III.4.(ii) below).
23 Cf. PGZ  352. In German, Befindlichkeit is to capture ‘daB es sich [...] in seiner Geworfenheit 
befindet’ ( ‘that it finds itself in its thrownness’; SZ 135) and ‘wie es sich (dabei) befindet’ (roughly: 
how Dasein finds it to be the way it is). There is no satisfactory translation o f this term, rendered 
variously as ‘state o f  mind’, ‘moodness’, ‘situatedness’, or ‘attunement’ etc. ‘Affectedness’ highlights 
the second sense o f Dasein’s mattering to itself (cf. SZ 12), but has the disadvantage o f not 
simultaneously suggesting Dasein’s factical thrownness in the way the German term does.
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which is answerable to its being’.24 Heidegger’s use of the familiar term 
‘understanding’ (Verstehen) is somewhat idiosyncratic, distinguished by three features 
from both the (Kantian) discursive ‘faculty of concepts’ and Heidegger’s 
contemporaries’ debates about the distinction between understanding and explanation, 
supposedly reflecting the respective methodologies of the humanities and sciences 25 
First, for Heidegger, Understanding is concerned with that ‘for the sake of which’ 
Dasein exists (its Worumwillen; SZ 143). By this he means that Understanding 
pertains not to entities as such, but to the ‘projected possibility’ or ‘project’ as which 
Dasein lives (SZ 144, 145). Thus Understanding is purposive with regard to human 
aims, rather than to cosmic teleological constants, and it is in relation to such aims 
that entities encountered in the environment are potentially useful or expedient. In 
Heidegger’s words, the ‘primary “for what” is a for-the-sake-of-which. [...], the “sake 
for which” always concerns the being of Dasein’ (SZ 84). Second, Understanding is 
holistic, encompassing the ‘entire basic constitution of being-in-the-world’ (SZ 144; 
cf. 152). Third, unlike a ‘plan’, Heidegger tells us, Understanding entails no ‘thematic’ 
grasp of the possibilities it addresses (SZ 145). By ‘thematization’ he means an 
‘articulation of the understanding of being’, a ‘delimitation of the area of subject matter’ 
that prefigures the concepts appropriate to the relevant entities and befits this subject 
matter to ‘objectivizing’ scientific enquiry (SZ 363). Thus, on Heidegger’s view, 
‘Understanding’ refers to a purposive, holistic and inarticulate (hence pre-objective) 
grasp of the world, with disclosure combining this overall sense of purpose 
(Understanding) with a general sense of mattering (Affectedness).
Heidegger contrasts this overall sense of purpose, the ‘pre-structure of 
Understanding’, with ‘the development of Understanding’, as a level or stage within 
disclosure at which ‘the structure of something as something’ arises. Heidegger calls
24 SZ 134. This is put more forcefully in the earlier draft o f SZ: ‘Affectedness is the genuine way o f  
being Dasein, o f  possessing oneself as discovered, the manner in which Dasein is itself its there’ (PGZ  
354).
25 Cf. Kant 1983a, 202 [B 199]. -  Heidegger distances himself explicitly from the debate over the 
distinction o f  understanding and explanation at SZ 143. For a survey o f this debate cf. Schnadelbach 
1983, 138-171.
26 SZ 151, 148, 149. -  ‘Something as something’ is the only idiomatic rendering o f ‘Etwas als Etwas’ in 
English, which is slightly unfortunate given Heidegger’s emphatic distinction between Equipment and 
Things. The general point he is making concerns the individuation o f what is understood (whether as 
Equipment or Things).
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97this level or stage of disclosure ‘Auslegung’, the ‘setting out’, of what is understood. 
Such Setting-out is the process in which features within Understanding become 
individuated ‘as’ a such-and-such, and it is with this move that differences between
98entities are to become expressly or ‘explicitly understood’. Two points are worth 
noting about the relationship between Understanding and Setting-out. First, there is an 
important difference in that whereas Understanding pertains to, is of, projected 
possibilities or aims, Setting-out concerns the entities addressed. Thus Heidegger is 
claiming that entities are only individuated (in disclosure) in relation to a presupposed 
horizon of purpose, no matter how vague the latter may initially be. A corollary of this, 
second, is that the way entities are picked out in Setting-out and the concepts thus 
developed are constrained by the purposive projection of Understanding (SZ 150). 
Nonetheless, while always ‘grounded in Understanding’ (SZ 148), it is important that 
Setting-out is to occur in different modes, distinguished by what they respectively take 
entities to be, as being, i.e. in their sense of ‘as-ness’. In particular, Heidegger 
distinguishes two modes of Setting-out, corresponding to the difference between 
Equipment and Things. To begin with he foregrounds ‘circumspective’ Setting-out, 
which individuates entities as Equipment -  i.e. purposively, according to what they are 
for.29 But §33 further identifies predicative statements as a ‘derivative’ mode of Setting- 
out: it is in ‘predicating articulation’ that entities are individuated as Things, in terms of 
determinate properties (SZ 155, 158).
This analysis is given a further, and potentially problematic, twist by the claim 
that Affectedness and Understanding are ‘equiprimordially determined’ by a further 
ontological structure that forms the ‘existential-ontological foundation of language’ 
(SZ 133, 160). Heidegger calls this Rede, defining it as ‘the articulation of 
intelligibility’ (SZ 161). For reasons that will emerge in the sequel, I want to avoid the 
common translations of the term ‘Rede’ as ‘Discourse’ or ‘Talk’ and will instead,
27 This is usually rendered as ‘intepretation’. However, ‘setting out’ gets closer to the literal sense of 
‘laying out’ in ‘Auslegung’ and avoids potential confusion with Heidegger’s own term ‘Interpretation’ 
which he applies only to reflective theoretical activity (e.g. SZ 130, 357).
28 SZ 149. It is no coincidence that the term usually rendered as ‘explicit’ (ausdriicklich) also suggests the
use o f an expression (Ausdruck). The usual rendition, which is constrained by the use o f ‘expression’ 
to render (sich) aussprechen/(Hinans)gesprochenheit (e.g. SZ  28; 161, 220), somewhat obscures 
Heidegger’s distinction between being ‘spoken out’ or verbally performed and explicitness or having 
an expression for (cf. on this Macquarrie/Robinson 1962, 190n).
29 Their iUm-zu' or ‘Wozu’. As Heidegger puts it, to the question o f what a certain entity is, 
circumspective setting out responds ‘it is to . . . ’ (SZ 149). -  ‘Circumspection’, ‘Umsicht’, is Heidegger’s 
term for the kind o f understanding that guides practical action (cf. SZ 69). This presumably alludes to 
the Aristotelian practical reason, or (ppoovrjaiq, which he also translates as ‘Umsicht’ (Dilthey 255; 
SophlX).
28
following Heidegger’s definition, use the term ‘Articulacy’.30 The reference to 
‘intelligibility’, glossed as the ‘significant whole’ (Bedeutungsganze), establishes the 
link with the notion of ‘Significance’ discussed above. Heidegger characterizes 
Articulacy in terms of four ‘constitutive elements’ : (a) that which is being talked about 
or referred to (Woruber)\ (b) what is said, the words uttered or written (Geredetes); 
(c) communication (.Mitteilung), by which Heidegger means the sharing of disclosure,
i.e. of Affectedness and Understanding, in the public space; (d) intimation 
(Bekundung), that which Dasein reveals of itself in performing linguistic acts (SZ 
161-2). Against this background Heidegger presents language (Sprache) merely as the 
performance, outward manifestation, or ‘spokenness of Articulacy’. Thus presented, 
the public use of signs might seem little more than an accidental accretion to the 
ontological structure of Articulacy which is to articulate the meanings or ‘significations’ 
(Bedeutungeri) of words: ‘divided up in Articulating articulation [redenden 
Artikulation]\ ‘[intelligibility’s whole of signification advenes to the word [kommt 
zu Wort]. Words accrue to the significations’ (SZ 161).
The result is a puzzle as to where language fits into Heidegger’s overall 
picture. Story A, so to speak, is an apparently straightforward account of the 
articulation of disclosure through different levels of ‘originality’, from inarticulate 
Understanding, through Setting-out as Equipment, and finally to Setting-out as Things 
(§§28-33). Yet there is also Story B: for in claiming that Articulacy is ‘equiprimordial’ 
with Affectedness and Understanding Heidegger seems also to suggest that linguistic 
meanings are articulated independently of, and indeed prior to, any form of Setting-out. 
Thus ‘intelligibility’, he now assures us, is ‘already divided-up [gegliedert] prior to 
appropriating Setting-out’, such that Articulacy ‘already underlies Setting-out and [the 
predicative] Statement’ (SZ 161). The puzzle therefore results from what appears to be a 
basic tension between these two stories: viz. whereas Story A apparently assimilates 
language to a nonlinguistic account of meaning, Story B seems to imply that all 
articulate understanding is linguistically structured.
30 Briefly: Historically ‘Discourse’ tends to suggest a link with predicative awareness. According to Kant 
(1983b, 205), for example, ‘the specific nature o f our understanding consists in thinking o f everything 
discursively, i.e. through concepts, consequently also through nothing but predicates’.
31 The link with Understanding ( Verstehen) is also reflected in Heidegger’s talk o f Verstandlichkeit 
( ‘intelligibility’) as what is ‘articulated in Understanding disclosing’ (SZ 151, cf. 161).
32 Literally the ‘spoken-out-ness’ ([Hin]Ausgesprochenheit), the state o f  having been pronounced (SZ 
161, 167), though the comments o f SZ 168 f. imply that this is to encompass written, as well as oral use 
o f signs.
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The tension between these two stories relate generates two significant difficulties 
in understanding the role Heidegger supposes language to have in disclosure. First, his 
conception of language might seem undecided as to whether language plays a 
constitutive role in disclosure. For according to Story A Understanding and Setting-out 
(and perhaps Articulacy) look like nonlinguistic feats, such that language has only a 
peripheral role. Hence, in Guignon’s (1983, 118) view, there is ‘clearly the intimation 
that there could be a fully articulated sense of the world [...] prior to or independent 
of the mastery of language’. Yet, quite apart from the intrinsic difficulties of such a 
view, this seems to be inconsistent with the role Heidegger attributes to language in 
setting up the everyday (‘inauthentic’) understanding of historically situated Dasein. 
However, second, if language is conceded to have a constitutive role in everyday 
disclosure, Story A’s foundational hierarchy appears to collapse. For Heidegger’s 
identification of language (as Gerede, ‘idle talk’; SZ 167) with Articulacy’s ‘everyday 
way of being’, together with his claim that Articulacy is ‘equiprimordial’ with 
Understanding and Affectedness, seems to imply that language already pervades 
Understanding and so underlies all Setting-out. Yet if, as one would suppose, the use of 
language entails both identifying entities as such-and-such and saying things about 
them, its correlate Articulacy (cf. (a) and (b) above) would implant these capacities at 
the most basic level of the analysis, thus rendering obscure both Heidegger’s general 
claims about Setting-out and his view that purposive or equipmental Setting-out is basic.
Contributing to all these difficulties is obscurity as to what exactly Articulacy is 
supposed to be and in what sense it is the ‘existential-ontological foundation of 
language’. Part of the answer is that Heidegger uses the word ‘Articulacy’ (Rede) to 
translate the Greek Afryoq.34 The ambiguity of the latter between language and reason 
would facilitate the claim that a discursive capacity or abilities (reason) is a necessary 
condition for linguistic phenomena and that language, as the public use of signs, is 
but an accidental manifestation of this faculty. But this cannot suffice. For since 
Heidegger already defines Articulacy as public (cf. (c) above) it is not clear that this
33 SZ  §35; see section 3 below. Hence Guignon’s (1983, 117 f.) suggestion that SZ  remains ‘tom between 
two incompatible views o f the nature o f language’ which he terms the ‘instrumentalist’ and 
‘constitutive’ views. Lafont interprets SZ similarly as exhibiting an inchoate recognition o f the 
constitutive function o f language that was to mature and to overcome the instrumental view fully only in 
Heidegger’s later writings (cf. Lafont 2001, 11).
34 Cf. e.g. SZ  32; Logik, 2, 3, 6, 7; PGZ  364.
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captures anything sufficiently distinct from language to function as its ‘foundation’.35 
Moreover, obscurity in the notion of Articulacy surely reflects a tension between two 
desiderata Heidegger is trying to respect. As previously observed, Story A suggests 
thinking of language as acquiring significance in the same way as other entities (such as 
hammers) might, i.e. as continuous with other meaningful phenomena. Conversely, 
Story B suggests that linguistic articulation has a specific form -  being about something, 
and saying something of it (cf. (a) and (b) above) -  that underlies all explicit 
understanding. In attempting to disambiguate the notion of Articulacy a key question is 
therefore whether these two desiderata, the continuity and specificity of language, can be 
reconciled within Heidegger’s picture.
I think it is fair to claim that Heidegger exhibits no awareness of the difficulties 
just outlined. Perhaps because they do not arise when his view is properly construed, 
perhaps because they did not occur to him. Be this as it may, in the following I want to 
argue that these three difficulties can be resolved and both desiderata respected within 
Heidegger’s conception. To do this, it is necessary first to consider Heidegger’s analysis 
o f ‘Statements’ as a derivative mode of Setting-out.
(ii) The heterogeneity o f sentences: Heidegger defines Statements (Aussagen) in terms 
of three features (SZ 154 f.): Statements point out (aufzeigeri) features of the world, 
allowing entities to be grasped as they in themselves are; their ‘mode of pointing out’, 
as predication, makes what is (already) manifest ‘explicitly manifest in its 
determination’; finally, Statements are communicative acts of ‘allowing to be seen’
^*7(Mitsehenlassen), i.e. they consist in the public use of language. As the title of §33 
indicates, Heidegger considers Statements to be a ‘derivative’ form of Setting-out, 
involving a change in what he calls the ‘as-structure’ -  i.e. in the way we are 
expressly or explicitly aware of what is understood -  from the ‘hermeneutic as’ to the 
‘apophantic as’. This is to consist of a transition from Handiness to Thingness that 
‘first opens access to something like properties’, to ‘the what’ or ‘predicating
35 With some justice Lafont (2001, 67; cf. 67-73) discerns a ‘doomed effort to conceive the phenomenon 
of “articulation” as categorially distinct from language as a system o f signs’ in order to treat Dasein as a 
transcendental medium.
36 After all, as Heidegger coyly concedes in US (93), ‘Maybe it is the basic deficiency o f  the book 
Being and Time that I ventured too far too early’.
37 As Heidegger puts it, ‘spoken-out-ness’ (Ausgesprochenheit) belongs to the Statement -  this being 
the same locution as he uses in defining language (SZ 161).
38 SZ 158. Cf. 149, where as-structure is characterized as the expressness or explicitness o f  what is 
understood ( ‘Ausdriicklichkeit des Verstandenen’).
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articulation’ of the entity concerned, a transition in which the entity is ‘cut off from 
the ‘instrumental relations [ Verweisungsbeziige] of Significance’ {SZ 158, 155, 158). 
So in Heidegger’s terms, the use of Statements embodies a transition from 
circumspective to predicative Setting-out, from awareness of entities as Equipment to 
awareness of entities as Things, from individuation in terms of purpose to 
individuation in terms of properties.
It is important to be clear as to what this transition is to involve. The crux of 
Heidegger’s view is effectively that purposive awareness of entities is basic in the 
process of Setting-out. So the central thought is not only that purposive awareness of 
Equipment is importantly different from properties-based awareness of Things, but 
that the latter presupposes the former (and not vice versa). The transition from the 
hermeneutic-as to the apophantic-as thus corresponds to a change in the basis of 
individuation of entities from purposive expediency to their properties. In an 
important sense it is also a move towards objective knowledge: For although 
Heidegger would insist that Equipmental awareness is direct awareness of entities, 
such awareness -  of what they are for (cf. SZ 149) -  is clearly relative to particular 
ends. Conversely, the point of emphasizing that instrumental relations are ‘cut off is 
that predicative awareness entails liberation from such relativeness to particular ends. 
This provides a minimal sense to Heidegger’s distinction between properties and 
expediency (.Dienlichkeit; SZ 83), and makes clear why this distinction is not 
collapsed by the objection, mentioned above, that ‘being for . . . ’ is a property. For 
whereas the expediency of entities (as Equipment) is purpose-relative, the properties 
of entities (as Things) are purpose-independent. Incidentally, it is important here, as 
elsewhere, not to be taken in by the rhetorical colouring in Heidegger’s talk of 
‘derivativeness’, ‘levelling o ff, ‘suppression’ etc. {SZ 158). For predicative
v
awareness is clearly an extension of purposive awareness, gained by tracking the 
(objective) properties of entities over variations in the perspective of interests in 
which they are understood.39 At the same time, this should not be taken to imply that 
purposive awareness can simply be disregarded as philosophically irrelevant. As 
Heidegger is emphasizing, to the extent that predicative awareness is based on
39 In this respect Heidegger’s view parallels Dewey’s pragmatist and relational conception o f objective 
knowledge for which ‘ The object is an abstraction’ that ‘designates selected relations o f things which 
[...]  are constant within the limits practically important’ (Dewey 1988, 190, cf. also 175 f.).
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generalizations over varying contexts of use, it necessarily presupposes, i.e. is 
founded in, purposive understanding.
The fact that he both explicitly discusses them and identifies them as linguistic 
communication might give the impression that Heidegger thinks of predicative 
statements as paradigmatic of linguistic phenomena. In fact, as hinted by the label 
‘derivative’, nothing could be further from the case, and Heidegger opposes the idea 
that theoretical predicative statements are a model for understanding the functioning 
of language. This can be seen in the following passage -  one of cardinal importance 
to understanding Heidegger’s conception of language in SZ:
Between interpretation still completely enveloped in concemful understanding and the extreme 
countercase o f  a theoretical Statement about some Thing [ Vorhandenes] there is a multitude o f  
intermediate steps: Statements about occurrences in the environment, accounts o f the Handy 
[.Zuhandenes], ‘reports on situations’, recording and registering ‘facts o f the matter’, describing a state 
o f  affairs, recounting what has happened. These ‘sentences’ cannot be reduced to theoretical 
statements without essentially distorting their sense. They, like theoretical statements themselves, have 
their ‘origin’ in circumspective interpretation. (SZ 158; cf. Logik 156n.)
This passage makes clear that Heidegger’s claims about the foundational role of 
purposive (circumspective) awareness includes language. In particular it implies that 
the difference between hermeneutic and apophantic as-ness means that different kinds 
of sentences40 cannot be assimilated to predicative Statements without ‘essentially 
distorting their sense’. Language use, Heidegger is here claiming, can be an 
expression of Equipmental awareness at one extreme, of predicative awareness at the 
other, and of a whole range of intermediate steps.
This has several important implications. First, it means that the distinction 
between the hermeneutic and apophantic is to cut across, rather than coincide with, 
that between the linguistic and nonlinguistic. In other words, rather than paralleling 
the latter distinction, the delimitation between purposive and predicative awareness 
falls within language use. Second it highlights that what Heiddgger calls predicative 
‘Statements’ have a point distinguishing them from other uses of language. To 
borrow Taylor Carman’s (2003, 211) fitting term, their use comprises ‘overtly 
demonstrative practices’: ‘a kind of exhibiting or showing’, the public letting-be-seen 
of determinations, that must be understood as ‘a mode of practical comportment, a 
doing’. Yet at the same time Heidegger here emphasizes that not all language use is
40 Sic.: Heidegger’s use o f scare quotes here ( ‘sentences’) is due to the ambiguity o f the German ‘Satz’ 
between ‘sentence’ and ‘proposition’ qua logical judgement. The point o f the scare quotes is precisely 
to express the claim that sentences o f the kind listed are not (predicative) judgements.
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of this type, that much use of language is not as such an act of exhibiting or showing, 
but is simply immersed or embedded in other actions. And whereas it is true that for 
Heidegger signs serve generally to draw attention to the environing world (cf. SZ 19 
f.), he clearly also distinguishes between ‘overtly demonstrative practices’ and 
practices in which what might be called ‘embedded showing’ occurs. For example, 
while drawing attention to the environing world, car indicators function for 
Heidegger at the level of practical responses and Equipmental understanding. Rather 
than having the point of ‘exhibiting or showing’ in the way ‘Statements’ do, their 
showing is embedded in and subordinate to the ends of other actions.41 This might 
lead one to think of Heidegger’s Statements as a kind of speech act, and that the 
above passage might better have deployed the distinction between the speech act of 
assertion and use of a declarative sentence. However, it would be wrong to think that 
Heidegger’s general point is about the different kinds of act that a sentence can be 
used to perform, i.e. about illocution 42 Rather, the distinction he is making would 
prevail even if all the sentences referred to were both declarative in form and 
assertoric in force, since it concerns the kind of content involved in the use of 
sentences. The claim is not simply (and trivially) that the content of sentences can 
vary, but that the kind of content sentences express is heterogeneous: that language 
use can be linked with purposive awareness, properties-based awareness, or any 
admixture of the two.
It should also be noted that, though they do not coincide, the distinctions 
between the hermeneutic/apophantic and nonlinguistic/linguistic are not orthogonal. 
For Heidegger’s treatment of Statements as both a mode of Setting-out and linguistic 
introduces an asymmetry in that whereas predicative statements are necessarily 
linguistic, language use does not necessarily involve predicative awareness. A 
striking consequence of this asymmetry is Heidegger’s view that even a sentence that 
looks exactly like a predicative statement (‘The hammer is heavy’) can be an
41 SZ  79. -  It seems to me that Carman (2003, 234) conflates this distinction in equating 
‘interpretation’ (Auslegung, Setting-out) with ‘demonstrative practice’, meaning that he cannot 
distinguish activity in which articulate understanding is manifested from activities the point o f which is 
to draw attention to articulate understanding. Linked with this is his thesis that signs are ‘not embedded 
in their equipmental contexts’, that they are hence ‘conspicuous’, so that correct response to a sign 
cannot be to ‘simply absorb it into the purposive structure o f [...]  activity’ (Carman 2003, 234 f.). It 
seems to me that these claims are clearly at odds with SZ 79, in particular the point that practical 
attention is drawn to the environing world without the sign itself being conspicuous (or ‘stared at’ as a 
‘showing Thing’).
42 Though Heidegger does elsewhere make the Aristotelian point that not all sentences concern truth 
(SZ 32; cf. Aristotle 1938, 121 [17a5]).
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‘expression’ of ‘concemful deliberation’ without being a predicative judgement.43 In 
fact, in Heidegger’s view, the use of a sentence that is predicative in form is in itself 
neither necessary nor sufficient for attributing predicative awareness to its speaker. 
Not only, as he puts it, can one not infer the lack of interpretation (Setting-out) from 
the ‘lack of words’; equally ‘circumspectively spoken-out’ interpretation is ‘not 
necessarily a [predicative] Statement in the defined sense’ {SZ 157). Hence the 
possibility -  on which (as will be seen below) Heidegger relies in his conception of 
‘idle talk’ -  that language can be bound up in the constitution of everyday 
understanding without entailing (full) awareness of its predicative import. Put another 
way, Heidegger’s view is that, although perhaps symptomatic, the use of 
predicatively structured language is not criterial for the presence of predicative 
awareness.
(iii) Linguistic and nonlinguistic articulation: To see how this affects interpretation of 
the notion of Articulacy, it is helpful to recall the tension between Story A’s 
apparently nonlinguistic picture and Story B’s intimation that linguistic structure 
pervades all understanding of the world. This tension has given rise to two 
approaches to the notion of Articulacy. The first, the ‘linguistic model’ takes 
Articulacy ‘as something very closely bound up, if not indeed identical, with 
language’; the second, the ‘pragmatic model’ concentrates on Heidegger’s 
characterization of Articulacy as the ‘articulation of intelligibility’, seeing it as 
applying to any differential behaviour and so not essentially linguistic 44 Given this 
alternative, it seems to me that the linguistic model must be preferred, since a specific 
link with language is not only suggested by the introduction of Articulacy as the 
‘existential-ontological foundation of language’ {SZ 160), but clearly signalled by its 
characterization in terms of ‘what is said’ {Geredetes).45 In this light Articulacy 
seems best thought of as a generic characterization of linguistic ability as comprising,
43 ‘kann einer besorgenden Uberlegung Ausdruck geben’ {SZ 360 f., cf. 157).
44 The above distinction is Carman’s (2003, 221, 228; cf. 220-232), identifying Guignon (1983) as a 
representative o f the linguistic model. The pragmatic model is found in Dreyfiis (1991, 215 ff.) and 
Blattner (1999).
45 Seeing the linguistic model as too narrow and -  given the need to distinguish expressive from other 
features o f action -  the pragmatic model as too broad, Carman (2003, 234) interprets Discourse 
(Articulacy) as ‘the normativity specific to interpretation’, whether linguistic or nonlinguistic. 
Whatever the independent virtues o f this approach to expressive phenomena, it is difficult to square 
with Heidegger’s unambiguously linguistic definition. -  Alternatively ‘what is said’ might be taken to 
invoke a notion o f propositional content, but in that case the linguistic-pragmatic distinction seems to 
have no point (see also below page 72).
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according to Heidegger’s four-point definition, the ability of an agent to pick out 
something referred to, to say something of that referent, to say it in the public 
domain, and simultaneously to express itself.46 Indeed it is perhaps strange that the 
pragmatic model should have been proposed. What motivates it is the possibility of 
nonlinguistic behaviour exhibiting an articulate grasp of the world, such as making 
and understanding gestures, but also any number of bodily actions (swimming, 
looking for shelter from the rain, lighting a fire etc.) and goal-directed animal 
behaviour (e.g. hunting, mating rituals, nest building).47 Many such behaviours could 
be plausibly accounted for in a language-independent manner by Heidegger’s Story 
A. However, if this is to be consistent with his claim that Articulacy is equiprimordial 
with Understanding and Affectedness, it would seem that Articulacy cannot be 
essentially linguistic, just as the pragmatic model claims.
The crucial question at this point is: in what way does Story B imply that 
articulate behaviour is ‘linguistically structured’? Or more precisely: which features 
of Articulacy seem to introduce linguistic structure to all Setting-out? Clearly it is the 
first two features -  (a) that something is talked about, and (b) that something is said. 
However, it is important that nothing in Heidegger’s characterization (SZ 161) aligns 
either of these features to either circumspective or predicative Setting-out, or to a 
grasp of entities as Equipment or Things. The reason for this, I propose, is that (a) and 
(b) are intended to apply to both purposive and properties-based understanding. In 
other words, as suggested by the above passage from SZ 158, the notion of Articulacy 
is itself subject to the distinction between Things and Equipment so that it could be 
said to have different ‘modes’ (as SZ 167, 269 suggest). Rather than being bound to a 
univocal notion of content, (a) and (b) should then be taken as common 
characteristics of the different kinds of sense expressed by sentences.48
This proposal is not without difficulties. For example, if does not obviously 
free Story B of the problematic implication that all articulate behaviour is language- 
dependent. Whether or not it does depends on how Heidegger’s claim that Articulacy 
is ‘equiprimordial’ with Affectedness and Understanding is construed. For instance,
46 Put this way, ‘Articulacy’ might seem to involve subjective psychological states o f the kind 
Heidegger intends not to discuss. But the above description is intended (in Wittgensteinian fashion) as 
a characterization o f the public phenomenology o f this ability.
47 For an illuminating discussion o f tigers’ purposive behaviour cf. chapter 5 o f Okrent 1988, 
especially 137, 147, 148.
48 The suggestion is thus that the ‘content’ o f Heidegger’s ‘Rede’ can be nonpredicative, rather than 
bound to the traditional discourse-concepts-predicates triad (cf. footnote 30 and section 2.(ii)).
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whether Articulacy is to be necessarily or contingently involved in nonlinguistic 
articulate actions. Or whether language is supposed to comprise a subset of articulate 
behaviours which, although stratified into purposive and predicative levels of Setting- 
out, is ‘equiprimordially’ characterized by Affectedness, Understanding and 
Articulacy. It seems to me that Heidegger’s position is best read in this latter way. 
Acknowledging the possibility of articulate nonlinguistic behaviours would certainly 
cohere with his claims that purposive articulation is the most basic form of Setting- 
out and that such articulation is possible only for creatures with an overall sense of 
Understanding.49 Yet it would also lead one to expect a distinction at the level of 
Setting-out between Discursive and non-Discursive forms of articulation/expression 
which Heidegger apparently neglects.50 Though such a distinction is perhaps hinted at 
by the organization of §§28-34, particularly its late consideration of Articulacy in 
§34, I will not pursue these claims here, either exegetically or otherwise, since the 
status of nonlinguistic behaviours is peripheral to Heidegger’s conception of language 
Instead I want to argue that this view of Articulacy -  as bearing on a 
(linguistic) subset of articulate behaviour -  is recommended by the way it deals with 
the two difficulties outlined above. Regarding the first of these, the apparent 
peripheralization of language, it is far from clear that Heidegger does in fact intimate 
that there could be a ‘fully articulated sense of the world’ without language use. For 
he thinks that language is already used in Equipmental Setting-out, which in turn is a 
precondition for the predicative Setting-out that presumably belongs to ‘full 
articulation’. Thus even Story A, as I called it, does not commit Heidegger to illicit 
reliance on nonlinguistic structures. Moreover, by treating (predicative) Statements as 
‘communication’ Heidegger implies that predicative judgement depends on language 
use. Indeed, independently of Heidegger’s stated commitments, his view of the 
relationship between Equipment and Thingness seems to require this. For getting 
beyond the immediacy of the expediency of individual entities to particular ends and 
attaining ends-independent predicative generalizations presumably requires symbolic 
representation of entities so as to identify them in a stable way over variation in the
49 On the latter see, for example, Dreyfus’s classic discussion o f the ‘situational character o f  relevance’ 
and the difficulties this poses -  the so-called ‘frame problem’ -  to Artificial Intelligence research 
(Dreyfus 1992 257, cf. 256-282).
0 Indeed, Story-A-appearances to the contrary, it seems to me that strictly speaking Heidegger does 
not give an account o f articulate nonlinguistic behaviours. That is, although Story A provides the 
means for doing so, Story B means that SZ itself concerns only linguistically contoured disclosure.
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functional context.51 It also seems at least plausible to suggest that organizing the 
attribution of properties requires the complex but finite kind of syntactic framework
C 'y
that linguistic representation embodies. It is therefore difficult, even without 
considering the role of Gerede (‘idle talk’), to see Heidegger as denying that language 
has a constitutive role in disclosing the world. Nonetheless, what remains importantly 
correct about this objection it that Heidegger is silent as to how language might do 
constituting work.53
The second difficulty was that Heidegger’s foundational hierarchy appears to 
collapse once language is conceded to have a constitutive role in everyday disclosure. 
For it appeared that Articulacy implants ‘linguistic structure’ at the same level as 
Understanding and Affectedness, implying that these are inherently articulated and 
thus undermining Heidegger’s account of Setting-out. This difficulty can be 
dissipated by putting together three thoughts. First, the recognition that Equipmental 
Setting-out is to be construed not as a level of prelinguistic articulation, but as a basic 
purposive articulation of Understanding potentially linked with linguistic expression. 
Second, since Articulacy is itself subject to the purposive-predicative distinction, i.e. 
is structurally equivocal, there is no implication that, for example, predicative 
structure is projected back into or prior to purposive awareness via the notion of 
Articulacy. Third, Heidegger’s view of the hermeneutic-apophantic transition implies, 
indeed explicitly allows, that the use of linguistic forms indicating predicative 
structure does not entail predicative awareness. Whereas the first thought clarifies that 
Story A does not exclude language, the latter two make clear that the notion of 
Articulacy does not short-circuit the stratified picture of Story A. The result is that the 
two stories A and B can be seen as complementary rather than in conflict -  just as 
Heidegger seems to have supposed.
Nevertheless, assuming the above, what kind of Articulate structure 
(Gliederung; SZ 161) is supposed to inhere in Understanding and Affectedness?
51 As Humboldt (1995, 48 f.) points out, linguistic representation, in his view an exteriorization o f the 
mental, objectifies and enables us to gain reflective distance towards our thoughts.
52 Mark Okrent (1988, 147-149) further proposes a verificationist argument to the effect that without 
the use o f language there would be no evidential basis to distinguish predicative awareness from 
purposive awareness. Although this is in itself plausible and would support the above claims, it seems 
to me rather generous to attribute this argument to Heidegger.
53 While Heidegger’s later thinking might be seen as emphasizing the ‘constitutive’ function o f  
language, it is not clear to me that, for example, his accounts o f poetic experience o f language (US 
157-216) helpfully elucidate -  as opposed to simply encouraging a pious attitude towards -  the 
supposed constitutive function o f language.
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Although at one point mentioning the need to ask about ‘the basic forms’ of an 
‘articulation of what can be understood altogether’, Heidegger does not address this 
question, suggesting only that an answer presupposes his analytic of Dasein (SZ 165 
f.). However, from what has been said here two constraints can be discerned. First, 
given Heidegger’s claims that Articulate structure precedes Setting-out, and that 
Setting-out effects the individuation of entities, Articulate structure should precede 
individuation. Or equivalently, given the structurally equivocal nature of Articulacy, 
its structure should be amenable to different modes of individuation. This suggests 
that the Articulate structure Heidegger invokes should be thought of as differential 
structure, a manifold exhibiting discernible differences without being organized into 
units. Second, given the specific link between Articulacy and language, the structure 
involved should be discemable as linguistic. Although Heidegger does not elucidate 
this link, the Saussurean conception of linguistic structure, to be discussed in the next 
chapter (section 3), can be seen to meet these constraints, and can to this extent be 
considered to play the role of Heidegger’s Articulate structure.
In conclusion two features of the view I am attributing to Heidegger are worth 
highlighting. The first is the foundational function of purposive understanding. This 
idea is central to the hierarchical picture of structures that I have been referring to as 
Story A. The ultimate context for language, on this picture, is a holistic and pragmatic 
notion of the world as experienced, the entire nexus of instrumental relations that 
Heidegger calls ‘Significance’. Our grasp of this Significance reposes in a purposive, 
holistic, inarticulate background awareness (Understanding), which can be developed 
(in Setting-out) into different forms of articulate understanding. For Heidegger, as has 
been seen, the most basic articulations are the product of purposive understanding, 
individuating entities (as Equipment) in relation to specific ends. By contrast 
predicative understanding, which individuates entities (as Things) according to 
purpose-indifferent properties, is ‘derivative’ in presupposing purpose-relative 
Equipmental understanding as a basis of generalization. The second feature to be 
highlighted is that this first feature, the founding of predicative in purposive 
awareness, also applies to language. This is most obviously manifested in 
Heidegger’s treatment of both words and sentences/Statements as Equipment (SZ 
161, 224) and in his polemics against treating language in terms of Things (SZ 161). 
This is significant in identifying SZ 's position as a pragmatist one, according to which
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language is to be understood as instrumental in character. However, I have now 
attempted to show that, apparent tensions notwithstanding, the foundational role of 
the purposive is also more deeply ingrained in Heidegger’s conception of language. 
For allowing that Articulacy is heterogeneous in the sense that it can exhibit different 
modes of Setting-out not only removes the apparently obvious tension between 
stories A and B, but also allows key difficulties to be resolved that would otherwise 
afflict Heidegger’s conception of language. In this way subjecting the notion of 
Articulacy to different modes of Setting-out is the key to a consistent reading of the 
analysis of the disclosure presented in SZ §§28-34.
2. Phenomenological commitments
Before looking more specifically at Heidegger’s conception of the function of 
linguistic signs and linguistic competence, I want briefly to highlight several very 
general features of his view of language that characterize it as a phenomenological 
one. In doing this the point will be both to identify what is distinctive about a 
phenomenological conception of language in general, and to outline the ways in 
which such a position might potentially conflict with or complement other 
philosophical conceptions of language.
(i) Language as language-in-the-world: One such general feature is that on 
Heidegger’s view language cannot be thought of as something with an inside-outside 
topology ‘within which’ intentional relations are contained. In one respect this might 
seem obvious, since Heidegger’s (Story A) account of the structures of disclosure 
made language look like an altogether peripheral aspect of intentionality. However, 
the point applies equally if (as I have suggested) language is constitutively involved 
in Heidegger’s Setting-out, and is better appreciated in the light of his shift away 
from Husserlian phenomenology. A central aspect of this shift, as previously pointed 
out, was Heidegger’s insistence on the need for phenomenological enquiry to 
examine the ontology required for its own realization.54 It was this requirement that 
led him to challenge the intelligibility of postulating transcendental subjectivity as a 
closed (‘immanent’) realm of constitution, to insist on the primacy of lived 
experience, and ultimately to reject basic subject-object dualism in favour of Dasein’s
54 Cf. page 13 above.
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essential ‘being-in-the-world’. Because Dasein is a kind of historically and socially 
situated agency, there is no intimation that all of intentionality is ‘in’, or the correlate 
of, any one such agent. As a result, intentionality is pictured as having a distributed 
topology: rather than being contained ‘within’ some constituting entity, intentional 
relations are spread out over time and between agents. Heidegger’s objections to the 
idea of a constituting medium must, however, be thought of as generic. For any 
objections bearing on the conceivability of transcendental subjectivity as a closed, 
fully present realm of constituted eidetic relations would apply equally to attempts to 
think of language in the same way. The only plausible assumption is therefore that 
rather than substituting language-world dualism for mind-world dualism, as some 
adherents of the linguistic turn appear to do, Heidegger is opposed to any such basic 
dualism.
A second general feature of Heidegger’s approach to language -  one clearly 
motivated by the idea of ‘getting the phenomenology right’ (PA) -  is its 
antireductionism. This is the view that because language is essentially embedded in a 
broader phenomenal context, to understand what or how language is requires 
consideration of the processes and phenomenal relations it is involved in.55 A good 
example of this is the idea of what might be called phenomenal integrity, the idea that 
in describing some phenomenon one must respect its character as a unified whole, 
which Heidegger often relies on in invoking the imagery of ‘unitary’ phenomena 
being ‘shattered’, ‘demolished’ or simply ‘passed over’.56
Antireductionism is a recurrent theme in Heidegger’s conception of language. 
In addition to the claim that analysis in terms of ‘word Things’ ‘shatters’ language, it 
emerges with particular clarity in his rejection of attempts to conceive of language in 
terms of ‘symbolic forms’, ‘categories of meaning’, or the logic of propositions {SZ 
161, 163, 165). Heidegger’s general point is that picking out one of these aspects as 
the ‘essence of language’ cannot yield a philosophically adequate understanding of 
language. The same tendency is at work in what I shall call antiformalism, a feature 
particularly salient in SZ's discussion of signs. Heidegger states that both the 
instrumental relations comprising the world and the relations between different kinds of
55 This parallels Austin’s (1979, 182) ‘linguistic phenomenology’: ‘When we examine what we should 
say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking not merely at words [...]  but 
also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using words to sharpen our perception of, 
though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena.’
56 Cf. e.g. SZ 53, 161, 206, 65. The aspects o f unity and completeness are combined in Heidegger’s 
notion o f  ‘originality’ at SZ 231.
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signs can be ‘easily formalized’, but that the problem with such formalizations is that 
they ‘basically say nothing’ as they ‘level off the phenomena to such an extent that the 
proper phenomenal content gets lost’ (SZ 78, 88). Incidentally, though he would object 
to it in the same way, Heidegger’s talk of the ‘formal’ and ‘formalization’ is not 
specifically directed to the now common use of this term as standing for formal- 
logical quantification. Rather, it relies on a general distinction between symbolic 
representations (forms) and their fulfilment in phenomena, roughly analogous to the 
Kantian contrast between empty concepts and the material of intuitions.57 The point 
Heidegger is making is that any theory of signs focusing exclusively on formal and 
relational properties will yield no insight into the phenomenal basis from which its 
abstractions proceed, i.e. it tells us nothing about what it is actually to be or to 
function as a sign. Further, in concentrating on one kind of similarity, such theories 
constitutively disregard other differences between phenomena. So Heidegger is not 
denying that such a formalized conception of, e.g., semiotic phenomena can be 
developed. Indeed he claims this is ‘easy’. The point of his antiformalism is rather to 
insist that an abstract formal conception of whatever kind (e.g. semiotic, syntactic or 
semantic) of relationship can provide only an uninformative schematism; to be 
revealingly informative such a conception must be complemented by an account of 
what it is for those kinds of relationship to be realized in actual phenomena.
Finally it is perhaps worth highlighting that for Heidegger language’s mode of 
being, just as that of subjectivity, cannot be the ‘constant remaining’ (standiger 
Verbleib; SZ 96) of Things. Rather, since phenomena are temporal in character, his 
insistence on spelling out the phenomenal basis of formal relationships rules out a 
(platonistic) picture of content as a detemporalized, static realm in which various
semantic or inferential relations hold. Heidegger is thus committed to a process view
\
of language rather than a stasis view -  or in Humboldt’s terms to viewing language as
ro
an activity rather than a (finished) work.
So Heidegger’s presentation of language in the broader context of the phenomenon of 
disclosure reflects a pervasive tendency in his approach, which can be summed up by
57 The distinction between the formal and fulfilment results from Heidegger’s adaptation o f Husserl’s 
theory o f meaning (cf. section 4 below).
58 Emphasis on the processual character o f language is the point o f Humboldt’s oft cited distinction 
between ergon and energeia: ‘Language, grasped in its real essence, is something persistent and at 
every moment transient. [...] [Language] itself is not a work (ergon), but an activity (energeia). Its true 
definition can therefore be only a genetic one’ (Humboldt 1995, 36).
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saying it is fundamental to his picture that language, just as Dasein, is to be 
understood in terms of its embeddedness in the world, so to speak, as language-in- 
the-world. These features, I suggest, are palpably motivated by Heidegger’s 
commitment to the need for philosophical views to reflect lived experience 
accurately, i.e. to phenomenological accountability. With this in mind, however, they 
can be taken as bringing out a pattern of general commitments that should 
characterize a phenomenological conception of language: namely, that language has 
no inside and outside, is embedded in or distributed over the world, and should be 
understood non-reductively, without formalism, and as processual rather than static.
Suppose it were agreed that these features adumbrate the general shape a 
phenomenological conception of language ought to have. What of it? How might 
such a conception contribute to philosophical understanding of language? At this 
general level Heidegger, say, might be taken simply to be proposing a certain picture 
or a better way of seeing language. And since the way we ‘picture’ some 
phenomenon is simply shorthand for the overall way we conceive of it, to urge a 
particular picture in this way is clearly of some critical interest. Indeed, even at this 
general level Heidegger’s approach can be taken to contest directly some of the more 
strident abstractions found in philosophy of language, e.g. forthright claims that ‘a 
language’ is a set of paired sentences and meanings, an abstract object, or essentially 
an internal representation conforming to ‘Universal Grammar’.59 It is plausible to 
suggest that such claims either neglect to examine the ontology required for their 
realization or disregard the actual or full phenomenology of language, leading to a 
conception of language that is at best inadequate and at worst highly misleading.
But matters are often not so clear cut, as can be illustrated by considering how 
Heidegger might respond to a conception of language based on predicate calculus of 
the kind originally due to Frege. This kind of approach, which I shall call the 
‘semantics approach’, can reasonably be considered standard in contemporary 
philosophy of language. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that Heidegger would object 
that in its outset the semantics approach ignores the phenomenology of language and 
that the conception of language it yields is a variant of formalism.60 What is the
59 Cf. respectively Davies 1981, 135; George 1990, 291 -  who makes the obscure, yet supposedly 
‘uncontroversial’, claim that ‘[w]hen I die, my own language, being an abstract entity, will not cease to 
exist and will almost certainly never be possessed by anyone again’; and Chomsky 1986, 25 f.
60 Heidegger consistently opposed algorithmic approaches to modelling content. Cf. e.g. PIA 32; US 
263 f.; and UStS 24 f. -  Incidentally, Heidegger was to some extent aware o f Frege’s work, suggesting
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substance and force of such objections? Heidegger’s claim is in effect that a formal or 
algorithmic conception of language is superficial. Suppose the means of predicate 
calculus could be honed to represent convincingly and comprehensively the 
semantics of natural languages. While allowing this to be an extraordinary technical 
and intellectual achievement, a Heideggerian antireductionist would presumably 
maintain that it fails to tell us anything about the phenomena and processes in which 
the use of language is embedded. However, it is not obvious that is necessarily a 
problem for the semantics approach, which might simply acknowledge the need 
Heidegger identifies and view his approach as complementary. I am not suggesting 
here that that would be the proper response, but simply that this possibility brings out 
a genuine limitation of picture-level engagement in that one needs to establish not just 
that pictures or approaches appear different, but that the views they yield genuinely 
contradict or conflict with each other. For, failing this, two apparently dissimilar 
approaches or conceptions may simply be providing complementary and equally 
correct accounts of disjunct aspects of linguistic phenomena. That is to say, picture- 
level engagement is not sufficiently specific to allow a properly informed judgement 
as to the precise relationship between, say, a phenomenological approach a la 
Heidegger and the semantics approach.
If the risk of degeneration into a polemical, or simply indifferent, stand-off is 
to be averted, a more specific kind of engagement is therefore required. The requisite 
focus for this, I suggest, is hinted at by Heidegger’s treatment of predicative 
Statements as ‘derivative’ in virtue of their foundation in purposive understanding. 
Examining this claim in more detail, as I shall now do, will bring out both what is 
distinctive about Heidegger’s position and an identifiable tension between this 
position and the semantics approach.
\
(ii) The idea o f prepredicative founding: The philosophical poignancy of Heidegger’s 
view of predicative statements (Aussagen) in SZ can be brought into focus by 
considering the parallel, more extensive discussion in his 1925/26 lectures entitled 
‘Logic’. In an exposition of Aristotle’s On Interpretation Heidegger there highlights 
the importance of ‘combination and division’, or synthesis and diairesis, as a
in a 1912 review of research in logic that Frege’s importance for a ‘general theory o f concepts’ was 
still to be realized. Yet later in the same text he more characteristically claims that ‘logistics’, or formal 
logic, is simply mathematics and is not ‘capable o f pressing forward to the actual logical problems’ 
(FS 20, 42; cf. US 116).
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precondition for the truth/falsity of propositions.61 As he puts it, a ‘proposition can 
only be true at all [...] because qua proposition it moves a priori within the “as”' 
(italics added; Logik 135). In Heidegger’s view, Aristotle had correctly recognized 
the need for, but failed to explicate the phenomenon of combination/division. Just 
as in his discussion of signs, Heidegger allows that the ‘formal structures of 
“combining” and “dividing”’ can become the object of a kind of calculus or 
“‘calculation’” . But here too he insists on the need to spell out the phenomenal basis 
of such an ‘external “theory of judgement’” (SZ 159). Accordingly, to understand the 
‘basic structure of the Xoyoq qua Statement’, Heidegger thinks it crucial to explicate 
how this a priori ‘as-ness’ -  what it is for an object to be (as) that object -  is 
constituted.63 And this of course is exactly what the analytic of Dasein in SZ claims to 
do in highlighting the founding of the ‘apophantic-as’ in the ‘hermeneutic-as’, or of 
predicative in purposive awareness.
The first thing to notice here is that Heidegger’s approach to the content of 
predication centres on an underlying ‘prepredicative character of the as-structure’ 
(Logik 144). In this respect his position takes up a characteristic theme of the 
phenomenological tradition, motivated by its general commitment to antireductionism 
and antiformalism. For Husserl’s aim had always been to investigate the overall 
constitution of intentionality, and in so doing to relate logical-categorial acts to their 
foundation in underlying phenomena, in particular perceptual acts. And Husserl 
himself, most notably in Experience and Judgement, offers an extended account of 
‘prepredicative’ structures, the aims of which closely resemble Heidegger’s.64 
Heidegger’s view differs markedly from Husserl’s in claiming that the prepredicative 
should be understood in terms of purposiveness rather than perceptual states. Thus he 
not only talks of ‘prepredicative [...] seeing’ of Equipment (SZ 149), but suggests
vx
that ‘so-called straightforward having-there and grasping’ of an entity is ‘not a direct 
grasping at all’ since this presupposes having ‘already dealt with it previously’, 
understanding it ‘in terms of that for which it serves’ (Logik 147). However, the 
question this section will focus on is not the substance of such claims, i.e. what the
61 Aristotle 1938, 115 [ 16al 3]; Logik 140. The discussion o f Logik 127-161 is particularly relevant to 
the treatment o f predicative statements in §33 o f SZ.
62 Logik 141; SZ 159. Aristotle presumably thought this occurred in the ‘soul’ (Aristotle 1938, 115 
[16a4]), but this can be ignored for the present purpose.
3 In a phenomenon ‘which in itself is combining and dividing and lies prior to relationships between 
linguistic expressions and their attribution and denial’ (.Logik 141).
64 Husserl 1985, 1-230. As will be seen, Merleau-Ponty also took up this interest in the prepredicative.
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prepredicative is taken to consist of (since this is addressed by subsequent chapters), 
but how they are to be interpreted: what does it mean to say that something is 
‘prepredicative’?
The starting point in answering this is simply to observe that if propositional 
content is taken to be based on predication, then ‘ prepredicative’ factors will be 
concerned with the way the content of propositions is constituted. In saying this, it 
should be borne in mind that Heidegger thinks that the notion of ‘content’ is arrived 
at only by way of abstraction, or ‘formalization’, and that it encompasses 
heterogeneous phenomena. In other words, what looks homogeneous at the level of 
propositional content may be eliding important differences in the way entities are 
understood. Accordingly, one might expect there to be several kinds of content- 
constitution process that underlie meaningful sentences. This qualification 
notwithstanding, the rough idea is that prepredicative factors are to effect the 
constitution of propositional content. However, to be more precise and to allow the 
relationship between a Heideggerian and the semantics approach to be explored more 
fully, I want to suggest that Heidegger should be understood as claiming that 
prepredicative factors have three defining features:
(a) Subpropositional: In claiming that propositional content is formed by 
prepredicative factors, Heidegger’s basic claim is twofold: First, he is clearly denying 
explanatory priority to the (‘derivative’) propositional level.65 Second, he is claiming 
that the existence and functioning of prepredicative factors is required for, and is 
hence implicit in, contentful use of sentences. However, in addition, the genetic 
phenomenological approach he takes to the articulation of Significance leads him to 
focus on words, that is, on the structural components of sentences. His concern, in 
other words, is with factors that underlie propositional content both functionally and
v
structurally. To reflect this dual sense of reliance I shall describe the prepredicative 
factors Heidegger is concerned with as subpropositional.
(b) Subinferential: A second feature of the prepredicative can be drawn from 
an aspect of the transition to predicative awareness highlighted by Robert Brandom. 
As he puts it, the distinctive feature of predicates relied on by Heidegger’s treatment 
of Statements is that ‘predicates come in inferential families’, serving to ‘codify’ the 
‘inferential significances’ already grasped purposively (Brandom 1983, 402). Linking
65 See also his critique o f the paradigm of propositions (Statements) in at SZ 165.
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predication with inferential properties is compelling: if inferential properties 
correspond to propositional content and propositional content is understood in terms 
of predication, then predicative and inferential properties will clearly be linked. And 
with this move come also, as correlates of grasping inferential properties, 
commitment to the notion of semantic truth and the ability to engage in reasoning. 
But recognizing the link between predication and inference also sheds further light on 
the transition to properties-based awareness, which was previously interpreted 
minimally as involving a shift from purpose-specific to purpose-independent 
individuation of entities. This minimal interpretation might be challenged by arguing 
that purposive understanding already entails awareness of some properties. Thus in 
Heidegger’s paradigm case Dasein must know what a hammer looks like, at least in 
the sense of being able to recognize hammers from non-hammers. Or in the case of 
language, of principal interest here, a speaker must surely have a corresponding 
recognitional grasp of the syntactic properties of words -  their distinctness from one 
another and grammatical properties -  in order to make use of them. What Brandom’s 
observation adds is a constraint clarifying what it is to be aware of something in a 
predicative manner, or to individuate it in terms of objective properties: namely, that 
one be able to involve it in inferential operations, so that the ‘properties’ involved in 
predicative awareness are inferential properties.
This might initially seem to modify Heidegger’s claim by restricting his talk 
of ‘properties’ to some subset ‘inferential properties’. But I think this would be to 
misconstrue the constraint Brandom articulates. After all, in principle any property 
can be involved in inferences, if an agent is able to introduce them into reasoning 
processes. Conversely, if an agent is unable to involve some feature in inferential use, 
then it must be at least doubtful that he is aware of that feature as such.66 Brandom’s 
constraint thus bears not on properties as such, but on the kind of grasp agents have of 
them. So, if predicative awareness is taken to involve being aware of something such 
that it is immediately available for use in inferences, prepredicative awareness should 
be taken to lack this quality. Although this implies that prepredicative awareness is in 
some sense ‘prior’ to the ability to reason, it obviously does not mean that it is 
‘irrational’ in the sense of lacking any link with inferential reasoning. Rather the
66 This should apply even if one thinks it possible to have ‘implicit’ grasp o f properties. If such a grasp 
cannot be seamlessly made ‘explicit’ in the sense o f being involved in one’s reasoning, it is difficult to 
see what an ‘implicit grasp’ amounts to.
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whole point of talking of a transition from prepredicative to predicative awareness is 
that, this modification notwithstanding, inferential properties are somehow 
determined by the prepredicative.
The second feature is therefore that the prepredicative can be described as 
subinferential in a dual sense: (a) to grasp an entity prepredicatively -  in Heidegger’s 
picture, as being ‘for -  does not entail the ability to reason about that entity or its 
uses, i.e. does not entail awareness of how these relate to other beliefs or 
propositionally expressible commitments; (b) inferential properties are based on, and 
somehow shaped by prepredicative factors.
(c) Heterologous functioning: A third feature of the prepredicative can be 
approached by considering the relationship between disclosure and truth. As is well 
known, in SZ Heidegger advocates a broad and unorthodox notion of truth according 
to which disclosedness is understood as the ‘most original phenomenon of truth’ -  
supposedly reflecting the proper meaning of the Greek term (alijOeia), standardly 
translated as ‘truth’ (SZ 220 f., 219). This view was in no doubt partly motivated by 
Heidegger’s reading of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, which distinguishes five
fx 7different ways of attaining truth, including practical wisdom and science. But, 
historical considerations aside, Heidegger also had a philosophical motive for 
incorporating propositional truth within a broader phenomenon: Denying a basic 
subject-object dichotomy in favour of the notion of being-in-the-world meant the idea 
of being radically out of touch with the world, or with truth, makes no sense. Dasein 
is always ‘in the truth’ (SZ 221) in the sense that it is in genuine, unbreached contact 
with its surroundings. The difficulty, as Heidegger sees it, is instead to understand 
how truth is founded in the world, or how ‘the roots of propositional truth reach down 
into the disclosedness of [purposive] Understanding’ (SZ 223). It is not my aim here 
to consider the objections that have or might be made to thi<^  view as a theory of 
truth. For the present purposes, however, it will be convenient to allow, in the spirit 
of the traditional view rejected in SZ §44a, that the label ‘truth’ should apply only to 
propositions and sentences. Although it was no doubt part of Heidegger’s rhetorical 
strategy to incorporate the propositional level in a more comprehensive notion of 
truth qua disclosure, respecting this terminological convention in fact makes it easier 
to articulate an important feature of Heidegger’s position. In contrast to ‘truth’
67 Cf. Aristotle 1934, 331 [1139b 14] ff. and particularly Heidegger’s 1924-5 lectures (Soph 14-64).
68 See, for example, Tugendhat (1970).
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Heidegger’s term ‘disclosure’ will be taken in the following to refer to the broader 
phenomenon of openness to and contact with the world, and as encompassing 
subpropositional, propositional and suprapropositional levels.69
With this distinction between truth and disclosure in place, it becomes easier 
to see prepredicative and predicative factors as distinct. After all, as long as both 
prepredicative and predicative awareness are described in the same terms, whether 
disclosure or truth, it might seem that their functioning is governed by the same 
considerations. Yet, as has been seen, one of the principal theses of the analytic of 
Dasein is that this is not the case: Equipment and Things, purposive and predicative 
awareness, are to be distinct categories, even though the latter are somehow to depend 
on the former. This ambivalent relationship of both distinctness and dependency is 
underwritten by the thought that prepredicative and predicative awareness somehow 
function in different ways -  they are, as I shall put it, heterologous.70 This third 
feature of Heidegger’s view of the prepredicative not only underlies the assumption 
that the predicative and prepredicative are mutually irreducible, but also gives 
genuine substance to idea of foundation by allowing that subpropositional elements 
play a role which is neither arbitrary nor reducible to their contribution to 
propositional truth/falsity.
Whether or not one thinks Heidegger’s account satisfactory, it is clearly 
helpful to preserve this feature of his foundational claims by characterizing the 
functioning of prepredicative factors in some way other than its relation to 
propositional truth. In the following I will therefore talk of the prepredicative as being 
governed by considerations of appropriateness.71 In addition to distinguishing 
prepredicative functionality from propositional truth, this has two advantages. First it 
avoids assuming apriori the yoke of bivalency. This allows the possibility -  as is
v
arguably more plausible -  that appropriateness comes in degrees: the tone of my 
comments can be more or less appropriate to the situation, a tool better or worse
69 This is not intended as an exegetic claim. Nevertheless, although obviously diverging from 
Heidegger’s position in SZ, it is presumably consistent with his late concession that it had been 
incorrect and misleading to call ‘o\lrjdeia in the sense o f the Clearing “truth”’ (SD  77).
70 This represents a significant difference to Husserl, who rather curiously often discerned directly 
corresponding features o f predicative judgements in ‘prepredicative’ perception (cf. Husserl 1985, 97, 
104, 111).
71 Heidegger makes a corresponding move by describing Equipment in terms o f ‘expediency’ 
(Dienlichkeit) or ‘suitability (Geeignetheit; SZ 83). However, as already noted, the distinctness o f this 
prepredicative functionality is less easy to appreciate where expediency is treated as part o f the 
‘original phenomenon o f truth’.
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suited to the job at hand etc. At the same time, second, it suggests that conditions or 
considerations of felicity (e.g. relative to other means, expressions) are relevant, i.e. 
that there is something to be said about what constitutes appropriateness or a lack 
thereof.
An implication of recognizing appropriateness as distinct from (propositional) 
truth is that a conception of the overall phenomenon of disclosure should respect both 
modes of functioning. An instructive attempt to do this is made by Martin Seel, who 
sees ‘pragmatic appropriateness’ and ‘propositional truth’ as complementarity aspects 
in ‘disclosure of the world’. According to Seel, appropriateness -  or as he calls it 
‘rightness’ -  governs our access to the world and constitutes ‘domain-opening 
understanding of things’ in practice, whereas propositional truth functions 
normatively, as a corrective influence on rightness, which is not itself ‘a dimension of 
validity’ (Seel 2002, 50, 61). It seems to me that Seel is right to discern both mutual 
irreducibility and functional complementarity between appropriateness and truth. 
However, despite the obvious philosophical appeal of emphasizing the corrective 
potential of propositional truth, his approach seems a little one-sided. For although 
not necessarily directed to epistemic goals or restricted in its functioning to a bivalent 
scheme of evaluation, pragmatic appropriateness is clearly a kind of (nonepistemic) 
normative requirement governing disclosure. To emphasize the corrective role of 
propositional truth alone would somewhat obscure Heidegger’s point that 
Equipmental access is not accountable to epistemic standards. However, the lesson of 
Heidegger’s analysis, I suggest, is rather that disclosure, in particular linguistic 
disclosure, should be thought of as genuinely multifactorial, governed by the 
interplay and tensions between both pragmatic and cognitive criteria.
At this point it might seem that Heidegger’s prepredicative founding thesis is 
compounded and complicated once language is in the picture. For it might seem 
necessary to distinguish between prepredicative (prepredicatives) awareness of 
linguistic signs and prepredicative (prepredicative0) awareness of the objects referred 
to using these, inevitably prompting the question as to the relationship between the 
two. In particular it would then be tempting to wonder about inconvenient 
permutations such as (a) prepredicatives awareness of signs effecting predicative 
awareness of objects, or (b) prepredicative0 awareness of objects being mediated by 
predicative awareness of language. In fact either of these possibilities seems
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problematic: (a) implausibly suggests one could be aware of the inferentially relevant 
properties of an object without knowing the inferentially relevant properties of the 
term being used to refer to it; equally unconvincingly, (b) suggests one could be 
aware of the inferentially relevant properties of signs without being similarly aware 
of the corresponding properties of the objects to which they refer.
The intimacy of the link between predicative awareness of objects and that of 
signs ensures, however, that prepredicatives and prepredicative0 are actually 
correlative. For on the one hand, the use of signs is involved in predicative thinking,
77since symbolic representation is required for generalized cross-purpose awareness. 
Yet on the other hand, the whole point of representation is that the inferential 
properties signs have qua signs are due to what they are taken to stand for. In other 
words, predicative awareness of an object is possible only by using a sign that by 
definition shares its inferential properties. Conversely without predicative awareness 
of its supposed object, a sign cannot be considered to have inferential properties. As a 
result, our awareness of both signs and their supposed referents is either predicative 
or prepredicative, so that a single distinction between prepredicative and predicative 
awareness (applying correlatively to both) is all that is needed. This result, which 
reflects the involvement of signs in predicative awareness, is perhaps not surprising, 
given Heidegger’s view of language as embedded in the world more generally. 
Indeed the temptation to think there is a philosophically important distinction 
between the grasp we have of language and the grasp of the world we arrive at 
through the use of language is perhaps due to residual dualist habits of the kind 
Heidegger sought to overcome.
One complication that does arise on Heidegger’s picture is that whereas the 
use of signs is necessary for predicative awareness, he clearly does not think it
v
sufficient. This not only reiterates the point previously encountered that the 
distinction between purposive and predicative awareness falls within language, rather 
than coinciding with the linguistic/nonlinguistic distinction, but also points to a 
distinctive and interesting feature of Heidegger’s view in allowing that at least some 
language use is prepredicative in character. This hints at two questions to be 
addressed in the following chapters. First, having here clarified what claims to be
72 It might be objected that predicative awareness o f objects is possible without the overt use o f signs. 
If this is possible, it is clearly o f no relevance to the relationship between signs and what they stand 
for.
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3. An ambivalence about language
I now want to consider Heidegger’s view of the way linguistic signs are involv* 
developing an articulate understanding of the world, or in his terms their disch 
function. The most general determination of this function, and hence the functi< 
language, in SZ  is that attributed to Articulacy. For in addition to outlining 
fourfold structure, discussed above, Heidegger characterizes the general functi< 
Articulacy -  or A,6yoc; -  as ‘pointing to’ what is talked about so as to allow it
7T‘directly seen’ or ‘inspected’. This use of the term ‘see’ is deliberately broa 
‘formalized’, referring to any act of direct apprehension of features of the work 
147). And while it might be thought somewhat metaphorical, such broad use is 
familiar from idiomatic phrases such as ‘I see what ... means’, ‘He doesn’t see i 
way’, etc. All the same, Heidegger’s talk of ‘direct’ (schlicht) apprehension o 
world, especially where the use of signs is involved, might seem paradoxical, 
point of this is a contrast with inference, i.e. consciously moving from given de 
corresponding conclusions, so that ‘direct’ awareness means noninferc
74awareness. But for Heidegger ‘direct’ awareness also means unsevered contact 
the world, having an awareness of entities or features of the world as such, rather 
an awareness in which some interposed medium (e.g. language) continues to p 
constitutive and potentially distortive role.75
Further insight into Heidegger’s view of language in SZ  is provided t 
discussion of what he calls ‘Gerede’ and defines as the ‘everyday way of beii 
Articulacy’ (SZ 167 f.). In contrast to Heidegger’s examples of hearing or rema
73 It is ‘aufweisendes Sehenlassen’ or ‘Vemehmenlassen’: ‘die Grundbedeutung von Xoyoq ist 1 
which is ‘a7ro(pavaic;’ or ‘aufweisendes Sehenlassen’; the ‘Funktion des X6yo<;’ lies ‘im schl 
Sehenlassen von etwas [ .. .] ,  im Vemehmenlassen des Seienden’ (SZ 32, 34).
74 As Austin (1962, 14-19) and Stroll (1988, 152-159, 161) have emphasized without some c( 
with ‘indirectness’ it would make no sense to speak o f ‘directness’.
75 Cf. Heidegger’s characterization o f ‘reine noein, das schlicht hinsehende Vemehmen der einfa 
Seinsbestimmungen des Seienden als solchen’ (SZ 33) and IV.4 below.
silent, this everyday mode of linguistic ability, as ‘spoken-out-ness’, 
‘communication’ (.Mitteilung), is concerned with the public life of sign use, and in 
particular with the role of language in relation to Dasein’s everyday, ‘inauthentic’ 
understanding of being. As such it can be considered as Heidegger’s view of most 
language use. The term ‘Gerede’ means ‘rumour’ or ‘gossip’ and is usually translated 
as ‘idle talk’. However, since Heidegger denies that this term is intended to be 
‘detractive’ (herabziehend; SZ 167) -  a ‘denial’ that would be unnecessary, were the 
term’s negative connotations not so manifest -  it will be rendered here more neutrally 
as ‘routine’ language use. Note that routine language use should not be confused with 
the use of ‘everyday language’, taken to refer to the use of a relatively small stock of 
commonplace linguistic means as opposed to highbrow or technical concepts. Rather, 
routine use is a manner or mode of language use, potentially applying to everyday 
and technical terms in the same way.
So what characterizes this routine mode of language use? Given that Dasein is 
‘thrown’ into a historically conditioned intentional situation, the need arises to 
account for the constitutive role of language in setting this up. Heidegger recognizes 
this in emphasizing that routine use is a ‘positive phenomenon which constitutes 
everyday Dasein’s Understanding and Setting-out’ {SZ 167). It is the amorphous
7 f\agency of everyday life that articulates Significance. Language, as normally 
manifested in spoken and written use, ‘harbours in it a way of setting out 
[Ausgelegtheit] Dasein’s understanding’, and so too ‘already a developed 
conceptuality’ {SZ 167, 157). Accordingly, Dasein and language complement one 
another in their historicity: Language is a product of ‘the discoveredness respectively 
attained and handed down’ which ‘preserves, in the whole of its divided-up contexts of 
signification, an understanding of the disclosed world’, of self and others. Hence, for 
thrown Dasein, it conditions ‘the available possibilities and horizons for new 
approaches by Setting-out and conceptual articulation’ {SZ 168).
But the pejorative air of Heidegger’s term ‘Gerede’ is no coincidence. Rather 
it rhetorically accentuates a supposed negative aspect of routine language use. 
Routine use, Heidegger says, is the medium of ‘public interpretedness’ {SZ 169), 
which contents itself with an average kind of understanding. What is said can ‘be 
largely understood without the hearer’s bringing himself into an original
76 ‘Das Man-selbst [...] artikuliert den Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit’ {SZ 129).
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understanding being towards what is being talked about. [...] one means the same, 
because one understands what is said in the same averageness’ (SZ 168). Words 
themselves, what is said, gain a ‘life’ of their own and can be passed from speaker to 
speaker as empty tokens in processes of ‘hearsay’.77 Without an ‘original 
appropriation’ of what is being spoken about, the ‘initial lack of firm grounding 
[Bodenstandigkeity of such freely circulating linguistic signs ascends to ‘full 
groundlessness’ (SZ 168). In this sense, the disclosive function of routine language use 
culminates in a counter-tendency to ‘close off, a phenomenon that remains largely 
unnoticed because its ‘indifferent intelligibility’ leaves speakers with the impression that 
they understand everything (SZ 169).
On the face of it, then, Heidegger’s view of routine language use is an 
ambivalent one: although conceding its constitutive role in everyday understanding of 
the world, it is clearly insinuated that this understanding is somehow inadequate. 
Understanding and explaining this ambivalence will, I suggest, prove highly instructive 
with regard to Heidegger’s overall conception of language.
From what Heidegger says about routine language use as a ‘positive 
phenomenon’, three important commitments can be elicited which help provide a 
clearer picture of the task. The first of these, which Heidegger explicitly recognizes, 
is that everyday understanding, as mediated by routine language use, is a necessary 
precondition for attaining any kind of understanding. As he puts it, Dasein can ‘never 
escape’ everyday understanding, in which, out of which, and against which ‘all 
genuine understanding, interpretation and communication, rediscovery and new 
appropriation’ occurs (SZ 169). Heidegger does not think everyday understanding is 
the only mode of understanding of being, and contrasts this with ‘authentic’ 
understanding. Nonetheless, he maintains that all genuine understanding, not least 
‘authentic’ understanding, ‘remains dependent on One [das Man] and its world’ (SZ 
299): ‘authentic existence is not something that floats above falling everydayness’, it 
is merely a ‘modified grasping’; ‘authentic disclosedness’ is still ‘guided by the 
concemful lostness in One’, but ‘modifies’ its understanding of being without a 
change “‘in its content’” (SZ 179, 297). A second commitment explicitly recognized 
by Heidegger is that routine use of language in attaining everyday understanding 
commits us to a ‘developed conceptuality’ linked with a certain way of interpreting
77 SZ 169, 155. Heidegger elsewhere tersely describes this as ‘Wortdenken, Horensagen, Angelesenem’ 
{GAP 274).
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being. This immediately plausible claim is, I suggest, in considerable need of 
elucidation and will turn out to be a complex commitment: for in what way does 
routine language use embody a ‘conceptuality’ and in what way are we committed to 
or bound by it? To appreciate why these questions are nontrivial in Heidegger’s 
framework a third commitment should be considered. For his claim that much of 
what we learn in life never exceeds the ‘average understanding’ of ‘One’ clearly 
implies that such understanding, as a rule, is perfectly adequate to the purposes of 
everyday life {SZ 169). Language must, so to speak, be failing despite its successes. 
So whatever supposed deficiencies underlie Heidegger’s ambivalence towards routine 
language use, they must accommodate this triple commitment to its indispensability, 
its role in conceptual conditioning, and its pragmatic adequacy to majority of 
everyday needs.
When one comes to consider the source of the negative aspect of Heidegger’s 
ambivalence to routine language use, there are two obvious candidates. The first is 
suggested by his talk of the ‘averageness’ of the ‘public interpretedness’ of being. For 
this might seem to suggest a view, familiar from discussions of the division of 
linguistic labour, according to which speakers ordinarily have only schematic or 
‘stereotypical’ awareness of concepts’ intensional properties, but are thereby enabled 
to use words in their ‘social meaning’, the full intensional and extensional character
n o
of which is determined by respective experts. However, disregarding the fact that 
Heidegger does not explicitly consider the idea of such a distribution of competence, 
a difficulty remains with this proposal in that speaking this way about concepts treats 
words as object-like bearers of properties -  in Heidegger’s terms as Things. And 
reasonable as it is to require an account of the kind of limitation implied by talk of 
‘averageness’, Heidegger’s unequivocally dismissive claim that analysis in terms of 
‘word Things’ ‘shatters’ language {SZ 161) signals that his reservations about routine 
language use can hardly be due to limited knowledge of intensional properties.
The second obvious candidate for explaining Heidegger’s reservations about 
routine language use is suggested by his emphasis on the foundational function of 
purposive understanding. For it is tempting to suppose that Heidegger thinks of 
everyday understanding of being as just purposive rather than predicative, that routine 
use of language mediates an awareness of what environing entities are for, but not of
78 Cf. Putnam 1975, esp. 247 ff. and 228.
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their objective properties. Apart from the fact that Heidegger says nothing explicit to 
this effect, there are two reasons for rejecting this proposal. To begin with, it would 
conflict with Heidegger’s argument that traditional and ‘vulgar’ concepts engender a 
misguided ontological picture which conceals the foundational role of purposive 
awareness by presenting the world to us in an ontologically indifferent way as a 
nexus of Things (SZ 225). For this argument implies that the language we (routinely) 
speak presents the world to us as predicatively structured. Admittedly, given 
Heidegger’s view that using sentences with a predicative form is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for predicative awareness (cf. page 34), the fact that 
established language is predicatively structured does not entail that speakers be aware 
of the predicative implications of the sentences they utter. Nonetheless, it does reveal 
something about the mode of conceptual conditioning Heidegger is assuming routine 
language use to effect: namely that this cannot be construed in terms of purposive 
factors alone. It is also, secondly, intrinsically implausible to suggest that everyday 
understanding of the world could possibly fail to involve predicative awareness of 
any degree, as though this were simply a subsequent theoretical superstructure. For as 
Heidegger himself emphasizes -  in the previously quoted passage (SZ 158; cf. page
33) -  theoretical predication is one extreme kind of speech act performed with 
sentences of a predicative structure. Yet if, as Heidegger there claims, it is 
unreasonable to assimilate all use of assertive sentences to theoretical predication, so 
too it would be wrong to claim that properties’ attribution takes place only in 
‘theoretical’ contexts: what something weighs, what colour it is, whether it is 
damaged by water etc. are properties basic to everyday interaction that are quite 
independent of specific functional expediency. So, given Heidegger’s distinction 
between purposive and predicative awareness and his suggestion that these are two 
extremes on a graduated continuum, everyday understanding of the world, and with 
this the conceptual conditioning of routine language use, must encompass a blend of 
the two. Whatever deficiency Heidegger discerns in routine language use cannot 
therefore be captured straightforwardly using the purposive/predicative distinction.
In fact there is one useful, though rather cryptic, clue to the inadequacy 
Heidegger attributes to routine language use. Drawing on his characterization of the 
structure of Articulacy, Heidegger identifies a specific sense in which routine use is a 
limited actualization of its possibilities: in routine use -  Gerede -  ‘hearing and 
understanding’ cling to ‘what is said [das Geredete] as such’, ‘Being with one
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another moves in talking with one another and concern with what is said’, ‘What is
• 70said as such [...] takes on authoritative character’. So routine use focuses on ‘what 
is said’, rather than on what is being talked about. Stated in this elliptic way, as it is in 
SZ, it is clear neither what this distinction amounts to, nor why it should be 
considered to identify a deficiency -  after all, what could be more appropriate to 
language than attending to what is said? To get a clearer sense of both this claim and 
the overall perspective at work in Heidegger’s ambivalence about language it will be 
revealing to look back several years prior to SZ. For, as will become clear, the 
conception of language found in SZ is shaped by Heidegger’s earlier view of signs, so 
that reviewing the earlier model allows some important features to emerge more 
clearly than in SZ’s dense and sometimes occlusive narrative.
4. Phenomenological concepts as formal indication
From 1918 through to the early 1920s Heidegger intended his philosophy to be a 
radicalization of Husserl’s phenomenology. This project, as he construed it, involved 
understanding the way presuppositions, in particular its ‘entire conceptual material’, 
are made by phenomenological-philosophical enquiry. Accordingly, the ‘problem of 
concept formation’ -  in the form of ‘a phenomenology of intuition and expression’ -
DA
took on ‘central importance’ in Heidegger’s project of radicalizing phenomenology. 
His response to this problem was a general characterization of the way signs or 
symbols function in phenomenological enquiry that he refers to as ‘formal 
indication’. It should be pointed out that, although the term pervades his work around 
1920-2, Heidegger never provided a systematic or comprehensive account of formal 
indication, so that reconstruction of his view must rely on interspersed comments in
Q 1
his writings. Nevertheless what he does say sheds light on what Heidegger took to 
be the proper function of concepts in the context of phenomenological enquiry.
79 SZ 168. -  Incidentally, this provides a good example of Heidegger’s exploitation o f morphology. His 
terminology is supposed to make manifest that Gerede (rumour) is a form o f Rede (Articulacy); 
moreover that Gerede focuses on Geredetes (what is said). The latter similarity might presumably be 
invoked in support o f Heidegger’s -  nonetheless hardly plausible -  claim that the term ‘Gerede’ is not 
intended pejoratively.
80 PAA 168, 8, cf. 171. Heidegger even described the problem o f concept formation as ‘the 
philosophical problem in its origin’ {PAA 169).
1 The main sources o f which are PIA, AKJ, Rel and PAA. He seems to have commenced such an 
account once, but abandoned it following complaints by students questioning its relevance in lectures 
ostensibly on the phenomenology of religion (cf. Rel 55-65; Kisiel 1993, 149 f.). -  Awareness in the 
literature o f the importance of formal indication has grown following the publication o f Heidegger’s
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In considering Heidegger’s notion of formal indication it helps to be mindful 
of two distinctions from the first of Husserl’s Logical Investigations. The first, 
between ‘indication’ and ‘expression’, concerns the way in which signs function as 
meaningful. Something functions as an ‘indication’ when its existence is taken by an 
agent to motivate belief in the existence of ‘certain other objects or states of affairs’ 
(i.e. that which is indicated; Husserl 1992b, 31 f.). This ‘motivation’ is due to there 
being some link between the indication and the indicated, so that it makes sense to 
describe them together. The links underlying such a ‘descriptive unity’ might be 
either causal links or the intentional use of arbitrary signs to stand for something, but 
Husserl excludes connections that are immediately obvious, or ‘insightive’ 
(einsichtig; Husserl 1992b, 32, 31; cf. 35). Thus an indicating sign suggests, but does 
not make it intuitively obvious, that what is indicated exists. Husserl contrasts 
indications with ‘expressions’ as -  so to speak, properly -  ‘meaningful’ signs 
(Husserl 1992b, 37), the sound of a word ‘animated by meaning’.82 The 
meaningfulness of expressions, he tells us, is due to certain ‘meaning-conferring acts’ 
or ‘meaning intentions’ that comprise the ‘phenomenological characteristic of the 
expression as opposed to the empty sound of a word’. In fact, although Husserl 
initially contrasts the two, indication and expression are not intended to be mutually 
exclusive functions. In spoken communication, for example, both occur: spoken 
words are expressions, since ‘the speaker generates them with the intention of thus 
“speaking out about something’” and so ‘conferring meaning on them’; yet at the 
same time in ‘communicative talk’, ‘all expressions [...] function as indications’ by 
standing for just those ‘meaning-giving acts’.84
The second distinction, between meaningful intentions ‘empty of intuition’ 
and those ‘fulfilled’, is to concern the difference between meaning and knowledge 
and does constitute an exclusive contrast. Husserl defines fulfilment as the conscious
early (1919-23) lectures. Dahlstrom (1994) and Imdahl (1994) offer particularly helpful surveys o f  the 
main sources and motifs; much of the relevant source material is summarized in Kisiel (1993).
82 sinnbelebter Wortlaut, Husserl 1992b, 44. (Unlike Frege, Husserl famously considers ‘Sinn’ and 
‘Bedeutung’ to be synonymous, cf. ibid., 58.)
83 Husserl 1992b, 44, 47. -  Here there is obvious proximity to Grice’s (1989, 215 ff.) distinction 
between natural and intentions-based nonnatural meaning, though Grice provides greater detail about 
the kind o f intentions supposed to confer meaning.
84 Husserl 1992b, 39, 40. Derrida (1993, cf. 46) has challenged Husserl’s distinction by claiming that 
signs cannot function as expressions without being indications, further suggesting that the expressive 
function depends on a problematic notion of transcendental subjectivity’s full presence to itself. As 
will become clear, Heidegger’s conception of signs avoids these potential objections by being based on 
the indicative function and a different view of meaning conferral (or expressiveness).
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‘realization’ or ‘actualization’ of the ‘objectual relationship’ signalled by a 
meaningful expression. Fulfilment, he explains, is inessential (aufierwesentlich) to 
expressions as such, but can bring out their ‘appropriateness’ by ‘confirming, 
enhancing, [or] illustrating’ them (Husserl 1992b, 44). Fulfilment, then, is a 
conscious experience in which -  otherwise ‘empty’ -  expressions are validated.
The starting point for Heidegger is a distinction between ‘philosophical 
concepts’ and concepts in the individual sciences -  which he called ‘ontic’ or 
‘positive’ sciences and took to be defined in relation to a corresponding domain of
O f
entities. Heidegger supposed the basic function of concepts in individual sciences to 
be classification or taxonomy of the entities concerned, with these being apprehended 
in terms of properties, i.e. as Things. Whether plausible or not, this claim indicates an 
important delimitation in that Heidegger sees the role of concepts in philosophy as 
differing from the essentially classificatory function of properties-based 
understanding. In a move characteristic of his reorientation of phenomenology to 
lived experience -  and which would later facilitate his incorporation of existentialist 
ideas into a phenomenological framework -  Heidegger sees the key distinction of 
philosophical concepts as being due to the performed or actualized character of 
philosophical understanding.86 Correspondingly, the ‘peculiarity of philosophical 
concepts’ is to be understood in terms of the role they play in ‘the manner of 
philosophical experience and [...] the manner in which philosophical experience 
makes itself explicit’ {PAA 171).
The basic point of reference for Heidegger’s ‘philosophical concepts’ is some 
kind of apprehending experience, from which a definition or concepts result and to 
which they remain accountable. Such ‘grounding experience’ (Grunderfahrung), as 
he calls it, is the ‘specific performed context’ of understanding, ‘the situation of 
evidence’ or ‘experience in which the object properly [eigentlich] gives itself as that 
which it is and how it is’ {PIA 35 f.). Characterized in this way, grounding experience 
clearly corresponds both to Husserl’s acts of fulfilment, in which the objectual 
relationship is actualized in consciousness, and to Heidegger’s own later definition of 
a phenomenon {SZ 31). And, as this lineage suggests, this notion of ‘experience’ is
85 For this contrast, cf. Rel 3-18; GPP 141-4, 235-7. On Heidegger’s view o f ontic-positive sciences, 
cf. SZ 9 f., 51 f.
86 PIA 1-2. They have the character of Vollzug, from vollziehen (to carry out, complete, or perform). As 
will become clearer in the sequel Dahlstrom (1994, 782n) is right to suggest that in ‘“Vollziehen” there 
is a sense o f executing, carrying out, and performing but also a sense o f accomplishing, perfecting, and 
fulfilling’.
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intended to be broad, encompassing not only experience via sense perception, but any 
validating experience in the realm of thought or intentionality -  in which sense 
Heidegger was later to credit Husserl with having rediscovered ‘the sense of all 
genuine philosophical “empiricism” [Empirie]’ {SZ 50n). Above all it should be noted 
that this is the basis of Heidegger’s talk of ‘originality’: grounding experience or the 
‘concrete situation’ are the ‘sense-genesis’ or ‘original contexts of sense’; it is these
0 7
that comprise the ‘proper original sphere’.
Heidegger defines the function of philosophical concepts, as formal 
indications, in relation to grounding experience. The task of ‘ [pjhenomenological 
definition’ -  Heidegger standardly treats definition as paradigmatic of formal 
indication88 -  is to indicate the ‘grounding experience’ such that the way ‘back’ to 
this is clear; accordingly, Heidegger demands, the concepts describing or defining an 
object should be created so as to reflect ‘the way in which the object becomes 
originally accessible’ {PIA 20). Reflecting this task, the term ‘formal indication’ has 
both a negative and a positive connotation. As with Husserl, the negative aspect is 
that formal indications are merely (unfulfilled or empty) indications. In Heidegger’s 
words: ‘indicating’ definitions ‘precisely do not give the object to be determined fully 
and properly [eigentlichy; ‘indication of something by another’ means not ‘to show it
£Q
in itself, but to represent \darstellen] it indirectly, mediately, symbolically’. This 
constitutive shortfall -  that signs present things that do not themselves appear -  is 
marked by the term ‘indication’. Conversely, the qualification as ‘formal’ indication 
is to signal a positive characteristic {PIA 32 f.). A formal indication is one in which, 
although itself ‘empty’, the “‘[fjormal” provides the “character of the approach” to 
performing [...] the original fulfilment of what is indicated’ {PIA 33). The point of 
this is that the link between formally indicating signs and what they stand for is to be 
tighter, or more determinate, than with arbitrary or unstructured indications. So 
whereas a high temperature can be a symptom, or indicative of indefinitely many 
kinds of illness, the link between signs and what they conceptualize is in some way to 
be revealed by their form. As Heidegger somewhat enigmatically describes it, formal 
indication is a use of signs that shows ‘the “way”, in its “outset”. Undetermined in
87 PIA 23, PAA 179, 180, cf. also 186; KNS 24. -  Such talk o f originality once again echoes Husserl 
(e.g. 1992a, 246).
88 He sees the ‘idea o f definition’ as ‘nothing but the formal interpretation o f the full sense of  
knowledge’ (PIA 54).
89 PIA 32; PGZ  112. This idea is retained in SZ, where ‘indication’ is described as the basic structure of 
the appearance o f ‘all indications, representations, symptoms and symbols’ (29).
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content, a determinate bind on performance is given in advance’. The ‘“formal” is 
such content as refers the indication in the [right] direction, prefigures the way’.90 
Thus in broad outline the function of philosophical concepts on Heidegger’s account 
is as follows: formal indication is a use of signs the content of which is indeterminate, 
but which comprise a constraint serving to bring about the state of understanding 
from which they issue. In this sense, formal indications are to function as a pointer, a 
signpost, or a path to the corresponding grounding experience.
When compared with Husserl’s conception of signs, a feature corresponding 
to meaning-conferring acts is conspicuously absent from Heidegger’s discussions of 
formal indication. Along with Heidegger’s general eschewal of psychological 
concepts, this can be explained by seeing formal indication as combining Husserl’s 
contrast between indication and fulfilment with Wilhelm Dilthey’s notion of 
expression, which centres on the mutual interdependence of experience, 
understanding and expression.91 According to Dilthey, the lifeworld is permeated 
with ordered objective structures and practices that result from, and continue to shape 
human purposes and understanding. Such ‘objectifications of spirit’ or ‘expressions 
of life’ range from ‘morals, law, the state, religion, art, science and philosophy’ 
through to ‘every square planted with trees, every room in which chairs are arranged’, 
and includes linguistic expressions (Dilthey 1990, 252, 177, 256). Because they result 
from processes of understanding and determinate possibilities of experience, and are 
hence literally expressions of these, Dilthey reasoned that such objectifications allow 
those same possibilities to be relived or reactualized. So on this view -  which I am 
suggesting Heidegger adopts -  the expressiveness, or meaningfulness, of signs is due 
not to meaning-conferring intentions, but to their embodying and standing in a 
determinate relationship to particular situations of actualized understanding. 
Moreover, forms of expression that emerge from acts of understanding are to be
90 PIA 20 ( ‘“/orm a/” anzeigend’ means ‘der “Weg”, im “Ansatz”. Es ist eine gehaltlich unbestimmte, 
vollzugshaft bestimmte Bindung vorgegeben’), 34.
91 Dilthey 1990, 235 ff. (cf. 157, 176). Heidegger refers to this triad -  Erlebnis, Verstehen, Ausdruck — 
explicitly at PAA 169. -  Many of Heidegger’s key notions (e.g. existentiales, significance, temporality, 
historicity) are prefigured in Dilthey. For a good survey of such themes cf. Guignon 1983, 45-59.
92 Dilthey 1990, 263-7. This idea was later relied on by Collingwood’s (1958, cf. 150; 1994, e.g. 115, 
172, 203) ‘expression theory’ in aesthetics and the philosophy o f history.
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intrinsically conducive to reattaining that same understanding, and it is in this sense 
that they ‘point to’ their grounding experience.
Heidegger’s notion of formal indication goes beyond Dilthey’s view, 
however, by intimating in virtue of what expressions point to their grounding 
experiences. As already hinted, the qualification ‘formal’ means for Heidegger that 
the ‘sense structure’ of the ‘empty’ content ‘provides the direction of performance’ 
(PIA 33). In other words, the structuredness and interrelatedness of the signs used are 
taken to ‘point’ the way to, and so enable, experiences of understanding. The 
determining sense-structure of linguistic forms thus comprises a clue to the link 
between the indication and indicated that distinguishes formal indication from 
arbitrary or unstructured indications. Nevertheless, to preserve the distinction 
between indication and performed apprehension, and corresponding to Husserl’s 
stipulation that indications are not ‘insightive’, the clue provided by the sense- 
structure cannot suffice to induce immediate understanding.94 Rather, Heidegger 
explains, in ‘order to grasp the complete sense’ of a formal indication, to follow 
where it points, ‘radical interpretation of the “formal” itself is required’ (PIA 33). 
This interpretation of ‘empty’ symbolic forms is a means to the end of ‘performed 
understanding of the formally indicating definition’; it is part of a process of ‘working 
forth to the situation’ in which formally indicating ‘characteristics’ become 
‘deformalized’ by ‘receiving the concrete factual categorial determination from the 
respective direction of experience and interpretation’.95 So put simply, ‘formal’ or 
‘empty’ signification and actualized or performed understanding are two extremes 
between which interpretation mediates. In ideally actualized understanding, one 
would appreciate how each of the various features of one’s symbolic representation 
are motivated by corresponding features of the phenomenon in question.
Against this background Heidegger’s view of concepts can be seen to 
epitomize commitment to phenomenological accountability in being guided by the 
idea that concepts are somehow proper to their respective phenomenal origin, the 
grounding experience in which they arise and to which they remain internally related. 
For formal indications are to be characterized by what might be called the twin
93 Thus grounding experience, as performed understanding, plays the same role as Dilthey’s notion o f  
Erlebnis (experience). See Gadamer’s (1990, 70 ff.) insightful discussion o f this role as attempting to 
model methodology in the humanities on that of empirical natural science.
94 Heidegger repeatedly opposes the ‘prejudice’ that phenomenology’s emphasis on direct insight 
means grasping things ‘in a flash’ without interpretative effort (PGZ, 36 f.; cf. SZ 36 f.).
95 PIA 72, 141. Heidegger often talks o f ‘deformalization’ (e.g. AKJ 24; SZ 35).
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virtues of phenomenal receptivity and expressiveness. The first of these requires that 
concepts be literally shaped by phenomena: ‘the conceptuality of the object in the 
respective definitional determination must be drawn from the way in which the object 
becomes originally accessible’ (PIA 20). In this way ‘the function of “meaning- 
differentiation by forms” proceeds from the [phenomenal] “material”’ (AKJ 13), such 
that definitions and concepts (i.e. use of signs) are literally to be articulations of 
grounding experience, the intensity of sense, or determinacy, of a phenomenon in its 
proper context. Expressiveness is the correlate of phenomenal receptivity: the former 
implies that in being used ‘significantly’ signs capture to some degree the sense 
manifested in phenomenal contexts, so that formally structured signs quite literally 
express phenomenal features. As Heidegger puts it, the meanings of ‘linguistic 
expressions’ should ‘spring into’ them ‘out of the phenomenal context and its 
categorial tendencies’.96 By being thus expressive of, or standing for, certain 
phenomenal features, signs in turn acquire the peculiarity of evoking the original 
sense context. The efficacy of signs, on this picture, is due to their formally 
articulated expressiveness, which makes them conducive to actualizing the 
understanding in which they are based.97
The idea of formal indication is clearly based on a fairly straightforward 
representational model according to which linguistic articulations correspond to 
phenomenal features. Significantly, however, formal indication is assumed to be 
approximative or schematic in character, as constitutively lacking the concretion of 
sense in actual phenomena. It has, Heidegger emphasizes, a ‘necessarily restricted 
mode of performance’ since, although its content ‘directs [us] to the manner of proper 
encounter’, it remains inconclusive in leaving ‘the genuine phenomena to become 
determinately decisive’ {PIA 74, 33 f.). This constitutive inconclusiveness is 
significant because it underlies Heidegger’s view of the way phenomenology makes 
presuppositions, that is of how formal indication solves the problem to which it was 
addressed. The ‘ineluctable significance’ of formal indication, he claims, lies in its 
being ‘genuinely motivated by the concrete and factual [...] as non-prejudicial, but 
also non-decisive, prefigurative touching on the factual’ {PAA 85). In other words,
96 PIA 144. In this spirit, Heidegger also suggests that grammatical relationships are grounded in 
phenomenal relations {PIA 82-3).
7 Indeed Heidegger experimented with the term ‘expressive concepts’ {GPP 240) to reflect this 
Diltheyan interdependence of experience, understanding, and expression. -  Even in SZ ‘ausdriicklich’ 
might be construed in terms o f such expressiveness (cf. footnote 28).
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formal indication is a use of signs through which phenomena are addressed in a 
provisional, tentative, and hence corrigible manner. Understanding the functioning of 
signs in this way meant that phenomenological enquiry can be understood as an 
ongoing cycle of interpreting phenomena -  with signs formally indicating phenomena 
and phenomena prefiguring the forms of symbolic indication.98 Formal indication is 
the ‘method of outset of phenomenological interpretation in each stage of its 
execution’, with ‘the interpretation’s preconception’ each time ‘stem[ming] from the 
respective stage of appropriation’ {PIA 141, 87).
Before returning to consider its relevance to SZ, I want briefly to highlight three 
features of Heidegger’s notion of formal indication that are relevant to assessing not 
only this notion, but also a phenomenological conception of language more generally. 
The first is that Heidegger’s discussions seem to invoke an ideal of full actual 
presentation of sense, the kind of ‘presence of sense to a full and original intention’ 
that Derrida (1993, 3) has portrayed as a dubious metaphysical assumption 
underlying Husserl’s phenomenology. For in grounding experiences, the basis of 
‘concrete work’, the ‘(ultimate) structural sense of the full object’ is to be possessed 
in its full determination; a ‘phenomenon’ is simply the ‘being present of an object’ 
{PIA 28; Ont 69). However, whether or not Heidegger was assuming such an 
idealized presence of sense, it is important to realize that his view of the function of 
formal indication as approximative or schematic could survive without it. Although 
his picture involves some kind of actualization of understanding, that role might be 
understood in relation to aspectual or partial presentations such as Husserl’s 
‘adumbrations’ or Merleau-Ponty’s corresponding view of the indirectness of 
intentional objects.
The second feature to highlight is that on Heidegger’s model the function of 
signs is what might be called ‘simple preservation’: i.e. actual or performed 
understanding is laid down in language such that it can later be reactualized in just the 
same way. Formal indications thus function, or fail to function, as deposition and 
reactivation, in much the same way as a long-playing record. Underlying this is 
Heidegger’s assumption that there is an internal link between formal indications and 
determinate grounding experiences, between signs and their ‘origins’. This implies
98 This process, which Heidegger once aptly termed ‘diahermeneutics’ {GPP 262), features in SZ (153, 
314 f.) as the ‘hermeneutic circle’.
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that the relationship between expressions and their sense-genetic origins is essentially 
atemporal: Actualized understanding may deteriorate into ‘empty’ use of indications 
and so stand in need of ‘reappropriation’, but there is no allowance for the ravages of 
time or the internal workings of language eroding the internal link between 
expressions and the grounding experiences proper to them. Rather, on this model, 
language would be a pseudo-temporal phenomenon, a ‘process’ with no intrinsic 
temporality."
Finally, a major source of obscurity in Heidegger’s idea of formal indication is 
the idea of ‘form’ it relies on. In being contrasted with ‘deformalizing’ situations of 
‘evidence’, it is clearly supposed to function as one pole of something like a form- 
content distinction, or more precisely a form-fulfilment distinction. Unfortunately, the 
one passage where Heidegger undertakes to explain the sense of ‘formal’ in formal 
indication is of limited use. He there compares and contrasts his use of the term 
‘formal’ with Husserl’s distinction between (eidetic) formalization and 
(classificatory) generalization (cf. Husserl 1992c, 31 [§13]). As Heidegger sees it, 
generalization is ordering within a framework of genres and species that entails 
reference to the subject matter being classified, whereas formalization is to be 
subject-matter independent and pertain to ‘formal ontological’ categories such as 
thing, experience, object {Rel 58 f.). He attempts to link this with formal indication by 
claiming that the latter should ‘indicate the relation to the phenomenon in advance’ or 
what he called ‘relational sense’ {Rel 63). This claim relies on a distinction Heidegger 
standardly made during his early phenomenological period between three ‘directions 
of sense’ found in any phenomenon: (a) content sense (Gehaltssinn): ‘what’ is 
‘originally experienced in it’; (b) relational sense {Bezugssinn): the ‘original manner 
in which it is experienced’; and (c) performative sense (Vollzugssinn): the ‘original 
manner in which the relational sense is performed’ or actualized.100 However, it 
seems to me that Heidegger is here in a tangle: First, he fails to offer any reason as to 
why the ‘formal’ should not convey all three kinds of sense he distinguishes. Second, 
it is far from clear that a formal indication could serve its purpose without some 
determination of ‘what’ is involved. Third, the restriction to relational sense is
99 Not surprisingly therefore §68d o f SZ -  on the ‘temporality of Articulacy [Rede]' -  is conspicuously 
brief. Though Heidegger reassures us that ‘Articulacy is in itself temporal’ and ‘grounded in the 
ecstatic unity o f temporality’, he has nothing specific to say about the temporality o f language (either 
Rede or Sprache) as such. For Heidegger, on his own gloss, ‘temporality o f Articulacy, that is, o f  
Dasein altogether’ (SZ 349).
100 Rel 63. This tripartite view o f sense is also found at e.g. PIA 53 f.; PAA 60; AKJ  22; GPP  261.
65
inconsistent with Heidegger’s own subsequent discussions of formal indication which 
routinely treat them as having ‘content’.101
Nonetheless, quite independently of the question of what exactly it conveys, 
Heidegger does not explicate what he means by ‘form’. To the extent that language is 
to be construed as formal indication -  which is clearly implied by Heidegger’s 
discussions (e.g. by construing definition as formal indications) -  the relevant notion 
of form can be taken to be that of linguistic form at all syntactic levels, i.e. 
definitions, sentences, words, etc. But this leaves open important questions as to what 
aspects of linguistic form are relevant in directing us to features of the world: Are the 
inferential properties of sentences or expressions ‘formal’ in Heidegger’s sense? Do 
letters, words, and sentences all ‘point’ to phenomena in the same way? Are we 
supposed to agree with the view half-heartedly proposed by Socrates that individual 
letters have their own expressive or representational properties? And, finally, how 
might Heidegger have responded to the obvious difficulty posed by the ‘arbitrariness’ 
of linguistic signs? To answer such questions clearly requires a more detailed view 
about the ‘formal’ qualities in virtue of which linguistic signs ‘point out’ features of 
the world.
5. The disclosive function of linguistic signs
The motivation for examining Heidegger’s earlier views was to explain his 
ambivalence about the role of routine language use in SZ, i.e. to explain its apparently 
negative attitude towards routine language use while acknowledging its 
indispensability, its role in conceptual conditioning, and its pragmatic adequacy. How 
does the notion of formal indication do this?
Since SZ contains no account of formal indication and references to it are 
sparse and seemingly incidental, some evidence should perhaps be mentioned for 
assuming its relevance to the later work.103 To begin with there is testimonial
101 E.g., from 1921-2, PIA 33 f. -  Indeed even in the above 1920-1 discussion Heidegger seems unable 
to uphold his own distinction: ‘because formal determination is completely indifferent in content 
[inhaltlich indifferent] [ ...]  it prescribes a theoretical relational sense [...][,] covers up the performative 
aspect [das Vollzugsmdfiige)[...] and directs itself one-sidedly towards the content [G ehalt\ {Rel 63).
102 Plato 1926, 142-149 [425d-427d],
103 Heidegger talks literally of ‘formal indication’ (formale Anzeige) or cognates at SZ 114, 116, 117, 
231, 313, 315; o f temporary indication at SZ 14, 41; formal sense at SZ 34, 43 and o f indication o f a 
formal concept at SZ 53. -  These references might seem sparser still in English translation as 
MacQuarrie/Robinson (1962) miss, and so do not render, the terminological significance of
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evidence in that Heidegger himself continued to emphasize the importance of formal 
indication both at and beyond the time of S T  s publication. For example, in a letter to 
Karl Lowith in August 1927, he writes: ‘Formal indication, critique of the customary 
doctrine of the a priori, formalization and the like, all of that is still for me there [in 
SZ\ even though I do not talk about them now’ (quoted from Kisiel 1993, 19). And in 
his 1929/30 lectures formal indication is still described as the basic or pervasive 
character of philosophical concepts (GM425, 430).
More significant, perhaps, are several terminological and structural parallels 
between formal indication and views expounded in SZ. Most obviously, the 
emptiness-fulfilment distinction on which the formal-indication model is built 
suggests a basis for Heidegger’s qualified disqualification of routine language use. In 
particular the negative characterization of routine language use in SZ, as lacking 
actualized understanding and grounding (experience), clearly corresponds to the 
‘emptiness’ of formal indications. Particularly telling, however, is the fact that the 
same two fundamental regulative concepts are applied in discussing both formal 
indication and Dasein’s disclosedness in SZ. Thus the notion of ‘originality’ is 
correlated with grounding experience, as the source of sense, not only (as already 
pointed out) in the early conception, but also in SZ.104 Similarly, the distinction 
between formal emptiness and fulfilment in grounding experience is cast in terms of 
Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit, the centrally important terms in SZ usually 
rendered as (in)authenticity, but discussed above in terms of (im)propriety. Thus 
indications, being empty, are ‘improper’; whereas apprehension, or understanding, 
comes to be ‘proper’ when fulfilled, actualized, or performed.105 To be sure, in the 
context of SZ these terms are quite naturally taken to have an existentialist 
connotation, bearing on Dasein’s self-realization and appropriation of its hermeneutic 
situation. But in the light of Heidegger’s phenomenological conception of signs it
‘indication’; with the exception of p. 315, this oversight is remedied in Stambaugh’s (1996) revised 
translation.
104 ‘Originality’ is characterized only once, and briefly, in SZ. It is there characterized as requiring: (i) 
the securing o f ‘a phenomenally suitable hermeneutic situation’, which involves finding an appropriate 
provisional interpretation of a ‘grounding experience’ (Grunderfahrung)\ (ii) that ‘the whole o f the 
thematic entity’ is treated; (iii) that the ‘unity of [its] structural aspects’ is found (SZ 231 f.).
105 The clearest examples o f this use are found at PIA 33-35, but cf. PIA 41, 60, 62-3, 73. For example: 
“‘Formally indicated” means [...] indicated in such a way that what’s said is o f the character o f  the 
“formal”, improper [uneigentlich\; Formal indication ‘provides the way to try out and to fulfil what’s 
improperly [uneigentlich] indicated’, so that it comes to be proper [lzum Eigentlichen kommeri] (PIA 
33). The opposite o f improper indication is ‘proper possession [das eigentliche H aben)\ ‘the specific 
being o f what’s respectively performed’ (PIA 34).
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should be noted that ‘proper’ apprehension (also) denotes an epistemological 
distinction. The problem with the ‘situation of understanding in its outset’, Heidegger 
explains, is that ‘the object’ does not offer ‘itself fully and properly [eigentlichy (PIA
34). By contrast, grounding experience is to be the ‘situation of evidence’ in which a 
decision is made according to ‘experience in which the object properly [eigentlich] 
gives itself as that which it is and how it is’ (PIA 35). So there are two sides to the 
‘propriety’ of grounding experience: it is not simply that an agent ‘appropriates’ 
objects, making them cognitively its own, but also that the object of understanding 
simultaneously shows itself (‘properly’) as it in itself is.106 Finally, the ideal of 
phenomenal receptivity also recurs in SZ. For example, in his discussion of the 
development of Understanding Heidegger emphasizes that Setting-out can either 
‘create the conceptuality belonging to the entity [...] from this itself, or ‘force [this 
entity] into concepts’ which conflict with its ‘manner of being’ (SZ 150). Or again, as 
he puts it in introducing Articulacy -  in precisely the terms used to characterize the 
deficiency of routine language use -  ‘what is said’ should be drawn or created 
(geschopft) from ‘what is talked about’ and so make this manifest and accessible to 
others.107
As these parallels suggest, the principal importance of the idea of formal 
indication is its positive aspect, i.e. what it tells us about the way Heidegger thought 
signs could, or ideally should, function as phenomenological concepts. The ideal 
supposedly underpinning the proper functioning of concepts is concisely stated in his 
summer 1924 lectures. When ‘meaning and the use of a word’ function optimally, he 
there explains, the object addressed is broken down into the ‘proper “respectiveness” 
comprising such an object [...], so that I see it in its proper articulatedness’ (GAP 37 
f.). So this is Heidegger’s ideal: that the function of concepts is to allow features of 
the world to be seen as articulated in the way linguistic forms present them to us. 
Significantly, the same ideal is also found in SZ’s general determination of the 
function of Articulacy in SZ as ‘pointing to’ what is talked about so as to allow it to 
be ‘directly seen’ or ‘inspected’ (SZ 32, 34). The proper function of Articulacy is thus 
the same as that of formal indication, namely to see the world directly in the way it is
106 Cf. SZ 28. -  Kisiel (1993, 46) talks of a ‘properizing event’ and accurately captures this reciprocity: 
‘It is my proper experience because it appropriates me and I, in accord, appropriate it. I am It, I am of 
It, It is mine’.
107 SZ 32. Cf. 315, and 35, where it is emphasized that in phenomenology, the ‘character of 
description’, ‘the specific sense of the \o yo <.;’, should be fixed by the nature o f the subject matter 
(Sachheit) to be described.
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presented (by language) as being. The core function of signs, according to this ideal, 
is to present features of the world in a certain way which can then prove to be 
appropriate or otherwise. In the following I want to hold on to this thought by saying 
that linguistic expressions have a presentational sense and that, since it is the form of 
the signs used that effects presentation of the world in a certain ‘articulation’, this 
should be taken to be due specifically to the form of linguistic expressions.
Of course, if the distinction between empty and fulfilled, or improper and 
proper, sign use is to be upheld phenomenologically, it must be possible for such 
articulate seeing to fail to take place -  indeed SZ 's discussion of routine language use 
suggests this is the standard case. This possibility is accommodated by the role 
Heidegger attributes to interpretation and the approximative or schematic character of 
formal indications. For, as seen above, interpretation has the role -  so-called 
‘deformalization’ -  of cashing out formally indicating features of signs in terms of 
phenomenal features of the world. The need to do this arises from the schematic 
character of formal indications, which allows that it may not be immediately obvious 
how they relate to phenomena.109 In other words, the formal-indication model allows 
us to have ‘empty’ awareness, as opposed to awareness of the phenomenal 
‘fulfilment’ implied by the forms of language we use, i.e. to be in possession of 
linguistic forms without being able to map them interpretatively onto the features of 
reality (assuming there to be such) that make them appropriate.
With regard to ‘empty’ understanding, however, an important limitation of the 
formal indication model emerges, insofar as this is conceived of almost entirely 
negatively in relation to grounding experiences. For although the significance of signs 
is anchored in form, it is conceived of only as the sketchy imprint of actual 
phenomena. Yet with this one-sidedness the formal-indication model seems to 
suggest that empty intending itself consists in nothing positive.110 Whether or not this 
possibility is coherent in considering the function of signs in the rarefied context of
108 Although the terminological proximity here to Lange’s (1951, 79-102) interesting contrast between 
discursive and presentational forms o f symbol is no coincidence, I do not intend to follow the (often 
problematic) details o f her account. In particular, I am suggesting that language has presentational 
aspects, so that the discursive-presentational distinction cannot coincide with that between linguistic 
and nonlinguistic forms in the way Lange often seems to imply.
109 An analogy might be an infra-red photo o f a familiar face which presents its features in an 
unfamiliar, reduced way so that recognition perhaps requires ‘interpretative’ effort.
110 Thus prior to SZ Heidegger appears to have overlooked Husserl’s warning that for theories which 
define meaning solely in relation to intuitive fulfilment the phenomenon o f ‘symbolic thinking’ 
remains an ‘insoluble puzzle’ (Husserl 1992b, 72).
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phenomenological enquiry, to which the notion of formal indication was tailored, it 
would be obviously inadequate in the framework of a general account of language. 
However, by integrating the understanding of linguistic entities within its general 
account of the foundational function of purposive awareness, SZ has the means to fill 
this lacuna in Heidegger’s earlier conception of signs. And indeed, as seen in section 
1 above, Heidegger extends his view of the foundational function of purposive 
understanding to language. The result is a pervasive instrumentalism in SZ1 s 
characterizations of language: ‘statements’ are ‘equipmental’ entities, as are words, 
the totality of which -  as the ‘spoken-out-ness’ of Articulacy -  comprises language 
{SZ 161, 224, 161). This instrumentalism emerges most clearly, as one might expect, 
in Heidegger’s conception of signs in §17, in which signs are characterized as 
Equipment whose use is embedded in and serves to make manifest instrumental 
relations.111 On Heidegger’s view, therefore, our basic grasp of language, of linguistic 
entities, is of a kind with the purposive understanding of other tools, with words and 
sentences being grasped in terms of ‘what they are for’ and not as object-like entities 
bearing certain (‘semantic’) properties. Hence it can be allowed that the understanding 
we have in using language is of this instrumental kind even if it is ‘empty’ in the sense 
of not meeting the positive ideal of formal indication.
At this point one complication should be considered. In the light of what has 
just been said it might be thought that the distinction between emptiness and 
fulfilment is now to coincide with that between purposive and predicative 
understanding. But this, I think, would be a mistake. First because, as pointed out 
above, it is implausible that everyday use of language should completely exclude 
predicative awareness. But a further reason, again as previously seen, is provided by 
Heidegger’s view that both purposive and predicative modes of Setting-out exist. 
This seems to imply that one can have or fail to have an articulate grasp of the world 
in two corresponding ways, so that the emptiness-fulfilment contrast might be applied 
to each mode, yielding a somewhat more complex overall picture. To have or to lack 
the ability to interpret (‘Set out’) entities purposively would be to have or to lack 
articulate understanding in the sense of knowing how to do certain things. Conversely, 
predicative Setting-out concerns the ability to grasp purpose-independent properties,
111 SZ 82. -  As Heidegger claims {SZ 77) to be discussing signs so as to clarify the character of  
instrumental relations {Venveisungen), it might be objected that taking this as bearing on language is 
an interpretative assumption. However, unless language -  the ‘spoken-out-ness o f Articulacy’ -  is 
thought not to involve the use o f signs, the assumption is surely justified.
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make inferences and reason. While this complication means the purposive-predicative 
distinction does not correspond simply to the emptiness-fulfilment contrast, together 
with Heidegger’s purposive-foundation thesis it does suggest a basis for his claims about 
routine language use. For it identifies a minimal mode of (purposive) understanding, the 
possession of which is quite compatible with a tendency to fail to actualize (e.g. 
founded, predicative) understanding. As a result Heidegger’s notion of routine language 
use can be thought of as involving both purposive and predicative understanding of the 
world (of ‘what is talked about’) that suffices for everyday purposes. In this way it can 
plausibly claim to meet the constraint of pragmatic adequacy, while simultaneously 
tending to exhibit inadequacies that motivate Heidegger’s ambivalence about its 
disclosive efficacy.
Overall the conception of the disclosive function of linguistic signs in SZ 
might be summed up as the result of trying to fuse the ideals of presentational sense 
underlying formal indication with the story Heidegger tells about the foundational 
role of purposive understanding. This fusion can be seen to underlie Heidegger’s 
ambivalence towards routine language use. On the one hand the presentational 
function of formal indications identifies a positive ideal for the functioning of 
phenomenological concepts, viz. that of actualizing awareness of how what we are 
talking about is presented to us by language, by which routine language use is held to 
fail. This failure amounts to being unable to interpret features of the language we use 
in terms of correlative phenomenal features, and thus in not appreciating the 
presentational sense of the expressions we are using. But the negative assessment this 
suggests must be tempered, on pain of absurdity, since the failure to actualize 
understanding in routine use cannot be complete. Such absurdity is avoided by the 
claim that language (what is said) is grasped instrumentally in conjunction with the 
thought that in being so grasped language mediates an understanding of the world (of 
what is talked about) which suffices for everyday purposes.
Against this background, the difference between Heidegger’s talk of 
‘averageness’ of understanding and the ‘stereotypical’ awareness of words’ 
intensional properties in the division-of-labour view can be better appreciated. To 
begin with the latter seems phenomenologically unconvincing, since we are not 
usually conscious of the supposed properties of words mediating understanding. This 
fact can be explained by Heidegger’s view, which suggests a different conceptual 
priority: i.e. it is not that (intensional) properties of words mediate awareness of
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features of the world, but that what it is for a word to have certain (intensional)
properties must be spelt out by interpreting it in terms of features of the world.
Heidegger’s view thus offers a direct account of the routine functioning of language,
whereas the stereotype thesis introduces intensional properties as an initially obscure,
and presumably superfluous, intermediary.
What of Heidegger’s otherwise cryptic characterization of routine use as being
directed to ‘what is said’, rather than ‘what is talked about’? Although this
characterization clearly intends to suggest that ‘what is talked about’ is understood
only superficially or minimally, it is less clear how to construe Heidegger’s formulaic
‘what is said’ (das Geredete). Does this have the honorific sense, ‘what is saicT,
referring to successfully expressed propositional content? Or is it a slighting reference
to ‘what is said’, as the words uttered with a quality bordering on that of mere noise?
• 112Though Heidegger never says anything that would resolve this matter directly, his 
various comments incline to the latter. This reading is supported by considering 
Heidegger’s view that different degrees of understanding can be brought to bear on 
the same utterance, according to how well it can be interpreted phenomenally. For on 
this view ‘what is said’ remains constant between superficial and more penetrating 
interpretations of an utterance’s phenomenal implications in a way that would be 
unintelligible if ‘what is said’ were taken to mean ‘propositional content’. So it is 
most plausible to read ‘what is said’ as referring literally just to the words uttered, 
such that the superficial understanding of routine use borders on the merely verbal, of
113knowing merely which linguistic forms to use in which circumstances.
If the preceding reading of Heidegger’s views is correct, it faces an obvious 
challenge. Knowing which words to utter in which circumstances, it may be objected, 
is perfectly adequate as a characterization of what understanding language consists in. 
By contrast, Heidegger’s ideal of transparent presentation might be dismissed as 
irrelevant to the functioning of language as a public phenomenon, and as reminiscent 
of the simplistic hypostatization of linguistic imagery which the later Wittgenstein 
mocks. Now in a sense this objection is redundant. For far from denying that 
knowledge of this kind suffices as knowledge of language, this is precisely
112 Even the apparent elucidation ‘Das Gesagte wird [im Gerede] zunSchst immer verstanden als 
“sagendes”, das ist entdeckendes’ is part o f explaining how routine language use is in fact a covering 
up, i.e. is ‘initially’ wrongly taken to be discovering or ‘saying’ (SZ 169).
113 For a suggestion o f this kind cf. SZ 5.
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Heidegger’s point. It is despite this that he discerns language’s failure to convey fully 
interpretative awareness of phenomena. Nevertheless, the objection does pick out 
something important. For Heidegger’s negative comments about routine language use 
arise from modelling the function of signs in terms of presentational feats, even 
though this model seems, by his own account, to be largely irrelevant to the practical 
functioning of language. This reliance on two different kinds of standard seems to 
some extent incongruous, and perhaps indicative of a tension, as the standard of 
presentational sense is not only extraneous to practical concerns but appears to 
conflict with Heidegger’s rhetorical emphasis on the foundational importance of 
purposive understanding.
The key to reconciling the two different types of demand is found in the 
conception of signs of SZ §17. As Heidegger summarizes this, the ‘Sign is ontic 
Equipment [ontisch Zuhandenes] which [...] simultaneously [...] indicates the ontological 
structure of Handiness, the totality of instrumental relations and worldliness’ (italics 
added; SZ 82). It is crucial to appreciate that this definition is twofold. In a basic 
sense, signs are instruments with a determinate function. So, like other instruments, 
they are ‘constituted by instrumental relating’ and are a means to getting things done 
within practical contexts {SZ 78). Beyond this Heidegger attributes to signs a 
‘distinguished use’ that sets them apart from other instruments.114 Thus, unlike other 
instruments, a sign ‘explicitly raises an instrumental whole into circumspection’; signs 
‘allow the Equipmental to [be] encountered]’, or ‘more exactly, a context’ of such 
Equipmentality, they ‘show primarily that “in which” one lives’ {SZ 80, 79 f.). 
Heidegger emphasizes this ‘peculiar instrumental character of signs’ with regard to 
the creation or ‘institution of signs’: because the worldly context usually remains 
inconspicuous, an instrument is needed to do the ‘“work” of allowing the ready-to-hand 
to become conspicuous’; hence the ‘production of such instruments (of signs) must be 
attentive to their conspicuousness’ and tailored to assure ‘easy accessibility’ {SZ 80). 
Thus, independently of the various specific uses to which they may be put, this dual 
conception also identifies a general standard of propriety for sign-instruments, insofar 
as these can be more or less well suited to the task of inducing awareness of their 
context.
114 SZ 79. Given the expression ‘vorziigliche Verwendung’, and the nature o f the distinction he 
suggests, it is quite possible that Heidegger is here exploiting the relationship o f vorziehen -  the literal 
sense of which is to bring or draw forth -  and vorziiglich (distinctive, excellent): the distinctive use o f  
signs being to bring to the fore instrumental relations.
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In this characterization of signs’ ‘distinction’ or ‘peculiarity’ it is not difficult to 
recognize again the influence of formal indication’s presentational function, in particular 
the ideas of phenomenal receptivity and expressiveness. But in SZ the presentational 
sense signs have due to their form is conjoined with what I shall call pragmatic sense, 
due to the respective roles they have as instruments in established practices. Thus S'Z’s 
twofold conception of signs is tailored to meet the demands of both pragmatic sense, 
since signs are instruments; and presentational sense, since these instruments are 
specifically formed so as to be good at ‘pointing to’ phenomena. In this light 
Heidegger’s reliance on two kinds of standard -  the presentational and the pragmatic -  
is less surprising. For although the presentational ideal is perhaps extraneous to practical 
concerns, both kinds of aim -  so to speak, the foundational and the aspirational -  are 
combined in his conception of a sign.
But how is the distinction between presentational and pragmatic sense to be 
understood? Is it genuine or merely a superficial semblance? I want to claim it is 
genuine and that an important virtue of ST  s conception of signs is to fuse two distinct 
sense-generating mechanisms, the structure of linguistic forms and the role of 
expressions in human practices, each of which has implications for the inferential 
properties that linguistic expressions manifest in sentential contexts. One obvious 
reason for suspecting that there is some slippage between these two articulatory 
factors is that identical practices can be carried out in different languages, such that 
words which are in some respects pragmatically equivalent can nonetheless have 
quite different implications in virtue of syntactic differences. But this is effectively 
where the Heideggerian path comes to an end. For although Heidegger places great 
emphasis on the foundational importance of purposive understanding in SZ, he offers 
no more detailed account of the way in which conceptual commitments -  or if one 
prefers: the structure of disclosure -  are inherent in the practices amidst which Dasein 
is ‘thrown’. Further, as noted in the previous section, while orienting his whole 
account of signs towards the goal of presenting the world in an articulate manner, 
Heidegger never provides anything more than passing hints as to what comprises the 
‘formal’ aspect of language (or concepts). Thus in SZ, while insisting on the need to 
liberate ‘grammar’ from ‘logic’, Heidegger again postpones consideration of the form 
of Articulacy, claiming only that settling ‘the basic forms’ of an ‘articulation of what 
can be understood altogether’ presupposes his analytic of Dasein (SZ 165 f.). In these 
respects Heidegger’s twofold instrumentalist conception of signs ultimately offers
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only a schematic framework, so that an important task for the following chapters will 
be to give substance to the distinction between presentational and pragmatic sense.
In doing this there is an additional constraint. For since, as previously pointed 
out, a distinctive feature of Heidegger’s position is that it allows prepredicative uses of 
language, i.e. of linguistic forms, both pragmatic and presentational sense should be 
explicable in a way consistent with their involvement in prepredicative use. 
Consequently, both should be understood in terms of factors that are subpropositional, 
subinferential, and irreducible to the predicative functioning of propositions. This does 
not, of course, mean that presentational and pragmatic sense should be isolated from 
predicative uses -  for they should provide the (subinferential) foundation for such 
‘derivative’ uses. Indeed, the rationale for describing presentational or pragmatic sense 
as ‘sense’ is precisely that they can be exploited in these different -  prepredicative or 
predicative -  ways. That is, the term ‘sense’ in the following is intended to refer to 
factors that structurally influence linguistic articulation, with the distinction between 
these two types of sense corresponding to two different kinds of structural influence. So 
the task for the following two chapters will be to draw on the ideas of Merleau-Ponty 
and Wittgenstein to set out, in a phenomenologically plausible way, how linguistic form 
and practical factors are of structural relevance to both prepredicative and predicative 
uses of language.
Before moving on to this much larger task, it should be noted that it is now 
possible to see how Heidegger’s position -  at least in outline -  meets its two remaining 
obligations. The general shape of his answer to the question of how routine language 
use embodies a ‘conceptuality’ is twofold, with conceptual commitments being 
shaped by both the requirements of various practices and the constraints imposed by 
operating with a certain set of linguistic forms. In addition, the indispensability of 
signs to both empty and fulfilled, or improper and proper, understanding can be 
appreciated. Signs are required by fulfilled understanding, since this presupposes 
being presented (or ‘indicated’) in some articulation by linguistic forms. But they are 
also required for empty understanding since -  even in the absence of ‘fulfilment’ -  
routine language use is involved in the constitution of the instrumental nexus of 
Significance.
Finally, describing the function of linguistic signs as ‘instrumental’ introduces a 
potential misunderstanding due to an accident of historical usage. Locke, for 
example, describes language as ‘the great Instrument’ and words as instruments that
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man uses arbitrarily ‘as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind’ (1975, 402, 
[III. 1 .§ 1; cf. §5]). On this usage, language is merely a means (an ‘instrument’) for 
communicating thoughts that is extrinsic to, i.e. not essentially involved in, meaning 
constitution. Against this background it is often suggested that a conception of 
language that is ‘instrumentalist’ as such contrasts with any view which recognizes 
language as having a role in constituting intentionality.115 Yet there is no reason to 
assume that these two determinations necessarily exclude one another, i.e. that 
conceiving of language in instrumental terms rules out its having a role in constituting 
meaning. Moreover, although some of Heidegger’s comments in SZ (Story A above) 
might be seen as aligning him to an extrinsic view of instrumentality, such a view is 
neither directly entailed by his characterization of language as ‘Equipmental’ nor 
obviously reconcilable with the role he attributes to routine language use in 
conceptual conditioning. For these reasons I will be interpreting Heidegger’s views as 
relying on a notion of linguistic instrumentality that allows a more intimate link 
between language use and meaning constitution.
115 This instrumentalist-constitutive contraposition is found, for example, in Taylor (1985, 1995), 
Guignon (1983) and Lafont (1999, 2001). In her illuminating discussion of the role o f language in the 
German philosophical tradition Lafont (1999, 13-18) traces this distinction back to Humboldt.
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C h a p t e r  II
M e r l e a u -P o n t y : T h e  E x p r e s siv e  
A sp e c t  o f  L a n g u a g e
Merleau-Ponty’s approach to language is guided by his conviction that perception is a 
paradigmatic phenomenon that ‘teaches us [...] the true conditions of objectivity’ 
relevant to ‘the present and living being’ of cultural and historical phenomena such as 
language (Primat 67 f.). The influence of this paradigm is discernible in two defining 
characteristics of his conception of language. First, his views of perception and 
language both focus on the role of embodied finite agents. Merleau-Ponty does not, as 
Heidegger does, arrive at this focus through arguments against the coherence of the 
idea of transcendental subjectivity or its compatibility with phenomenology. Rather it 
was implicit from the start in his working assumption that a philosophical conception 
of subjectivity should reflect the findings of empirical biology and Gestalt 
psychology. But it led to similar commitments. Most notably, it led Merleau-Ponty to 
reject the ‘prejudice of the world’, the idea of an ‘exact world, entirely determined’ 
that is ‘posited first’ by ‘objective thinking’ (PdP 11, 39). The same motif is found in 
his later rejection of a fully explicit ideal language, or a ‘language before language’ 
(PdM 10), and clearly corresponds to Heidegger’s rejection of transcendental 
subjectivity as the atemporal being -  or ‘constant remaining’ (SZ 96) -  of fully 
constituted eidetic relations. So the second defining characteristic of Merleau-Ponty’s 
views is the rejection of what I shall call final determinacy, i.e. any state of 
determinacy that functions as the presupposed telos of intentionality. Eschewing this 
idea, the task for a philosophical conception of subjectivity or language becomes 
precisely to explicate how structures bearing determinate meaning are generated in 
actual experience -  i.e. to be a ‘phenomenology of the genesis’ of such structures 
(PdP xiii).
This chapter will centre on the way Merleau-Ponty’s resultant views on 
language and expression complement and modify the Heideggerian framework, in 
particular by explicating the idea of presentational sense. As with the preceding 
chapter’s treatment of the Heideggerian framework, this discussion will operate at
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two levels. The first two sections of this chapter -  corresponding to the two defining 
characteristics just mentioned -  draw primarily on The Structure o f Behaviour (SdC) 
and The Phenomenology o f Perception (PdP) to outline general features of Merleau- 
Ponty’s conception of language. The first introduces his view of language as 
behaviour expressing the biologically and phenomenologically ‘lived sense’ of 
embodied agents. The second examines how Merleau-Ponty’s view of intentional 
objects is shaped by his rejection of final determinacy and introduces his notion of 
‘indirect sense’. The next two sections concentrate on texts from the early 1950s and 
set out in greater detail the specific function that Merleau-Ponty supposes signs to 
have as bearers of indirect sense. This exegetic focus is explained by the fact -  as 
should become clear -  that Merleau-Ponty’s views underwent significant 
development at this time through his assimilation of Saussurean ideas.116 The third 
section therefore examines the structural and rational character of indirect sense 
suggested by Saussure’s views, whereas the fourth draws on Merleau-Ponty’s 
analogy with painting to shed light on its functioning, in particular its presentational 
function. The final section then explains how indirect sense can be taken as a 
phenomenologically plausible explication of the notion of presentational sense.
1. Language as the expression of lived sense
In PdP Merleau-Ponty characteristically introduces his view of linguistic expression 
by delimiting it from those he attributes to ‘empiricism’ and ‘intellectualism’ 
respectively. The ‘empiricist’ view thinks of language in terms of the causal efficacy 
(existence effective) of ‘verbal images’, or the ‘traces’ of previous language use (PdP 
203). Because this affords no role to the speaking subject, Merleau-Ponty sees the 
‘intellectualist’ position, according to which the meaning of linguistic utterances is 
constituted by the categorial operations of a pure thinking subject, as a modest 
improvement. Nevertheless, he objects that this -  essentially Kantian -  picture fails to 
account for the connection between thought and language: Although subjectivity is 
now involved, it is as the ‘thinking subject’ not the ‘speaking subject’; thought has
116 My exegetic strategy thus differs from the common approaches o f either periodizing Merleau- 
Ponty’s views on language (e.g. Fontaine-de Visscher 1974, 17 f.; Silvermann 1981) or approaching 
them from the perspective o f his late works (e.g. Dillon 1997; Madison 1981). Briefly this is because 
(a) Saussure’s views introduce the most important systematic development to Merleau-Ponty’s 
otherwise continuous view o f how language functions; (b) despite attempts to reconceive the 
ontological picture, VPs text and working notes provide no indication o f a significant modification to 
this view.
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meaning while ‘the word remains an empty envelope’, lacking ‘an efficacy of its own 
[efficacite propre]’ and functioning merely as an ‘exterior accompaniment’ of 
thought {PdP 206). Merleau-Ponty therefore concludes, somewhat enigmatically, that 
one surpasses both these positions through the ‘simple remark that the word has a 
sense [,sens]’, which is to imply that ‘the word, far from being the simple sign of 
objects and of meanings, inhabits things and is the vehicle of meanings [vehicle les 
significations]' {PdP 206, 207). This is of course a general point: Merleau-Ponty’s 
objection applies not only to the idea of a pure thinking subject, but to any postulated 
mode of meaning constitution that stands in a merely external relation to actual 
linguistic processes, i.e. to any view of language as an instrument in the extrinsic 
sense mentioned above (page 76), including attempts to construe linguistic signs 
simply as indications in the Husserlian sense {PdP 193, 211; cf. PdM 24).
Merleau-Ponty characterizes the more intimate link he discerns by observing 
that ‘thought tends towards expression as towards its completion’, such that ‘thought 
and expression are therefore constituted simultaneously’ {PdP 206, 213 f.). However, 
although there are certain experiences (e.g. literary writing) of which this Kleistian
11 7thought is perhaps literally true, such formulations are clearly challenging. Is one 
supposed to be incapable of having a thought without vocalizing it? Is it not 
obviously wrong to suggest that ‘the thinking subject himself is in a sort of ignorance 
about his thoughts as long as he has not formulated them for himself or even said or
1 1 ft_written them’? These claims are best interpreted not as simply reporting experience 
but criterially, as saying that what a thought is can be understood only in terms of its 
being expressed. The ‘tendency’ towards expression can then explained by the fact 
that the ability to express it in language is the best, and often the only, criterion of an 
agent’s having a certain thought. In this sense, to cite two of Merleau-Ponty’s own 
examples, the way thought ‘tends towards’ language is analogous to the way abilities 
to type or play a musical instrument are directed towards performance {SdC 131). In 
all these cases, just as Merleau-Ponty suggests, the relationship is one of culmination 
or accomplishment, such that a thought is nothing more precisely and more properly 
than its expression.
117 ‘The Frenchman says “l’app&it vient en mangeant” and this empirical principle remains true when 
one parodies it and says “l’id6e vient en parlant’” (Kleist 1990, 535).
118 PdP  206. In one passage Merleau-Ponty goes as far as to suggest that ‘my [own] acts o f speech 
surprise me’ (S 111).
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This view is not without its difficulties. To begin with, it seems simply to 
paraphrase the claim that linguistic expression is the realization of thought with the 
tautology that linguistic behaviour wouldn’t be what it is without the use of linguistic 
expressions. Nor is it clear that it improves on intellectualism’s failure to account for 
the ‘efficacite propre’ of words. For the claim that thought tends towards expression 
leaves the linguistic articulation of a thought looking simply like a final cause and 
does nothing to establish a constitutive role for language in the formation of thoughts. 
So if the distinctiveness and potential appeal of Merleau-Ponty’s position is to be 
understood, it is necessary to get clearer about the two aspects of what I shall call his 
inherence requirement: what is it for words to ‘inhabit’ things, or to be the ‘vehicle’ 
of significance?
Merleau-Ponty’s answer centres on the idea of what I shall call lived sense. 
This has an underlying biological aspect, according to which language is a kind of 
‘incarnate sense’. Thus the realization of sense through the body, Merleau-Ponty 
says, comprises ‘a primordial operation of meaning [signification) where the 
expressed does not exist apart from the expression’, this being ‘the central 
phenomenon of which body and spirit, sign and meaning are abstract aspects’ {PdP 
193). The emphasis in PdP on the body’s explanatory importance, together with a 
suggestive reliance on subjectivist terminology, might give the impression that 
Merleau-Ponty’s own position fails to meet the inherence requirement.119 For 
instance, his descriptions of the body as ‘a power of natural expression’ which we see 
‘secreting in itself a “sense”’ that it ‘project[s] onto its material surroundings and 
communicates to others’ {PdP 211, 230) might seem to imply that sense is constituted 
-  so to speak, as a transcendental medium -  by the body, and contingently 
externalized via linguistic signs. However, this impression can be dispelled by 
considering Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work The Structure o f Behaviour {SdC), which
1 9 0underlies many of his claims in PdP. Comparing biological and physical systems 
Merleau-Ponty there talks of ‘sense’ as something implicit in the ‘structure’ of the 
interaction between a system and its surroundings {SdC 112 f.). Rather than 
straightforwardly tending towards physical equilibrium with the outside, he 
distinguishes organisms as having a complex ‘structure’ that enables them
119 Though the limitations o f such terminology were astutely criticized by Jean Bauffret as early as 
1946 (cf. Primal 102 f.), Merleau-Ponty himself seems to have realized the need to develop an 
ontological picture appropriate to his views only much later. Cf. footnote 136.
120 Waldenfels (1976, 1981) brings out this continuity well with regard to the notion o f structure.
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interactively to ‘constitute an environment of their own’, as comprising a ‘unity of 
meaning’ with behaviour coordinated by ‘sense’ rather than physical ‘laws’ (SdC 
157, 169). So despite his suggestive formulations in PdP, Merleau-Ponty’s is not the 
subjectivist claim that the world acquires meaning (‘extrinsically’) in virtue of bodily 
sense-constitution projected outward by expressive acts. Rather, his idea is that sense 
is constituted by the interaction between an organism and its surroundings, that 
behaviour is so to speak the locus of sense, so that it is in virtue of being bodily
p i
behaviour that meaning is immanent in language. It is this view of sense as a 
biological feature manifested in behaviour which underlies PdP 's talk of ‘incarnate 
sense’ and its claim that linguistic expression, as ‘living sense’, ‘presents, or rather 
[...] is the subject’s taking up a position in the world of its meanings’ (PdP 225).
With regard to language an important ramification of this notion of 
biologically lived sense is found. As Merleau-Ponty explains it in PdP, ‘below the 
conceptual meaning of acts of speech [paroles]’ there is an ‘existential meaning’ 
which they do not simply translate, but which ‘inhabits’ and ‘is inseparable’ from 
them (PdP 212). In making this distinction Merleau-Ponty relies on empirical 
findings from Gestalt psychology. Thus in arguing the need for an ‘existential theory’ 
of aphasia, he discusses patients who are unable to sort a series of samples into colour 
groups. Because for them red samples fail to stand out as forming a group, these 
patients are unable to subsume particular cases under the colour concept. In more 
general terms, characteristic of Gestalt psychology, in failing to discern general 
patterns or saliences within experience in the way normal subjects do, such patients 
lose the ability to apply the ‘categorial attitude’ to experience and remain stuck in the 
‘concrete attitude’ (PdP 204 f., 222 f.). Despite this loss, however, such subjects 
reportedly retain the ability to use words where they are of ‘affective and vital 
interest’, leading Merleau-Ponty to distinguish between ‘the word as an instrument of 
action and as a means of disinterested denomination’ (PdP 204).
The simple absence of classificatory abilities contrasts with cases in which the 
categorial attitude is somehow preserved but fails to engage appropriately with its 
existential foundation. Merleau-Ponty illustrates this with the case of Schneider, a 
brain-damaged patient studied in detail by the Gestalt psychologists Gelb and 
Goldstein. Schneider’s impairment was such that his intellectual or judgemental
121 The notion o f behaviour was taken as central to SdC  precisely due to its neutrality between classical 
oppositions such as that between subject and object (SdC 2 f.; cf. 137).
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faculties were at some level left intact: he showed ‘no sign of a weakening of general
intelligence’ and retained the ability explicitly to subsume particulars under general
concepts (PdP 228, 148). His difficulty was that this general intelligence no longer
seemed attuned to human relevance. For instance, although motorically capable of
‘concrete’ movements -  such as those habitually acquired, or reflex responses to pain
-  and able to understand instructions concerning ‘abstract’ movements simply to
move his arm to a certain position, Schneider was unable to carry out the latter or,
generally speaking, spontaneously to translate intellectual understanding into motoric
action. In addition, Schneider manifested no sense of fictive or ‘virtual’ scenarios, nor
122of involvement in sexual or conversational interactions. With regard to language he 
had difficulty in understanding simple analogies and metaphors, even where these 
deployed familiar words -  familiarity which sometimes enabled him explicitly to 
reason out the analogy via their literal meanings (PdP 148 f.).
This distinction between the concrete and categorial, or existential and 
conceptual meaning, can be illuminated further by the corresponding distinction 
between ‘detachable’ (amovible) and ‘symbolic’ forms of behaviour discussed in SdC 
(115 ff, 130 ff.). Detachable forms of behaviour are already distinguished from 
straightforward ‘syncretic forms’, i.e. responses to stimuli that remain bound to ‘the 
material of certain concrete situations’, by being ‘relatively independent of the 
materials in which they realize themselves’ (SdC 115). Such behaviour involves a 
certain flexibility in responding purposively to given situations: e.g. chickens making 
relational sense of stimuli, rats choosing a shortest path without being confused by 
their initial direction, or chimpanzees exploiting the ‘instrumental value of an object’ 
(SdC 124). While such behaviours manifest some awareness of situations’ structure, 
‘the animal cannot adopt a point of view chosen at discretion with regard to objects’ 
and hence ‘cannot recognize a same thing in different perspectives’ (SdC 127 f.). In 
sum, detachable forms are ‘behaviour adapted to the immediate and not to the virtual, 
to functional values and not to things’ (SdC 130). By contrast ‘the “thing structure’” 
and ‘the sense of the virtual’ are made possible by and characterize ‘symbolic 
behaviour’ (SdC 128, 130). Here a ‘symbol’ is used to allow ‘substitutions of 
different points of view’, thus freeing ‘“stimuli” from actual relations’ or the
122 Cf. in particular PdP  120 ff , 181 ff., 228-9. What Schneider lacked was the ability to ‘situate 
himself in the virtual’, ‘the power to project before him a sexual world, to put himself in an erotic 
situation’, or quite generally to ‘polarize’ the world in terms of significance (PdP  126, 182, 130).
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‘functional values’ assigned to them by ‘the defined needs of the species’ (SdC 133). 
This type of feat, Merleau-Ponty further suggests, is explained by the ‘systematic 
principle’ inherent in a sign system along with the idea of a ‘structural 
correspondence’: ‘The true sign represents the signified [...] as long as its relation to 
other signs is the same as the relation of the object signified by it to other objects’ 
(SdC 132 f.).
At this point two important clarifications are possible. First, it is clearly 
symbolic behaviour that Merleau-Ponty has in mind in discussing the inherent sense 
of words in PdP. To be sure, both forms of behaviour manifest living or ‘biological 
sense’ (SdC 19), and this explains Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term ‘inhabitation’ to
p i
characterize the intimacy of bodily presence in the world. In addition, as already 
hinted, the use of linguistic signs -  the word as an instrument -  is already possible in 
detachable or concrete behaviours. But whereas there the ‘vocal sign does not 
mediate any reaction to the general meaning of the stimulus’ (SdC 131), in symbolic 
behaviour the use of an expression is essential to cross-situational organization. 
Moreover, insofar as the articulation of thought is linked with the ‘systematic 
principle’ underlying a sign system, the means of mediation Merleau-Ponty suggests 
-  although in itself in need of explication -  would plausibly explain thought’s 
‘tendency’ towards expression. Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, it is only in 
symbolic behaviour that linguistic expressions mediate, i.e. are the vehicle of, sense; 
such behaviour does not ‘have’, but ‘is’ itself meaning [signification].124
Second, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Schneider serves to highlight certain 
competences tacitly at work in normally engaged subjectivity. As such, the force of 
his claims does not rely on their reliability as empirical hypotheses, but on the use of 
this case as a paradigm exemplifying certain deficiencies -  a role that might be
p c
equally well fulfilled by a fictive patient. Thus in discussing various possibilities of 
disintegration Merleau-Ponty aims to show that to be (causally) effective in the 
sensible world intellectual capacities require ‘orientation’, i.e. they must connect with 
practically and emotionally significant features of lived experience. Corresponding to
123 E.g. PdP  162; cf. also 161 which similarly talks o f the body ‘haunting’ its environment.
124 This formulation o f SdC  133 anticipates the distinction between ‘having’ (existential) sense and 
‘being’ (predicative) sense o f PdP  203n.
125 As empirical claims o f course, Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations o f experiments might prove 
scientifically anachronistic; alternatively, the Schneider case might seem an inadequate inductive basis 
for his confident extrapolations. Indeed, the reliability of even that case might be questioned 
(cf.Gardner 1977, 142-151).
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the concrete and categorial attitudes, this involves the distinct feats of picking out
practically and emotionally significant features as figure-ground saliences in the lived
1world, and organizing these saliences into intellectual categories. What makes 
Schneider’s case of particular interest to Merleau-Ponty is that, despite embodying 
intellectualist philosophical assumptions about the nature of subjectivity, he remains 
recognizably dysfunctional as a human agent in lacking the overall ability to connect 
the categorial attitude properly with the concrete attitude. This powerfully illustrates 
Merleau-Ponty’s claims that such ‘orientation’ is needed and that it must be 
understood as a bodily feat. The body ‘is the condition of possibility [...] for all 
expressive operations’ since -  to generalize Merleau-Ponty’s comments about the 
notion of space -  talk of the ‘body image’ [schema corporel] is ‘a way of expressing 
that my body is in the world [...] one’s own body is the third term, always implied, of 
the figure-ground structure’.127
Merleau-Ponty is clear, however, that ‘the theory of language must make its way 
through to the experience of speaking subjects’, so that the notion of lived sense also 
has a visible aspect: it is not simply lived through but experienced, phenomenological 
as well as biological.128 Correspondingly, several features of Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception of language seek to characterize our experience of language. Thus he 
highlights the transparent feel that language has in carrying our attention to the world, 
rather than opaquely fixing it on the signs used. The ‘marvel of language’, he says, is 
that we ‘forget’ it, that successful ‘expression erases itself before what is 
expressed’.129 In fact Merleau-Ponty considers this ‘transparency’ to be apparent 
rather than genuine, an effect of habitual familiarity not to be confused with attaining 
language-independent awareness of the world.130 He further suggests that an act of
126 Taylor (1989, 4-8) emphasizes and illuminates the importance o f such bodily orientation. Baldwin 
(2004, 12) correctly notes that bodily disorders such as Schneider’s are ‘not intelligible without 
reference to the body’s contribution to experience’. However, the underlying point o f Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussion is that ‘normal’ experience too is intelligible only with this contribution.
127 PdP 117, cf. 271. In the sense that it mediates the link between intellectual concepts and the sensory 
domain the ‘schema corporel’ might be viewed as analogous to Kant’s schematism (Kant 1983a, 187 
[B176] ff.). Merleau-Ponty’s notion o f ‘orientation’ is also reminiscent o f Kant’s appeal to subjective 
factors in geographical, mathematic and logical orientation (Kant 1983c, 270n).
128 PdM 23. Given the content of SdC and PdP, Barbaras’s (2005, 210 f.) claim that Merleau-Ponty’s 
use o f ‘living’ has the dual meaning of living and experiencing (i.e. Leben/Erleben, vivre/vivre 
quelque chose) is clearly plausible. My talk o f ‘lived sense’ is therefore intended to allow this 
ambiguity.
129 PdP 459; cf. similarly 221 and PdM 15, 58.
130 PdP 219. Cf. PdM 43 and 156, which talks o f the ‘illusion of an absolutely transparent expression’.
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speech (la parole) is ‘a true gesture’ containing its ‘sense’ in the same way as other
ni
gestures. This has several connotations for Merleau-Ponty. One is active uptake: 
‘The sense of gestures is not given but understood, that is, seized again by an act of 
the spectator’ (PdP 215). This disavows the behaviourist (or empiricist) idea that 
gestures might be learned passively by conditioning processes, but the 
phenomenology of such learning further implies that grasping a gesture, though 
spontaneous, is a nonintellectual act: ‘One day I “caught” the word [e.g.] “sleet” as 
one imitates a gesture [...]’; the word was ‘never inspected, analysed, known or 
constituted, but grabbed and taken on by a speaking power’; the ‘sense of a word’ is 
learnt like ‘the use of a tool, by seeing it employed in the context of a certain 
situation’ (PdP 461 f.; cf. 216). Moreover, gestures are grasped in relation to a form 
of life. As Merleau-Ponty points out, as humans we naturally have no sense of the 
‘sexual mimicry’ of other species, yet if the sense of a gesture ‘were given to me as a 
thing’ it would not be clear ‘why my comprehension of gestures is for the most part 
limited to human gestures’ (PdP 215). These phenomenological claims reflect 
Merleau-Ponty’s general (biological) view that the sense inherent in embodied 
behaviour is due to the way the world is presented in the optic of the organism’s 
vitality: ‘Behavioural gestures [...] do not pick out [ne visentpas] the true world or 
pure being, but being for the animal [...] a certain manner of dealing with the world, 
of “being in the world’” . But since even sexual or otherwise affective (e.g. anger) 
behaviours are not transcultural constants, the form of life to which gestures relate is 
also modulated by cultural factors. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, such behaviours are 
‘invented’ just as words are and ‘transcend’ the body’s ‘simply biological being’ to 
‘create meanings that are transcendent with regard to the anatomical arrangement and 
yet immanent in behaviour’ (PdP 220 f.). Thus it is in relation to a human blend of 
nature and culture that the ‘phonetic gesture [...] realizes for the speaking subject and 
for those listening a certain structuration of experience’ (PdP 225).
Two general features of this assimilation of language to gestural 
communication should be highlighted. The first -  reflected in the expression ‘to 
gesture at’ something -  is that gestures are more a matter of intimation than fully
131 PdP  214. Incidentally, Merleau-Ponty’s talk o f ‘gestural meaning’ -  as ‘immanent within speech’ 
and the basis o f ‘conceptual meaning’ (PdP 209) -  is clearly intended to be synonymous with 
‘existential meaning’ (PdP  225).
132 SdC  136. The basis o f  this view is Merleau-Ponty’s critique o f behaviourism, centring on the idea 
that the individuation o f environmental stimuli (perceptual ‘givens’) depends on an organism’s internal 
functioning (cf. SdC  1-64).
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determinate presentation.133 Extended to language, this means that ‘once “acquired”’ 
a word’s sense is ‘just as precise and just as little definable as the sense of a gesture. 
[...] The consciousness that conditions language is merely a global and inarticulate 
grasp of the world’ {PdP 462 f.). The second feature is closely connected: although a 
gesture only ‘outlines [dessine en pointille] an intentional object’, this ‘object 
becomes actual and is fully understood when my body’s powers adjust to and recover 
it’ {PdP 215 f.). Thus, in keeping with PdP’s overall focus on the body, the second 
feature is that gestures are fundamentally bodily behaviours. In this respect Merleau- 
Ponty likens gestures to perceptible things, the identity of which ‘through perceptual 
experience is merely another aspect of the identity of one’s own body’, and which 
comprise ‘a system of equivalences [...] under examination by a bodily presence’ 
{PdP 216).
There is, however, one feature that Merleau-Ponty sees distinguishing 
language from other kinds of gesture: ‘speech is capable of becoming sedimented and 
constituting an intersubjective acquisition’ -  ‘in the case of speech the expressive 
operation can be iterated indefinitely’ {PdP 221 f.). Because expressed concepts or 
thoughts can be reused or taken up {repris), one is able to ‘overcome the temporal 
dispersion of the phases of thought’, meaning that ‘speech is precisely the act through 
which thought eternalizes itself as truth’ {PdP 441, 445). This interplay of speech and 
sedimentation is intended to address an enduring central requirement of Merleau- 
Ponty’s overall metaphysical picture by accounting for the genesis of the ‘mental 
landscape’ in lived experience, i.e. by indicating how the mode of being of explicit 
ideas is constitutively linked with acts performed by embodied subjects.134 Merleau- 
Ponty further believes that the phenomenon of sedimentation also distinguishes 
language from other forms of expression, such as music or painting. The difference, 
as presented in PdP, is that whereas acts of speech consciously take up and are 
founded on previous acts of linguistic expression, music and painting do not depend 
on antecedent acts of expression, so that ‘each artist takes up his task from the 
beginning’ {PdP 221). An obvious objection to this -  that an artist’s work is similarly 
conditioned by the personal, historical, and discursive situation -  is accommodated by
133 This feature -  to be discussed in the sequel -  makes the mode o f gestural expression appropriate to 
the ‘principle o f indeterminacy’ that in Merleau-Ponty’s view pervasively characterizes human 
existence (PdP  197).
134 PdP 217. Merleau-Ponty requires: ‘What one calls an “idea” is necessarily linked to an act of  
expression and owes to this its appearance o f autonomy’ (PdP  447; cf. 212 and V I196 ff.).
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his later concession that painting too is capable o f  sedimentation {PdM 139 ff.). 
Refining his earlier claim, Merleau-Ponty now suggests a distinction between 
sedimentation that ‘accumulates’ and sedimentation which ‘integrates’. Unlike 
painting, which ‘accumulates’ or juxtaposes its productions over history, language is 
to ‘integrate’, i.e. preserve and develop, its past products and so to establish the realm 
of ‘integral’ truths {PdM 142 f.). This distinction is motivated by Merleau-Ponty’s 
conviction that the development of language is animated by the aim of establishing 
stable bodies of truth, and that this requires ‘integration’, with the result that whereas 
sedimentation is possible for painting, it necessarily shapes linguistic expression.
Against this background it is possible to identify two basic problems with Merleau- 
Ponty’s views around the time of PdP which would be improved on by his 
subsequent appropriation of Saussurean ideas. The first is that although the notion of 
biologically and phenomenologically lived sense explains in some detail how words 
are ‘inhabited’ by sense, Merleau-Ponty’s early view of how they are the ‘vehicle’ of 
sense is less developed. To be sure, in telling us that expression realizes thought and 
that language builds up a stable matrix of ‘sedimented’ relations Merleau-Ponty hints 
at how words are the bearer -  and in this sense the vehicle -  of meaning. 
Furthermore, in SdC he had appealed to the ‘systematic principle’ underlying 
relations between signs to explain their mediative role in symbolic behaviour. But his 
early attempts to explicate further how words are involved in the mechanics of 
articulating thought -  what exactly their ‘efficacite propre’ consists in -  are less than 
convincing. This can be seen in a passage evincing PdP's view of how syntactic and 
lexical forms bear their meaning. Arguing against the idea that linguistic signs are 
conventional, Merleau-Ponty picturesquely suggests that if one takes into account 
their ‘gestural sense’, ‘words, vowels and phonemes are so many ways of singing the 
world’ {PdP 218). He expands on this with the hypothetical suggestion that, if it were 
possible to eliminate all ‘mechanical’ phonetic rules, foreign-language influence, and 
grammatical rationalizations from a language, the result would be an ‘emotional 
essence’, a ‘somewhat reduced system of expression’ in which, say, ‘it is not arbitrary 
to call light “light” if one calls night “night” {PdP 218). In the analogy with singing 
and language’s supposed emotionally expressive core it is not difficult to discern 
echoes of Condillac and Rousseau’s, and even Herder’s, speculations concerning the
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origin of language. Nonetheless, it is tempting to doubt the coherence of this 
hypothetical construction and to object that stripped of grammatical and phonetic 
regularities a language would not be a system of expression at all; further that by 
lacking systematicity it would also lack the means to be genuinely expressive. But, 
even indulging Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis, it is difficult to see the claim that pairs of 
words, such as ‘lumiere’ and ‘nuit’, stand in some deep-seated emotional contrast as 
anything more than an article of faith. Whatever the attractions of this view, it is 
hardly a convincing characterization of linguistic representation. The fact, say, that 
tables are distinguished from chairs, or light from dark, and correspondingly referred 
to with different general terms is surely a perceptive or cognitive response to the 
world rather than an ‘emotional’ one. Merleau-Ponty’s motivation for these claims 
can nonetheless be understood and is revealing. As his discussion of the relationship 
between ‘existential’ and ‘conceptual’ meaning makes clear, he is attempting to 
identify preconceptual aspects of language that would parallel his critique of 
objective thinking about perception. His aim, here as there, is to describe the 
‘prepredicative’ level of ‘operant intentionality’ {PdP xiii). However, lacking the 
conceptual means to do this convincingly, in PdP he resorts to vague and clearly 
inadequate metaphors -  ‘singing the world’, ‘emotional gesticulation’ {PdP 219) — 
suggested by his overall somatocentric perspective and vague analogies with artistic 
expression. As a result PdP ultimately fails in its aspiration to articulate what it is for 
linguistic signs to be a ‘vehicle’ of meaning.
The second basic problem is that PdP's assimilation of language to other 
bodily behaviour obscures its ontological character. This can be seen by considering a 
passage describing the persistence of linguistic entities, i.e. words, over time, which 
compares ‘the presence [...] of the words I know’ with that of perceptible objects and 
perceptive horizons. For words to endure, Merleau-Ponty suggests, it ‘suffices that I 
possess its articulatory and acoustic essence as one of the modulations, one of the 
possible uses of my body’ {PdP 210). However, since words are routinely longer 
lived than the ‘fleeting hold’ {prise glissante; PdP 462) that mortal subjects have on 
them, this clearly cannot be the whole story. Merleau-Ponty recognizes this in
135 Particularly Rousseau’s view that ‘the first languages were singing and impassioned’ -  a view also 
hinted at by Condillac (1971, 180-1) -  and only later acquired grammatical structure (Rousseau 1990 
67, 73). The claim that certain (linguistic) sounds naturally express feelings, passions, or emotions is 
common not only to Condillac (1971, 172, 228 f., 237) and Rousseau (1990, 114, 126), but also -  at 
least with words for things lacking characteristic sounds -  to Herder (1966, 57).
criticizing Descartes’ failure to consider the importance of acquired language -  the 
‘spoken cogito’ -  and underlining the ‘power of language’ to make things ‘exist’ and 
to open up ‘new dimensions, new landscapes to thought’. However, he then brushes 
aside the idea, as he puts it, that language ‘envelops us’, suggesting that this would be 
to ‘forget half the truth’ {PdP 460). Merleau-Ponty himself focuses one-sidedly on 
this other half of the truth, that presupposed by explicit language use, which he 
enigmatically refers to as ‘a tacit cogito’, ‘a silence of consciousness that envelops 
the speaking world’. He characterizes this as ‘a motoric presence’, such that a word’s 
‘generality is not that of the idea, but that of a style of behaviour which my body 
“understands”’ {PdP 461 f.).
But here a tension in Merleau-Ponty’s account emerges. On the one hand, if 
the tacit cogito’s motoric presence is individuated so as to correspond to individual 
bodies, then its existence is equally ‘fleeting’ or transient and a more sophisticated 
account of linguistic entities’ persistence is required -  i.e. of how the horizontal 
structure of language is distributed over many speakers and equally many tacit 
cogitos. On the other hand, there are some passages in which Merleau-Ponty stresses 
the distributed, or transindividual, character of language: ‘The sense of a word [...] is 
above all the aspect it takes on in a human experience [...]. It is a meeting of the 
human and inhuman, it is like a behaviour of the world’ {PdP 462). If, as such 
passages seem to suggest, the tacit cogito’s motoric presence is an aspect of the 
world-as-agent, it surely would provide a context sufficiently comprehensive to 
account for the horizontal structure of language. But the price would be to obscure 
and perhaps destroy the force of Merleau-Ponty’s methodological and explanatory 
reliance on lived experience: for it would then be unclear in what relation the tacit 
cogito’s motoric presence stands to that of individual bodies, and indeed in what 
sense the tacit cogito is a ‘cogito’. This tension is part of a general problem with 
PdP’s exclusive focus on the body as a transcendental explanans. Presumably it is 
such tensions that eventually led Merleau-Ponty to seek an ontology more suited to 
his views and so to a decentred metaphysical idiom.136 But it is particularly acute with 
regard to language. For the attempted reduction of linguistic entities to motoric
136 Including explicit rejection o f the ‘tacit cogito’ (V I222, 227). -  While it seems correct to claim that 
this development was necessitated by certain aspects o f his thinking -  e.g. his treatments o f expression 
or nature (cf. Barbaras 1993, 2005) -  it seems to me that the need extends back to S d C s attempts to 
clarify the relationship between nature and consciousness using an ontologically undetermined notion 
of behaviour.
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presence is latently subjectivist, fails to acknowledge that linguistic objects’ mode of 
persistence differs from that (say) of physical objects, and fails to distinguish 
linguistic sense from that of other embodied behaviours. These defects all indicate the 
ontological evanescence of language in PdP, which fails not only to characterize the 
linguistic horizon specifically, but even to acknowledge that language is a distinct 
kind of horizon with its own ontological import.
Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s views should be distinguished from some conceptions of 
expression that are common, particularly in aesthetics. To begin with it contrasts with 
the view that ‘expression’ is primarily about externalizing emotions or other 
subjective states. Despite PdP's emphasis on ‘emotional’ and bodily significance, 
Merleau-Ponty always conceived of expression as a complex function, occurring at 
the subject-object interface of behaviour and shaped by the ‘system “me-others- 
things’” (PdP 69; cf. PdM 95). So although this clearly emerges only in later attempts 
to develop a decentred ontological picture, it is at least an implication of Merleau- 
Ponty’s approach -  from SdC onwards -  that expression has multiple inputs and is
1T7not specifically concerned with the extemalization of subjective states. 
Furthermore, his view of expression as the ‘realization’ of thought cannot be thought
1TR •of as contrasting with representation or the literal. It therefore differs not only from 
the simplistic view of expression as flowing from a person’s ‘feelings or his 
character’, but also from more refined views that distinguish expressive properties, 
say, as ‘those properties of art works (or natural objects) whose names also designate 
intentional states of persons’, as contrasting with a work’s ‘representational 
properties’, or as ‘metaphorically exemplified’ in contrast to those properties (e.g.
i OQ
consisting of certain colours, shapes etc.) a work literally exemplifies. For insofar 
as linguistic expression effects the formulation or embodiment of thoughts, it 
obviously cannot be opposed to the cognitively relevant and hence precedes 
distinctions between the literal and the metaphorical, or representation and
137 Though he continued to talk of linguistic ‘gestures’, after PdP  Merleau-Ponty no longer refers to 
them as ‘emotional’. Moreover, it is precisely the view o f modem art as self-expression that his theory 
of expression sought to overcome (cf. PdM  76 ff. and section 4.(i) below).
138 Collingwood (1958, 122) similarly holds that ‘a person who expresses something thereby becomes 
conscious o f what it is that he is expressing’. He also parallels Merleau-Ponty in likening language to 
gestures and in his (similarly misleading) account o f linguistic expression as founded in emotional 
meaning (cf. Collingwood 1958, 243, 225 ff.).
139 Cf. Carnap 1935, 27 ; Tormey 1971, 128; Wollheim 1992, 12 ff.; Goodman 1976, 85 respectively.
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expression. Thus overall Merleau-Ponty’s conception of expression is of a very 
general kind, corresponding to that found in Dilthey and underlying Heidegger’s 
formal indication. Its concern is with what Charles Taylor (1985, 238) describes as 
‘expressive power, the power to make things manifest’, where ‘what is made manifest 
is not exclusively, not even mainly, the self, but a world’.
2. Creative expression and the aspectual presence of language
A pervasive motif in Merleau-Ponty’s discussions is his likening of linguistic to 
artistic expression. Already in PdP (213) painting and music are appealed to as 
uncontroversial examples of expression in which sense is inherently realized. But the 
model of artistic expression subsequently assumed a more central role in Merleau- 
Ponty’s discussions of language, finding its most extensive treatment in the 
discussions of literary expression and painting in The Prose o f the World (PdM). This 
model has an intuitive link with what Merleau-Ponty sees as a basic distinction 
between two different modes of expression. In presenting this distinction among acts 
of speech (parole) Merleau-Ponty’s terminology varies: he refers to ‘authentic’ and 
‘constituted’ speech, speech that is ‘original’ or ‘secondary’, ‘speaking’ or (already) 
‘spoken’, and finally ‘transcendental’ or ‘empirical’ speech. Nevertheless, rather than 
hinting at a rich typology of kinds of speech, in each of these pairings the first term 
refers to acts in which ‘new sense’ is generated as opposed to reusing previously 
available ‘sedimented’ sense.140 This tendency is perhaps at its clearest in the 
distinction between ‘original’ speech, which Merleau-Ponty exalts as ‘the primordial 
function of expression’, and ‘secondary’ speech (PdP 446). However, the message 
common to these terminological variants is that a certain mode of language use is 
philosophically primary: that to say something is, properly speaking, to say 
something new; to speak ‘authentically’ is to create new sense; this being the 
‘transcendental’ mode of expression that forms the paradigmatic act in relation to 
which all speech must be understood. To avoid both terminological confusion and
140 The distinction between ‘authentic speech’ -  which ‘gives rise to a new sense’ (PdP 226) -  and 
‘secondary expression’ occurs first (PdP 207n). Authentic speech is then referred to as ‘original 
speech’ (PdP  208n), which in turn is counterposed with the ‘constituted speech’ o f ‘everyday life’ that 
presupposes ‘the decisive step o f expression’ (PdP 214; cf. 253). Authentic speech is further linked 
with ‘speaking speech’ ( ‘the significative intention finds itself in statu nascendV) as opposed to 
‘spoken speech’ (PdP  229). Further contrapositions between ‘secondary speech’ and ‘original speech’, 
as well as between ‘empirical speech’ ( ‘the word as an acoustic phenomenon’) and ‘transcendental or 
authentic speech’ are found at PdP 446 and 448 respectively.
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implicit acceptance of Merleau-Ponty’s primacy claims, the following discussion 
will, however, refer to the two modes of speech distinguished by the use of old and 
new sense as established and creative expression respectively.141
Merleau-Ponty describes these two modes of expression as differing 
phenomenologically. Whereas already ‘spoken language’ ‘disappears before the sense 
of which it has become the bearer’, ‘speaking language’ is to lead one ‘from the signs 
to the sense’, i.e. makes one aware of signs’ mediation {PdM 17). To illustrate what 
this amounts to he concentrates on literary experience as a model. Although this 
phenomenon relies on the use of established words, Merleau-Ponty likens 
communally shared language to an ‘anonymous corporality’ which conveys others to 
us only schematically or ‘in general’.142 At the same time in ‘speaking’ speech it is 
susceptible to small modulations, a ‘coherent deformation’ of established language, 
that Merleau-Ponty characterizes using the notion of ‘style’.143 In literary experience, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, we see that the words used by a writer, such as Stendhal, 
are to have been ‘subjected to a secret torsion’ investing them with ‘new sense’ {PdM
19). The ‘moment of expression’, he says, occurs when the ‘book takes possession of 
the reader’, who responds by acquiring, for example, ‘Stendhal’s language’ {PdM
20).
Now it might be disputed that this is a representative description of linguistic, 
or even literary, experience. However, whatever else the experience involves, perhaps 
it is plausible that in literature we are exposed to and become to some extent familiar 
with an author’s idiolect. Yet, if this is allowed, what exactly distinguishes creative 
expression as philosophically primary? Merleau-Ponty sometimes relies on the idea 
of genetic priority, such that creative expression’s primacy lies simply in that 
established uses of language must at some time have been initiated: first use is 
original, established use is derivative. Indeed he often suggests that reusing linguistic 
expressions in a previously established sense is not really to say anything at all, and
141 Though it should be noted that such terminological variations could be seen as reflecting Merleau- 
Ponty’s view o f  indirect sense, since ‘truly expressive speech [...] feels its way around an intention to 
signify’ {PdM  64), so to speak circling in on an idea, rather than purporting to capture it directly with 
univocal terminology.
142 PdM  195. For Merleau-Ponty the initial impression o f possessing a common language is 
approximative, superficial, or perhaps even illusory: ‘We speak and we understand each other, at least 
at first sight’ {PdM  32).
143 PdM  85, cf. 84 and PdP  209. See Frank (1999a, 1999b) for an interesting development o f  the nature 
and philosophical relevance of (ultimately) individual style which, though not drawing on it directly, is 
very much in line with Merleau-Ponty’s thinking.
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that really, truly, or properly (‘speakingly’) to say something means forging new 
meaning.144 This sometimes translates into a pejorative attitude towards noncreative 
expression, reminiscent of Heidegger’s treatment of routine language use (Gerede): 
The previously ‘constituted speech’ of ‘everyday life’ presupposes ‘expression’s 
decisive step’, established ways of speaking are ‘banal’, ‘already formed meanings’ 
which ‘excite in us only secondary thoughts’ (PdP 214).
But Merleau-Ponty also relies on a more important, transcendental line of 
thought, which I shall call the new sense argument. Thus he assumes (quite 
reasonably) that unless the phenomenon of communication is to be an illusion, 
speakers must be able to learn something new from utterances. To explain this fact 
without appealing to an antecedently constituted realm of meanings such as 
transcendental subjectivity or a ‘pure language’ requires, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, an 
account of how ‘new sense’ is constituted (PdP 208; PdM 12 f.). However, as the 
conditions of intelligibility of speech are effectively the same from the first and third 
personal perspectives -  literary experience reminds us that ‘to speak to and to be 
spoken to’ is ‘the same thing’ (PdM 197) -  the new sense argument applies not only 
to communication, but also to the expression of one’s own thoughts.145 Reflecting this 
thought, that both communication and thinking rely on creative expression, Merleau- 
Ponty proposes that ‘the fundamental fact of expression’ is that the signifier makes 
possible reference to a signified which ‘exceeds’ or ‘transcends’ it.146 Speech he 
describes as the ‘paradoxical operation’ which uses ‘already available meanings’ to 
realize ‘an intention which on principle goes beyond and modifies, in the final 
analysis itself fixes, the sense of the words by which it is translated’ (PdP 445 f.).
As arguments for the philosophical primacy of creative expression these are 
unconvincing. First, the importance of genetic priority is counterbalanced in the -  
integrating, sedimentary -  case of language by the fact, as Merleau-Ponty freely 
concedes, that creative expression itself relies on taking up ‘already available 
meanings, the result of previous acts of expression’.147 But if established language is 
just as essential to new sense constitution as vice versa, their relationship is clearly 
one of interdependence rather than one-sided priority. In addition, the new sense
144 Cf. PdM  30, 21. Also the curious suggestion that to ‘say something important’ implies saying 
something original that ‘imposes’ its sense (PdP 445, cf. 460).
145 Cf. S 113 f. Thus coinciding with the idea that thought is realized in linguistic expression.
146 S 112. Merleau-Ponty talks o f ‘exces’ at PdP  447, PdM  9, 24, and S  104, 112; and of 
‘transcendence’ at PdP  449.
147 PdP  213, cf. also 217 and P dM 20.
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argument, as Merleau-Ponty presents it, is faulted. To begin with it trades on an 
ambiguity as to whether learning ‘something new’ means new facts or new ways of 
saying things. Yet once disambiguated it is obvious that learning new facts does not 
entail learning new ways of using words, leaving it far from clear that new sense 
constitution is needed to explain, say, the phenomenon of communication. Despite 
these arguments’ inadequacies, however, it is true that Merleau-Ponty’s overall 
position structurally requires an account of new sense constitution, since his rejection 
of final determinacy commits him to explicating how determinate meaning is 
generated in actual experience. This structural need, which both SdC and PdP seek to 
address, can be seen to underlie Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on both the inherent 
realization of sense in expression and creative expression. Indeed it also explains 
some of the more obscure features of Merleau-Ponty’s views, such as his interest in 
the emergence of the ‘first word’ from the ‘silence’ underlying language -  again 
echoing the Condillac-Rousseau-Herder tradition’s speculations about the origin of 
language -  and his somewhat mischievous suggestion that philosophical reflection on 
language should foster awareness of the ‘paradox of expression’ and the ‘mystery’ of 
language.148
Now while it is perhaps helpful to understand why Merleau-Ponty focused on 
creative, and in particular artistic, expression, for the present purposes it actually 
matters very little whether or not creative expression is thought of as explanatorily 
primary. Rather than being thought of as identifying a transcendental, original or 
authentic function of language, Merleau-Ponty’s discussions can here be thought of 
simply as shedding light on certain kinds of language use. Nonetheless, to understand 
what these are and how they explicate the notion of presentational sense, it is 
necessary to consider the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ -  or ‘lateral’ -  
sense which Merleau-Ponty links with established and creative expression 
respectively.
The idea of ‘indirect’ sense is central to Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of language 
after PdP. He introduces it as contrasting with the ‘direct sense’ of ‘already acquired 
expressions’, which ‘corresponds point for point to the turns, the forms, of instituted
148 On the former cf. PdM  60 f., PdP 217 and 462 f.; on the latter PdM  160, 162, 165 and PdP  448 f. 
Emphasizing the fact that language expresses something which did not antecedently exist as ‘paradox’ 
or ‘mystery’ can be interpreted as urging a pious attitude towards the ineffability o f the ‘silence’ 
underlying language (e.g. by Kwant 1966, 184-191).
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words’. It is the ‘sense of expressions in the course of making themselves [en train de 
se faire]\ resulting ‘from the commerce of words themselves’, that is ‘lateral’ or 
‘indirect’ {PdM 64 f.; cf. S 53). Although this direct-indirect distinction clearly 
corresponds to that between established and creative expression, what exactly is 
meant by ‘indirect’ sense is difficult to pin down. This is perhaps partly because some 
of the relevant texts were incomplete and only published posthumously, but also 
because Merleau-Ponty clearly applies the label to several theses. Thus the 
‘indirectness’ of linguistic meaning variously refers to the fact that signs play a role 
in mediating awareness of the world, alludes to the Saussurean emphasis on 
differences between signs, including its holism, and hints at the unspoken, implicit 
content of linguistic acts. The following two sections of this chapter will have task of 
exploring the positive aspects of this view. However, to understand the demarcation 
intended by the label ‘indirect’, it will be helpful to begin by focusing on what he is 
rejecting, i.e. by asking: What does Merleau-Ponty mean by ‘direct’ sense?
This question is complicated by equivocation in Merleau-Ponty’s use of the 
term ‘direct’. In the definition just quoted ‘directness’ simply denotes conformity to 
established or ‘instituted’ patterns of language use. Merleau-Ponty takes such 
conformity to characterize both everyday language use and mathematical or 
‘algorithmic’ thinking {PdP 214; PdM 180). In contrast to what he considers the 
‘fundamental fact of expression’ this makes both of these ‘secondary’ phenomena as 
they fail to exploit the expressive potential of terms and leave signs functioning as 
‘simple indices of uni vocal thought’ {PdP 446). However, despite thus attempting to 
downplay its importance for a philosophical conception of language, Merleau-Ponty 
clearly accepts that linguistic sense can be ‘direct’ in this way.
The same cannot be said of a second, highly consequential, demarcation 
Merleau-Ponty makes with the term ‘direct’. This concerns the implications of the 
paradigm of perception, specifically Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of final determinacy, 
on the mode of givenness of intentional objects.149 The intended demarcation is most 
succinctly expressed in the statement that all perception is ‘indirect or even inverted 
in relation to an ideal of adequation which it presumes, but which it does not look at 
face on’ {RdC 12). The ideal of adequation relied on here is Husserl’s view of it as 
the sum total of all possible experiential ‘evidences’ in relation to the perceived
149 These implications are brought out well by Charron’s (1972, 69-138) insightful exposition o f  
Merleau-Ponty’s views on language.
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object.150 By thus integrating over all possible perceptions, such an ideal is supposed 
to eliminate perspectival properties and become something like the ‘full’ (or 
‘absolute’) presence of the object. In Merleau-Ponty’s view remaining true to lived 
experience means rejecting this kind of idealization, so that perception ‘can only be 
grasped via certain of its parts or certain of its aspects’ (Primat 49). And while this 
clearly echoes Husserl’s analysis of perception in terms of ‘adumbrations’
(Abschattungen), Merleau-Ponty differs decisively in assuming no fully present and 
fully determinate object as its telos. Instead Merleau-Ponty attempts to conceive of 
the functioning of language without reference to such an ideal, underlining that ‘it is 
necessary to see [...] that [the act of] meaning [la signification] does not transcend 
the factual presence of signs’ (PdM 148 f.). His approach therefore takes a 
‘decentring as the foundation o f sense’ -  ‘the thing is not frontal’, but ‘given in an 
indirect grasp’ (PdM 63n). This mirrors his view of the ‘perceived thing’ as ‘an open 
totality’, ‘an indefinite number of perspective views that match up according to a 
certain style, a style which defines the object concerned’ (Primat 49). Indeed such 
emphasis on the openness, or ongoing processuality, of intentional phenomena is a 
hallmark of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking overall: perception an is ‘open field’, human 
experience an ‘open totality whose synthesis cannot be achieved’, the world even an 
‘open unity’ or ‘incomplete work’.151 The second sense o f ‘indirectness’ is therefore 
to preclude reliance on the idea of idealized ‘fully present’ intentional objects.
It might be objected that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception is faulted and 
so cannot be generalized in this way. After all, in the case of perception of a 
physically present object the goal of adequation seems to be underwritten by the 
existence of a material substrate. So although an object is only ever perceived 
perspectivally (in ‘adumbrations’), it seems reasonable, necessary even, to posit a 
kind of direct (physical) presence that underwrites the idea of adequacy. So one might 
object that Merleau-Ponty’s view fails to acknowledge a key feature of perception, 
viz. that it is a pars pro toto operation in which experienced adumbrations relate to a 
determinate whole. Whatever the case may be with perception, there is a disanalogy 
which, I suggest, makes his conclusions more convincing in the case of language. For 
unless one is a platonist it is not clear what could correspond here to the physical
150 For Husserl’s view o f ‘adequate evidence’ as the consummation, or complete sum, o f relative 
experiential ‘evidences’, cf. Husserl 1992d, 16 [§6].
151 RdC 12; PdP  254, 465. As highlighted by Waldenfels (1976), this emphasis on the openness of  
structure and human behaviour goes back to SdC (cf. 125).
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object as a determinate whole. Hence, whether or not one agrees with his analysis of 
sense perception, Merleau-Ponty seems right to highlight that the intentional objects 
of linguistic discourse cannot generally be thought of as having a direct, fully 
determinate, presence in the world. This has the profound consequence that on 
Merleau-Ponty’s view there is no such thing as a fully ‘adequate’ saying of what is 
meant. Or rather, the term ‘adequacy’ no longer makes sense: Because the presence 
of thoughts in the world is realized in linguistic expression, the implication is that
1 S')thought itself is constitutively indirect, aspectual, or perspectival. Fully
representing ‘content’ in language is impossible -  ‘expression is never total’ -
1precisely because there is no such thing as full content.
Many of Merleau-Ponty’s claims about language respond to a need to 
reinterpret the ‘representational’ function of language entailed by this repudiation of 
direct statement of thoughts. One example is his rejection of the idea of a language 
‘of things’ themselves (cf. PdM 7-8, 92 f.). The thought behind this is presumably 
that a full direct presentation of objects would make sense of language’s 
accountability to its objects, and enable it ‘in principle’ to represent them fully. But 
Merleau-Ponty’s disavowal of the adequacy ideal implies that there is no 
aperspectival object of accountability, so that 'the very idea o f adequate expression, 
that o f a signifier which comes to cover exactly the signified* becomes ‘inconsistent’ 
(PdM 42). Linguistically expressed thoughts, on this model, constitute not a presence 
but an absence, a ‘determinate void’, such that ‘the meanings in speech are always 
ideas in the Kantian sense, the poles of a certain number of convergent acts of 
expression which magnetize discourse without for their part being properly given’ (S 
112). As a consequence, precision of expression must be understood without recourse 
to an ideal standard. Linguistic expression can no longer be thought of as gravitating 
towards unequivocally determinate thoughts or structures. Instead it serves to shut 
down indeterminacy, constraining possible interpretations sufficiently for 
equivocation, to all intents and purposes, to be eliminated: ‘the very idea of
152 The view that language should be modelled on perception, realizes (or ‘constitutes’) thought, and is 
hence perspectival in character was later (1960) echoed by Gadamer (1990, 451 ff.). For a lucid 
contemporary discussion o f intentionality as perspectival see chapter 1 o f Crane 2001, especially pp. 4- 
8, 18-21.
153 5  112, cf. 54. -  Note that this is not simply about limits o f ‘representation’, but a constraint on the 
mode of presence o f what is ‘represented’. A photo o f a house, for example, is limited in the sense that 
it depicts only one view o f it; the indirect objects of language are akin to the painting o f a fictive 
house, which is not only depicted from one viewpoint but exists in no other.
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accomplished expression is chimerical: what we call [accomplished expression] is 
successful communication’; ‘all expression is perfect to the degree that it is 
understood unequivocally’.154 Thus the ideal of fully determinate presence yields to 
the pragmatic criterion of successful communication as a standard of univocity.
Merleau-Ponty seems to have thought of the two senses of directness 
distinguished here as connected. In cases ‘where it seems to us that what is expressed 
is itself attained [...] it is simply that the gesture is habitual, that our take up is 
immediate, and that it does not demand from us any reorganization of our ordinary 
operations’ {PdM 43; italics added). It is fairly simple to see how this association 
might arise: when talking in established ways communication generally succeeds, so 
that it can seem that we are somehow speaking the language of things themselves.155 
But even if they suggest one another in this way, it is important to be clear that the 
two notions of directness are quite distinct: one concerns the relation to established 
regularities, the other to an idealized presence of thoughts. At the same time, there is 
a common feature in that both hint at a standard of determinacy, or univocity: in the 
first case direct sense appears to be unequivocally laid out in (‘corresponds point for 
point to’) established patterns of language use in which there are no ‘gaps’ (lacunes); 
in the second case direct sense lies in conformity to the fully determinate presence of 
(intentional) objects -  an ‘eidetics of language [...] of univocal relations susceptible, 
in their structure as in their functioning, to total explication’ (S 105 f.). Thus 
‘directness’ also implies a lack of equivocation or ambiguity, so that a further point to 
Merleau-Ponty’s talk of ‘indirectness’ is to signal the absence of an objective 
standard of determinacy in language use.156
In summary, then, Merleau-Ponty’s talk of the ‘indirectness’ of linguistic 
sense stands for three (independent) theses, each marking the demarcation from a 
certain sense of ‘directness’: ‘Indirect’ sense is not explicable (a) in terms of 
established rules of language use; (b) in terms of an ideal of representational
154 PdM  41; S  112 (italics added), cf. also 114. -  On the ‘inadequate’ character o f linguistic expression 
see further also PdM  52 f., 79.
155 ‘It always seems to us that the processes o f experience codified in our language follow the very 
articulations of being because it is through [our language] that we learn to direct ourselves to [being] ’ 
{PdM  38).
156 In this respect the terms ‘indirect’ and ‘lateral’ correspond to the earlier emphasis on ‘ambiguity’, 
which, apart from an occasional distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ambiguity (e.g. Eloge 14; Inedit 
409), disappears after PdP. Perhaps this is because, as Sapontzis (1978, 542) has pointed out, in 
presupposing determinate meanings between which it prevails, the idea o f ambiguity is ill-suited to 
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking.
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adequacy; (c) in relation to an ideal standard of univocity. This, of course, tells us 
only what indirect sense is not. The following two sections will examine some of its 
positive aspects with a view to explicating the idea of presentational sense identified 
in chapter I.
Before doing so, this is a convenient point to highlight how the views set out in the 
last two sections fit into or augment the Heideggerian framework’s general picture of 
language. Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s approaches to language obviously have a 
lot in common. Both take concrete, finite agency -  ‘In-der-Welt-sein’ and ‘etre-au- 
monde’ respectively -  and lived experience as a starting point, while aiming to 
overcome the basic opposition of subject-object dualism. In addition both see 
predicative awareness as founded in something prepredicative on which their 
respective analyses focus: just as objective Things are founded in purposive 
Equipment for Heidegger, for Merleau-Ponty conceptual meaning is founded in 
existential meaning. Given this compatibility in approach, Merleau-Ponty’s reliance 
on the model of perception brings two important revisions to the Heideggerian picture 
previously outlined. First, Merleau-Ponty makes clear that embodiment is an essential 
aspect of finite agency, reminding us, so to speak, that Dasein is flesh and blood. 
Second, his repudiation of final determinacy leads to a view of intentional objects as 
indirect presences and constitutively open horizons unified by a certain style, rather 
than determinate full presences. The distinctiveness of this view can be highlighted 
by contrasting it with Heidegger’s conception of formal indication. To recall, 
Heidegger had conceived of linguistic signs as indeterminate/determinate pointers 
(‘indications’) to the performance of originary understanding in acts of ‘grounding
1 S7experience’. On this picture, apparently as with Merleau-Ponty, linguistic signs 
function by gesturing at or towards thoughts rather than fully embodying them, by 
intimating rather than stating outright. There is a fundamental difference, however, in 
that Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea of ‘grounding experience’ as a fully and finally 
determinate presentation of sense. So whereas Heidegger conceives of formal 
indication as constitutively inadequate gesturing towards original understanding, 
Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea of adequacy and accepts that the actual reality of 
understanding is perspectival, partial, or ‘indirect’. True to this commitment, as will
157 Cf. section 1.4 above.
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emerge in the sequel, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language provides a way of 
understanding the presentational function of language freed of reliance on the idea of 
a full and original ‘presence of sense’ that Derrida critically describes as ‘the 
foundational concept of phenomenology as metaphysics’ (Derrida 1993, 3, 111).
3. The differential structure of indirect sense
Merleau-Ponty’s reliance on the idea of ‘indirect’ sense coincided with important 
developments to his views on language due to his adoption of Saussurean ideas from 
1947 onwards.158 It is therefore to Saussure’s conception of linguistic signs that one 
must look to understand Merleau-Ponty’s enigmatic claims that ‘language expresses 
as much through what is between words as through words themselves, and through 
what it does not say [as much] as through what it says’ (PdM  61 f.). Merleau-Ponty’s 
interest in Saussure, as economically stated in his 1953 inaugural lecture ‘In Praise of 
Philosophy’, centres on the idea that his conception of linguistic signs suggests ‘a 
theory of historical sense’ and hence ‘a new philosophy of history’ (Eloge 56). The 
problem Merleau-Ponty saw for such a theory is to reconcile the roles of contingency 
and dialectic necessity in historical development, the conflicting demands 
exemplified in the ‘paradox’ that the history of language is ‘made of too much chance 
to admit a logical development’, yet ‘produces nothing that is not motivated’ {PdM 
32). Saussure’s virtue, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, was to offer an account of the ‘living 
present’ or the ‘synchronic sense’ of language freed from etymological 
considerations, while reconciling the influences of reason and chance, or necessity 
and contingency, in ‘a new conception of reason’.159 Merleau-Ponty interpreted these 
moves as a turn to ‘speech [la parole], to experienced language’ and as such to be a 
phenomenological view {PdM 36; cf. SNS 107).
At this point several exegetic difficulties should be mentioned briefly. For the 
present purposes controversies about the posthumous editing of the Course in 
General Linguistics can be neglected and, since this was the source available to 
Merleau-Ponty, Saussure’s views taken to be those of the published text.160 Even so,
158 Cf. Watson (1983, here 210) for a useful catalogue o f Merleau-Ponty’s references to Saussure.
159 PdM  37, 34. On the historically plausible claim that Saussure liberated linguistics from etymology 
see Culler 1986, 65-85.
160 The published text o f the Cours was compiled from student notes o f three courses held from 1907- 
1911. For a useful survey o f the editorial difficulties see chapter 3 o f Harris 2001. Bouquet (2004) has 
argued that linguistics o f parole  was more important to Saussure than the published Cours suggests -  
which would potentially narrow the gap between Saussure and Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation o f him.
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there are notorious difficulties in reconciling Merleau-Ponty’s presentation of 
Saussure with the Saussure of that text.161 Foremost among these, and potentially 
bearing on the compatibility of the two views, are Merleau-Ponty’s references to 
Saussure’s key distinction between parole and langue. For example in his 1951 
lecture ‘On the Phenomenology of Language’ Merleau-Ponty suggests that Saussure 
distinguishes ‘synchronic linguistics’ of parole from ‘diachronic linguistics’ of 
langue (S 107; cf. also PdM 33). As it stands, this seems straightforwardly mistaken, 
since Saussure’s own distinction was between parole, as ‘the execution’ of speech by 
individuals, and langue as the conventional, social, and above all synchronic system 
of language (langage).162 Furthermore, it might seem that, due to his own emphasis 
on acts of speech {parole), Merleau-Ponty is oblivious to the fact that Saussure (1972 
36-37) thought langue the proper object of linguistic theory, with parole being 
systematically derivative. Yet despite the impression given by such passages, it would 
be an oversimplification to think that Merleau-Ponty simply fails to understand (what 
is after all) a fairly basic distinction of Saussure’s.163 The discrepancies are, I suggest, 
primarily terminological, and arise because rather than straightforwardly adopting 
Saussure’s standpoint, Merleau-Ponty is incorporating certain of Saussure’s views 
into his own position. Moreover, given Merleau-Ponty’s focus on ‘parole’, this 
incorporation naturally creates the impression that Saussure’s views are being 
misrepresented. In this light, though it is surprising that Merleau-Ponty saw no need 
to clarify such terminological shifts, it is in fact of secondary importance whether he 
is being true to Saussure. Nonetheless, terminological changes aside, Merleau- 
Ponty’s view of parole as the living present of language does respect key Saussurean 
motifs, and his talk of a ‘return to living spoken language’ is clearly justified given 
Saussure’s emphasis on synchronic meaning and the primacy of spoken language.164 
This fidelity, for what it is worth, should emerge more clearly in the sequel.
161 As Dastur (2001, 63) delicately puts it, Merleau-Ponty’s reading o f Saussure ‘peut sembler peu 
rigoureuse’; Schmidt (1985, 105) describes it as ‘so idiosyncratic that it makes his notoriously loose 
readings o f  Husserl look like models o f hermeneutic chastity’. For helpful commentary on Merleau- 
Ponty’s relation to Saussure, cf. Lagueux (1965) and Schmidt (1985, 105 ff.).
162 Saussure 1972, 25, 124. Madison (1981, 322n) ponders whether Merleau-Ponty is confusing 
Saussure with Pos and Wartburg. But, as Schmidt (1985, 195 f.) reasonably points out, it ‘is difficult to 
believe that Merleau-Ponty would be this confused in the early 1950s after having taught several 
courses on Saussure.’
163 In his 1949-50 course, for example, Merleau-Ponty more accurately distinguishes ‘parole’ as ‘what 
one says’ from ‘la langue’ as ‘a system o f possibilities’ (CAL 84).
164 CAL 82. For Saussure (1972, 45, cf. 44 ff.) it is the ‘spoken word’ that ‘alone’ constitutes the object 
of linguistics.
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So what, according to Merleau-Ponty, constitutes the ‘synchronic sense’ of 
living speech? The view he develops centres on a distinction between the ‘categories’ 
of ‘official grammar’ and an underlying ‘expressive system’. And although, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s use, ‘grammatical’ rules attribute ‘meanings’ {significations) to 
signs, he sees them as lacking explanatory importance {PdM 40). This is partly 
because he takes post-Saussurean linguistics to have established that ‘grammatical 
categories’ are merely approximative, a ‘retrospective and inessential expression of 
our proper power to speak’ {PdM 39, 38). But the underlying thought is that 
grammatical -  i.e. on Merleau-Ponty’s view, both semantic and syntactic -  categories 
are not autonomous, but to be explained in terms of something more basic: ‘Before 
language bears its meanings’, he explains, its ‘internal arrangement’ must ‘secrete 
[...] a certain original sense from which meanings are taken’ {PdM44). Consequently 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion focuses exclusively on the functioning of this ‘expressive 
system’, just as his views on perception focus on the preobjective.
It is in characterizing this ‘expressive system’ that Merleau-Ponty relies on 
Saussurean ideas. To begin with he identifies phonemes and morphemes as the 
elements of which words are comprised.165 The internal organization and interaction 
of these -  as I shall call them -  sublexical elements are to account for the ‘effective 
function of speech’ {PdM 44), which Merleau-Ponty describes as a holistic process 
using two Saussurean notions. First, he emphasizes above all the importance of 
differences: ‘each element of the “verbal chain” [...] only signifies its difference with 
regard to the others’; ‘The most exact characteristic of a word is to be “what the 
others are not’” (5* 110; CAL 83). Indeed Merleau-Ponty goes so far as to suggest that 
‘in language there are only differences in meaning [signification]’.166 Second, 
Merleau-Ponty adopts Saussure’s idea of value, describing language as a ‘collection 
of linguistic gestures [...], each of which is defined less by a meaning than by a use 
value’; similarly, all morphemes are “‘linguistic tools” which have less a meaning 
than a use value’ {S 109; PdM 41).
Although Merleau-Ponty never discusses this in detail, it is worth reviewing 
more precisely the role these notions play in Saussure’s conception of linguistic signs. 
Saussure (1972, 99) defines a sign as a whole formed by the pairing of ‘signifier’ and
165 Cf. PdM  41, 47 as well as the examples o f 41 ff. Particularly Saussurean is Merleau-Ponty’s claim 
that phonemes are the ‘true foundations o f speech’ {PdM 47).
166 S  110. This might seem to echo Saussure’s (1972, 166) own view, but see below.
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‘signified’. This is not to be mistaken for a pairing of sign and referent, or any similar 
modelling of linguistic signs -  as what Saussure calls ‘nomenclature’ -  on the 
operation of naming independently individuated objects or ideas. Indeed, his very 
point in introducing this terminology was to avoid confusion with views that picture 
linguistic signs as the pairing of antecedently individuated -  conceptual and acoustic 
-  elements. The intended relationship was far more intimate, with signifier and 
signified comprising two aspects, ‘two faces’, of the linguistic sign as a ‘psychic 
entity’ (Saussure 1972, 99). Saussure offers several ingenious illustrations of this 
intimacy: e.g. language is to ‘serve as the intermediary between thought and sound’; 
it resembles a sheet of paper, the two sides of which are thought and sound; linguistic 
signs are like chemical compounds, such as H2O, which are formed from structured 
elements but acquire new properties in combination (Saussure 1972, 156, 157, 145). 
Perhaps the most challenging feature of this picture is that the two aspects are 
supposed to individuate one another, without a basis of primitive or ‘atomic’ units. 
Thought and sounds, as Saussure (1972, 155, 157) puts it, are simply ‘amorphous and 
indistinct’ masses, such that each acquires discrete form only through their 
‘combination’ in linguistic signs. It is ‘their union’ that ‘leads necessarily to the 
reciprocal delimitations of units’ (Saussure 1972, 156), so that signs are, so to speak, 
the intersections to which the articulation of both sound and thought are due.
It is in describing the signifier-signified relationship that Saussure deploys his 
technical notions of difference and value. With regard to the structure within each of 
the sign’s conceptual and material (phonetic, morphemic) aspects he speaks of 
‘differences’; to discuss relationships between two (such) ‘orders’, as he calls them, 
Saussure instead talks of ‘value’. The characteristic feature, on this view, of 
something with value is therefore to stand in two kinds of relationship: to things 
‘similar’, of the same kind (‘order’), with which it can be ‘compared’; and to things 
‘dissimilar’, or differing in kind, with which it can be ‘exchanged’. Thus in the 
paradigmatic case of money a £10 note can be exchanged either for other notes or 
coins (similar) or for goods (dissimilar) to the same value. Analogously, Saussure 
suggests, a word can be ‘compared’ with other words (similar) or exchanged for an
1 fsl‘idea’ (dissimilar). To grasp the point of distinguishing difference and value, it is
167 Saussure 1972, 159 f. -  A misleading feature, however, o f the analogy with money is the latter’s 
quantitative character, suggesting a uniform principle o f comparison -  along the lines o f more/less -  
which is hardly germane to language.
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helpful to consider another important, though often neglected, distinction made by 
Saussure. This immediately follows a passage prone to misuse in which Saussure 
(1972, 166) states ‘in language [langue] there are only differences’. Crucially, 
however, he is talking about ‘all that precedes’, about signifier and signified 
respectively, so as to distinguish these from the sign as whole. Nonetheless, with ‘the 
sign in its totality’, as a signifier-signified pairing, ‘one finds oneself in the presence 
of a thing [that is] positive in its order’, and in relation to this, Saussure states, ‘one 
cannot speak of difference’. Signs, he explains, are characterized not by ‘difference’,
1 / o
but ‘distinctness’ and ‘opposition’. The key phrase here is ‘in its order’: as a 
‘positive’, Saussure is claiming, the sign is something that can be considered discrete, 
delimited, individuated without reference to something different in kind. In this it 
differs structurally from the aspects of signifier and signified, which, Saussure has 
argued, are not composed of antecedently articulated units.
At first blush this might look like mere terminological posturing. It might, for 
example, be objected that where there are differences there is identity, or discrete 
units. I think this rather ‘intuitive’ objection is clearly wrong, as is shown by looking 
at a map of any coastline: here we find a form which undeniably has structure, shape, 
yet with no natural ‘units’ of which it is comprised. In Saussure’s terms the 
coastline’s features are ‘different’ but not ‘distinct’.169 Although both terms imply 
contrast, they denote dissimilar modes of structural contrast: distinctness is a relation 
between individuated units, whereas difference can lie on a continuum. Thus whereas 
coins are distinct, the prodigious range of sounds the human vocal system is capable 
of producing or an autumnal forest’s rich spectacle of colours are examples of 
differential structure.
Alternatively, it might be suggested that the prior units of which linguistic 
signs are composed are morphemes and sememes, i.e. the minimal syntactic features 
that make a semantic difference and (putatively) basic semantic elements. But this is 
precisely the kind of suggestion against which Saussure’s analysis is directed. For 
neither are signs in his sense. Rather, these are in effect semi-determinate structures, 
representing (orthogonal) cross-sections through the system of signs, such that in
168 Saussure 1972, 167; cf. 26, where ‘a language [langue]' is characterized as ‘a system o f distinct 
signs corresponding to distinct ideas’.
16 The point is not merely that we don’t know which features to make the basis o f distinct units. It is 
rather that there are no such features. For coastlines are fractals, meaning that ‘the’ exact length (also 
shape) is a function o f the scale at which it is represented (cf. Gleick 1987, 94-96).
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170focusing on one dimension (e.g. syntactic), the other (semantic) loses all definition.
In addition, as Saussure (1972, 157) puts it, one must start with the ‘interdependent 
whole’ in order to ‘obtain by analysis the elements that it contains’. His point is not 
merely epistemological or methodological, but rather that elements such as 
morphemes or phonemes would not exist but for the role they play in a system of 
constituted signs. Indeed this is precisely what Saussure means in describing 
language as having no ‘simples’, as being ‘an algebra possessing only complex terms’ 
or a ‘form’ rather than a ‘substance’ (Saussure 1972,168 f., cf. 157).
The purpose of Saussure’s terminology is thus to characterize precisely 
qualitative structural differences between (what he calls) signs and their constituent 
aspects, i.e. signifiers and signifieds. The result is a hierarchy of structural levels 
identified by the notions of difference, value, and distinctness respectively. At the 
lowest level are two ‘orders’, referred to by Saussure as those of ‘acoustic images’ 
and ‘ideas’, characterized by inhomogeneity, variation, or ‘difference’; but not by 
individuated units. Difference is discernible, but not in systematic arrangement. At 
the next level are structures, such as Saussure’s signifier and signified, characterized 
by ‘value’. Value concerns the relationship between two structural axes. Since, by 
definition, it is a principle of equivalence that regulates the exchangeability or 
comparison of all relevant structures, value is necessarily holistic. Morphemes and 
sememes, though not fully-fledged signs in Saussure’s sense, are particularly 
illustrative examples of structures with value. Simultaneous semantic and syntactic 
focus comes only at the level of what Saussure calls ‘signs’. Signs are discrete units, 
individuable as such, which stand in relations of ‘distinctness’ to one another and 
bear ‘characteristic properties’ (caracteres; Saussure 1972, 168). Saussure’s scheme 
of concepts can thus be summarized in the table below.
One final point requires emphasis: Although these features are structural, 
serving to identify particular aspects and relationships of the organization embodied 
by a system of signs, Saussure does not consider them independent. Rather, as he puts 
it, value is something ‘emanating from the system’, ‘[i]t is difference that makes the 
character [of signs], as it makes [their] value and unity’ (Saussure 1972, 162, 168). It
170 By way o f analogy, the behaviour o f a sign might be likened to that o f a photon in Young’s slits 
experiments. With photons Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (AxAp~h) tells us that the precision with 
which a photon’s position is ascertained is inversely proportional to the precision with which its 
momentum can be known. In an analogous way, the more precisely a syntactic element (e.g. 
morpheme) is focused on, the less determinate are its semantic properties -  and vice versa.
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is for this reason that Saussure can be, and often is, read as providing a reductive 
account of the functioning of signs in terms of difference.
Structural Examples Distinct units Holistic?
characteristic ( ‘positives’)?
difference acoustic images no no
ideas
value signifier, signified no yes
morphemes
distinctness signs yes yes
words
Against this background, and notwithstanding any laxness in some of Merleau- 
Ponty’s references to Saussure, it is not difficult to discern both convergence and 
complementarity in their views. Clearly, in addition to their (as Merleau-Ponty 
supposed) shared interest in the ‘living present’ of language, both share the view that 
thought is realized in language. There is also an important parallel between 
Saussure’s rejection of antecedent simples, the view that language is a ‘form’ not a 
‘substance’, and Merleau-Ponty’s view that expressed thoughts are a ‘determinate 
void’ (S 112). In this respect both seek to account for the functioning of language 
without recourse to language-independent entities, the presence of which might 
originate linguistic meaning. But most striking is the structural parallel between 
Saussure’s positive and differential levels and Merleau-Ponty’s interest in finding a
171foundation for objective or conceptual awareness. This parallel allows Merleau- 
Ponty to see Saussure as providing an approach to language corresponding to his own 
treatment of perception, linked by the claim that differentiation is a process 
underlying distinct units: just as gestalts are preobjective structurations in the realm 
of perception, so too is linguistic differentiation preobjective and preconceptual. 
Conversely, Merleau-Ponty’s gestalt-psychological approach to the formation of 
categories can be seen as bolstering a weak point in Saussure’s approach. For 
Saussure relies on the thought that both the phonetic and conceptual domains are 
fundamentally differential. Yet whereas it is reasonably clear how this applies to the 
linear ‘chain’ of phonetic ‘acoustic images’, Saussure does not explain how the
171 Corresponding to his earlier distinction between ‘conceptual meaning’ and ‘existential meaning’ 
(PdP 212; cf. section 1 above).
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conceptual domain, or as he also calls it the conceptual ‘chain’, is to be thought of as 
a process of differentiation (Saussure 1972, 146). It is this gap that Merleau-Ponty’s 
view of Gestalt formation -  the ‘differentiation of excitations which appears to be the 
essential function of the nervous system’ (.PdP 88) -  can at least claim to be filling.
Given these parallels Merleau-Ponty was able to integrate Saussure’s 
diacritical conception of signs quite smoothly within the framework of his earlier 
views. Thus he continues to treat language as gestural, links Saussurean 
differentiation with his earlier metaphors of the melody or style of articulation, and 
re-rehearses his argument that language is underlain by an original language of 
expressive contrasts -  except that whereas these were formerly ‘emotional’, they now
1 77comprise a system of ‘coherent motivations’. Similarly, as in PdP our grasp of 
language is still to be bodily, gestural, preintellectual, preobjective and 
nonconceptual. It belongs to the ‘perceptive order’, is ‘quasi-sensory’, is something 
we ‘sense [sentir]'.113 But his characterization of this basic linguistic sensitivity now 
takes on a Saussurean flavour: ‘speaking is not having a certain number of signs at 
one’s disposal, but possessing the language as a principle of distinction’ (PdM 46).
At the same time, the appropriation of Saussure’s ideas brings significant 
changes that address the two difficulties with PdP's position identified in the first 
section of the chapter. The first is signalled by the fact that Saussure’s conception of 
signs is not straightforwardly, if at all, amenable to somatocentric interpretation. 
Whereas in PdP Merleau-Ponty had construed the tacit underpinnings of language 
simply as a ‘tacit cogito’, or a ‘motoric presence’, this ‘silence’ now encompasses 
both a somatic and an immanent linguistic dimension, or ‘horizon’. So now he claims 
that phenomenology of language has an ‘ontological bearing’, and somewhat 
awkwardly concludes that language itself is ‘something like a being’.174 
Correspondingly, PdM draws on two sciences, psychology and linguistics, to show 
how one ‘can renounce timeless philosophy without falling into irrationalism’.175 The 
appropriation of Saussure’s views thus brings what might be described as Merleau- 
Ponty’s personal version of the linguistic turn, the recognition that the being of 
language (as an intersubjective, sedimented acquisition) cannot be straightforwardly
172 Cf. PdM (e.g.) 41, 161; 43, 46; and 35 f.
173 PdM 4 In (cf. 53n, 57), 42n, 64. Merleau-Ponty characterizes the basic operation o f language as 
nonconceptual (52, 56 f.), preobjective (42n), and links the two via the notion o f style (63n).
174 S 108, ( ‘quelque chose comme un etre’) 54.
175 PdM33; 26-30 deal with psychology, 30-54 with Saussurean linguistics.
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assimilated to the behaviour of a single embodied cogito but requires a ‘new 
conception of the being of language’ (S 110).
Most importantly, second, the diacritical conception of signs provides a much 
more satisfactory answer to the question of what it is for signs to be the ‘vehicle’ of 
sense. In Saussurean terms the functioning of the ‘expressive system’ is explained as 
the interaction of phonetic-morphemic and conceptual differentiation, and it is to this 
that signifier-signified pairings, or linguistic ‘categories’ are to be due. This provides 
Merleau-Ponty with an articulate account of the constitution of conceptual meaning 
or categories in terms of ‘a more original differentiation activity [...] an inexhaustible 
power to differentiate one linguistic gesture from another’ (PdM 47). Language, as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it, becomes ‘a profusion of gestures, all occupied with 
differentiating themselves from each other and intersecting. [...] this sublinguistic 
life, the entire industry of which is to differentiate and systematize signs’ (PdM 161). 
So Saussure provides Merleau-Ponty with a way of detailing the specifically 
linguistic structurations that underlie and shape the conceptual meaning of linguistic 
expressions. This means that Merleau-Ponty can draw on an articulate and sober 
(indeed scientifically respectable) conception of the prepredicative workings of 
language and need no longer rely on misleading claims about emotionality or vague 
metaphors of singing the world.
The key to understanding how this leads to a ‘historical theory of sense’, and 
how contingency and necessity are to be reconciled in a ‘new conception of reason’, 
is found in the following claim of Merleau-Ponty’s: ‘chance is the basis of all the 
restructurations of language; in this sense one can say that language is the domain of 
the relatively motivated: nothing rational is found there which does not derive from 
taking up and elaborating some piece of chance by means of systematic expression by 
the community of speaking subjects’ (CAL 85). The term ‘relatively motivated’ again 
stems from Saussure, who had used it to mark a limitation of his thesis of the 
‘arbitrariness’ of the linguistic sign, i.e. the thesis that there is no ‘natural link’
1 7Abetween signifier and signified. Notwithstanding this ‘fundamental principle of the 
arbitrariness of the sign’, he distinguished features of signs that are ‘relatively 
motivated’ from those that are absolutely, or ‘radically arbitrary’, i.e. ‘unmotivated’
176 Saussure 1972, 100 f. -  Note, incidentally, that Saussure’s view o f the arbitrariness of signs does 
not depend, as Beneviste (1939, 24) supposed, on the tacit assumption of referents as a ‘third term’. 
Saussure’s view is rather that arbitrariness attends the pairing o f sounds with differentiated thought, 
not signs with referents.
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(Saussure 1972, 180 f.). As an example Saussure explains that in French whereas the 
use of the term ‘dix’ to mean ‘10’ or ‘neuf to mean ‘9’ is unmotivated, use of ‘dix- 
neuf to mean ‘19’ is relatively motivated and correspondingly less arbitrary. Thus 
relatively-motivated features are what might be called intelligible features of signs, 
syntactic traits with conceptual implications, or as Saussure puts it they imply a 
‘syntagmatic relation’ and an ‘associative relation’. In doing this, they effect a 
‘limitation of the arbitrary’ and are ‘nothing other than the mechanism in virtue of 
which any term whatever lends itself to the expression of an idea’ (Saussure 1972,
182). This -  for Saussure clearly essential -  aspect of the functioning of language 
serves to highlight that his thesis of the ultimate, absolute arbitrariness of the sign 
does not commit him to the claim that either the distinctions marked by linguistic 
signs or relatively-motivated semiotic features themselves are arbitrary. Indeed, as 
Saussure (1972, 167) himself argues, on pain of becoming lost or confused ‘every 
difference’ of ideas ‘perceived by the mind seeks to express itself by distinct 
signifiers’. So Merleau-Ponty’s point is that relatively motivated features testify to 
the meeting of contingency and rational order in acts of speech. For on the one hand 
language deploys contingent (phonetic) material to do its intentional work;177 yet, on 
the other hand, traces of such intentional use become inscribed (‘sedimented’) in the 
sublexical structure of linguistic signs. ‘What Saussure saw’, Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes, ‘is precisely this meshing of chance and order, this taking-up of the 
rational, [and] of chance’ (CAL 86). This interweaving of contingency and reason, 
though already implicit in Saussure’s pairing of phonetic signifier and conceptual 
signified, is epitomized by Merleau-Ponty’s notion of parole. For it is acts of speech, 
understood to be both contingently conditioned and intentional, that mediate between 
chance and logic, yielding a ‘constituted’ expressive system shot through with 
relatively motivated features. Acts of speech are, so to speak, the stitches that weave
i n o
the fabric of historical and intersubjective sense.
Two clarifications are required. The first concerns the rational status of 
relative motivations. To take Saussure’s example, it does not seem to be completely
177 On Saussure’s view contingency plays a basic role in two ways. In addition to his thesis o f the 
arbitrariness o f the linguistic sign, he argues that semantic shifts often result from (contingent) 
phonetic shifts which over time result in modified subjective parsings o f word meaning (Saussure 
1972,211 ff.).
178 Note also that Merleau-Ponty’s notion o f parole as a productive intentional act, while differing 
from Saussure’s minimalist notion of individual performance, is arguably akin to the latter’s treatment 
of analogy (Saussure 1972, 226 ff.).
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contingent that ‘dix-neuf means 19 in French; this compound label, we might say, 
makes sense; but equally there is no compelling reason for adopting this label, rather 
(say) than a simple one such as ‘seize’ for 16. It is precisely this intermediacy 
between causes and reason that Merleau-Ponty expresses with the term ‘motivation’: 
‘One phenomenon triggers another, not by an objective efficacy, like that which links 
the events of nature, but through the sense it offers -  there is a reason for being that 
orients the flow of phenomena without being explicitly posited in any of them’.179 A 
motive, on this view, is inchoately rational in a dual sense. First, it serves as a basis 
for reasons that it cannot be considered to embody antecedently. This important 
asymmetry, which I will call nonretrojectability, means that such reasons as motives 
lead us to find cannot be projected back into the motivating structure itself. This is 
more plausible when one bears in mind, second, Merleau-Ponty’s view that i lived 
logic’ does not ‘possess the full determination of its objects’ {PdP 61): 
nonretrojectability is not simply a stipulation, but is due to the fact that motives’ are -  
as I shall say -  semideterminate and could in principle always motivate different 
reasons. So on this view a motive, or a motivated feature, is something with sense 
that enters into intentional activity, and shapes or ‘orients’ this without fully 
predetermining it. It is in this technical sense, I suggest, that Merleau-Ponty adopts 
Saussure’s talk of the relatively motivated. His claim is that, despite their ultimately 
contingent phonetic basis, the sublexical structure of words conveys something about 
the way their referents are to be thought of, that relative to other features of the 
lexical system morphemes can signal aspects of similarity and difference. For 
example, in English the four words ‘telephone’, ‘microphone’, ‘telescope’, and 
‘microscope’ are clearly cognate. And whereas the various objects to which each term 
refers might have acquired a different label in the language, these terms could not be 
interchanged without failing to make sense in a way particularly appropriate to their 
referents. It is this kind of loose connection between the structure of words and what 
they can be used to mean that makes language, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘the domain 
of the relatively motivated’. The shape of individual expressions constrains, though it 
does not fully determine, what they can be used to say. So while morphemic features 
might suggest reasons for preferring one word over others, their relative character
179 PdP 61. This characterization o f motives corresponds to the phenomenological concept of 
foundation described at PdP  451. For a clear and detailed discussion o f the motivations and their 
relationship to causes and reasons see Wrathall 2005.
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implies that not all such features are thus interpretable, and their motivational 
character means that such reasons as we find cannot be projected back into language 
-  as its inherent underlying rationality or some such.
Second: it might look as though Merleau-Ponty has overstated the case in 
describing language straightforwardly as the domain of relative motivations. Isn’t 
Saussure’s point to distinguish some signs from others? Doesn’t he imply that 
relatively motivated features are found only in ‘compound’ words formed of several 
morphemes? Well, compound terms, such as ‘dix-neuf, no doubt provide clear 
paradigms of the principle of relative motivation. Nevertheless, Saussure’s own claim 
extends further. Relative motivation, he says, is the ‘mechanism in virtue of which 
any term whatever lends itself to the expression of an idea’ (Saussure 1972, 182; 
italics added). Two thoughts can help in understanding the broad scope of this thesis. 
The first is that words belong to an articulate system, and that as such each word 
means what it does only in relation to others, and ultimately to all others. In 
Saussure’s terms this is reflected in the notion of value, with its concomitant holism, 
and the distinctness of linguistic signs from one another. So even where there is no 
manifest structure to words, their formation is nonetheless a distinct node within the 
system of phonetic and conceptual differences. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the 
‘expressive power of a sign depends on its being part of a system and coexisting with 
other signs’; accordingly, language is ‘a system of signs which only have sense 
relative to one another and of which each is recognized according to a certain use 
value that comes to it in the whole of the language’ {PdM 52; Eloge 56 f.). The 
second thought is the Austinian idea that the mere existence of an established word
1 O A
should serve as prima facie evidence for its having a distinct function. This idea is 
based on the evolutionary heuristic that words are more likely to establish themselves 
in language, rather than disappearing from circulation, if they are found to have a 
specific use. What both these thoughts assume is that there is some kind of reason for 
the existence of a particular word, as distinct from all others. Or rather, since this 
assumption is presumably defeasible -  perhaps there are genuine synonyms and/or 
redundancy in use -  and because any claim to identify ‘the’ reason for any such 
differences is bound to look suspect, the intelligibility of words’ distinctness is 
presumably somewhat weaker. This weaker link, I am suggesting, can be understood,
180 Austin uses this argument, about the ‘natural economy o f language’, to justify his methodological 
concentration on Ordinary Language (Austin 1979, 190, 182).
I l l
with Merleau-Ponty, by saying that the existence of a particular word is motivated 
relative to all others, i.e. is relatively motivated.
There is one subtle, but significant difference between Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Saussure’s view of signs. Saussure, despite describing them as ‘emanating’ from the 
underlying patterns of phonetic and conceptual differentiation, allows that signs as 
distinct, ‘positive’ linguistic units do result. Merleau-Ponty, however, adopts a more 
reductive attitude. He takes Saussurean linguistics to show that ‘grammatical 
categories’ are only ever approximate and, so to speak, epiphenomenal, so that they
•  1 R1play no proper role in accounting for the functioning of language. Although 
perhaps making explicit Saussure’s tendency in talking of ‘emanation’, Merleau- 
Ponty’s claim goes further in suggesting that the macrosemantics of conceptual 
relations can be accounted for reductively by the microsemantics of the 
prepredicative expressive system.
A reductive approach of this kind would, however, exacerbate a problem 
inherited from Saussure. For perhaps the gravest deficiency of his conception of signs 
is that reference plays no role in it, which makes it susceptible to the charge of 
linguistic idealism, of viewing language as an abstract medium disconnected from the 
world.182 To some degree Merleau-Ponty’s overall picture of language suggests a 
corrective to this tendency. After all, his view of language as embodied expressive 
behaviour rules out many of the ontological assumptions Saussure encourages: e.g. 
viewing langue as a platonistic abstract object or a closed system of semiotic 
relations, or as somehow licensing the structuralist tradition’s subject-free picture of 
linguistic phenomena. But the ontological embeddedness of Merleau-Ponty’s 
overall picture is not carried over into his conception of how signs function. For he 
not only fails to take any account of the use of signs to refer to objects, but effectively 
eliminates that aspect of Saussure’s picture -  signs as distinct units -  to which an 
account of language’s referential function might be annexed.
Three lines of argument can be found in Merleau-Ponty for accepting his 
reductionist move. The first is that our use of language does not seem to involve 
specific awareness of the conceptual, or ‘categorial’, properties of linguistic
181 Cf. S 49 and page 102 above.
182 This charge is developed, for example, by Falck 1986 and Dillon 1997, 181-186.
183 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s 1959 essay on structuralist anthropology, in which he insists on the need for ‘a 
sort o f lived equivalent’ to ground formal theoretical structures (S 149, cf. also 155).
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expressions.184 Although plausible as a phenomenological observation, this hardly 
supports Merleau-Ponty’s reductive claim, since in speaking we are no more focally 
aware of the values of sublexical elements than we are of grammatical categories. The 
second argument is that ‘it is essential to language that the logic of its construction is 
never one of those that can be put in concepts’. Instead, Merleau-Ponty continues, 
language is an expressive activity driven by the ‘blurred logic of a system of 
expression which bears the traces of another past and the germs of another future’ 
{PdP 52 f.). This argument, that the expressive power of language depends on 
sublexical factors which are irreducible to conceptual relations, is stronger. 
Nonetheless it too is inconclusive, for the fact that linguistic functioning is not 
reducible to conceptual relations does not entail that conceptual relations are not also 
important, i.e. that linguistic function can be explained reductively in terms of 
nonconceptual relations, as Merleau-Ponty seems to think. The third is that Merleau- 
Ponty seems to think of himself as more consistently assimilating the insights of 
Saussurean linguistics, hinting that the latter remains too close to ‘positivism’ {PdM 
55). Perhaps his thought is that, having dispensed with primitive or atomic entities at 
the start of his account, Saussure lapses into a corresponding commitment to (final) 
determinacy by reintroducing the notion of distinct signs. However, unless it is shown 
that emergent distinctness relies on a problematic notion of full presence, it is 
difficult to see what the problem might be, since the rejection of presupposed 
determinacy in no way implies that there should be anything problematic about 
emanating determinacy. Alternatively, perhaps Merleau-Ponty’s thought is that if 
distinct linguistic units simply ‘emanate’ from underlying differential processes, they 
have no proper function and are hence explanatorily vacuous. This is, of course, quite 
true, but begs the present question about the legitimacy of a reduction in simply 
assuming that distinct units have no functional importance.
The requisite conclusion is that Merleau-Ponty fails to provide convincing 
reasons for his apparent view that conceptual meaning can be accounted for 
reductively in terms of underlying differential processes. If the referential use of signs 
is to be incorporated in an overall picture of how language functions, as it no doubt 
should be, linguistic signs should in this respect be understood as closer to Saussure’s 
own model. Thus one can accept that sublexical differentiation has a role in
184 Cf. PdM  40. Merleau-Ponty similarly praises Saussure for having freed considerations o f meaning 
from etymology on the grounds that speakers are usually unaware o f such factors {PdM  33).
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explaining the functioning of language, yet allow that talk of determinate conceptual 
meanings (or ‘positives’) is not otiose. This leaves open the possibility that something 
like Saussurean positives comprise a higher level of linguistic organization, 
characterized by irreducible level-specific (emergent) features of a kind suggested by 
Saussure’s (1972, 145) analogy with H2O. At such a ‘positive’ level signs might 
behave more or less as they would if characterized only by determinate conceptual 
meanings, as they perhaps appear to be in standard use. This suggestion is in fact less 
difficult to reconcile with Merleau-Ponty’s approach than it might seem. For the key 
requirement is that something functions as a distinct sign, which is unproblematic 
provided that this is not conceived of in terms of a full objective presence. So on 
Merleau-Ponty’s picture we need only replace the talk of something ‘positive’ with 
that of a ‘determinate void’ behaving, to all intents and purposes, as though it were 
unambiguously determinate.
4. Painting as a model of indirect sense
A second characteristic feature of Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of indirect sense is his 
reliance on an analogy with painting, motivated by the thought that both this and 
language are forms of ‘creative expression’ (S 59). The development of this analogy 
is clearly intended to correspond to his appropriation of Saussure and so to provide a 
complementary perspective on processes of linguistic articulation. This section will 
therefore look at three aspects of this analogy to show both how it illustrates the 
function of indirect sense and how it lends support to thinking of language as having 
the structural and rational characteristics suggested by Saussure’s conception of 
language.
(i) The presentational function o f style: There is of course nothing new in comparing 
the representational feats of language with those of pictures or images. What is 
distinctive about Merleau-Ponty’s comparison is that it centres on modem painting, 
which might initially seem surprising, given the common thought that this departs 
from traditional painting’s concern with accurately representing the natural world -  a 
task plausibly shared with language. In keeping with his general notion of expression, 
Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that modem painting can be understood a move away 
from objective representation to subjective self-expression. In doing so he 
foregrounds the objection that a subjectivist notion of self-expression cannot account
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1 o c  .  ,for acceptance of incompleteness (the inacheve) in modem painting. This objection 
is telling. It is not simply the banal point that it became acceptable for artists to leave 
gaps on a finished canvas, but testifies that modem painting is no longer directed 
towards the ideal of adequate representation. Somewhat paradoxically therefore, it is 
precisely because it does not attempt to represent nature adequately that Merleau- 
Ponty is drawn to modem art. Nonetheless, it is significant that, while breaking with 
traditional academic techniques such as central or aerial perspective, the work of the 
early modem painters Merleau-Ponty has in mind -  in particular Cezanne and 
Matisse -  is generally figurative or representational, rather than purely abstract, in 
character. For, as will be seen, this enables him to treat painting as a paradigm of 
indirect encounters with the world which deploy an ‘allusive logic’ rather than 
supposedly ‘sufficient signs’ of the visual’ (PdM 91, 71).
Merleau-Ponty faces a challenge: if not as adequate representation of the 
world, and not as subjective self-expression, how is the task of modem painting to be 
understood? His response is that ‘What the painter puts into the painting is not his 
immediate self [...], it is his style’ (S 65). This appeal to style is finely balanced. On 
the one hand, style is the hallmark of embodied action and is therefore to be 
understood as founded in our body as ‘a general power of motoric formulation
1 RAcapable of transpositions that effect the constancy of style’. On the other hand, it is 
fundamental to Merleau-Ponty’s view that artistic output is the product of intentional, 
deliberate expressive acts (cf. PdM 82-84; SNS 23 ff). This is what allows him, 
despite emphasizing the intimate link between an individual’s life and art, to distance 
himself from both a crude expressivism -  such that, for example, sad painters 
automatically paint sad pictures -  and the inadequacies of psychoanalytic theories of
i o n
art. Indeed, although he does not use these terms, and though an artist will surely 
have both, Merleau-Ponty clearly intends to distinguish artistic style, as a feature of 
works, from personal style, as characterizing an embodied agent.
Merleau-Ponty defines (artistic) style as a mode of ‘formulation’ that can be 
characterized for ‘each painter [as] the system of equivalences that he constitutes for
185 PdM  77. On the preceding, cf. Merleau-Ponty’s summary o f the task for a modem theory of 
expression on PdM  79.
186 S  82. For the link with the general system o f embodied equivalences -  i.e. the ‘schdma corporel’ o f  
P d P -  see S 83 or PdM  110.
187 Cf. PdM  105 f. Merleau-Ponty’s Cezanne interpretation discusses this intimate link, arguing that 
although not straightforwardly explained by facts about the painter’s life his painterly expression, ‘this 
work to be done demanded this life’ (SNS 26).
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this work of manifestation’; ‘what makes “a Vermeer” for us, or that that it speaks
• 109Vermeer’s language, is [...] that it observes the particular system of equivalences’. 
Although this allows style to be highly individual, in several ways it is an impersonal 
feature. For example, an artist is not assumed to have privileged knowledge of it: ‘it is 
a mode of formulation that is just as recognizable for others, as little visible for him 
as his silhouette or his everyday gestures’ {PdM 82). Indeed, while immersed in the 
task of creative production the artist may not be conscious of style as such -  it may 
develop, so to speak, without him knowing (a son insu\ S  67). Moreover, there is no 
reason to think of it one-sidedly as manifestation of an artist’s self: ‘When style is at 
work the painter knows nothing of the antithesis of the human and the world’; ‘the 
painter himself [cannot] ever say [...] what is due to him and what is due to things’ 
{PdM 83, 95). Instead style characterizes an artist’s representational technique as 
such, a particular way of depicting the world. Vermeer, for example, has artistic 
significance not as an ‘empirical figure’, but as the inaugurator of ‘an essence, a 
structure, a Vermeer sense’ {PdM 100). In this perspective style is akin to scientific or 
technological discoveries -  intellectual acquisitions that no one thinks of as 
inextricably linked with their creator. As a characteristic way of doing something, a 
technique, style is clearly impersonal or ‘objective’, so that there is no reason to 
suppose that the inventor of a technique, an artist perhaps, is in a privileged position 
to understand the significance of his or her own style.
What Merleau-Ponty means by a ‘mode of formulation’ and a ‘system of 
equivalences’ is illustrated by an anecdote he borrows from Andre Malraux of a 
hotelier in Cassis who was (apparently) intrigued to see Renoir working on a painting 
of riverside washer women while standing before the sea. Merleau-Ponty explains 
that Renoir’s interest in painting the blue of the sea was to study a ‘fragment of the 
world’ so as to grasp ‘a general manner of speaking’. His concern was to ‘interpret 
the liquid substance, to manifest it, to compose with this itself and so to master what 
is ‘typical of the manifestations of water’ {PdM 87 fi, cf. 104). Renoir was, one might 
say, sampling an aspect of the visual world, the style of water’s visual effects, so as to 
add to his compositional repertoire as a painter. Or, more prosaically, he was 
practising a certain way of painting water.
188 PdM  86, 99. The terms ‘mise en forme’ and ‘formulation’ are found at PdM  84 f., 86 and PdM  82 
respectively.
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The point Merleau-Ponty makes with this anecdote can be elucidated more 
fully by relating it to Ernst Gombrich’s strikingly similar account of the relationship 
between artistic expression and style. Despite thinking of the history of western art in 
a progressivist manner, guided by the representational ideal of accurately rendering 
the appearance of the natural world, Gombrich’s Art and Illusion argues against the 
idea of an ‘innocent eye’ that would allow art simply to copy nature. Whether or not 
this holds as a psychological thesis -  which is how Gombrich presents it -  is in fact 
irrelevant to his central claim, which is that painting relies upon available 
compositional techniques. Taking landscapes, animals, human bodies and clouds as 
examples, Gombrich shows how, in practice, learning to paint has always involved 
mastering the use of pictorial ‘schemata’ embodying the proportions and
1 fiQphysiognomy considered essential to accurate rendition. Such schemata, which 
were collected in compendia for teaching purposes, function as a ‘visual vocabulary’ 
(Gombrich 1960, 143) from which representational paintings could be built up. Now, 
of course, the use of schemata in painting does not rule out personal and specific 
variations. Indeed, once mastered, they have an enabling function, underdetermining 
final products and obviously permitting the personal or context-dependent variations 
of which art history is replete. Nor is Gombrich’s claim simply empirical or 
historical; rather his point is that the representation of objects in painting are 
necessarily mediated by techniques of rendition. As he says, the ‘artist, no less than 
the writer, needs a vocabulary before he can embark on a “copy” of reality’ 
(Gombrich 1960, 75). It is this fact that allows him to explain the role of history in 
art, and to make sense of his claims about the need for and nature of progress in 
naturalistic representation. For such progress depends on the development of 
representational techniques, or schemata, which Gombrich sees (in a Popperian 
manner) as evolving in an experimental process of trial and error.
It may be objected that Gombrich’s progressivism and emphasis on the telos 
of naturalistic representation make it precisely the kind of position Merleau-Ponty 
opposes. This is true. Nevertheless, what I take to be Gombrich’s central claims -  that 
expression in painting is to be understood in terms of the use of schemata and that 
these are the vehicle of style -  can be generalized independently of his 
representationalist orientation, so that their thoughts can be paralleled. For although
189 For details, see in particular Gombrich 1960, 55-78, 126-152.
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there is no longer a standard ‘vocabulary’ of representational elements, even 
nonrepresentational or ‘abstract’ painting is usually built up of a visual vocabulary of 
characteristic formal features such that the works of individual artists -  e.g. Klee, 
Kandinsky, Pollock, Stella, Twombly -  usually exhibit a distinctive ‘look’, or style, 
enabling them to be told apart. To generalize Gombrich’s view, schemata need only 
be thought of as exemplifying formal patterns rather than formal patterns that stand 
for objects, i.e. as being configurational rather than representational. In this sense it is 
the composition and variation of formal elements (schemata) in more or less 
systematic and sophisticated ways that constitute the characteristic features, the style, 
of representational and nonrepresentational works alike. As Gombrich (1960, 309) 
puts it, it ‘is in the microstructure of movement and shapes that the connoisseur will 
find the inimitable personal accent of an artist.’ Merleau-Ponty’s Renoir anecdote can 
be interpreted in this perspective: Rather than, say, sampling the visible essence of 
water, Renoir is seen to be rehearsing or honing techniques, or configurational 
schemata, that underpin and so characterize his painting. Moreover, just as Merleau- 
Ponty intimates, it is regularities or characteristic features of configurational schemata 
which constitute a painter’s distinctive look, so that these are rightly considered the 
vehicle of style.
There are two senses in which the analogy with painting exemplifies the idea 
of an ‘allusive logic’. The first is well highlighted by the example of early modem 
painting, which provides a paradigm for the way configured form functions in 
presenting the world. As already hinted, eschewing the idea of ‘sufficient signs’ of 
the visual -  which Merleau-Ponty considers its characteristic feature -  does not 
prevent (say) Cezanne’s or Matisse’s work from being figurative or representational. 
The crucial feature of such painting is that differences in pictorial articulation 
correspond to discernible features of visual experience. Yet the importance of these 
examples is to bring out a functional asymmetry, showing that for features of a 
painting to be ‘representational’ it suffices that they can be read in a picture-to-world 
direction. To be sure, painted articulations should succeed -  at least roughly -  in 
picking out discernible features of the world. But an asymmetry arises insofar as to 
meet this requirement the painting need not be recognizable as a direct copy of what
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it represents.190 On reflection, this is obvious: since there is no principled limit to the 
fine-grainedness of visual experience, to insist on correspondence read from world- 
to-picture would imply an unworkable criterion. What Merleau-Ponty calls modem 
art’s ‘toleration’ of the inacheve is nothing but the acceptance, or even celebration, of 
its inevitable fate. So the first sense in which paintings embody an ‘allusive logic’ is 
that they can function representationally without aspiring to capture every feature of 
what they represent, i.e. to the ideal of adequacy. Rather than ‘capturing things 
themselves in its forms’, it suffices that a representational painting exemplifies a 
certain pattern of articulation and invites us to see the world as articulated in the way
. . .  . 191the painting presents it.
The second sense in which paintings exhibit an ‘allusive logic’ is in their 
presentational mechanism. For schemata, Gombrich’s ‘visual vocabulary’, depict 
characteristic aspects of the world that have been abstracted out for both reapplication 
and reinterpretation in the context of diverse works. Alongside obvious schemata -  
such as faces, body forms etc. -  this can be thought of as including less objectual 
methods for rendering space, light (shadow), texture and so on. Although they acquire 
concrete significance in single works, such schemata function as do they precisely 
because they are schematic, i.e. neither devoid of, nor fully determinate in 
representational significance. They are, so to speak, adumbrations rather than 
embodiments of determinate pictorial meaning and in this sense the ‘allusive’ means 
on which the presentational feats of paintings rely.
(ii) Painting as a model o f deliberative activity: An important feature of Merleau- 
Ponty’s comparison is the suggestion that the indirect sense bome by linguistic 
articulations resembles the style of paintings in its mode of intelligibility. This 
follows partly from the impersonality of style. For if artistic style is conceived as an 
work predicate, characterized by a system of equivalences, then Merleau-Ponty is 
right to suggest that people other than the artist will be able to assess it, just as others 
are competent to assess the uses to which a scientific technique can be put. Indeed, to 
some extent the sense embodied by individual paintings is already a function of the
190 Cf. PdM  91 f. By ‘direct copy’ I mean here, roughly, like a photo rather than a caricature: e.g. there 
is correspondence without omission, geometric distortion, changes in patterns o f colour equivalence, a 
loss of linear-perspectival integrity etc.
191 S 55. This presentational function is clearly independent o f whether or not the painting has an actual 
referent. In this sense the presentational sense o f pictorial articulations is more intrinsic to pictorial 
expression than the referential function.
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context in which it is considered. For it clearly makes a difference whether one asks 
what is the significance of doing such-and-such for the artist herself, in her 
contemporary context, or for subsequent art. Although an artist presumably knows 
better than anyone else the answer in first sense, in the second sense she is no more 
privileged than anyone else, while in the third sense many others will be in a better 
position. However, this will be more true still of general features such as stylistic 
innovations. For such ‘acquisitions’, as Merleau-Ponty terms them, naturally undergo 
a context shift, or recontextualization, from the individual to the public and historical 
perspective, such that once a new painting technique is invented its originator has no 
more privilege in determining its uses or full significance -  in the second and third 
senses -  than the inventor of a scientific theory.
Further important implications of Merleau-Ponty’s analogy can be brought out 
by considering a second example highlighting the embodied character of painting 
activity. Thus to explain the way indirect sense is ‘between words’ Merleau-Ponty 
discusses a slow motion film of Matisse at work which shows that rather than moving 
with mechanical or surgical precision, Matisse’s hand deftly rehearsed different 
possibilities, appearing to ‘meditate’, before applying each single brushstroke {PdM 
62). Having characteristically warned against over-rationalizing this process, 
Merleau-Ponty comments: ‘it is true that the hand hesitated, that it meditated; it is 
therefore true that there was choice, that the chosen trait was chosen so as to satisfy 
ten conditions [...] that were unformulated, informulable for anyone but Matisse, 
since they were defined and imposed only by the intention to make that painting 
which did not yet exist’ {PdM 64). The immediate point, then, is that the brushstrokes 
actually made are situated within and stand out against this field of alternative 
possibilities, even though the relevant alternatives did not exist prior to the act of 
creative expression. However, the example also highlights that painting is an 
operation that is both intentional, i.e. directed towards the work being produced, and 
involves deliberate choice. To talk of ‘deliberate choice’ here does not, of course, 
mean that Matisse engaged in a process of conscious and explicit reasoning to arrive 
at his choice of brushstroke. Rather there is what might be called ‘motoric 
deliberation’, a preconceptual weighing up, (literally) going through the motions so as 
to get the right feel for the stroke required. The reason this is deliberation, rather than 
palpitation or pot luck, is that the resultant stroke is nonetheless subject to both
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considerations of appropriateness and, where needed, correction in the context of the 
nascent work, and hence to some degree of conscious control.
This suggests that the choice processes governing features of a painting are 
what I shall call rationally ambivalent in standing between two poles hinted at by the 
expression ‘motoric deliberation’. On the one hand their determination may tend to be 
discourse-led, i.e. guided by the intention to embody certain ideas. An extreme 
example of this is perhaps minimalism, in which certain artistic features arguably 
acquire their significance from a framework of (theoretical) discourse. On the other 
hand, the painting process may flow more contingently, as the (dispositional) product 
of having learned in a certain way -  the artist’s ‘natural’ way of painting -  or simply 
so as to achieve a particular visual appearance. In the former case reasons precede 
and determine pictorial features, in the latter they succeed and seek to interpret them. 
The point of this rather artificial contrast is not to assert that the two kinds of 
influence can be cleanly prised apart in artistic practice. Quite the contrary, the point 
is precisely that reasons and contingent factors are interwoven in the painting process 
so that such a distinction cannot be clearly made. Hence rational ambivalence: it will 
generally be unclear whether particular features of any painting are discourse-led or 
discourse-leading, whether they result from or provide a basis for reasoning.
This clearly bears on the interpretability or intelligibility of a painting. To be 
sure, every aspect of a painting -  in contrast to the causality of photographs -  is in 
some way the product of deliberation. Correspondingly, everything about a painting 
is potentially intelligible: not only is each brushstroke part of a pictorial whole, say in 
rendering objects as part of a motif, but stylistic choices too are often integral to
109realizing a work’s aim. So in attempting (seriously) to interpret the meaning 
inherent in a painting, the default assumption must be that every feature is deliberate. 
The painting is treated as a complex of interpretable forms, with the aim being to 
articulate reasons for particular features’ having been done in the way they are rather 
than in some other way. Yet at the same time, the assumed interpretability of a 
painting is inhibited by its rational ambivalence: As a product of motoric deliberation, 
a hybrid of dispositional and reasoned activity, it is impossible in principle to 
ascertain a cut-off between causal and rational factors in the painting process. Indeed,
192 For example, it is not difficult to find reasons for the deployment o f different kinds o f brushstrokes 
in Jean Fran?ois Millet’s rural scenes, Seurat’s pointillism, or Cezanne’s late paintings o f the Bibemus 
quarry and the Mont Saint-Victoire.
121
even if one is tempted to think of an artist’s testimony as an appropriate criterion for 
making such a distinction, this will be at best a limited guide. Overall this suggests 
that although an interpreter of a painting must by default assume that every feature is 
deliberate, this assumption cannot point towards a system of underlying reasoning. In 
other words, as a product of motoric deliberation a painting exhibits the 
nonretrojectability identified above as characteristic of motivations.
Against this background the analogy with painting provides a way of 
understanding why linguistic articulations should be thought of in terms of 
motivations, or as inchoately rational, in the manner described in the previous section. 
The crux of the analogy is the fact that both are the products not of chance, but of 
deliberate intentional activity, so that there is prima facie reason to think of them as 
being intelligible. There is often a temptation, particularly with regard to language, to 
assimilate all deliberative activities to highly reflective, maximally explicit cases such 
as solving mathematical problems. The significance of Merleau-Ponty’s painting 
analogy, in particular his Matisse example, is therefore to provide an alternative 
paradigm of deliberate intentional activity that better reflects its character as 
‘incarnate logic’ or ‘logic within contingency’ (S 110). The analogy is also supported 
by the fact that in linguistic acts, as in painting, the contingent and arbitrary blends 
seamlessly with the rational. For although the formation of lexis will often be due to 
explicit reasoning, contingency is involved -  as Saussure emphasizes -  through both 
changes in word parsing due to phonetic drift and the ultimate arbitrariness of the 
phonetic basis of linguistic signs.193 With these parallels in mind, comparison with 
the production of a single painting already suggests that linguistic articulations should 
be thought of as exhibiting the trait of nonretrojectability. However, this conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that linguistic articulations, just as stylistic or other techniques, 
are subject to recontextualization so that, once coined, new terms enter a systematic 
context broader than might (possibly) have been considered by their inventors.194
It is also possible to appreciate how the semideterminacy -  the second 
characteristic of motivations -  arises with linguistic expressions. This is linked with 
the important difference between individual paintings, as concrete artefacts, and an 
articulate lexical system, as what I shall a type artefact. The lexical system as a
193 Cf. footnote 177.
194 An ‘act o f thought, having been expressed, from then on has the power to outlive itself {PdP 449). 
This fact, incidentally, highlights the naivety of Nietzsche’s (1980, 260 [I §2]) suggestion that the 
coining o f concepts be thought o f as an ‘expression of power by the dominant’.
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whole, and each of its constituents, are not just one-off products, but -  in Merleau- 
Ponty’s terms -  the ‘sediment’ of ‘iterated’ expressive operations {PdP 229, 222). As 
such individual words are both conditioned and conditioning, both products of and 
the material for deliberate intentional acts which (as a rule) have been reused or 
recycled countless times. Such recycling has feedback effects that impregnate 
linguistic articulations with motivational character: ‘having been employed in 
different contexts [...] the word is gradually charged with a sense that it is not 
possible to fix absolutely’ {PdP 445). For on the one hand, our propensity to find 
words meaningful or appropriate for intentional use is explained by the fact that they 
have (often) been used previously. In contrast to that of individual paintings, the 
intelligibility of linguistic articulations, as type artefacts, is an evolved intelligibility: 
words are tried and tested expressive tools.195 On the other hand, with such iteration 
the effects of rational ambivalence and recontextualization on the overall product are 
compounded, so that there can be no sensible aspiration to uncover ‘the’ rationality 
inherent in the sediment of linguistic articulation. By thus both compounding the 
supposition of intelligibility and frustrating any hope of unique underlying rationality, 
the (distributed, iterative, evolutive) mode of production brings about the 
semideterminacy of linguistic articulation as a whole. The need to think of linguistic 
articulation as an inchoately rational field of motivations thus results from their being 
both a product of motoric deliberation, which introduces nonretrojectability, and type 
artefacts, which generates semideterminacy.
The difference between an individual painting, as a concrete artefact, and 
linguistic articulations, as type artefacts, can be usefully summed up by saying that 
although each can be thought of as an arrangement of interpretable form, they differ 
in their respective modes of interpretability. With an individual painting -  as a single 
object of determinate origin -  an art historian’s interpretation may aim to rediscover 
its original meaning, even though this aspiration must contend with the rational 
ambivalence of painting just highlighted. The important point, nevertheless, is that its 
interpretability is retrospective, based on the supposition of antecedent rationality. 
Interpretation is here recovery. However, with linguistic articulation -  a sedimented 
type artefact of indeterminately many origins -  such retrospective interpretation 
would be pointless given its typological and pervasive motivational character. In this
195 This is what licences Austin’s talk o f ‘natural economy of language’ and ‘the long test o f the 
survival o f the fittest’ (Austin 1979, 190, 182).
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case to talk of interpretable forms instead, means that words are open to constant 
(re)interpretation in acts of speech, thus exhibiting in situ or situated interpretability. 
Interpretation is here application to the given circumstances.
It is perhaps worth highlighting that the interrelated features discussed here -  
inchoate rationality, motivational character, and situated interpretability -  are not 
imperfections, but fundamental to the way words work. Philosophers have often been 
tempted to think of words, at least ‘ideally’, as bearing a determinate meaning and as 
playing a well-defined role in some fully rational system. But against such 
preconceived ideals it should be emphasized that the evolved intelligibility outlined 
here and the consequent situated interpretability are a condition for words’ 
functioning as they do. For they underlie both the aptness of words, the fact that these 
seem antecedently suited for use in presenting features of the world, and their 
plasticity, the fact that they can be adapted to new situations and applications.
(iii) Style as a preconceptual generality: Finally, the analogy with painting can show 
what is meant by Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of style as a ‘pre-conceptual 
generality’ and as ‘that which renders all meaningful signs [signification] possible’ 
(PdM 63n, 81). In the case of paintings this suggestion is easy to follow, since it is 
obvious that any given object, a chair say, could be rendered in indefinitely many 
different ways, different visual styles, without falling under a different concept. To 
isolate what the preconceptual features of paintings are it will be helpful to consider 
Panofsky’s (1993, cf. 51-67) well-known distinction between three aspects of 
pictorial meaning: the pre-iconographic, which catalogues or inventories the objects 
depicted; the iconographic, which identifies, where appropriate, the conventional 
symbolism of those objects; and the iconological, which is concerned with interpreted 
content. A conspicuous feature of this model is that it applies -  albeit intentionally -  
only to representational, conventional, and highly codified works. But, even 
accepting this limitation, in concentrating on represented objects and narrative 
Panofsky’s model effectively assimilates pictorial meaning to conceptual and 
propositional content. In so doing it fails to accommodate two essential aspects of 
painting. First, it disregards the fact that pre-iconographic items are built up from 
formal elements which in themselves could not be assigned any determinate meaning. 
Yet anything in a picture that is conceptually interpretable must consist of some 
configuration of forms, it must -  as I shall put it -  be configured. It is this feature, I
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suggest, that Merleau-Ponty is drawing attention to in describing style as 
‘preconceptual’ and as a precondition for ‘signification’. Second, Panofsky’s model 
fails to reflect the fact that arrangements of form and colour are continuously 
variable, i.e. what Goodman calls the ‘syntactic density’ of pictures.196 This means -  
as in the chair example above -  that any number of compositional or configurational 
differences could fail to make a difference to the ‘content’ of a painting. However, 
what matters here is that we nonetheless see differences in formal configuration, i.e. 
in style.197 This is why the example of paintings is so attractive for Merleau-Ponty. 
Because we can see differences in (syntactically dense) configuration, and because 
the conceptual content of paintings must be configured, paintings are a paradigm in 
which the seeing of stylistic differences is plausibly prior to conceptual awareness.
How is this thought to apply to language? As already mentioned, Merleau- 
Ponty’s analogy with painting and his notion of style as a ‘system of equivalences’ 
are intended to converge with the Saussurean conception of signs, as complementary 
takes on the process of linguistic articulation and indirect sense. Hence in both cases 
the focus is on certain aspects of structure -  configurational schemata in painting, and 
differential signifiers and signifieds in language -  the role of which is to be 
subconceptual. Less obviously perhaps, style choices can be viewed as taking place in 
a differential realm in Saussure’s sense insofar as stylistically relevant choices are 
made on a ‘syntactically dense’ continuum of possibilities. Moreover, in a slightly 
extenuated, and somewhat intuitive, sense Saussure’s notion of value could also be 
applied to the use of configurational or stylistic features. For clearly the use of 
various materials, methods and forms in a given work can be considered in terms of 
interchangeability and comparison -  as expressed in the maxim that in a successful 
work nothing could be added or taken away without aesthetic compromise.
Nonetheless, there are limits to the analogy with painting, and in this respect 
considering Panofsky’s model is particularly instructive. For in assimilating pictorial 
meaning to conceptual and propositional meaning this appears to assimilate paintings 
to language. Consequently, the features of pictures Panofsky’s model misses -  viz. 
configuredness and denseness -  might seem not to apply to language, and so to show 
up the analogy’s limits. However, as just hinted, in the case of language too the
196 A notational scheme that is ‘syntactically dense [...] provides for infinitely many characters so 
ordered that between each two there is a third’ (Goodman 1976, 136).
197 For an impressive illustration of this cf. Gombrich’s (1960, 309) juxtaposition o f a van Gogh copy 
of Millet’s Cornfield with the original.
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formation of linguistic signs from sublexical elements can be considered as a process 
of subconceptual configuration. But is language syntactically dense? Well, although 
the phonetic aspect is itself continuously variable, its organization through use in a 
sign system results in sublexical elements -  phonemes or morphemes -  characterized 
by discontinuities. In other words, the resultant configuration of linguistic signs is not 
syntactically dense, but syntactically discrete -  or, to borrow another of Goodman’s
1 Qfiterms, ‘finitely differentiated’. This brings out a difficulty not discussed by 
Merleau-Ponty. For it is precisely the fact that indefinitely small differences count, 
that there is syntactic density, which makes style such an important feature of 
paintings. Indeed the infinite variability of every feature makes it practically 
inevitable that each painter will exhibit an individual style. The same cannot be said 
regarding language. For as language users we cannot freely vary the form of 
signifiers; or rather we can to the extent that others are able to neglect such variations 
and map them onto a familiar and discrete phonological/morphological scheme. Far 
from being a sociological observation, this identifies a fundamental disanalogy 
between language and painting: insensitivity to syntactic variations beyond a certain 
degree is a requirement for the practical and communicative functioning of linguistic 
signs.199 As a result style, in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, is a more strongly constrained 
and presumably less salient phenomenon with language than it is with pictures. 
Moreover, because it cannot rely on continuous malleability, the development of 
individual linguistic style will generally turn on factors other than syntactic 
variations.200 However, despite these qualifications, there is no problem in principle 
with applying Merleau-Ponty’s notion of style to language, with sublexical 
composition as the primary (syntactic) vehicle of style in much the same way as use 
of a characteristic palette or configurational schemata might define style in painting. 
For language, like painting, is configured and where different syntactic schemes are 
found -  say between English, French, Russian etc. -  this clearly could be described as 
a difference in ‘style’ as Merleau-Ponty understands it.
198 Which Goodman (1976, 135 f.) defines as follows: ‘For every two characters K and K' and every 
mark m that does not actually belong to both, determination that m does not belong to K or that m does 
not belong to K' is theoretically possible.’
199 It is presumably a necessary condition for the use of language to organize experience in a 
manageable way.
200 Merleau-Ponty shows some awareness o f this in suggesting that literary language differs from 
routine language use while standing in a relationship o f ‘homonymy’ (S  96; cf. PdM  19 and 5  113 f.). 
But despite often referring to the ‘coherent deformation’ it introduces, he does not detail how literary 
use distinguishes itself from common use.
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5. Presentational sense as indirect sense
The notion of presentational sense was initially introduced somewhat schematically, 
in discussing Heidegger’s view of the proper function of Articulacy, to refer to an 
aspect of linguistic expressions’ meaning that is due to their form and in virtue of 
which they function to present features of the world in an articulate manner. The last 
two sections’ discussion of indirect sense was intended to explicate the two 
fundamental components of this schema while taking account of the modifications -  
in particular, the emphasis on embodiment and the rejection of final determinacy -  
that Merleau-Ponty brings to Heidegger’s general picture of language. Thus 
Saussure’s conception of signs provides a detailed account of the notion of linguistic 
form appealed to, and correspondingly of the structure of presentational sense. 
Further, the analogy with painting, I have suggested, provides a model for 
understanding the presentational function of signs, as well as providing support for 
the Saussurean view of linguistic articulations as being inchoately rational and 
underlying conceptual units. This section undertakes three tasks. First and foremost it 
sets out several ways in which understanding presentational sense as Merleau-Ponty’s 
indirect sense fills out Heidegger’s view of the specific function of linguistic signs in 
a phenomenologically convincing way. It then summarizes how presentational sense 
meets the requirements previously identified for prepredicative factors, before finally 
identifying a basic inadequacy that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language shares 
with Heidegger’s, leading to the need for an account of what was previously called 
pragmatic sense.
One obvious way in which Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language remains 
true to phenomena is in its ontological commitments. Being set out in terms of 
behaviour, gestures, words and acts of speech, his conception of language assiduously 
avoids positing any linguistic entities that are not phenomenologically licensed. Yet 
rather than merely acknowledging, it seeks to do justice to the fact that these items, in 
particular words, are literally involved in the constitution of linguistic meaning. As 
seen in this chapter’s first section, this was already a key aim for PdP’s discussion of 
language, even though its account of the way language is a ‘vehicle’ of sense rested 
on inadequate metaphors. But with the appropriation of Saussure’s conception of 
signs this aim could draw on a more literal and articulate accommodation of the fact 
that sublexical structure is integral to the functioning of linguistic signs. In this way it
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becomes possible to describe systematically -  rather than metaphorically -  two 
further phenomenological features, namely the perceptible differences between 
(natural, ‘national’) languages and the intuitively obvious significance of many 
grammatical features. For example, the ‘grammatical’ ordering of words into verbs, 
adjectives and adverbs typically relies on the use of standardized sublexical features 
that identify how their referents are being presented, say as a temporally occurrent 
process or event (verbs), a property (adjectives), or a manner of doing such-and-such 
(adverbs). Of course, there is no necessary link between such features and their 
referents -  using a noun to refer to a process, for example, does not imply blindness 
to its temporal character. But they do have an expressive significance -  these are the 
means we use to organize and present features of the world in such ways -  that a 
phenomenologically accurate conception of language ought to respect as having a 
distinct function in meaningful language use rather than being ‘superficial’ features.
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language is also in a position to address, in a 
phenomenologically plausible fashion, two problems previously identified with
90 1 • •Heidegger’s view of signs as formal indications. First, as already mentioned, the 
appropriation of Saussure’s position answers an open question by making explicit 
which features of linguistic form Heidegger tacitly relied on prior to and in SZ. On 
Saussure’s model linguistic articulation is understood to take place at the lexical and 
sublexical level, rather than centring on higher-level structures such as sentences, 
texts, or discourses. In this respect it coheres well with Heidegger’s view of 
propositions as ‘derivative’. But it is also phenomenologically plausible to think of 
linguistic articulation in terms of the distinct elements found at the lexical and 
sublexical levels, since higher-level structures -  sentences, texts, discourses -  are 
clearly composed of these. By the same token Saussure’s model also provides an 
answer to the question of how far down presentational sense goes, since by definition 
morphemes are the smallest units that can be considered to articulate a significant
909difference. Hence the suggestion here is that presentational sense of linguistic 
expressions is due to the differences and distinctions inherent in the nexus of 
morphemes and their (relatively motivated) combination in words.
Second, Merleau-Ponty’s views also provide an important corrective to 
Heidegger’s picture of signs’ being internally linked with determinate grounding
201 Cf. page 64 above.
202 Cf. page 66 above.
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experiences and having the essentially atemporal function of simple preservation of 
original meanings.203 To be sure, if scepticism about meaning or the possibility of 
communication is to be avoided, then at some level (say of texts) or under certain 
conditions (e.g. constant patterns of use) linguistic signs must be assumed able to 
preserve meaning. But, as Merleau-Ponty’s view of the way indirect sense functions 
makes clear, this assumption cannot be made without qualification. For by 
introducing and compounding the effects of rational ambivalence, the processes of 
production and transmission of linguistic expressions expose the naivety of assuming 
individual signs to stand in some recoverable internal relation to determinate 
phenomena. Heidegger’s view rests on an oversimplification which might be 
described -  in the terminology of the preceding section -  by saying he treats signs as 
concrete artefacts rather than type artefacts, and so attributes them with retrospective 
rather than situated interpretability. There is, to be sure, continuity between 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in that both centre on the relationship between 
expressions and the phenomena of lived, or at least liveable, experience. In this sense 
both approaches are phenomenological. But although recurrent phenomena might 
provide a basis for stable patterns of expression, within the Merleau-Pontian picture 
there can be no underlying general assumption of simple preservation. Linguistic 
articulation instead issues in a field of type artefacts characterized by inchoate 
rationality and situated interpretability. The relationship between linguistic 
expressions and phenomena is hence reconfigured: rather than being internally linked 
with determinate phenomena, these characteristics engender the flexibility that makes 
individual linguistic expressions appropriate to a range of varying situations.
The difference is crucial: for Merleau-Ponty words do not have original 
contexts of sense; instead their expressive power is rooted in the here and now of 
lived experience. This is why Merleau-Ponty, unlike Heidegger, is able to 
acknowledge the genuinely temporal character of language. First, as has been seen, 
under Saussure’s influence he valorizes the present of speech acts (parole): ‘the 
power of language [...] is entirely in its present’ 204 While linguistic articulations 
remain semideterminate on principle, determinacy of meaning is maximized in
203 Incidentally -  though to argue this is well beyond the scope of this thesis -  it seems to me that, for 
all its naivety, this is an assumption that underpinned Heidegger’s own philosophical methods 
throughout his work.
204 PdM 58. Such presence, for Merleau-Ponty, is o f course ‘of the perceptive order’ (PdM 41, 57, 53), 
i.e. perspectival, partial, or indirect.
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particular utterances: ‘The act of speaking is clear only for whoever speaks or hears 
effectively’ (PdP 448). Second, he nonetheless conceives of acts of speech as 
embedded in a temporal horizon: The speaking present itself is not point-like, but 
temporally extended: ‘the [synchronic] system that is realized is never entirely in the 
act’. In particular, the linguistic present is privileged only as conditioned by the 
sedimented products or acquisition of its past such that ‘the contingency of the 
linguistic past intrudes through to the synchronic system’.205
Having incorporated these modifications -  an articulate conception of 
linguistic form and the temporalization of linguistic phenomena -  I want to suggest 
that the notion of presentational sense provides a phenomenologically plausible view 
of the role articulate form plays in linguistic expression. One aspect of this is that it 
cashes out Merleau-Ponty’s view of what it is for signs to be the ‘vehicle’ of sense. 
As described above, SdC had suggested that the key to this is ‘structural 
correspondence’ between signifieds and signifiers, while vaguely appealing to a 
‘systematic principle’ inherent in the organization of the latter. In PdP talk of a 
systematic principle had yielded to still more vague metaphors of singing the world 
and emotional essences. However, with Saussure comes the idea of a sign system 
(langue) with explicitly and exhaustively identifiable structural components. The 
organization of sign structure is now due not to a ‘systematic principle’ but to iterated 
intentional activity, yielding a differential scheme that is type artefactual and 
characterized by an inchoate mode of intelligibility. Nonetheless, in any given context 
of use it is the articulations inherent in this scheme of difference and distinctness that 
are used to organize experience of the world by picking out (corresponding) features 
of the world. Hence, though not in any obvious way comprising a ‘direct’ copy or 
representation of the world, linguistic articulations can fulfil the presentational 
function -  pointing out features of the world, letting them be seen directly -  that 
Heidegger thought of as proper to Articulacy in the allusive or ‘indirect’ way 
illustrated by Merleau-Ponty’s analogy with painting.
These improvements would be of no real interest, were it not for the fact that 
they accurately accommodate certain factors highly relevant in making careful or 
expressive use of language. For example, new linguistic expressions are usually
205 S 109, cf. PdP  450. Merleau-Ponty goes as far as to suggest that ‘the present exercise o f speech’ 
involves taking up ‘all the preceding experience’ sedimented in language {PdM  59).
206 SdC  132 f. (cf. page 83 above).
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coined as recognizable combinations or modifications of existing words; and even 
where this is not the case, their coinage is often implicitly conditioned by existing 
forms, from which there is a need to be distinguished. In this respect Merleau-Ponty 
is certainly true to the phenomenology of creative expression. Alternatively, in 
seeking to express, or avoid expressing, certain nuances one might rely on thesauri, 
where words are grouped in ways that inevitably highlight their differences as much 
as their similarities. Again in translation work differences in word structure can 
generate difficulties, since words with equivalent patterns of use can present their
9 07referents in disconcertingly different or reassuringly parallel ways. In each of these 
cases it is plausible to think of language as functioning as a differential resource the 
structure of which is embodied in the array of available sublexical and lexical forms. 
In this way the idea of presentational sense does justice to the phenomenological fact 
that words and their constituents are quite literally the means of which thoughts are 
composed. Linguistic articulations are expressive ‘materials’ embodying certain 
constraints, as Merleau-Ponty unsurprisingly points out, in much the same way as an 
artist’s colours {PdP 446). Moreover, what Saussure’s conception of signs captures 
well, and such examples illustrate, is that a term’s meaning or sense is often 
recognizably linked with the way relatively-motivated morphological features present 
its referents.
An interesting consequence of this is the ability to account plausibly for the 
significance of what John Austin (1979, 201) fittingly describes as ‘[t]railing clouds 
of etymology’, the fact that ‘a word never -  well, hardly ever -  shakes off its 
etymology and its formation’. Etymology adheres to words in the sense that their 
morphological features anchor certain associations or relations to other terms, in a 
manner typically elucidated by considering language historically. Such adherence can 
give rise to the idea that the meaning of expressions is best understood by considering 
their historically original meaning. This idea is sometimes thought to underlie 
Heidegger’s reliance -  particularly in his later works -  on controversial appeals to
90R‘etymology’ in his philosophical analyses. In fact, it is far from clear that 
Heidegger had any specific interest in historical originality of meanings. To be sure,
207 As just one example, the German term ‘Mitleid’ can be read as literally saying ‘with-suffering’, 
which to some extent makes ‘compassion’ a better rendition than the standard ‘pity’.
208 Charles Guignon, for example, suggests that for Heidegger ‘the true springs o f the meaning’ which 
Dasein discloses ‘are historical’, such that authentic being ‘brings about a new relationship to the past 
and history’ in which Dasein ‘remembers its historical roots and can find the underlying meaning of 
what is passed down in the tradition’ (Guignon 1983, 141, 139, 138).
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already in SZ his whole project is oriented towards the ideals of proper (‘authentic’) 
disclosure and originality, with the ultimate ‘business of philosophy’ described as 
being to ‘preserve the force o f the most elemental words'?®9 But Heidegger’s 
indifference to historical originality is strikingly illustrated by his treatment of the 
term ‘phenomenology’: while apparently appealing to the Greek etymology of its two 
‘constituent parts’ to explain its meaning, Heidegger shrugs off the ‘history of the 
word itself as insignificant.210 Perhaps there is no obvious incongruity in this claim 
insofar as Heidegger’s primary aspiration -  as set out above (section 1.4) -  is to 
sense-genetic originality, the sense inherent in ‘grounding experiences’ or 
phenomena, rather than to historical accuracy. Nevertheless, his model of signs’ 
functioning implies that sense-genetic and historical originality cannot be fully 
dissociated. For if linguistic signs were internally related to and simply preserved 
their link with determinate phenomena, historical and sense-genetic originality would 
presumably be correlative, with historical origins being simply the first instantiation 
of a determinate sense-genesis. Accordingly, if etymology is indicative of historically 
original understanding, it would also be a useful pointer to phenomena.
By contrast the idea of accountability to determinate and recoverable sense- 
origins is undermined by a Merleau-Pontian picture of the evolution of linguistic 
expressions. And while it is still plausible, on this picture, to think of an expression’s 
articulate -  and relatively motivated -  form being intelligibly linked with its meaning, 
the link relies not on the (perhaps determinate) intelligibility of a concrete artefact, 
but on the inchoate rationality of type artefacts. This revision is again 
phenomenologically plausible. For it suggests that, much as Heidegger assumed, 
etymological facts can be drawn on -  say in cases of doubt, subtlety, ambiguity, 
neologism or metaphor -  to clarify ‘the meaning’ of a word in the sense of clarifying 
how it is presenting its objects, which contrasts and associations underlie its 
differential feats. Etymological considerations can, in other words, shed light on what 
I have been calling the presentational sense of an expression. However, given 
Merleau-Ponty’s view of the pervasive indeterminacy in the way language’s past 
shapes its present, etymological facts can be neither an unfailing nor an adequate 
guide to what an expression means in present use. In this way it reflects the Austinian
209 SZ 220 (on this orientation cf. particularly 231 f.).
210 SZ 28. -  As well he might, given that the term was an 18th century coinage. For an informative 
survey o f the history o f the term’s use see Spiegelberg 1960, vol. 1, 8-20.
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insight that while it is true that words do not generally shake off their etymology and 
formation, it is equally true that the bind is not very tight -  that the concern is with
911clouds rather than chains.
It might be objected that the examples of expressive use cited and relied on 
here are inappropriately recherche -  so to speak, a phenomenology of exceptions 
rather than the rule. This objection misconstrues the point of such examples here. It is 
not to suggest, as Merleau-Ponty indeed does, that such relatively unusual situations 
are explanatorily distinguished over more common ones, but simply that as contrast 
experiences they highlight features present, though not playing such a conspicuous 
role, in all use of language. Thus even when we use language routinely or 
‘inauthentically’ in Heidegger’s sense -  i.e. without being aware of its presentational 
import -  the sublexical-lexical articulations to which presentational sense is due are 
nonetheless pervasive.
One aspect of the pervasiveness just mentioned is the fact that presentational sense 
meets the previously identified requirements to function prepredicatively. Thus the 
use of words is clearly implicit in the construction of sentences, and is in this sense 
subpropositional. It is also subinferential in both senses required for it to function 
foundationally. To begin with, because even when presentational sense is not being 
treated as inferentially relevant, features of linguistic form are still involved -  so to 
speak, as mere syntax -  in language use. But also because, as illustrated by the above 
examples, the differential structure of presentational sense can also be drawn upon 
and developed as a basis for justification. In this respect, the relatively motivated 
differences in linguistic articulation -  Saussure’s langue -  are the basis of words’ 
interpretability. They comprise a kind of ‘sense’ insofar as they are present in all 
language use and generate the possibility of developed interpretation. Possessing 
language, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, as a ‘principle of distinction’ (PdM 46) thus 
extends over different levels of competence, from the most basic (merely ‘syntactic’) 
mastery of sublexical forms through to the exploitation of structurally inherent
211 The result has an air o f paradox: Heidegger, his atemporal model o f language notwithstanding, 
apparently values etymological facts. Yet it is Merleau-Ponty, who disavows the historical perspective 
to focus on the living present o f language, whose approach better does justice to the temporality of  
language and the relevance o f etymological facts.
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differences in inferentially relevant ways.212 Finally, the idea that presentational sense 
functions as a heterologous foundation of predicative awareness is reflected in the 
distinction between sublexical and lexical (sign) levels of linguistic structure. 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the ‘logic of [language’s] construction’ cannot be ‘put in 
concepts’ {PdM 52 f.) points in this direction. However, his view is not that the 
predicative and prepredicative function in genuinely different (mutually irreducible) 
ways, but that conceptual or predicative properties are reductively explained by the 
dynamics of sublexical elements. But it was argued above that this reduction is 
implausible and that the possibility of constituted, distinct signs being the bearers of -  
e.g. inferential or referential -  properties should be acknowledged. Distinguishing 
distinct signs and sublexical elements as different levels of organization provides a 
basis for the claim that predicative and prepredicative factors function in different 
ways. However, the idea of heterologous foundation requires not only that lexical 
properties presuppose the dynamics of sublexical elements, which I assume to be 
true, but also that these two levels of semiotic organization and function cannot be 
straightforwardly -  i.e. in a 1:1 manner -  mapped onto each other. What prevents this 
here is that they differ in the topology of their constituent units: not simply in that a 
language has many more lexical than sublexical items, but particularly because
213lexical items are themselves composed of sublexical forms.
So far in this section I have been claiming that the idea of presentational sense allows 
a number of closely related improvements to the original Heideggerian picture of how 
linguistic signs function. Thus it does justice to the involvement of words, including 
sublexical form, in linguistic articulation, to the genuinely temporal character of 
linguistic sedimentation, and to the significance of etymological considerations. 
Finally it was highlighted that presentational sense also plays a foundational role 
since it is both consistent with prepredicative use and one means that can be exploited 
in predicative use.
All the same, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language has significant 
inadequacies. To begin with it provides an altogether more partial picture than
212 PdM  46. As Merleau-Ponty elsewhere points out, in order to start picking up the system o f language 
the child must already have mastered -  as a scheme of differentiation -  its phonetic basis {RdC  34).
2,3 Complexity o f  linguistic forms, and with this their power to differentiate features o f the world, 
arises through the combination of simpler forms. Assuming words to be the bearers o f conceptual 
properties, this explains why the logic o f words’ construction cannot be ‘put into concepts’.
134
Merleau-Ponty seems to have supposed. One example, already highlighted, is that in 
concentrating on the role of sublexical elements, Merleau-Ponty neglects the 
possibility inherent in Saussure’s conception of signs that the functioning of 
constituted signs might require describing in a way not reducible to sublexical 
dynamics. Similarly, while he recognizes that language has a genuinely temporal 
character, it would be wrong to think that the question of how language’s past carries 
over into its present and future can be addressed simply at the sublexical level. 
Rather, the historical transmission of linguistic meaning involves a range of processes 
at different levels such as sentences or discourses and texts, as well as the ‘linguistic 
units’ focused on by structuralist linguistics.214
Two more trenchant problems with Merleau-Ponty’s approach result from its 
systematic bias in favour of creative expression. The first is that it fails to identify any 
checks on the unfolding of expressive potentials, i.e. how words are involved in 
expansive and limiting processes that result -  as Ricoeur (1969b, 71) aptly terms it -  
in a ‘regulated polysemy’. This one-sided emphasis on openness and creative 
expression, which casts any sense-preserving language use simply as failing of 
expressiveness and hence ‘secondary’, fails to account for the stability of many 
expressions’ meanings and to explicate the constraints effecting such stability. It fails, 
so to speak, to explain why language is not in expressive free fall.
Merleau-Ponty also fails, second, to account for the role played by a 
background of established use. The need to do this can easily be appreciated since, 
given the ultimate arbitrariness of the phonetic aspect of signs, in order to present 
entities in an articulate manner -  i.e. to convey differences and similarities -  signs 
must be interpreted in relation to standard patterns of use. To understand the resultant 
interdependency, however, a more detailed account of what Merleau-Ponty terms 
‘direct’ sense is required. In fact Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the reliance of indirect 
on direct sense, and of creative on established expression. Yet surprisingly he 
seems not to realize that this undermines his asymmetric claim to explanatory 
primacy on behalf of creative expression and indirect sense. This might be due to his 
tendency to associate the notion of ‘direct’ sense with the dubious metaphysical 
implication that intentional objects are presented in an idealized, nonaspectual
214 Cf. Ricoeur 1969a, 86. One such process being Gadamerian dialogue with texts o f the past, as the 
merging of horizons amidst the ‘the inconcludable openness o f the occurrence o f meaning’ (Gadamer 
1990,476).
215 Cf. page 93 above.
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manner. However, the correct conclusion to draw is instead that what is needed is a 
conception of the ‘direct’ background for creative expression which does not require 
such eccentric metaphysical commitments.
It seems to me that these two problems have a common root in a failure to 
consider more closely the pragmatic dimension of language. For what holds a pattern 
of linguistic regularities in place, and so keeps expressive free fall in check, are the 
exigencies of living and acting in certain ways. And since what characterizes living in 
a certain way is a certain pattern of regularities, it seems natural to link an account of 
established (‘direct’) patterns of language use with the forms of life in which they 
arise. Indeed it is puzzling that Merleau-Ponty neglects practice in the way he does. 
For given his emphasis on existential and bodily significance (or lived sense) in PdP, 
it is far from clear that already constituted or established forms of expression should 
qualify as ‘secondary’. Inauthentic, non-original, constituted speech instead bears 
meaning, is expressive, in all the same ways, and presumably with more vital 
urgency, than what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ speech. So one 
would expect a consistent phenomenological commitment to the lived present to 
focus on the world of everyday practice. In this light Merleau-Ponty’s preference for 
highbrow literary language use as a paradigm evidences a disregard for lived 
experience -  the world as experienced (le monde vecu; PdP iii) -  and day-to-day
01 f\embodiment that is incongruent with his own commitment to phenomenology. 
Nonetheless, the failure to consider in any detail the link between language and action 
is a deficit Merleau-Ponty shares with Heidegger. Again this is surprising, given SZ’s 
emphasis on the foundational function of purposive understanding and its 
corresponding twofold instrumentalist view of (linguistic) signs. Thus while both 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger’s conceptions of language are grounded in recognition 
of the pragmatic dimension of language, neither thought this sufficiently important or 
involved to deserve detailed discussion. Hence the solution to the two problems with 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language converges with my attempt to fill out an 
account of pragmatic sense within the Heideggerian framework. What is needed is an 
articulate conception of the way linguistic regularities are linked with practice, 
without reliance on metaphysically bizarre ‘direct’ encounters with intentional 
objects. It is this we will find with Wittgenstein.
216 In taking creative expression as paradigmatic he even suggests that to understand language one 
should precisely not attend to the ‘immediate practice of language’ (PdM  165; cf. 43).
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C h a pt e r  III
W it t g e n st e in : T h e  P r a g m a t ic  
A spe c t  o f  La n g u a g e
Two features of the late Wittgenstein’s approach to language suit this to 
phenomenologically accurate description of the character of rules in linguistic 
practice, and so to the task of explicating the notion of pragmatic sense identified 
within the Heideggerian framework. The first is the key insight that the use of certain 
concepts is internal to corresponding forms of practice, such that the ‘logic’ of those 
practices is reflected structurally in linguistic articulation. As Wittgenstein puts it:
‘Practice gives words their sense’ -  ‘the concept [...] is at home in the language- 
game’ (VB 571; Z §391). The point of this, it will be argued, is that not only is the use 
of signs in a particular way constitutive of corresponding practices, but also, 
conversely, that acting in certain ways imposes practical requirements that determine 
the use of signs. To highlight this literal embedding and shaping of concepts within
• 217practice I shall call this conception of language a ‘praxeologicaT one. The second 
feature important here is the characteristic modesty that Wittgenstein’s conception of 
rules takes on with the maturing language-game analogy. As will be seen, the late 
Wittgenstein not only affords rules a circumscribed role in linguistic processes, but 
reconfigures his conception of rules, in particular the notion of determinacy bearing 
on them, to reflect their attunement to empirical surroundings.
To begin with, several comments should be made about the approach to 
Wittgenstein to be taken here. First, because the above features could emerge only 
once Wittgenstein had dropped the calculus model of language, leading to greater 
reliance on the idea of language-games, it involves a selective textual focus. In this 
light ‘late’ writings such as the Philosophical Investigations (PU) stand opposed not 
only to the Tractatus, but also to texts of the early 1930s, up to and including the 
Philosophical Grammar (PG) of 1933. Second, my approach here is also selective in
217 Haller (1979, 1984) applies the term ‘praxeological’ to Wittgenstein. Skirbekk (1983, 9), describing 
a tendency in Scandinavian philosophy, characterizes praxeology fittingly as ‘theory (logos) o f action 
(praxis) [...] a conceptual analysis and reflective discussion of the way human activities are 
interwoven with their agents and with the things at which they are directed within our everyday world’.
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foregrounding several motifs that bring out systematic aspects of the relation between 
language and regularities in practice. The aim is to show what means Wittgenstein 
provides for explicating the notion of pragmatic sense, not to claim that these motifs 
exhaust his conception of language. I will therefore be abstracting out and 
instrumentalizing Wittgenstein’s views rather than offering detailed exegetic 
commentary or aligning myself to his philosophical aims.
With this in mind, a preliminary consideration is whether any determinate 
conception of language can be attributed to Wittgenstein, given PITs claim not to be 
advancing any philosophical theses. A curt response might be that we are free to 
ignore Wittgenstein’s own metaphilosophical views when reading him. But this 
would fail to address the potential difficulty that, whatever its content, no position 
could be said to represent Wittgenstein’s own views. So for the present purpose it is 
advisable to be clearer about Wittgenstein’s commitments and the sense in which 
views can be attributed to him. There are at least two approaches to what I shall call 
the ‘no-thesis thesis’, either of which could function as part of a ‘therapeutic’ 
philosophy aiming to liberate one from some, or even all, philosophical views. The 
straightforward, and textually well-founded, approach is to view Wittgenstein as an 
‘ordinary language philosopher’. On this approach, philosophical problems are the 
result of ‘misunderstandings’ fostered by linguistic forms, to be eliminated by
1^0
returning words from a ‘metaphysical’ to their ‘everyday’ use. This, Wittgenstein 
thinks, involves simply pointing out the obvious -  that which is already open to view
91Q-  so that any putative ‘theses’ would be accepted by everyone as commonplaces.
No ‘theses’ are involved because no theory is advanced; the method is simply to 
remind us of what we already know in making ‘ordinary’ or ‘everyday’ use of 
language. Although perhaps quaint, it is doubtful that this ‘ordinary language’ 
approach to philosophy is coherent. It is not, for example, clear that ‘everyday’ use of 
language can be delimited; nor, if it could, that this should be considered intrinsically 
more meaningful than other, ‘non-everyday’, uses of language; nor, even if that were 
allowed, why everyday language should be considered to eliminate philosophical 
problems, rather than simply failing to address them.220 Moreover, even if the general 
approach were coherent, it would nonetheless rely on a conception of language -  that
218 Cf. P U  §§90, 104, 109, 111 and 116, 94, 106 respectively.
219 Cf. P U  §§89, 415 and 109, 126, 128, 599.
220 As is well illustrated by Ayer’s (1969) response to Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia.
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applying to, and perhaps manifested, in everyday use -  as the basis for debunking 
‘metaphysical’ abuses of language. However, quite apart from all this, it seems 
straightforwardly false to suggest that Wittgenstein does not have distinctive views 
about the nature of language -  as evinced in his use of terms of art such as ‘language- 
game’, ‘grammar’, ‘forms of life’. In the light of such problems, it seems that in the 
straightforward form Wittgenstein’s no-thesis thesis cannot be taken at face value.
A more sophisticated approach to the no-thesis thesis is to treat Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical method, in particular his style of exposition, as nonthetic, i.e. as one 
that avoids actually positing any view. An example of this is presented by David 
Stem. Adopting Cavell’s view of the PU as a confessional dialogue between the 
‘voice of temptation’ and the ‘voice of correctness’, Stem (1996, 444) claims that 
neither represents Wittgenstein’s own views and that these are ‘two opposing voices, 
opposing trains of argument, which form part of a larger dialogue in which they 
ultimately cancel each other out’. In this way the PLTs literary form would be a 
means of emulating the Tractatus's self-abrogation, giving a whole new dimension to 
the no-thesis thesis and to Wittgenstein’s declared aim of pointing the way to peace 
beyond philosophy (PU §133). Stem’s proposal shares two difficulties with any 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s method as nonthetic. The first is reconciling the 
supposed aspiration to ultimate neutrality with Wittgenstein’s clear and pervasive 
preference for certain views -  expounded, after all, by the ‘voice of correctness’. 
Indeed, that aspiration should appear puzzling to Stem, since the whole point of 
(intellectual) confession is presumably to rid oneself of certain views, the 
temptations, and so to gain self-knowledge. The second is exegetic implausibility. 
For Wittgenstein’s stated aim in PU (§§128, 599) is not to have no views, but to have 
only views that everyone can agree with. Moreover, there no evidence -  either in 
published texts or from other sources, such as notebooks, correspondence, anecdotes, 
etc. -  that Wittgenstein intended to be read as not holding the views he apparently 
endorsed.
A more convincing approach, I suggest, lies somewhere between the 
preceding two. As will emerge in the following, Wittgenstein’s stated method is what 
might be described as ‘illuminating comparison’, i.e. offering comparisons or 
analogies to eliminate misunderstandings, say about the nature of language. Because
221 This seems to be Cavell’s (1962, 91 f.) own point in talking o f Wittgenstein’s ‘method of  
knowledge’ and his ‘exhortation [...] to self-scrutiny’.
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the aim of this is purely negative, and because this procedure is analogical in 
character, Wittgenstein’s method can be said to be positing nothing. Even so, this 
method involves a conception of language as a means of comparison, and at least 
some degree of commitment to this conception in that it is considered capable of 
correcting misunderstandings. So while the sophisticated approach to the no-thesis 
thesis is right to think of Wittgenstein’s method as nonthetic, the straightforward 
version is equally right to discern a preferred conception of language in the P U. -  It is 
of course still of significance that Wittgenstein sought to avoid positive theses. This 
aim should be bome in mind in interpreting the PU, and it is presumably one factor 
underlying the PITs unorthodox and cryptic literary form -  which is surely intended 
to make it difficult to discern positive views and so to attribute to Wittgenstein a
999systematic theory. However, the difficulty presented by Wittgenstein’s no-thesis 
thesis is ultimately a practical rather than a principled one: although complicating 
exegesis, it does not preclude treating the PU as having a determinate and 
determinable conception of language -  as I shall do in the sequel.
The task in the first two sections of this chapter will be to bring out those 
aspects of Wittgenstein’s conception of language relevant to describing the regular 
use of language in practice and so to explicating the notion of pragmatic sense. The 
first focuses on the notion of language-games to illustrate and explicate 
Wittgenstein’s commitment to the internal linking of practice and language, while the 
second tracks the implications of the maturing language-game analogy on his 
conception of linguistic rules. The third section looks more closely at the kind of 
grasp Wittgenstein’s takes speakers to have of linguistic rules and identifies a 
minimal sense of rule-following that Wittgenstein relies on. The fourth section sets 
out how Wittgenstein’s praxeological conception of language meets the previously 
identified requirements on a phenomenological notion of pragmatic sense, before the 
final section summarizes how it completes the picture of language outlined by the 
Heideggerian framework of chapter I.
222 Think o f the often epigrammatic or aphoristic character o f Wittgenstein’s comments, their 
arrangement in a quasi-dialogical form reminiscent o f both Plato and Augustinus, or the loose overall 
arrangement o f fragmented considerations into what is presumably not supposed to be a systematic 
whole. -  For a perspicacious comparison o f the aims and style o f Wittgenstein and Augustinus see 
Thompson 2000.
140
1. Language and the structure of practice
The intrinsic link between the use of language and practice referred to above is best 
understood by considering the notion of language-games. Although constantly relied 
on, and perhaps the most distinctive feature of his thinking from 1935 onwards, 
Wittgenstein’s characterizations of language-games are terse and somewhat vague. In 
the earliest of these, in the Blue Book (BIB) from 1933-4, language-games are 
introduced as ‘ways of using signs simpler than those in which we use the signs of 
our highly complicated everyday language’; they are ‘primitive’ or ‘simple forms of 
language’, from which ‘we can build up the complicated forms [...] by gradually 
adding new forms’ .223 In PU the term ‘language-game’ is introduced, in §7, against 
the background of an example of a ‘system of communication’, or ‘complete 
primitive language’, used to coordinate work on a building site (§§3, 2). Repeating a 
claim made in both the Blue and Brown Books, Wittgenstein goes on to suggest that it 
is through such simple ‘games’ that children first acquire language.224 The term 
‘language-game’ is then introduced as applying to ‘those games by means of which 
children learn their mother tongue’, including simple rote-leaming drills, and 
‘primitive languages’. Further explication comes in §23 with a sizeable list of 
examples of language-games such as giving orders, describing the appearance of 
objects, inventing stories, telling jokes, translation etc. Finally, in both these passages 
Wittgenstein highlights that language-games concern ‘the whole process of using 
words’, ‘the whole: of language and of the activities with which it is interwoven’ 
(§7). Indeed, the expression Tanguage-game' is intended to convey precisely that ‘the 
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’ (§23).
It will be instructive to proceed by considering three apparent problems. First, 
it is strange that Wittgenstein links language-games with children’s acquisition of 
language. Not only does this look like an (uncharacteristically) empirical claim -  for 
which Wittgenstein offers no evidence -  but it is far from obviously true that the 
examples of §23 are in any way specific to children’s learning of language. 
Understandably perhaps, Baker and Hacker (1980, 52) claim that by the time of the 
PU, Wittgenstein had rejected the idea of an ‘analytic-genetic’ connection between
223 BIB 17. -  The term also occurs several times in PG, which is based on a revised 1933 typescript (TS 
213; cf. footnote 245). Although this use might antedate the Blue Book, the term is simply used in 
these passages without being explained.
224 Cf. BIB 17; BrB 81; P U  §§5, 7.
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language-games and language acquisition. However, although §7 talks of this 
connection simply as something conceivable, thus freeing it of its empirical air, this 
claim is difficult to reconcile with both §7 and §5, both of which continue to imply 
the link. What does seem beyond question is that language acquisition involves 
acquiring the ability to participate in the various kinds of practice Wittgenstein 
enumerates in §23, examples that do not in any way reflect the specificity of 
(children’s) learning situations. It therefore seems that Baker and Hacker’s intuition is 
correct and that, however Wittgenstein presents it, the idea of language-games does 
not require any specific link with language-acquisition scenarios. The point 
Wittgenstein is making, somewhat misleadingly, in talking of language acquisition is 
thus best taken as describing the constitution of linguistic competence in terms of the 
ability to participate in the various kinds of language-game.
Second, Wittgenstein’s suggestion that language-games are ‘complete’ -
77albeit primitive -  languages is often thought problematic. Surely, the objection 
goes, nothing that qualifies as (human) language could be so impoverished. So isn’t 
Wittgenstein simply wrong (e.g. §6 ) to suggest that a system of communication of the 
kind described in §2 could even conceivably be a ‘complete’ language? An indication 
of the weakness of this objection is that is so obvious: if it were a problem for his 
conception of language-games, one must wonder, how could Wittgenstein have failed 
to notice? Often the objection also has a question-begging air in relying on unstated 
or undefended assumptions about what language requires for completeness -  simply
227brushing aside Wittgenstein’s opposing thoughts on this issue. But the main reason, 
I suggest, Wittgenstein was unconcerned about the conceivability of real human 
communities living in such impoverished ways is its irrelevance to his intended use of 
language-games. On this Wittgenstein is quite explicit: ‘Our clear and simple 
language-games are [...] objects for comparison which, through similarity and
225 §5 recommends studying ‘the phenomena o f language in primitive kinds o f its use’, explaining that 
‘the child uses such primitive forms o f language when learning to speak.’
226 E.g. Black 1996, 79, 81; Baker/Hacker 1980, 26 f.; Rhees 1970, 76, 81. Kenny 1973, 169 f. The 
same point is sometimes made with reference to the idea o f a primitive ‘form o f life’ (cf. Garver 1990, 
181).
227 Cf. PU  §18 and BIB 19. -  An alternative strategy is Marie McGinn’s (1997, 50) claim that since 
there is ‘no essential structure or function against which the notion o f completeness can be defined’, 
‘the idea o f  completeness simply doesn’t apply’ to language-games. In that case, why does 
Wittgenstein so insistently talk of ‘complete’ languages? A better answer is that he intends a different 
notion o f completeness to apply, characterized by the absence o f gaps. In this sense a small town, a 
child, and a language might all be complete, even though they will subsequently develop further. (On 
this kind o f gap-free order in transition cf. BIB 44.) Wittgenstein’s hope, expressed in the P U  Preface, 
that his thoughts should form a natural sequence with no gaps also hints at this kind o f completeness.
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dissimilarity, are to cast light on the conditions of our language’ .228 Simplified 
language-games are thus a methodological device, typological or schematic sketches 
of situations intended to focus attention on certain features of linguistic phenomena. 
Their ability to fulfil this function does not depend on the conceivability of human 
life comprising only a given language-game. Rather, as Wittgenstein puts it in the 
Brown Book (81), to think of language-games as ‘complete systems of human 
communication [...], it very often is useful to imagine such a simple language to be 
the entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society’. It is not 
necessary, but very often useful. To think of language-games as ‘complete’ languages 
is simply a heuristic expedient for treating them as distinctive linguistic subsystems.
Third, at first glance it might be doubted that Wittgenstein tells us anything 
informative about language-games. Having initially been somewhat casually applied 
to language-learning and primitive languages, Wittgenstein himself implies that 
‘countless different kinds of use of everything we call “signs”, “words”, “sentences’” 
are underlain by just as many types of language-game {PU §23). Hence, beyond the 
obvious connotation of having something to do with using linguistic signs, the notion 
of a language-game looks open-ended, unbounded, or undefined. Before either 
embracing this as part of Wittgenstein’s theory-free approach, or complaining about 
the apparent indeterminacy of the language-game notion, it is clearly relevant to bear 
in mind Wittgenstein’s views about the nature of concepts and concept-acquisition. 
For instance, it should be remembered that Wittgenstein does not think that vagueness 
in a term’s application renders it useless. Moreover, the discussion of ‘games’ in 
terms of family resemblance is intended to apply precisely to language-games: it is 
these that paradigmatically have nothing essential, ‘not one thing at all in common on 
account of which we use the same word for all’, and instead comprise a cluster of 
elements linked by case-to-case similarities {PU §65). Wittgenstein’s view of concept 
acquisition corresponds to this: concepts are to be explained or defined by giving 
examples, suggesting how these can be extended by analogy, and expecting this to 
allow the term to be used in certain ways {PU §§69, 71, 75, 208). Which is clearly 
what Wittgenstein does in explaining the notion of language-games: gives examples, 
hints at its analogical extension, and expects us just to get the hang of it.
228 P U  § \30 , cf. §5 and BIB 17.
229 Cf. particularly P U  §§69-71, and section 2.(iii) below.
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Nonetheless, if it is to mean anything at all, there is a need to be clear about 
the point of speaking of ‘language-games’. A direct answer, found in the Brown Book 
(108), is that the function of a word ‘can easily be seen if we look at the role this 
word really plays in our usage of language, but it is obscured when instead of looking 
at the whole language-game, we only look at the contexts, the phrases of language in 
which the word is used’. In PU the same feature recurs in both Wittgenstein’s early 
use of language-games -  in arguing that the uniformity (Gleichformigkeit) of words 
conceals the diversity of their functions and that sentences do not have a single 
underlying form -  and their methodological role in eliminating misunderstandings 
(as Wittgenstein supposed) due to linguistic forms. At the very least, therefore, to talk 
of ‘language-games’ is Wittgenstein’s antidote to the philosophical inadequacy of 
considering language in a reductive formalist manner.
Against this background it seems reasonable to interpret the notion of a 
language-game as having two principal features. The first is to emphasize the 
embedding of language, qua the use of spoken or written signs, within the broader 
context of human activity. The point is not that linguistic acts are ‘speech acts’, acts 
that would (perhaps) be impossible without the use of language, or which take place 
‘within’ language; nor does it allow them contingently to accompany ‘extra- 
linguistic’ actions, running in parallel like a film’s soundtrack. Rather, as 
Wittgenstein states, the point in talking of ‘language-games’ is that the use of signs is 
interwoven with, or part of, activity more generally. The term ‘praxeological’ is 
intended to express precisely this: that the logic inherent in patterns of language use is 
determined by the ‘logic’ of practices, or simply that the structure of language is 
intrinsically linked with that of practice, such that ‘everything that describes a 
language-game belongs to logic’. As long as this intrinsic link between sign use 
and practice is borne in mind, it seems to me that Wittgenstein’s earliest 
characterization of language-games -  as ‘simple forms’ of language use, from which 
‘we can build up the complicated forms [...] by gradually adding new forms’ (BIB 
17) -  is also the best. The intrinsic link with practice means that simple forms ‘of 
language’ are simultaneously simple forms of activity or practice, which is why 
Wittgenstein can, and indeed does, treat language-games as the kind of components 
that make up language. The second principal feature of language-games is therefore
230 PU  §11. Cf. §§10-13 and 22-23,65 respectively.
231 UG §56. Cf. also §§51, 501.
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to isolate simplified forms of language-using activity. However, while Wittgenstein 
thought that language could -  at least for the purposes of comparison and eliminating 
misunderstanding -  be decomposed into, or modelled in terms of pared-down 
typological situations, the general link between sign use and practice is treated as 
intrinsic and irreducible, as a feature indispensable for language-games’ functioning 
as ‘objects for comparison’.
I now want to look more closely at what the claim that the use of certain concepts is 
internal to certain forms of practice amounts to. To do this, it will be helpful to 
consider the difference between the language-games of §2 and § 8  in PU. In §2 
Wittgenstein describes a primitive language which ‘consists of the words “cube”, 
“column”, “slab” and “beam”’. This language is to allow ‘communication’ between 
two builders, such that when builder A calls one of the terms builder B hands A the 
corresponding object. In § 8  this language is extended to include ‘a series of words 
used [...] like numbers’, the terms ‘this’ and ‘over there’, and colour patterns. This 
enables, as Wittgenstein points out, an extended range of commands to be deployed 
in the task of fetching building blocks. The language-game of § 8  obviously differs 
from §2 in introducing new ‘kinds of words’ (PU §17). But rather than characterizing 
these in grammatical or logical terms, which he conspicuously avoids, Wittgenstein is 
more concerned with the underlying issue of what it is to differ in these ways. His 
general point is reasonably clear: By emphasizing the use (Gebrauch) made of 
expressions, their role in human practice or language-games, and the variety of 
functions served by linguistic ‘instruments’, he aims to highlight the inadequacy of 
the conception of language attributed to Augustinus in § 1 that models the function of 
all linguistic terms on the paradigm of naming or referring to objects. The point of § 8  
thus seems to be to introduce terms that are difficult to assimilate to the paradigms of 
ostensive definition and naming.
But how does this count against the ‘Augustinian’ view? One might simply 
respond that in § 8  too the basic function of linguistic tools is to refer, that the key 
difference between the concepts Wittgenstein discusses lies in their referential 
properties, and that precisely these explain their varying roles in language-games. In 
other words, why shouldn’t one insist on a uniform, reference-based explanation, and 
downplay Wittgenstein’s pragmatic perspective on language as prima facie 
appearance?
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Wittgenstein’s answer to this must be taken to include three claims. First, that 
referential (naming) relations are not primitive, i.e. something about which nothing 
further of ‘semantic’ relevance can be said. For while intimating that it will always be 
possible to say that a word ‘stands for’ (bezeichnet) something or other, Wittgenstein 
claims that generally speaking this is uninformative {PU §§10, 13; cf. §14). This is 
reminiscent of Heidegger’s view that relationships between signs are ‘easily 
formalized’ in a way that ‘levels off their phenomenal content {SZ 78, 8 8 ). However, 
Wittgenstein differs from Heidegger in being more explicit about what gets lost in 
suggesting that what it is for something to be a referent can be explicated by 
describing corresponding language-games. Second, Wittgenstein must be taken to 
be denying that extensions have explanatory primacy. This is to be expected, if 
describing language-games shows us what it is to be a referent, as this suggests that 
the role of expressions in language-games is extension-determining rather than 
extension-determined. Together these two claims imply that to describe the 
functioning of expressions merely in extensional terms is a superficial, 
philosophically unsatisfactory approach. The inadequacy Wittgenstein highlights lies 
in that, were it not for the different roles they play in our actions, we would have no 
grasp of the different ways in which, for example, concepts of number, colour, form 
etc. refer. So there is a clear asymmetry: someone who understands how the 
language-game works will understand what reference is in its context, whereas 
someone who understands which referents are being picked out need not understand 
what is going on. In fact, thirdly, the PU challenges the very idea of what might be 
called simple referring. For Wittgenstein not only relates the intelligibility of 
ostensive definitions to the context of language-games, and discredits the idea of 
primitive simples that might be referred to in an ideal language, but also suggests that 
to point to something in an inarticulate way is not to understand it (cf. PU §§28-37, 
46-64, 261). The upshot of this is that any reference to entities or features of the 
world -  articulate referring, as I shall call it -  picks out a referent as a such-and-such, 
and that the language-game environment determines what this such-and-such-ness is.
232 PU  §37. Hence Hintikka/Hintikka’s (1986, 212) emphasis on the role o f language-games in 
establishing '‘the basic semantic links between language and reality in Wittgenstein’s mature 
philosophy’. This somewhat misleadingly hints that there is still a problem o f contact between 
language and (nonlinguistic?) reality and such thing as ‘basic’ links. However, as Harris nicely argues, 
an important implication o f Wittgenstein’s later views is to break with the foundationalist idea that 
‘language touches or connects with the world only at certain points’ since ‘language is embedded in 
reality and vice versa’ (Harris 1986, 43, 47).
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Wittgenstein’s own proposal can be understood only by clarifying what he 
means by the function or the role of words. It might otherwise be felt that his talk of 
‘roles’ in a language-game, or ‘forms of life’, is just as uninformative as general talk 
of reference. To get clearer about the important difference between the language- 
games of § 2  and §8 , and so what it is for words to function in different ways, it will 
be instructive to consider a variation on the builders’ language-game that I shall call 
§2*: Imagine the builders of §2 always saying ‘red brick’ instead of ‘cube’, ‘white 
marble’ instead of ‘column’, ‘grey concrete’ instead of ‘slab’, and ‘brown wood’ 
instead of ‘beam’. Each word of §2 is thus replaced by two, one (we can imagine) 
being used as a colour word, the other to identify kinds of material. What difference 
does this make? Does the use, or the role, of the composite expressions in §2* differ 
from that of the simple expressions in §2? This question can be approached in two 
ways. On the one hand, to an onlooker attending to the conditions of utterance and the 
effects of various expressions their roles would look the same. To him the difference 
between the two language-games is merely notational. On the other hand, if the 
expressions in the revised language-game are genuinely being used to refer to colours 
and materials, their roles differ in that the building blocks are picked out in different 
ways in the two language-games: What in §2 is identified as a cube simpliciter, is 
picked out in the new variation as a colour-material composite, i.e. as a red something 
and as a brick something etc.234 So although the commands uttered in both cases are 
in some sense coextensive, the referring in §2 * is the result of a twofold 
determination. An indication of this difference in roles is that in §2* one would 
expect speakers straightforwardly to understand hitherto unheard combinations such 
as ‘red marble’ and ‘brown brick’. But even if not obviously manifested, the two 
language-games nonetheless differ in their internal structure.
Though § 8  brings an extension of, not simply a variation on §2, it is the 
second approach that sheds light on the relevant difference. As in §2*, the positive
233 For example, this would be the conclusion for a Quinean anthropologist working with stimulus 
meaning (cf. Quine 1960, 26-79).
234 Note in Wittgenstein’s presentation o f §2 the semantic function of the terms ‘cube’ etc. looks 
indeterminate. O f course, on the position Wittgenstein is opposing these words function as names, as 
labels standing for objects. But, so far as Wittgenstein’s sketch o f the builders’ language-game goes, 
there is nothing to stop us thinking o f these words as descriptions o f form, or as imperatives directed 
specifically to the action rather than the objects to be brought. This indeterminacy is perhaps 
intentional, and no doubt congenial to Wittgenstein’s aims.
235 Incidentally, this is why reference is neither indeterminate nor inscrutable in the way Quine (1969b, 
35) worries about. Knowing how to participate in the language-game entails understanding what ‘the 
referent’ is.
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point of the § 8  extension involves not simply new notation, i.e. different words that 
function in the same way, but new ‘kinds of words’ (PU §17), i.e. words that function 
in different ways. And what it is for words to function in different ways -  as the 
comparison of § 2  and §2 * shows -  is to be involved in practices of differing internal 
structure. An effective way of highlighting this difference is to recall Wittgenstein’s 
claim that language and its concepts are instruments (PU §569). Instruments can be 
characterized in terms of both their internal and outward functioning, i.e. both how 
they work and what they are for. The language-games §2 and §2* differ in their 
internal, but not in their external functioning -  just as two clocks might work in 
different ways while doing the same job. Introducing new kinds of word in § 8  is thus 
tantamount to the introduction of both new (linguistic) instruments and new forms of 
practice -  such as counting and identifying objects spatially or by colour, even where 
there is little difference in their outward function.
This kind of difference in the way language-games work can be used to show 
what is meant by saying that the use of certain concepts is intrinsically linked with 
certain forms of practice. This link -  which is the basis of describing Wittgenstein’s 
conception of language as praxeological -  has two aspects. On the one hand it brings 
out the fact that to deploy different concepts (not mere notations) amounts to acting 
differently, that ‘What one calls a change in concepts is of course not only a change 
in talking, but also one in doing’ (BPP I  §910). A clarification is important here: it 
was previously suggested that two approaches can be taken in comparing § 2  and §2 *, 
and that the role of expressions remains unchanged or is changed accordingly. These 
apparently conflicting claims can be reconciled by explicitly distinguishing the ‘role’ 
of language-games from that of expressions within them and saying -  in terms used 
by Wittgenstein -  that a language-game overall has a ‘point’, whereas words have 
‘techniques’ of use. Thus a language-game’s point is its outward function (what the 
game is about), whereas rules describing an expression’s use tell us about its internal 
functioning (how it works), so that comparison of § 2  and §2 * illustrates different 
techniques of word use with the same point. The first aspect of the internal link is 
hence that differences in the internal functioning of a language-game, in the way 
words are used as instruments, constitute differences in the practice.
236 This feature o f instruments is nicely applied to Wittgenstein’s language-games by Meggle (1985, 78 
ff).
237 For example, Wittgenstein talks o f the ‘point’ (Witz) o f language-games in P U  §§564, 142 and of 
‘techniques’ (Technik) o f word use in §§125, 262, 557 (cf. also §§150, 199).
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On the other hand, the comparison of §2 and §2* also illustrates quite clearly 
the second aspect, i.e. how engagement in certain forms of practice imposes 
constraints on the concepts to be used: ‘When language-games change, concepts 
change, and with the concepts the meanings of words’ (UG §65). The intuition here is 
that if you want to communicate on a building site you will need names for the 
different kinds of object; similarly, if you want to buy apples, you’ll need some kind 
of quantity words and type words for different kinds of fruit, etc. To be somewhat 
more precise, there is an implicit practical requirement that the language used be 
sufficiently unambiguous for the whole practice to work. The builders’ task, for 
example, requires distinct instructions for bringing each type of building block. In 
other words, getting the job done implies the need for a certain degree of distinction. 
This kind of requirement does not, as comparing §2 and §2* shows, imply that the 
same end could not be met with different concepts -  though to do so is eo ipso to 
engage in different practices. But it does imply that the concepts used are 
pragmatically adequate, i.e. that they meet the requirements implicit in the overall 
task of the language-game. With §2 the notion of practical requirements looks like a 
very clear-cut structural constraint: all that this simple task requires are four distinct 
commands. This might make the more articulate language of §2* (16 possible 
expressions) appear to have redundancy as against the optimized (4 possible 
expressions) language of §2. But the transparency of this optimum is due to the 
simplified scenario, and in general the question of what is pragmatically adequate 
(‘what works’) and efficient is hardly likely to be tractable in the full economy of 
language.238 Nonetheless, the idea of practical requirements can be generalized in two 
points. First, if it is to proceed smoothly, any practice will tend to impose the need for 
a specific degree of determination. Second, we would expect (to avoid needless 
inefficiency) there to be specific terms to refer to the objects, processes, agents etc. 
that are characteristically involved in that practice.
Two final points concerning the link between language and practice. First in 
the vague sense of according some kind of primacy to practice Wittgenstein’s view 
can be described as a form of pragmatism. Wittgenstein himself polemically 
disavowed pragmatism, taking this to be the view that to be true is to have the right 
consequences or to be useful (PG §133; cf. BPP I  §266). But the use of this label is
238 E.g. because optimization would then apply across and among different language-games and be 
causally determined by what agents typically understand or confuse.
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warranted by both Wittgenstein’s focus on human practice as constituting linguistic 
meaning and his frequent likening of words and sentences to tools or instruments.239 
However, as I have tried to show, the praxeological conception is a quite specific 
form of pragmatism, according to which human practices quite literally shape word 
use, so that language-games comprise the locus of conceptual articulation.
Second, the idea of a structural link between practice and language can also be 
followed from the level of individual language-games through to the macrolevel, such 
that (as previously mentioned) linguistic competence as a whole can be thought of as 
incorporating the ability to participate in a corresponding set of language-games, as 
the sum total of articulatory abilities required by these individual practices. In this 
perspective the ‘form of life’ that manifests itself in a language can, again quite 
literally, be thought of as composed of the forms of individual language games -  as 
the ‘complicated form’ of language built up from the ‘simple forms’ of language- 
games.240 This composition of language-games into the whole of a language should 
not, however, be pictured as the juxtaposition of atomic or hermetic units. Rather 
language-games are, so to speak, in praxeological arrangement, combined such that 
they structurally and functionally interlock in roughly the way individual subroutines 
(functions) do within a computer program do.241 An important feature of this idea of 
language as a functionally interdependent aggregate of constituent language-games is 
what might be called the stratification of such practices, the thought that there are 
different layers of practice, some of which build upon or exploit, and so presuppose, 
others. Wittgenstein himself often relies on the idea of such stratification: the ability 
to speak to oneself requires the ability to speak (PU §344; LTSF §855), to carry out 
arithmetic ‘in one’s head’ presupposes arithmetic skills (PU II, 563), pretending to be 
in pain presupposes possession of the concept of pain (LTSF §§861-876), language- 
games of doubt presuppose certainty.242 As Wittgenstein explains at one point, ‘it is 
characteristic of our language that it arises on the basis of solid forms of life, regular
239 Cf. PU  §§11-12, 360, 421, 569. This pragmatist tendency is arguably -  as Wittgenstein seems to 
recognize in §422 -  more pronounced still in UG. For arguments o f this kind cf. Moyal-Sharrock 
(2003) and Rudd (2005).
240 Cf. PU  §19; BIB 17. The use o f the expression ‘forms o f  life’ at PU  7/489 (cf. LTSF §862) suggests 
that it was also intended to refer to recurrent components -  including language-games -  o f an overall 
‘form o f life’.
241 E.g. they have interrelated consequences, shared input and output, and respectively embody certain 
kinds o f operation. -  The ‘roughness’ o f this analogy is indicated by Wittgenstein’s critique o f the 
calculus model (see the next section).
242 UG §§115, 150, 160, 354 etc. -  LTSF §803 points out the ‘logical’ character of such functional 
links.
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doing. [...] We have a concept of which forms of life are primitive and which could 
only arise from such [primitive forms]’ (LW403 f.).
2. Real rules and their limits
The notion of rules is central to Wittgenstein’s conception of language in two 
respects. To begin with it provides the principal means for conceiving of both 
techniques of word use and the typological structure of language-games. But it also 
connects with a traditional view of intellectual activity that sees, as Kant (1983a, 184 
[B171]) succinctly puts it, the intellect as the ‘faculty of rules’ and judgement as the 
ability to subsume under rules. The thought that Rules Constitute Meaning (RCM) 
underlies Wittgenstein’s frequent allusions to chess, and is explicit in his likening of 
words to chess figures, notably in his claim to be talking of language ‘as of the pieces 
in the game of chess, by stating rules of play’ .243 It is therefore tempting, indeed I 
think quite common, to interpret Wittgenstein’s reliance on RCM in a straightforward 
and strict manner, holding that rules are both necessary and sufficient for meaningful 
use of words. On this view, rules lay down the legitimate use of words just as rules 
define the ‘possible moves’ of chess pieces, thus distinguishing meaningful from 
nonsensical use. Although this view clearly appealed to Wittgenstein at one stage, 
this section will argue that his later views are characterized by a more relaxed attitude 
to RCM, corresponding to his abandonment of the calculus model of language and 
the maturing language-game analogy. Its task will therefore be to clarify why this 
shift came about, what it involved, and how it impacts on what the notion of rules can 
tell us about the structure of linguistic practices. The resultant view of the form and 
scope of language-game rules will tell us something about the general functional 
topology of pragmatic sense as explicated by such rules.
(i) The incoherence o f full determinacy: A good place to start considering 
Wittgenstein’s view of rules is the Philosophical Grammar (PG), which is 
characterized by both straightforward commitment to RCM and the attempt to 
combine the idea of language as a calculus with that of language as a game. The 
dominant, indeed pervasive, picture is that of language as a calculus: ‘understanding 
of language [...] is of the same kind as understanding, mastering a calculus’;
243 />£/§108, cf. §31 and P G §§13,23 .
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understanding a sign is to make ‘a step in a calculus (a calculation, as it were)’; ‘The 
proposition has its content as part of a calculus. Meaning is the role that a word plays 
in the calculus’ 244 The analogy between language and games is also found, but plays 
a subordinate role in Wittgenstein’s exposition. And although the term occurs, the 
idea of language-games is not systematically developed.245 The hybrid of rule-system 
and activity that Wittgenstein here had in mind is epitomized in his comment that 
‘Language is for us a calculus; it is characterized by linguistic actions 
[SprachhandlungenY (JPG §140). Given the fully rule-governed nature of a calculus, 
it is no surprise that Wittgenstein here foregrounds what he calls the ‘grammatical’ 
rules which are analogously to govern language: ‘We are interested in language as a 
process according to explicit rules’; ‘What interests us about the sign, the meaning 
that is for us definitive, is that which is laid down in the grammar of the sign’ .246 Nor 
is it any surprise that chess -  a game played out in an apriori possibility space -  is the 
example of a game that best suits the paratactic picture of language as calculus-game 
that Wittgenstein here envisaged.
Already in PG Wittgenstein’s reliance on rules is qualified in two ways to 
allow for differences between the ideal picture of a calculus and real linguistic 
phenomena. First, the vagueness, or ‘haziness of the normal use of our language’s 
concept words’ is acknowledged. Wittgenstein highlights that this renders such words 
neither ‘unusable’ nor inadequate ‘to their purpose’, which would be like saying ‘the 
warmth this oven provides is no good because you don’t know where it begins and 
where it finishes’ .247 Second, PG acknowledges the phenomenon of inexplicitness, 
i.e. that one can both learn a language without the use of explicitly stated rules and 
make meaningful use of a term without being explicitly aware of its definition (PG 
§§26, 13). At the time of PG Wittgenstein seems to have thought of inexplicitness as 
unproblematic. His concern, as in the Tractatus, was how meaningful use of language 
is constituted by semantic rules, not whether speakers have explicit knowledge of 
these, i.e. with the constitution not the epistemology of meaning. (Thus assuming that
244 PG  §§11, 13,27. Cf. also §§2, 11, 1 9 ,33 ,39 , 63 ,68 , 72, 80, 84, 110, 111.
245 The term ‘language-game’ appears 8 times in total in PG, in §§5, 26, 81, 123, and Appendix 4 B. -  
Even then §26 intimates that in describing language-games one might not ‘still want[] to call them 
calculi’.
246 PG  §§32, 44. -  A notorious difficulty o f this interpretation is the vagueness o f Wittgenstein’s 
notion o f grammatical rules -  e.g. are these rules syntactic (as the term ‘grammatical’ suggests) or 
semantic, constitutive or regulative? (Cf. Lectures 97 f. and Moore 1954, 292; Searle 1969, 33-42.)
247 PG  §76. A similar image -  the light o f  a reading lamp -  is used at BIB 27.
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the former can be treated independently of the latter.) There is, however, some 
tension. Wittgenstein describes the sense of a sentence as both the role it plays in a 
calculus and what one says when asked about it (PG §84), as if these were in 
preestablished harmony. Accordingly, some passages (§§13, 84, 28) seem to suggest 
that speakers are able, when asked, to explicate the rules they are following. 
Assuming this ability by default, such that language remains rationally transparent in 
principle, reduces inexplicitness to a superficial phenomenon. However, elsewhere 
(§26) Wittgenstein seems to accept that speakers might have difficulties in explaining 
rules.248 Inexplicitness is then a significant phenomenon, but when combined with the 
assumption that language is essentially a system of rules, it implies that speakers have 
‘implicit’ or ‘tacit’ knowledge of rules: our language use is assumed to manifest rules 
that we must be assumed in some way to know, even though we might never have 
heard them explicitly stated and ourselves be unable to state them. Hence the question 
of PU §75 -  ‘What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean to know 
it and not be able to say it?’
It is worth considering how Wittgenstein was able to reconcile these 
phenomena in PG with his then dominant picture of language as a calculus. The 
answer lies in a methodological stance which anticipates the PU: Already in PG 
Wittgenstein sees his philosophy as aiming to eliminate misunderstandings by 
clarifying our use of language (PG §§72, 32). To do this, he relies on a method of 
comparison: ‘We consider language from the viewpoint of a game according to fixed 
rules. We compare it with, measure it according to, such a game’ (PG §36; cf. §26). 
Thus Wittgenstein does not assert the factual reality of the calculus model of 
language, but offers it as an idealized picture for comparison, with the aim of clearing 
up certain misunderstandings. Once this concession is made, it is simply business as 
usual for the RCM principle. The phenomena of vagueness and inexplicitness of 
speakers’ knowledge can be accommodated, since neither directly challenges either 
the necessity or the sufficiency of rules to meaning constitution. Although suggesting 
discrepancies between the ideal picture of rule-govemance and phenomenal facts, 
they can be thought of as concessions or anomalies, ways in which natural languages 
merely approximate to the calculus ideal.249
248 One complication is what counts as ‘explaining’ a rule. If this includes merely giving examples of 
use (cf. PG  §§43, 28) explaining the rule scarcely differs from just applying it.
249 Fluctuation in the real use o f words is another anomaly, on this model, acknowledged in PG  §36.
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This helps bring into focus the relationship between PG and the later PU. It 
should be noted first that although often looking like conventional presentation of a 
systematic theory, PG's clear statements about the nature of meaning are rendered 
ambiguous by this comparative method and must be taken not as straightforwardly 
advancing ‘theses’, but as offering a supposedly illuminating comparison. In other 
words, although not embellished with the rhetoric of the no-thesis thesis, a nonthetic 
approach is already found in PG and is not new to PU. As previously mentioned, this 
nonthetic approach relies on an underlying conception of language as a means for 
comparison which, although its empirical reality is not asserted, is nonetheless 
assumed to approximate well enough to the reality of language to dispel 
misunderstandings. It is here that the significant difference between PG and PU lies, 
with the calculus model being eclipsed by the language-game analogy. PG 's reliance 
on the calculus model is therefore significant in assuming both that it is an 
illuminating comparison, i.e. that it is a good model for dispelling misunderstandings, 
and that it is straightforwardly compatible with the games analogy and the latter’s 
implications. The question is therefore: Why did Wittgenstein give up the calculus 
model as an analogy of language?
The answer is that he became convinced of the calculus model’s incoherence. 
This conclusion emerges in the PLTs first discussion of rules (§§81-88) and their 
relation to the nature of concepts (§§65-88). The main target there is Frege’s idea that 
concepts should be fully determinate, an idea that also animated Wittgenstein’s own 
earlier calculus model of language (cf. PU §71; Frege 1994a, 31). The idea is that for 
an expression to have determinate meaning there should be no possible doubt as to its 
conditions of applicability, so that rules for its use will cover all conceivable 
circumstances. This idea is challenged in §84 of the PU: ‘But what, then, does a game 
look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? Whose rules allow no doubt to creep 
in, block up all its holes? -  Can we not think of a rule governing the application of the 
rule? And a doubt which that rule removes -  and so on?’ It is here, in §§85-7, that 
Wittgenstein introduces the difficulty of an infinite regress-of-rules: seemingly any 
statement of a rule can be misunderstood, requiring disambiguation by a further rule 
(statement), which can in turn be misunderstood, and so on. To block the possibility 
of such a regress in principle would seem to require rules that admit of no possible 
misunderstanding, or as Wittgenstein puts it ‘doubt’. Yet, as Wittgenstein concedes, 
there can be no such regress-blocking rules.
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The question of how this regress-of-rules argument is to be interpreted is 
particularly vexed. One interpretation is that Wittgenstein accepts the conclusion of 
this argument, so that rules are afflicted by principled indeterminacy, resulting in a 
general scepticism about meaning. I want to suggest instead that Wittgenstein 
himself intends the regress-of-rules argument as a standard reductio ad absurdum, 
such that the absurd conclusion leads to a rejection of the premises that generate it. 
Thus viewed, the regress-of-rules argument reveals that the demand for a system of 
univocal, fully determinate rules -  a calculus -  underlying language is unstable in 
generating a regress that could be terminated only by the impermissible appeal to 
some ideally determinate rule structure. Its point is that, because it leads to 
incoherence, the demand for full determination by rules is to be rejected. This 
interpretation of the argument is directly supported by both the way it is introduced 
(in §84, as just quoted) and concluded in §8 8 . In §69 Wittgenstein had conceded that 
his view might, if a suitable definition of exactitude could be given, render concepts 
‘inexact’. However, returning to this question, § 8 8  concludes that there is no 
provision for ‘one idea of exactitude; we do not know what we are supposed to 
imagine this to be’. That is the implication of the regress-of-rules argument: we 
simply do not know what the demand for full determinacy, or exactitude, could 
amount to. This deficiency strikes at the heart of PG's vision and cannot be protected 
by the nonthetic method: Since it is built around an incoherent conception of 
linguistic rules, the calculus model cannot function as an illuminating comparison -  
rather it is its intimation of ideal determinacy that sows the seeds of confusion. It is 
this insight, I suggest, that separates PU from PG: the calculus model is dropped -  
cannot coexist with the language-game model -  simply because it is, or at least 
Wittgenstein believed it to be, incoherent.
250 This is the essence o f Kripke’s (1982) view. As the following will suggest, I believe this view to be 
both exegetically and philosophically problematic. Beyond setting out my alternative ( ‘nonsceptical’) 
interpretation o f this argument, however, considerations o f scope and relevance here preclude detailed 
engagement with Kripke’s ‘sceptical paradox’ -  which, after all, §201 dismisses as a 
‘misunderstanding’ -  and the debates it has spawned.
251 Incidentally, this argument in no way turns on whether rules are ‘explicit’ in agents’ awareness or 
merely ‘implicit’ in the practice. In particular, there is no intimation that the regress problem afflicts 
only ‘explicit’ rules, such that either ‘implicit’ awareness (Brandom 1994, 20-30) or ‘knowing how’ 
(Ryle 1990) serve to block the regress.
252 Hence shortly after PG  Wittgenstein changed his mind, seeing the comparison with exact rules as 
the source of, rather than the answer to philosophical misunderstandings o f language (BIB 25).
253 This is congenial to McDowell’s insistence that the regress o f ‘interpretations’ should never be 
allowed to start. However, the present interpretation o f the regress-of-rules argument has the advantage 
o f making clear that this is not dogmatic insistence on a supposed bedrock o f  normativity. The overall
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If the regress-of-rules argument is, as I have suggested, intended as a reductio, 
the incoherence of ideal determinacy ought to be taken not as denying the 
phenomenon of linguistic rules, but as requiring them to be conceived in some other 
way. The following two subsections attempt to show that this was Wittgenstein’s 
response: that having dropped the calculus model he developed the language-game 
analogy further, leading to a revised overall picture of rules and their role in language. 
Tracking the way Wittgenstein reconfigures his conception of rules to avoid recourse 
to an ideal of determinacy, and the limitations he sees in the role of rules in language- 
games will thus serve not only to clarify Wittgenstein’s view of how language-games 
are structured, but also provide further, indirect support for the interpretation of the 
regress-of-rules argument just suggested.
(ii) Rules reconfigured: The subsequent reconfiguration of Wittgenstein’s conception 
of rules can be characterized in terms of two main features. The first of these is what I 
shall call an empiricization of rules. The outward signs of this are that in PU  rules are 
conspicuously mundane: they are calibrated to ‘normal conditions’, explanations of 
them are somewhat ad hoc, serving to eliminate particular, rather than all conceivable 
uncertainties (PU §87; cf. §142). It also emerges in Wittgenstein’s terse response to 
the regress-of-rules argument in §85: whether a given sign, explanation, definition 
etc. is sufficiently clear or prone to misunderstandings is not settled by an underlying 
calculus, but is an empirical matter. Given Wittgenstein’s frequent emphasis on the 
difference between grammatical and empirical claims, this grounding of his 
conception of rules in empirical facts might appear puzzling. So what is the point of 
this claim? Superficially it might seem to be either an acquiescent matter-of-fact 
response to the regress-of-rules danger, or to suggest that it is just a contingent fact 
that we and the signpost manage to do the right thing most of the time. But there is a 
more subtle point to the claim that signs are ‘in order’ when they fulfil their purpose 
‘in normal conditions’ (PU §87). For if there were no general agreement in 
judgements about, say, how to interpret signposts, then signposts would not be fit for 
their purpose, in which case either we would have a different solution to the problem 
of indicating directions, or that kind of practice would not be possible in human life.
approach here is distinguished by taking Wittgenstein’s talk o f practices, customs and institutions as a 
significant commitment, a view to which McDowell was initially sympathetic, but later -  appealing to 
the no-thesis thesis -  rejects as un-Wittgensteinian (cf. McDowell 1984, 342; 1992, 50 f.).
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Thus it is presupposed with regard to anything correctly described as a rule 
characterizing human action that there is some such normal agreement in judgements; 
if there were not, there would simply be no rule.254 Accepting causal facts as the 
‘framework’ underlying our language’s operation {PU §240) is thus not simply an 
intellectual quietism, nor indeed an indirect solution to a supposed rule scepticism. It 
is instead part of Wittgenstein’s response to the incoherence of his earlier conception 
of rules. For the appeal to ‘normal conditions’ meets the requirement for a 
background of regularity that Wittgenstein now considers necessary in talking of 
rules.255
This first feature is more pronounced still in Wittgenstein’s post-1945 
thinking, where linguistic rules are accepted as exhibiting characteristic features of 
empirical rules. This can be well illustrated with several comments from the so-called 
Last Writings on the Philosophy o f Psychology (LTSF): In describing the use of 
words ‘we must find something characteristic in these individual cases, a kind of 
regularity’; bearing in mind that ‘we don’t learn the use of words with the help of 
rules’, Wittgenstein explains that there is a ‘rough lawfulness’ in the use people 
actually make of words. The way to interpret these comments, I suggest, is that 
Wittgenstein -  though he might have not put it in such terms -  now saw linguistic 
rules as being similar in form to statistical rules, with normal conditions characterized 
by greater or lesser degrees of distribution, just as normal (Gaussian) distributions are 
characterized by values spread around an average. Occasionally rules will be sharply 
defined, but in general ‘it is not fixed in advance that there is a such thing as “a 
general description of the use of a word”. And if there then is such a thing -  then it is 
not fixed how determinate such a description has to be’. In this vein Wittgenstein 
even declares that the ‘greatest difficulty’ in his ‘investigations is to find a way of
o
representing vagueness’. Wittgenstein’s frequent talk of characteristic features of 
language-games and his suggestion that words have a ‘physiognomy’ can be seen as a 
response to this difficulty.259 For in the physiognomical analogy these are empirically
254 Cf. P U I I 573. This point is highlighted by Baker/Hacker (1985, 249 f.).
255 Cf. PU  §§199, 207 as well as page 171 above.
256 ‘ UNGEFAHRE Gesetzmafiigkeif {LTSF §968; cf. similarly §211).
257 LTSF §969. -  ‘That we calculate with certain concepts, [but] not with others, merely shows how 
different in kind conceptual tools are (how little reason we ever have here to assume uniformity)’ {BPP 
7 61095).
25 LTSF §347. A corresponding claim is found at PU  I I 575.
259 PU  §568. For further examples o f physiognomical imagery cf. §§235, 167, PU  II 547, and BPP I 
§654.
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salient features which contrast with momentary expressions, with their discernment 
depending on (empirically instantiated) patterns of circumstances. On this 
empiricized picture the notion of a rule admits, and will generally be characterized 
by, some tolerance or vagueness ([Unscharfe), so that conformity with rules is gradual 
in character. To protest that such empirically contoured rules are ‘not rules’, or not 
useable as rules, would be to make precisely the mistake the PU inveighs against, 
namely to lapse into thinking that (all) rules must be ideally determinate or precise. 
Admitting a graduated transition between the two does not endanger the distinction 
between clear cases of conformity and nonconformity to rules.
This empiricization tendency is also reflected in PU’s picture of the language- 
world relation. An apparent complication here is that for Wittgenstein language- 
games clearly have some kind of operational structure or logic that cannot be reduced 
to causal facts or regularities. This view, sometimes referred to as the ‘autonomy’ of 
grammar or language, is advanced most clearly and most forcefully in PG: ‘Grammar 
is accountable to no reality. Grammatical rules first determine meaning (constitute it)
9A1and are hence responsible to no meaning and [are] to this extent arbitrary’. This 
‘autonomy’ vis-a-vis reality encompasses four claims: The structure of language, as 
‘grammar’, cannot be understood in terms of (a) purposes that language has, (b) the 
effects of language use, either intended or actual -  including on agents, or (c) true 
representation of the world; rules of language are hence (d) arbitrary and 
conventional.262 These claims are an important part of the overall picture of language 
in PG and its strong commitment to a scheme-content dualism: as a calculus, 
language is there considered an apriori medium of meaning constitution, with 
language-world ‘connections’ being set up by ‘ostensive explanation’ (PG §138). 
Now there are admittedly vestiges of these views in PU, with comments suggesting 
that language-games should not be understood in relation to effects (Wirkung) and a
260 The empiricization o f rules is also in evidence in UG. While emphasizing attunement to ‘normal 
conditions’ (§27), Wittgenstein there allows that rules and empirical claims differ gradually (§§51-2, 
98, 318-9, 321, 454) and acknowledges that rules of language are ultimately empirical (§519).
261 PG  §133. The actual term ‘autonomy’ is found in Zettel (§320) paralleling part o f PG  §133. ‘That 
grammar is autonomous, arbitrary, not justified by reference to reality’ has been emphasized by Baker 
and Hacker as ‘a deep leitmotiv o f Wittgenstein’s later work’ (Baker/Hacker 1980, 76; cf. 1985, 329 
ff). It is significant, however, that explication and substantiation o f this claim typically relies not on 
PU , but on PG  and Z -  the latter being a source of particularly uncertain status (cf. von Wright 1982, 
136).
262 PG  §§133, 140; 135-6, 140; 134; 133-4, 138. -  The first two claims are presumably part o f  
Wittgenstein’s attempt to distance his view from pragmatism (cf. page 150 f. above).
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passing allusion to the conventional character of language. And in §497 
Wittgenstein suggestively writes ‘The rules of grammar can be called “arbitrary”, if 
this is supposed to say that the purpose of grammar is only that of language’ .264 
However, this is manifestly not to claim that language (hence grammar also) does not 
have purpose(s) in terms of which it might be described, and indeed the requirement 
that sentences should have some function is used to challenge the idea that grammar 
is ‘arbitrary’ in §520. It seems to me that this signals a significant, and judicious, 
weakening in PU  of claims to the ‘autonomy’ of language. For whereas PG>s dualism 
makes it look like a mere coincidence that language has anything to do with the real 
world, the whole idea of language-games is to be intrinsically bound up with the rest 
of the world. Consequently, although the structure of language-games cannot be 
described straightforwardly in causal terms, language can no more be thought of as 
‘autonomous’. It must instead be thought of as attuned to the world, being largely 
shaped by the purposes that language-games are to serve and -  on pain of language- 
games’ breaking down {PU §142) -  ‘normal’ causal conditions 265
The second main feature of Wittgenstein’s reconfigured conception of rules is 
that they are conceived without any recourse to an ideal of determinacy. As 
mentioned above, in PU §85 Wittgenstein explains that it is an empirical claim 
whether or not a rule gives rise to doubt or is open to interpretation. The immediate 
point of this comment is clearly that although in practice we usually understand signs 
in a certain way, it is possible to think of alternative interpretations of them (cf. PU 
§201). However, as it comes in the context of a critique of the ideal of full 
determinacy (cf. PU  §84), the key question is what this comment tells us about the 
relationship between language and determinacy. In this respect the claim is that there 
are not rules to cover every eventuality, but that there is a degree of determination 
which usually suffices for practical purposes. This claim can be interpreted in two 
ways. The first interpretation makes it an expression of resignation in the face of 
intellectual anxiety: ‘sufficiently determinate for practical purposes’ here sounds like
263 Cf. PU  §§149, 498 (also the unnumbered note around §30); 355.
264 There is also an obscure invitation to ‘consider’ the claim that rules of grammar are arbitrary in 
§372. -  The apparent justification for the above claim is that grammar does not tell us ‘how language 
must be built to fulfil its purpose’ and simply describes the use o f signs (PU  §496). But this can easily 
be understood in the sense, discussed above in section 1, that differently functioning words can fulfil 
the same purpose.
265 As Mulhall puts it, the late Wittgenstein recognizes the ‘embeddedness o f the normative within the 
natural’, and ‘relocates normative or logical determination within the realms o f time, history, and 
society, without conflating it with empirical determination’ (Mulhall 2001, 112, 121).
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‘well, we get by, but isn’t that surprising, given that the rules we follow are in 
principle indeterminate’. This suggests a perpetual difficulty of principled 
indeterminacy, such that language use involves constantly deciding among an 
inexhaustible range of options. However, the vertiginous character of this 
interpretation results from acknowledging the desideratum of greater determinacy 
than that actually required. Which seems to miss the point of Wittgenstein’s critique 
of the idea of full determinacy. For acknowledging this desideratum is a slippery 
slope, an iterative tendency that could be halted only by some ideal terminus. But 
since -  as the regress-of-rules argument shows -  there is no such thing, full 
determinacy cannot be a standard that actual language-games fail to live up to.
Against this it seems to me that Wittgenstein’s praxeological conception of 
language suggests a less timid interpretation of the claim that a certain degree of 
determination usually suffices for practical purposes. Something like this was 
encountered above (section 1) in discussing the practical requirements implicit in 
language-games. Its importance, I suggest, is that determinacy is a practice-immanent 
and practice-relative notion, such that what suffices for practical purposes, i.e. is 
pragmatically adequate, becomes the criterion of determinacy. To say that the rules 
we follow (‘normally’) suffice for practical purposes is then not to express 
resignation, but to say that they meet the standard of determinacy required to act in 
the relevant way. It should be noted that Wittgenstein does not, strictly speaking, 
present things in these terms. Nonetheless, there is evidence for attributing to him 
this, as I shall call it, pragmatization o f determinacy. For example, PU §69 claims 
that strict definition of concepts is relative to particular purposes, § 8 8  strongly hints 
that exactitude should be understood as practice-relative. Wittgenstein also insists 
that possible doubt does not entail actual doubt (§84), or even that one ‘could have 
doubted’ (§213; cf. UW 399), and that doubts -  particularly sceptical doubts -  stand 
in need of motivation (UG §392). These claims can be understood in the light of 
Wittgenstein’s view that taking some things to be certain -  i.e. in a particular way, at 
a particular degree of determinacy -  is constitutive of any language-game. That one 
‘could not’ have had ‘conceivable’ doubts is a praxeological impossibility in the 
sense that acting in such-and-such a way constitutively excludes certain questions.
266 The same point is nicely made at Z §440 with regard to traffic regulations.
267 Cf. UG §329. -  The ‘kind o f certainty’ characterizes each ‘kind o f language-game’ (PU  I I 569).
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On this second interpretation, rather than accepting and stoically facing up to 
principled indeterminacy, Wittgenstein provides an alternative view of what 
comprises semantic determinacy. It remains the case, of course, that where rules are 
found, a greater degree of determinacy can be thought up, a ‘doubt’ requiring a 
further rule to settle it. However, on this second view someone who proposes the 
‘doubt’ is not identifying an ambiguity operant in the established practice, but is 
entertaining the prospect of a different, extended, form of practice in which a new 
choice, or a new degree of freedom, does play some role. If this new form of 
practice has some practical point or importance, one would expect it to lead to an 
improvement or sophistication of the original language-game. But once a language- 
game fulfils its purpose (e.g. as the use of signposts does) then the new doubt simply 
introduces redundant ‘determinacy’, the kind of decision that plays no role in actual 
practice. Wittgenstein concedes that one could imagine people thinking with a far 
higher degree of determinacy than ‘we’ do, but highlights that more precise concepts 
might not have the same practical value (PU 7/510, LTSF §267). Hence his attitude 
towards philosophical ‘doubts’: if these play no role in, and lead to no improvement 
in practice, the determinacy they aspire to is redundant -  a spinning of wheels not 
connected to the relevant mechanism.
(iii) Rules constrained: A second major aspect of Wittgenstein’s response to the 
breakdown of the calculus model is to see rules as having a more circumscribed role 
in linguistic phenomena. As has been seen, two qualifications to the role of rules -  
vagueness and inexplicitness -  had already been acknowledged in PG, but while 
acknowledged as features of real linguistic phenomena, both looked anomalous in the 
optic of the calculus model. Freed of this model’s constraints these phenomena are 
cast in a different light in PG, becoming integral parts of Wittgenstein’s revised view 
of rules.
The notion of vagueness plays a prominent role in PU. For example, in 
discussing games Wittgenstein allows ‘that the extension of the concept is not closed 
off by a limit’ (PU §6 8 ) and suggests that, though the use of terms can be fixed for 
certain purposes, this is not normally the case. And with his rejection of ideal
268 Cf. UW 396, 305. The implication is that to have a doubt presupposes a conception o f what it is to 
have that doubt, o f what that doubt amounts to in practice (cf. UG §§89, 120). This is a highly 
nontrivial requirement that is routinely neglected by those troubled by the ‘indeterminacy’ o f rules.
269 It is a principal theme o f  PU  §§65-80, 99-101, but cf. particularly §§69-71.
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determinacy, Wittgenstein’s emphasis that ‘inexactness’ does not make a term 
‘unusable’ is particularly poignant {PU §8 8 ). In PG, despite acknowledging the 
practical acceptability of vague terms (§76), Wittgenstein did not allow this insight to 
affect his reliance on the calculus model of language, with its constant intimations of 
the desirability of full determination. Vagueness was there an inconvenience, to be 
reconciled with the calculus model via a noncommittal method of comparison, rather 
than a positive and integral aspect of PG’s conception of language. The situation is 
fundamentally different in PU. For once the ideal of univocal ‘exactness’ is 
discredited by the regress-of-rules argument, ‘vagueness’ can, and indeed must, 
become an integral part of Wittgenstein’s positive conception of language, a fact 
reflected in both his discussions of determinacy and in the empirical form of rules 
attuned to statistically normal circumstances.
Similar considerations apply to the theme of inexplicitness. In PG, as in PG, 
Wittgenstein allows both that language can be learned without the use of explicit 
rules, by observing and getting the hang of it, and that speakers need not have an
270explicit awareness of the rules they are following in competent use of language. 
The implication of this is that there are two kinds of criterion for adherence to rules: 
the ability to instantiate correct use and the ability to explain, or form a conception of, 
that pattern of use -  or, as Wittgenstein himself puts it in PG (§42), ‘samples of use’ 
and ‘stating the rule’. In this perspective acknowledging inexplicitness means 
accepting the possibility of a mismatch between a speaker’s abilities to instantiate and 
to state rules governing language use. Again in PG the phenomenon of inexplicitness 
was anomalous, causing difficulties from which the calculus model needed protection 
through the nonthetic comparison method. Since in a calculus each step must be 
covered by a statable rule, the kind of rational opacity such a mismatch suggests 
conflicts with the demand for rational scrutability implicit in the calculus model. On 
this model there is no provision for the abilities to produce and to conceive of correct 
moves to come apart, so that inexplicitness can only look like a failure of 
competence. In addition, as mentioned above, when combined with the assumption 
that rules underlie all meaningful use of language, the phenomenon of inexplicitness 
generates the need for an account of ‘tacit knowledge’ -  of what it is to know a rule 
one cannot state. Again the situation is fundamentally different in PU. For once the
270 PU  §§31, 54; cf. §89 and UG §95.
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calculus model is rejected, there is no need to assume that the abilities to instantiate 
and explain rules are correlative. Hence, PU allows the possibility of using language 
in a way we cannot explain, such that we might find our own use of language 
reflectively opaque.271 In such cases Wittgenstein’s advice is to ‘let yourself be taught 
the meaning by the use’ (PU II 550). This kind of mismatch is presupposed by the 
inability to survey (ubersichtlich darstellen) our use of words which §122 describes 
as a ‘main source’ of our lack of understanding. Indeed, if the abilities to instantiate 
and conceive of correct use were in perfect equilibrium, such misunderstandings -  the 
Augustinian quandary (cf. PU §89) that Wittgenstein sees as characterizing 
philosophy -  could presumably never arise. Furthermore, in the PU perspective there 
is no need for confusing terms such as ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ knowledge of rules -  terms 
which seem inappropriate in describing rules manifested in linguistic behaviour. 
Instead so-called ‘tacit’ knowledge can be equated with the ability to produce a 
certain pattern of use; so-called ‘explicit’ knowledge with the ability to form some 
conception of these patterns.
As contrasted with PG, however, PU also introduces two new constraints on 
the scope of RCM. The first of these, which I shall call contextuality, is suggested by 
Wittgenstein’s consideration of making up or changing the rules of a game ‘as we go 
along’ (PU §83). He introduces this by imagining people playing with a ball in a way 
that seems to be interrupted and modified randomly, suggesting that someone might 
claim the ‘people are playing a ball game the whole time and so complying with 
determinate rules at each throw’ (italics added). Admittedly, the point of this 
comment is not immediately clear. Taken literally, it seems to affirm that rules are 
present, always defining the activity, even though they are constantly changing. In 
this way it might be interpreted as a stubborn defence of RCM. Nonetheless, the 
context of this comment makes clear that it is intended to show the absurdity of such 
a stubborn defence and the notion of rules it relies on. Wittgenstein not only considers 
a background of regularity, of normal conditions, a necessary component of rules, but 
unequivocally excludes application of the notion of a rule to one-off cases in PU 
§199. This is also the message of the immediate surroundings of §83: §81 initiates
271 Cf. the unnumbered note around P U  §139. The possibility o f a mismatch and a dialectic between 
these two aspects o f linguistic competence is nicely highlighted by Burge (1989, 182): ‘In attempting 
to articulate one’s conception o f one’s concept, one’s conceptual explication, one naturally alternates 
between thinking o f examples and refining one’s conceptual explication in order to accord with 
examples that one recognizes as legitimate’.
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Wittgenstein’s critique of his previous view of language as a calculus ‘according to 
determinate rules’. §82 then mentions three criteria for the presence of rules, while 
hinting that none might be fulfilled. Finally, §84 recalls Wittgenstein’s view (already 
expressed in §68) that the use of words is not everywhere bounded by rules before 
adducing the regress-of-rules argument against full determination by rules. In this 
context the idea of each throw being according to determinate rules (§83) is clearly a 
desperate attempt to find omnipresent rules underlying meaning.
All the same, in talking of ‘rules’ that are made up as we go along, 
Wittgenstein allows a certain ambiguity to persist. The reason for this, I suggest, is 
that this possibility picks out a difference which he wanted to respect between 
contextual correctness conditions and more broadly established patterns of regularity. 
For despite introducing a verbal difficulty in interpreting §83, ‘rules made up as we 
go along’ (contextual correctness conditions) would allow things to be done rationally 
without their being covered by an overarching system of rules, which would accord 
with the dominant line of argument in §§81-88. Thus the suggestion here is that in 
PU Wittgenstein has a bipartite notion of correctness conditions -  covering both
272general patterns (rules) and contextual correctness (‘rules made up as we go along’)
-  and that rules, in Wittgenstein’s sense of general patterns, are not necessary to 
meaning.
The final constraint on the scope of RCM can be called nonregulation: the 
fact, which Wittgenstein supports with the regress-of-rules argument, that the 
‘application of a word’ is not ‘everywhere bounded by rules’ (PU §84). Considering 
the objection that this would leave the use of an expression ‘unregulated’, 
Wittgenstein responds that ‘there is also no rule, for example, as to how high, or how 
hard, the ball may be thrown in tennis, yet tennis is a game and it too has rules’ (PU 
§68). As presented, this is the modest claim that an activity can still be said to be 
determined by rules even where rules do not fully determine the possible moves. 
However, I think it is important that this brings out a crucial aspect of the games 
analogy, insofar as games are a kind of activity in which not everything is determined 
by the rules. Some evidence that Wittgenstein shares this view is found in his 
Remarks on the Foundations o f Mathematics (BGM), where he considers a ‘game’ in
272 Evidence o f the latter can also be seen in Wittgenstein’s reliance on the idea that sense can be made 
of bizarre sounding sentences by specifying the particular conditions in which they might be used (PU  
§117; UG §§ 25, 413, 423, 622). -  Recall also Wittgenstein’s polemics in the Blue Book (18) against 
philosophy’s ‘craving for generality’, its ‘contemptuous attitude towards the particular case’.
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which it turns out that whoever makes the first move is predetermined by the rules to 
win. Wittgenstein denies that such a situation -  i.e. one fully determined by rules -  
would be called a ‘game’ (BGM III §77; VII §§13, 27). What Wittgenstein is here 
rightly acknowledging is that it is essential to games that there is some openness,
0*7 “lsome leeway or ‘Spielraum’, in which the game unfolds.
So once Wittgenstein accepted the instability of the demand for full 
determinacy, the language-game analogy was liberated from its forced coexistence 
with the calculus model.274 The result, as just seen, is that the latter’s exclusive view 
of linguistic competence as a rule-following capacity was replaced by an overall 
picture in which rules have a more circumscribed role. An important feature of the 
language-game analogy is therefore that while rules may constitute a given game, 
playing a game involves more than mere adherence to its constitutive rules. Although 
it requires going beyond what Wittgenstein himself says, I want finally to highlight 
two further implications of this fact.
On the one hand, language-games should be thought of as varying in the 
degree to which they are rule-governed. Some activities, such as mathematics, 
involve well defined rules and highly articulate structure, others -  such as aesthetics 
and ethics (PU §77) -  do not. This does not imply that loosely regulated activities are 
deficient. Since, on the language-game conception, rules in language are linked with 
regularities in practice, we should expect just as much or as little regularity of 
structure in patterns of language use as there is homogeneity in the kinds of activity in 
which language is used.275 At least two factors will influence this. The first is that a 
uniformity constraint is constitutive of some kinds of activity. Thus mathematics does 
not differ from, say, aesthetics simply in that mathematicians define terms precisely 
whereas aestheticians do not. Rather, mathematics is an intrinsically standardized 
activity, one in which results and agents must agree if what they are doing is in fact 
mathematics, whereas aesthetics does not constitutively require such uniformity (and
273 By contrast in a (mathematical) calculus the aim is precisely to eradicate such contextual ity and 
nonregulation, so that each step is rationally defensible in the sense o f being necessarily and 
sufficiently legitimized by adducing a rule.
274 One reflection o f this is that with the transition from PG  to PU  the games analogy is broadened 
beyond chess to games more generally (cf. P U  §65).
275 It ‘lies in the essence o f language’ that if ‘the language-game, the activity [...]  fixes the use o f a 
word, then the concept o f use is elastic with that o f the activity’ (LTSF §340).
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77 &each might otherwise lose its point). The second factor is how closely linked 
certain concepts are with the successful execution of corresponding kinds of action. 
Typically in highly specialized and/or technical activities the use of specific 
vocabulary will be essential to successful coordination of the relevant activity. To put 
it in terms used above, there will generally be a practical requirement for a sufficient 
degree of, and appropriate, linguistic differentiation. Thus how much free play there 
is in the use of words will generally be a function of the practical context. For this 
reason, I suggest, language-games are best thought of as contexts o f regulation in a 
dual sense: both the extent to which rules are found and what those rules are -  how
777much regulation and which -  are features of the respective practice.
On the other hand, the language-game analogy suggests, in contrast to the 
calculus model of language, a broader notion of competence. Of course, it is true that 
both bad players and good players, football players say, must adhere to the rules of 
the game in order to count as playing it at all. But what constitutes competence -  
what good players have, and poor players lack -  is knowing what to do over and 
above the rules. (And, of course, being physically capable of doing it!) Thus a 
player’s competence involves a general understanding of the game (e.g. knowing 
what it is to be playing well, to be lucky or unlucky), strategic awareness (how to 
react in various situations, which tactics might consolidate a strong position or help in 
a bad one), and dexterity or skill, which typically requires making good decisions and 
simply doing the right thing on the spur of the moment. This broader notion of 
competence is part of what made the union of language-games and the calculus model 
unstable. For, quite clearly, not only do these aspects of competence in playing a 
game go beyond the rules that define the game, but they cannot be characterized by
77fthard and fast ‘rules’. Equally, though not answerable to rules, these aspects of 
competence are not a matter of chance. Alternatives to a given strategy or move can 
be entertained and found better or worse than what actually happened (luckily for
276 Incidentally, there is no implication that individual, or groups of, aestheticians cannot adopt highly 
precise terms. Wittgenstein’s point (PU  §77) is simply that definitions could not be given for the 
overall activity.
277 At first glance, this might seem to conflict with Wittgenstein’s own examples of language-games, 
all o f which seem to be straightforwardly characterizable in terms o f rules. However, Wittgenstein’s 
qualification o f his own language-games as ‘clear and simple’ (PU  §130) is not redundant and clearly 
allows real language-games to be more complex.
278 E.g. as regulative principles. Even where there are practical heuristics: there are no rules, though 
much informed opinion, which tells the England cricket captain who should bowl next, whether he 
should take the new ball, declare, enforce the follow on, send in a night watchman, etc.
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sport commentary). I think these aspects of competence must be thought of as 
differing from ‘rules’ in two respects. First in that they are ad hoc, or contextual; but 
also in being subject to considerations of appropriateness -  i.e. graduated and 
nonexclusive evaluation, rather than a sharp distinction between correct and incorrect. 
This might be labelled the ‘phronetic aspect’ of linguistic competence: the 
disposition, acquired by experience, to do the right thing, all things considered, in 
particular circumstances.279
Overall then the language-game analogy led the late Wittgenstein to a more modest 
and flexible view of linguistic rules than that suggested by the calculus model of 
language. The picture that emerges -  involving vagueness, inexplicitness, 
contextuality and nonregulation -  not only challenges the exhaustiveness of RCM in 
accounting for linguistic competence, but has specific consequences regarding what 
rules can tell us about the structure of linguistic practices and hence pragmatic sense. 
First, as the features of nonregulation and contextuality imply, rules can be expected 
to provide only an incomplete picture of language-games. It is (tautologically) true 
that irregular features are not characteristic aspects of language-games. Such features 
-  corresponding to the phronetic aspect of linguistic competence -  are hence 
‘imponderable’ in that they elude a general, rules-based description of language- 
games. And although I shall continue to describe Wittgenstein’s position as a view 
of rules, this openness to the phronetic aspect of linguistic competence can be thought 
of, so to speak, as its alter ego, or as the ground from which the figure of rules 
emerges. Second, the empirical, i.e. statistically distributed, form of linguistic rules in 
general will determine the sharpness or resolution of any rule-based description of a 
practice. In strictly regulated practices, such as mathematics, established rules would 
provide a detailed picture of the practice, whereas in less mechanical areas of life 
(e.g. how to lay out a garden) they would perhaps yield a caricature at best. These 
consequences can be summed up by saying that on Wittgenstein’s non-idealized 
picture rules correspond to general features of language-games or word use, insofar 
as these are actually found in the relevant practice. This implies -  as reflected in the 
late Wittgenstein’s talk of the ‘physiognomy’ of meaning -  that the reconfigured and
279 Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of Prudence [(ppovrjoiq} and the deliberative excellence it involves 
(Aristotle 1934, 351-7 [1 142a25-l 142b30]).
280 Theirs is the domain o f ‘unwSgbare Evidenz’ {PU II, 575 f.).
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constrained notion of rules serves to describe characteristic features of language- 
games, and hence language. In this sense, although it is a significant feature of 
Wittgenstein’s overall picture that they are not ubiquitous in language, rules remain 
fundamentally important as the means by which established -  and so presumably 
particularly important or useful -  uses of words can be described.
3. Rule-following practices
To understand how Wittgenstein’s views are able to meet the requirements on the 
notion of pragmatic sense, in particular how they relate to the idea of prepredicative 
understanding, it is necessary to consider what grasp speakers have of language-game 
structure, and hence of the rules inherent in such practices. Although the concept of 
rules was an abiding feature of Wittgenstein’s views on language from the Tractatus 
on -  where ‘rules of logical syntax’ were to underlie meaningful language and to be 
implicit in normal language (Umgangssprache\ 3.334, 5.5563) -  Wittgenstein 
initially, under the influence of the calculus model, apparently saw no need to explain 
how such rules are linked with the speakers’ abilities in which they are supposedly 
manifested. This changed with the emergence of the language-game analogy, and 
already in the Blue Book Wittgenstein is troubled by the question of what following a 
rule consists of in practice, in particular by the (Kantian) difficulty of distinguishing
n o  I
behaviour involving rules from that merely conforming to them. However, given 
the developments described in the preceding section, it is to the PU that one should 
look for a more mature view of speakers’ grasp of rules.
There are two discussions of rules in PU. The first (§§81-88) -  on which the 
preceding section concentrated -  follows Wittgenstein’s engagement with the issue of 
the general nature of language in §65 and can be seen as focusing on the relationship 
between rules and concepts. The second discussion (§§138-242) addresses the nature 
of rules. Wittgenstein launches this discussion by highlighting the difference between 
the meaning of a word, which one can supposedly grasp ‘in a flash’, and its 
temporally extended use, prompting the question of how the two are related. The 
general difficulty is that if a word is to be thought of as meaningful, it seems there 
should be something about it -  its meaning -  that determines how it is used and to 
which speakers’ understanding corresponds. Whatever this something is, one might
281 BIB 13 (cf. already PG  §43). The analogy is with Kant’s (1983d, 33) distinction between acting out 
of duty and merely in accord with duty.
168
think, will explain what rules consist in. Discerning with any precision both the aims 
of this discussion and the conception of rules it relies on is complicated by the PIT’s 
attempt to avoid expounding positive ‘theses’, in particular by its aphoristic, 
discontinuous and conversational mode of exposition. However, the placing of this 
discussion provides an important clue to its general aim. As it follows Wittgenstein’s 
comments on the nature of philosophical problems and philosophical method of 
§§89-133, it is here, if anywhere, that one would expect the idea to apply that 
philosophical problems result from misunderstandings which are to be resolved by 
reminding us of the everyday uses of words. By implication, such views as 
Wittgenstein endorses are intended as reminders of an antecedently familiar notion of 
rules. As §235 puts it, his aim is to remind his reader of the ‘physiognomy’ of ‘what 
in everyday life we call “following a rule”’. This is of some significance, since -  in 
accord with his emphatic reliance on everyday language use -  it underlines 
Wittgenstein’s underlying commitment to a (so to speak) misunderstanding-free 
conception of linguistic rules.
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the general contours at least of 
Wittgenstein’s views, both negative and positive, can be quite easily discerned. On 
the negative side it is clear that in the course of his discussion Wittgenstein canvasses 
and rejects several proposals as to the kind of thing that might constitute meaning: the 
platonist image of a set of antecedently existing rails that guide us, occurrent mental 
states such as intuitions, or ideal ‘mechanisms’ somehow inherent in sign systems. 
This is to be expected, since the early parts of PU had already relied on 
Wittgenstein’s preferred view of meaning as use in language-games, while 
nonetheless rejecting the idea of a ‘general concept of meaning’ (§§5, 43). So it 
would clearly be problematic if his discussion of rules were subsequently to reveal a 
philosophically ‘superlative’ type of meaning-constituting fact capable of founding a 
general concept of meaning (cf. §192). Yet at the same time, although his discussion 
is tortuous and oblique in form, positive aspects of Wittgenstein’s view of rules are 
also intimated throughout: Understanding is likened to abilities and techniques 
(§150), such as reading (§§156 ff.), predicated on the basis of certain externally 
observable circumstances (§154); the basis of rules is acting without justification 
(§§211, 217). And against this background Wittgenstein seems to think that
282 Significant, that is, in supporting the above claims about the no-thesis thesis and the rule-scepticism 
Kripke imputes to Wittgenstein.
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unclarities about the notion of rules are resolved simply by referring to a ‘constant 
use, a custom’ (§198), ‘customs (uses, institutions)’, ‘a technique’ (§199), or ‘a 
practice’ (§202). The difficulty is how this proposal is to be understood. 
Wittgenstein’s invocation of these notions -  which he treats as broadly synonymous -
9 O'!is conspicuously elliptic and enigmatic at best. But what does this talk of customs 
etc. involve? And how does it help to explain what rule-following involves?
To answer these questions it is germane to consider the conditions 
Wittgenstein thought it necessary for a conception of rules to meet. To begin with, 
such conditions would have two general features. First, within the framework of the 
language-game conception ‘rules’ and ‘rule-following’ are correlative concepts, since 
to determine what a rule is amounts to determining how an agent acts in adhering to 
it. In Wittgenstein’s words: ‘Following a rule is a human activity’, which can be 
described ‘only by describing in a different way what we do’ (BGMVI §29, VII §51). 
Second, descriptions of rule-following activity are subject to Wittgenstein’s general 
requirement that an “‘inner process” requires external criteria’ (PU §580). To some 
extent the significance of this thought as a methodological artifice is straightforward: 
From the Blue Book onwards Wittgenstein often suggested replacing internal images 
with external ones, in the conviction that any explanatory function an internal 
representation might fulfil must be equally comprehensible in terms of the use of an 
external representation, such that the description of mental abilities coincides with a 
description of the practice(s) in which they are manifested. However, one further 
point is worth emphasizing. It is perhaps tempting to describe Wittgenstein’s 
insistence on external criteria as an insistence on the ‘public observability’ of criteria, 
or on ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first personal’ criteria.285 Though not strictly 
speaking incorrect, such glosses can be misleading and it is of some importance to 
underline that the point of Wittgenstein’s exteriorization method is to enforce 
explication of the supposed meaning-conferring role of inner representations. A 
consequence of this is that rules and criteria for rule-following are essentially 
impersonal: For the exteriorization move and the perspective it implies effectively
283 David Bloor understandably describes Wittgenstein’s commitments as ‘disturbingly minimal’, 
before less understandably -  without any exegetic foundation -  attributing to Wittgenstein a theory of  
institutions as ‘performative utterances, produced by the social collective’ (Bloor 1997, 28, 32).
284 E.g. BIB 4, 13, 53; PG  §§92, 99; cf. PU  §§53, 301, 397.
285 Cf. e.g. ‘Don’t now ask yourself “How is it with me?” -  Ask: “What do I know about the other?”’ 
(PU I I 539).
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insist on the objectivity of criteria by eliminating any reference to a (first or third) 
personal perspective.286
hi more specific terms, the basis for Wittgenstein’s conception of rules is a 
(recognizable) regularity, since it is only against the background of a repeated pattern 
of behaviour that the question of whether a rule is being followed or not can arise (cf. 
PU §§207, 237). Accordingly Wittgenstein explicitly excludes describing one-off 
actions as rules: ‘Is what we call “following a rule” something that only one person 
could do only once in his life? [...] It is not possible for one person to have followed 
a rule on only a single occasion’ 287 However, although necessary, the requirement 
that there be a background of regularity -  the regularity condition -  does not suffice 
in Wittgenstein’s view to speak of rule-following. Rather, although ‘acting according 
to a rule presupposes recognizing a uniformity [Gleichmafiigkeit] ’, Wittgenstein 
thought of regularity of action, or conformity to a rule, as merely a ‘precursor to 
acting according to a rule’ (BGM VI §§44, 43). What this lacks can be brought into 
focus by considering two examples from BGM. First:
there could be a caveman who produces regular [regelmafiige] sequences o f signs for himself. 
He entertains himself, for example, by drawing or on the wall o f the cave.
But he does not follow the general expression o f a rule. And we do not say that he acts 
regularly [sic.: regelmafiig] because we are able to form such an expression. {BGM  VI §41)
This indicates that the feature distinguishing acting according to a rule from actions 
describable in terms of a regularity is to lie in the agent’s (not an observer’s) 
deployment of a ‘general expression of the rule’. Wittgenstein contrasts this with 
activities in which a general expression is used such as teaching/learning:
If one o f two chimpanzees scratched the figure |--| in the clay soil and another then the series 
|~||—| etc., then the first would not have provided a rule and the second not have followed it, 
no matter what happened in the souls o f the two. However, if  one observed, for example, the 
phenomenon o f a kind o f lesson, o f demonstration and imitation o f successful and 
unsuccessful attempts, o f reward and punishment and suchlike; if  the one so taught in the end 
lined up previously unseen figures as in the first example, then we would indeed say that one 
chimpanzee is writing down rules, the other following them. {BGM  VI §42)
There are two differences between this case and the former that might seem decisive. 
First, the case of the chimpanzees differs from that of the caveman in that it involves
286 It follows, o f course, that one applies the same criteria in attributing concepts to oneself, or in 
understanding one’s own utterances, as one does to others. But this is because, as the Private Language 
Argumentation shows, there is no such thing as an essentially first-personal perspective on language, 
so that the distinction between first- and third-personal perspectives cannot do any work regarding the 
understanding o f language.
287 PU  §199. This exclusion o f a pure singularity from the concept o f rules is often reiterated, e.g. at 
BGM VI §§21, 34; III §67.
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social interaction. In this respect it might seem to support the claim that 
Wittgenstein’s appeal to customs, institutions etc. was supposed to convey that rule- 
following is an essentially social practice. It seems to me that there is good reason to 
doubt this claim. For example, elsewhere Wittgenstein comments: ‘When, then, do I 
say that I see the rule -  or a rule -  in this sequence? [...] [Is it] not also simply when I 
can continue it? No, I explain generally to myself or to another how it is to be 
continued’ (BGM VI §27; italics added). This suggests that the social aspect is not 
essential: I explain to myself or to someone else. Moreover, this indifference is to be 
expected, given the impersonal nature of the ‘external’ criteria Wittgenstein insists 
on. After all, what difference could it make to the rule being followed whether I 
explain it to myself or to someone else? What counts as explication or justification is 
governed by the same considerations or criteria in both cases, i.e. no matter whose 
behaviour is under consideration. Admittedly, however, the issue of the way in which 
customs, institutions etc. are social and how this impacts on the notion of rule- 
following, in particular whether an isolated individual (‘Robinson Crusoe’) could 
engage in rule-following, is a much discussed and controversial aspect of
-n o o
Wittgenstein’s views. Nevertheless, I will not consider it further here, since for the 
present purposes it makes no difference whether customs and rule-following are 
assumed to be essentially social or not, as long as the second difference is not lost 
from view.
The second difference is simply that in the chimpanzees’ case there is external 
evidence for the agent’s deployment of a general expression of the rule. In this 
respect the contrast between the two situations is a paradigm case of Wittgenstein’s 
use of (imaginary) language-games to elucidate what is involved in two different 
kinds of mental state -  in this case between two kinds of cognitive ability. What 
matters here is the structure of sign-use practices as such, with the difference between 
rule-conformity and rule-following lying in the level of complexity exhibited in the 
two kinds of behaviour. This additional complexity lies in the manifestation of 
corrective behaviour serving as evidence that the agent takes something involved in
288 On the one hand is the view that rule-following is an ability which, though usually exercised in 
shared social practices, is individually possessed (e.g. Baker/Hacker 1984, 1990; McGinn 1984; 
Shanker 1996). On the other hand are those who see a ‘language-community’ as playing some essential 
role -  e.g. contributing proper normativity or rational stability -  in the phenomenon o f rule-following 
(e.g. Kripke 1982; Malcolm 1986, 1995; Wright 1980, cf. 220).
289 That rule-following pertains to behaviourally manifested cognitive abilities is highlighted by 
Shanker 1996 and McGinn 1984, 32-40.
172
the practice to be a ‘general expression’ of the rule. In Wittgenstein’s view, as the 
second example shows, such complexity suffices to speak of rules being followed.
The problem with this example, as it stands, is that it is too demanding. While 
clearly sufficing to attribute such abilities, straightforward cases of overt use of a 
rule-expression and blatant corrective behaviour -  as in the chimpanzees’ example -  
cannot be considered necessary for rule-following. Its advantage, however, is to 
provide a clear paradigm for the kind of cognitive ability rule-following involves: i.e. 
the ability to make comparisons or to offer justification, which in turn implies the 
ability to discern an aspect of sameness between two things and to make use of 
something -  examples or a general expression -  as a model for or standard of that 
sameness (cf. PU §§72-3). Nonetheless, more subtle behavioural indications might 
equally well suffice as evidence of an agent’s responsiveness to the correctness of 
what she is doing, and so of her ability to engage in normative behaviour.290 This 
suggests that the condition met by Wittgenstein’s chimpanzees example should be 
formulated in a more forgiving form. Corresponding to the idea that the rule should 
be somehow involved in the process in question, the agent’s grasp condition -  as I 
shall call it -  should be seen as the general requirement that, whether or not anything 
is overtly deployed as a standard, rule-following requires that an agent be both aware 
of the regularity in question and attempting to maintain it. The difficultly is then to 
state, in general terms, what more must be added to a regularity in behaviour for an 
agent’s actions to provide evidence of the agent’s grasp condition’s being met.
Two features of the PIT s treatment of rules respond to this difficulty. The first 
occurs in the reflections Wittgenstein interposes between introducing (§143) and 
returning to (§185) the language-game of forming numerical series. To begin with the 
discussion of the concept of understanding (§§146-155) provides a general reminder 
that criteria for understanding lie in a sign’s pattern of use or application (§146), and 
that to the extent understanding is accompanied by criterially relevant characteristic 
processes, these are to lie in certain external circumstances rather than private mental 
events (§§152-155). The subsequent discussion, however, serves to make clear that 
rule-following encompasses complex and disparate phenomena characterized by 
family resemblance. Wittgenstein does not say this in as many words, i.e. advance it
290 Wittgenstein acknowledges several possibilities in PU  §§54, 82. Hence the plausibility o f Baker 
and Hacker’s emphasis that the notion o f practice Wittgenstein relies on ‘is that o f a normative 
regularity, not o f a social practice’ (Baker/Hacker 1985, 151; cf. 169-179).
173
as a thesis. However, in discussing the example of reading (§§156-178) -  a model of
‘being guided’ by linguistic signs -  he combines the demand for observable
contextual criteria with the insight that ‘reading’ stands not for one phenomenon, but
a ‘family of cases’ to which ‘different criteria’ are applied ‘in different 
1
circumstances’. The pertinence of these comments to the subsequent (from §185) 
further discussion of rules is established by the transition (§§179-184), in which the 
orientation towards (external) circumstances as well as the complexity of possible 
criteria is related back to the topic of rules (cf. §179). The implication is that, just as 
there no central defining feature of (language) games, there is no simple set of general 
conditions for meeting the agent’s grasp condition, and hence for rule-following. 
Criteria for the concepts of ability and understanding are, Wittgenstein warns, ‘much 
more complicated than it might seem at first glance’ (PU §182). And precisely in 
everyday linguistic practice -  i.e. Wittgenstein’s focus -  one would expect to find 
more subtle and variegated manifestations of such abilities. So the difficulty of 
pinning down Wittgenstein’s conception of rules is due not only to his no-thesis 
thesis and stylistic difficulties, but also because in one sense the PU does not offer a 
general answer: Instead of attempting to develop a systematic theory of rules, it 
remains open to diverse criteria while offering fragmentary indications of the 
complex ‘physiognomy’ of the concept of rules ‘in everyday life’ (PU §235).
The significance of the second feature, viz. Wittgenstein’s appeal to customs 
etc., can be understood in the light of the first. For although Wittgenstein does not 
attempt to enumerate all conditions sufficing to meet the agent’s grasp condition -  
presumably thinking that no such enumeration is possible -  this appeal does identify 
the kinds of phenomenon in which such a condition must be being met. For customs, 
institutions and (established) practices are phenomena in which there is transmission, 
or teaching, of intentionally upheld regularities -  even if it is not obvious how to 
catalogue the ways m which this is done. In other words, Wittgenstein’s talk of 
customs, institutions and practices is a place holder for a general answer, offered in 
lieu of a catalogue of specific conditions sufficient to attribute agents with a grasp of
291 PU  §164. The family-resemblance character o f reading is highlighted in §168. Wittgenstein had 
already made an equivalent claim about ‘understanding’ in PG  §35.
292 Cf. PU  §65. -  ‘Does that mean “following a rule” is indefmable? No. I can define it in countless 
ways’ (BGM VI §18).
293 Insofar as they have any persistence and regularity over time language-games are institutions in this 
sense. -  Incidentally, the idea that rules are upheld is reflected in the etymology o f the German for 
‘custom’: a ‘Gepflogenheit’ is that which is cared for or maintained ( ‘gepflegt’, from ‘pflegen’).
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the rule. Its apparent vagueness notwithstanding, or rather precisely in virtue of this, 
such talk provides a way of dealing with the problem of the diversity and complexity 
of criteria for rule-following. So in this second sense the PU does provide a general 
answer to the question of what rule-following comprises. It is generic and vague, but 
such is the price of its being a general and complete answer.
Understood in this way, it might be wondered whether the appeal to customs 
etc. is able to fulfil the role, identified in §198, of distinguishing Wittgenstein’s 
conception of rules from a mere ‘causal connection’, or explaining ‘how it came 
about’ that our actions accord with rules. For the appeal to customs etc., as just 
outlined, amounts to the insistence that the agent’s grasp condition be met in some 
way, but says nothing substantial about how to do so. In this sense invoking the 
notion of customs is frustratingly empty, and the causal connection worry justified, 
insofar as Wittgenstein fails to state specifically what distinguishes (linguistic) rule- 
following from the mere rule-conformity exhibited by physical objects. Some light 
can be shed on this by recalling the phenomenon of inexplicitness and the distinction 
between providing ‘samples of use’ and ‘stating the rule’ as criteria of rule-following 
(PG §42) -  which I shall subsequently refer to as rule-exemplification and rule- 
stating respectively. Using this distinction it might initially seem that -  unless one 
can state the rule being followed -  rule-exemplification is equivalent to the 
instantiation of rules, mere causal conformity, exhibited by inanimate natural objects. 
However, it is not difficult to appreciate that rule-exemplification can also provide the 
basis of corrective behaviour: ‘I show him, he copies me; and I influence him by 
expressions of agreement, disapproval, expectation, encouragement. I let him do as he 
likes, or hold him back etc.’ (PU §208). Insofar as it can form the basis of such 
corrective behaviour, the rule-exemplification ability suffices to fulfil the agent’s 
grasp condition -  i.e. to exhibit sensitivity to both the regularity in question and its 
maintenance -  and so gives a minimal sense to Wittgenstein’s distinction of 
‘customs’ etc. from merely ‘causal connections’.294 In fact it may be that this is 
precisely what Wittgenstein had in mind. For it is possible to discern here a 
characteristic feature of the conception of linguistic knowledge in the PU, according
294 Note that exemplifying use, or providing samples, is a spontaneous (e.g. potentially withholdable) 
feat, rather than being causally or ‘mechanically’ triggered.
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to which the use of words is learned and explained primarily through examples, and
90Soften cannot be otherwise explained.
The two general conditions Wittgenstein is looking to fulfil -  the regularity 
condition and the agent’s grasp condition -  can help in understanding the priority 
implicit in the phenomenon of inexplicitness, i.e. that rule-exemplification is more 
basic than rule-stating. These two conditions do not simply correspond to the two 
criteria for rule-following: the agent’s grasp condition is met by the ability to state the 
rule only in the simplest cases, and can also be met by the exemplification ability. 
Nonetheless, they allow the logical priority of rule-exemplification over rule-stating, 
and hence the possibility of the phenomenon of inexplicitness, to be understood as 
follows: Rule-exemplification suffices in principle to meet both the regularity 
condition and the agent’s grasp condition; which entails that the rule-stating ability is 
not necessary. Rule-exemplification is also necessary, as the regularity condition 
entails that a rule-follower be able to produce instances of the rule -  ‘The application 
[AnwendungY of a rule ‘remains a criterion of understanding’ (PU §146); which 
entails that rule-stating alone is not sufficient. Thus whereas rule-exemplification is 
both necessary and sufficient for rule-following, rule-stating is neither necessary nor 
sufficient.
To conclude two points regarding the relationship between rule-following and 
language should be highlighted. First, as the above examples show, while 
emphasizing that ‘Following a rule is at the BASIS of our language-game’ (BGMVI 
§28), Wittgenstein does not think of rule-following as a specifically linguistic 
competence. His caveman and chimpanzees differ in the complexity of their 
behaviour, but in neither case could their behaviour be convincingly described as 
linguistic. In particular it should be noted that the rule-following ability on which 
Wittgenstein takes language-games to be founded does not essentially involve 
awareness of anything that might be described as propositions, nor any kind of 
conceptual or inferential properties taken to be linked with the notion of propositional 
content. Second, the idea of sensitivity to correctness where there is no overt use of a 
general rule-expression is (rightly) suggestive of subtlety and variety in the 
sufficiency conditions for rule-following. But it would be misleading to equate this 
with ‘implicit’ awareness of such conditions. One reason for this is that in his
295 Cf. PU  §§69, 71, 75, 208.
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examples Wittgenstein’s willingness to attribute rule-awareness invariably turns on 
manifest, or at least manifestable, behaviour. In this respect his view of criteria 
centres on explicit behaviour alone; implicit features, if anything, are simply those 
that would be explicit in appropriate circumstances -  as PU  §126 puts it, ‘what might 
be hidden does not interest us’. On this view, for example, nonlinguistic behaviour 
should not be thought of as ‘implicit’ knowledge of the propositions that would 
describe it. Rather, linguistic and nonlinguistic behaviours are different forms of 
explicitness.296 Similarly, the distinction between rule-exemplification and rule- 
stating should not be thought of as the distinction between implicit and explicit 
awareness of the rule, but as two different kinds of manifestable (explicit) awareness 
of it.
4. Pragmatic sense
In chapter I the notion of pragmatic sense was introduced as the sense signs have due 
to the respective roles they play as instruments in established practices. This chapter, in 
particular the first two sections, have highlighted two major aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
‘praxeological’ conception of language that allow it to be understood as explicating 
what pragmatic sense consists of. First is the way that linguistic articulation is 
intrinsically linked with practice in general, reflected in the view of language-games 
as the context of conceptual articulation and the idea of forms of life as functionally 
interconnected aggregates of language-games. The somewhat mechanistic vision 
hinted at by such functional interrelations is relaxed and made more flexible, second, 
by the reconfigured and constrained conception of rules that emerges with the 
maturing language-game analogy. As opposed to the calculus model’s vision of 
sharply defined, omnipresent rules, the kind of rules inherent in language-games are 
in general to be thought of as both empirically contoured, i.e. defined in terms of 
more or less sharply delimited normal conditions, and as varying in the extent to 
which they constitute language-games. Nevertheless, to the extent that language- 
games do have a determinate and enduring structure, this ideal-free conception of 
rules provides the means for characterizing what participation in them requires, and 
hence what pragmatic sense consists in. The aim of this section is to show how these
296 In particular, being committed to the truth o f or belief in certain contents, say by one’s nonlinguistic 
actions, should be distinguished from ‘implicit knowledge’ o f those contents. After all, it is a lot 
clearer what explicit nonlinguistic awareness is than what implicit linguistic awareness is.
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Wittgensteinian ideas meet the requirements previously identified on the notion of 
pragmatic sense. It begins by indicating how Wittgenstein’s views are compatible 
with a phenomenological approach, and then draws on the preceding discussions to 
show how rule-based pragmatic sense can be considered to be prepredicative.
(i) A ‘phenomenological’ view: An obvious advantage of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
language, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s, is its focus on everyday experience of 
language. However, it is the two features just referred to -  the internal link between 
concepts and practice, and his late conception of rules -  that make Wittgenstein’s 
views particularly suited to phenomenologically accurate description of language. In 
contrast to formal, particularly calculus-based, conceptions of language, language- 
games are clearly recognizable as schematizations of actual linguistic practice. As 
such they picture language as processual in character, rather than as some kind of 
abstract structure, so that Wittgenstein can plausibly, trivially even, claim to be 
talking about language as a ‘spatial and temporal phenomenon’, rather as than ‘some 
non-spatial and non-temporal non-entity’.297 But above all the idea of language- 
games reflects the fundamental importance of practice, i.e. human action, in shaping 
language. The modest view of rules identified above reflects the fact that actual 
language use can, without deficiency, be more or less sharply delimited and manifest 
greater or lesser degrees of regulation. Rather than relying on idealized or artificial 
standards of precision, this conception of rules and their role exhibits the flexibility 
required to describe the characteristic traits of language-games. So it is by both 
centring on the right kind of thing (i.e. language-games) to invite comparison with 
linguistic practices, and doing so in the right way, that makes Wittgenstein’s 
praxeological conception of language particularly attuned to accurate description of 
real linguistic phenomena.
This conception of language also exhibits several features previously 
identified as generally characterizing a phenomenological conception of language. 
For example, the notion of language-games not only, as just noted, conceives of 
language as a process rather than some kind of stasis, but is specifically intended to 
block the tendency to think of language as a system of forms. As with Heidegger, this 
‘antiformalism’ is linked with a nonreductive approach to semantics, evidenced in
297 PU  §108 -  ‘non-entity’ here translates ‘Unding’ (literally ‘non-thing’), which in German conveys 
absurdity.
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Wittgenstein’s critique of simple referring and his dictum ‘everything that describes a 
language-game belongs to logic’ (UG §56). In addition, while Wittgenstein had 
earlier conceived of language, so to speak, as a world-independent (‘autonomous’) 
medium of meaning constitution, his later thinking was led by the maturing language- 
game analogy to reflect the embedment of language in human practice and its 
empirical surroundings (the empiricization of rules), and so to a view of language as 
language-in-the-world.
One clarification is perhaps requisite at this point: In claiming that 
Wittgenstein’s conception of language meets the key desideratum for a 
phenomenological approach to language -  i.e. accurately describing linguistic 
phenomena -  I do not mean to imply that he intended such an approach. The reason 
for highlighting this is that there have been various attempts to interpret Wittgenstein 
as a ‘phenomenological’ philosopher.298 This idea can be motivated in several ways. 
The starting point is Wittgenstein’s apparently phenomenological emphasis on 
description rather than explanation (PU §109; cf. §§124, 496). In addition, his focus 
on language as a ‘spatial and temporal phenomenon’ and insistence on the need to 
understand what is already manifest in linguistic phenomena -  what ‘already lies 
open before our eyes’ (PU §126; cf. §89) -  might give the impression that 
Wittgenstein was himself committed to the aim of accurately describing phenomena. 
An apparently plausible basis for developing interpretations of this kind is the fact 
that following his return to Cambridge in 1929 Wittgenstein himself was for a time 
interested in the development of what he called a ‘phenomenology’.299 But such 
interpretations have also been developed on the basis of perceived parallels between 
Wittgenstein’s thinking and the phenomenological movement -  typically relying on 
various of Husserl’s claims about phenomenological method.300
There are good grounds for doubting that Wittgenstein himself was a 
‘phenomenological’ philosopher in any significant sense. To begin with, his 
notebooks from around 1929 make clear that his interest was in describing immediate
298 See, for example, Munson 1962, Spiegelberg 1981, Gier 1981, Guest 1991. Developing the views 
of Hintikka/Hintikka (1986, cf. in particular 148-154), Byong-Chul (1998) offers an extensive and 
more philosophically focused interpretation o f Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a form o f phenomenology. 
For a dissenting voice, see Reeder 1989.
299 The best known traces o f this are found in the manuscripts known as Philosophical Remarks (1929- 
30) and the Big Typescript (1933). For anecdotal evidence o f Wittgenstein’s description o f his work as 
‘phenomenology’ see Rhees 1981, 131 and Spiegelberg 1981, 214.
3 Such parallels are suggested by Guest (1991), and with some caution by Spiegelberg (1981, 212, 
215 f.), but most extensively -  and most speculatively -  by Gier (1981, cf. 91-134).
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sense data (i.e. phenomenalism) and that he himself soon rejected this
o a i 9
‘phenomenological’ project as incoherent. Further, in the absence of explicit 
references, or any other evidence of influence, there is no reason to suppose that 
perceived parallels between Wittgenstein’s methods and, say, Husserl’s go beyond 
the kind of similarities one would expect to find between any two philosophers. More 
acutely, Wittgenstein explicitly and quite unequivocally claims in PU §383 to be 
‘analysing not a phenomenon (e.g. thinking), but a concept (e.g. that of thinking), and 
so the application of a word’. Although the tenability of this distinction might be 
challenged -  isn’t the investigation of language simultaneously an investigation of 
phenomena, as Austin (1979, 182) would later claim? -  Wittgenstein’s self- 
understanding is clear: the object of his descriptive study is language, not phenomena 
as such.
For my purposes, however, there is no need to settle whether Wittgenstein 
himself was a ‘phenomenologist’. The suggestion here, to reiterate, is not that his 
approach was phenomenological, but merely that his conception of language is 
compatible with such an approach. That is, insofar as it is recognizably suited to 
describing actual linguistic processes, it can be treated as though it were guided by 
the idea of accountability to phenomena. In fact this is not altogether surprising and 
might be thought of as an indirect commitment arising from Wittgenstein’s method of 
illuminating comparison: if such comparisons are to yield clarification, the underlying 
conception of language must cohere recognizably with actual linguistic phenomena. 
Accordingly, once convinced of the calculus model’s breakdown, Wittgenstein was 
naturally led to focus on everyday experience of language in developing the 
language-game conception. More significantly perhaps, Wittgenstein’s claim not to 
be analyzing phenomena as such should be relativized, given the special status of 
language in his thinking: Even if it is assumed that in focusing on language he does 
not generally analyze phenomena, this does not prevent Wittgenstein having a 
phenomenological conception o f language. For what loss could there be in reducing 
linguistic phenomena to linguistic phenomena?
301 See in particular manuscripts 105 (esp. 114, 116) from 1929-30 and 113 (esp. 245 f.) o f 1931-2, 
which are now widely available in the Vienna Edition ( Wiener vol. 1, 193; vol. 5, 133). For a sound 
and informative reconstruction o f ‘Wittgenstein’s phenomenology’ see Kienzler 1997, 105-142.
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(ii) Pragmatic sense as prepredicative: To show that the rule-structure inherent in 
language-games admits of being grasped prepredicatively, I now want to set out how 
Wittgenstein’s views meet the three requirements previously identified for 
prepredicative factors. It is relatively straightforward to see the late Wittgenstein as 
focusing on subpropositional factors. To begin with, there are several indications that 
he -  just as Heidegger -  does not see propositional meaning as having explanatory 
primacy: much of PITs discussion focuses directly on words rather than sentences; 
§§19-20 and §136 also hint that pragmatic rather than syntactic criteria can 
individuate sentences, so that propositions cannot be taken to have a general form -  
which Wittgenstein thought entailed commitment to the calculus model of 
language.302 Wittgenstein’s focus on subpropositional factors becomes clearer by 
considering his view of the processes that determine word use. First, as previously 
pointed out, the rule-following abilities he concentrates on can also be applied to 
nonlinguistic behaviours, and are in no way specifically tied to the use of expressions 
in sentential contexts or the idea of propositional content. However, above all it is 
implicit in the language-game model (section 1 above) that the meaning of terms is 
determined directly by practical requirements -  the need to have a word for this 
object, that process, or whatever -  and not mediated by participation in propositional 
units.
Somewhat more involved is understanding how pragmatic sense is supposed 
to be subinferential in the dual sense previously identified, which requires that 
pragmatic sense -  i.e. the rules corresponding to practice-inherent structure -  can be 
grasped without awareness of inferential properties, while at the same time 
functioning as the basis of inferential properties. Given the traditional link between 
rule-following and predication as characteristics of the Understanding, the difficulty 
is how praxeological rules can play a foundational (rather than a directly constitutive) 
role in relation to predicative awareness. To show how this subinferential function 
can be accommodated on Wittgenstein’s overall picture of how language works, it 
will be helpful first to consider his view of the finiteness of justification. Wittgenstein 
expresses this view in a number of ways, including the well-known metaphor of the 
bending spade in §217 and several comments suggesting resignative passivity: ‘What 
has to be accepted, the given [...] are forms o flife \  ‘the everyday language-game is
302 Cf. PU  §65. -  PG  §80 had claimed that ‘A general propositional form determines the proposition as 
a term in a calculus’.
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to be accepted’, ‘Our mistake is to search for an explanation where we should view 
the facts as “primal phenomena”. That is, where we should say: this language-game
"XCVXis played". The underlying thought -  in itself hardly original -  is that if justification
did not somehow come to an end an infinite regress would result, implying that there 
is no such thing as justification (cf. PU §485). The distinctive feature of 
Wittgenstein’s position is that he sees justification as coming to an end not in evident 
truths, some special way of seeing (intuiting), or even in ‘unjustified assumptions’, 
but in an ‘unjustified way of acting’.304 Indeed the existence of such basic practices, 
Wittgenstein further suggests, simply has to be accepted as something ‘beyond 
justified and unjustified; i.e. so to speak, as something animal’ (UG §359; cf. §559).
Such epigrammatic formulations are potentially misleading: In what sense are 
language-games, or forms of life, to be ‘accepted’ as ‘given’? Wittgenstein certainly 
does not think that the language-games constituting a language cannot change or 
evolve {PU §23). Nor does he think that no reasons can be given for acting in existing 
ways. Rather, in claiming that language use is founded in ways of acting that are 
themselves unjustified his thought is that at some stage justification loses its force 
{UG §307). The relevant sense of ‘acceptance’ is best understood in the perspective 
of ‘conceptual investigations’ of the kind Wittgenstein was interested in conducting, 
i.e. in describing the structural relationships between concepts.305 For here there is a 
sense in which established language-games do have to be ‘accepted’ as ‘given’, 
namely as the object of description; and insofar as concepts are viewed as standing in 
rationally motivated relationships, this mode of enquiry points towards something 
that must be considered unjustified. Moreover because, on Wittgenstein’s approach, 
concepts are articulated in language-games, they must be grounded in forms of action 
(rather than, say, basic logical forms) that are unjustified.
Rather than either defending or exploring the implications of Wittgenstein’s 
claims for a general theory of rationality, I want here simply to highlight two
303 PU  II, 572 (cf. BPP I §630), 529; PU  §654 -  where Wittgenstein’s term ‘Urphanomene’ is almost 
certainly an allusion to Goethe (e.g. Goethe 1996, vol. 12, 366-7).
304 UG §§204, 110, cf. §166: ‘The difficulty is to see [einsehen] the groundlessness o f our beliefs’. 
(Similarly PU  §§211, 212, 217.)
305 Cf. BPP I  §949, where Wittgenstein likens his conceptual investigations to Goethe’s morphology. 
There are several such indications of Goethe’s influence on Wittgenstein (cf. Schulte 1984, Monk 
1990, 509-512, 303-304), which, incidentally, is also a plausible source o f Wittgenstein’s apparently 
phenomenological emphasis on description over explanation (Goethe 1996, vol. 13, 123; cf. vol. 12, 
432, which BPP I §889 cites).
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features.306 First it is implicit in the idea of language-games which cannot be justified 
-  which are ‘beyond justified and unjustified’ -  that justification does not, on 
principle, play any role in such games. Thus Wittgenstein relies on a distinction 
between prejustificatory and justificatory language-games, i.e. between language- 
games that do not (cannot) involve justification and language-games that do (or at 
least might) involve justification. Second, employing this distinction, his claim is that 
justificatory language-games presuppose, or are based on, prejustificatory language- 
games.
But how is the ability to participate in prejustificatory language-games, in 
particular, to be understood? To answer this, it important to bear in mind that 
Wittgenstein is concerned with ‘justification’ in the specific sense of explicating the 
conceptual or sense structure inherent in practices. In this respect ‘justification’ is 
analogous to other practices such as description, explanation or teaching that involve 
rule-stating so as to elucidate the structure of some underlying practice (that being 
described, explained or learnt). With this in mind, the relationship between rule- 
stating and rule-exemplification in the phenomenon of inexplicitness provides a 
model for understanding prejustificatory practices. While this phenomenon reflects 
the (logical) priority of rule-exemplification over rule-stating, it is clear that there is 
some link between these two abilities. For rule-stating is implicitly referred to -  and 
hence founded in -  an underlying pattern (of rule-exemplifications) in the sense that, 
if there were no regularity, it could not count as stating a rule. This suggests that 
prejustificatory language-games should be thought of as language-games in which it 
is possible to participate on the basis of rule-exemplification alone (which, to recall, 
can meet Wittgenstein’s two conditions for rule-following). Accordingly, 
Wittgenstein’s idea that justification is finite can be interpreted as the claim that 
justificatory language-games, which involve rule-stating, presuppose prejustificatory 
language-games, for participation in which rule-exemplification abilities suffice.307
This conclusion can be recast in terms of the prepredicative-predicative 
distinction. Predicative awareness, according to Heidegger’s distinction, is awareness
306 Wittgenstein sometimes (e.g. UG §§253, 262, 612) hints at the -  implausible -  view advocated, for 
example, by Kuhn (1970) and Rorty (1979, 315 ff.; 1989, 8 f.) that rationality is system-internal, so 
that changes between systems (or forms o f life) are governed by nonrational procedures.
307 The builders language-game of PU  §2 is an example o f a routine in which no rule-stating is 
involved. It is interesting to note that although Wittgenstein thinks o f the builders as having knowledge 
which they cannot express (UG  §396), he elsewhere denies that ‘concepts’ are involved in this game 
(BG M V II §71).
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of expressions’ properties, understood to be purpose-independent attributes 
underlying their inferential behaviour. In relation to Wittgenstein’s picture, a grasp of 
such properties must be thought of in terms of the ability to involve them in 
justificatory practices, which requires the ability to characterize in some general way, 
to state rather than simply to exemplify, the rule for the use of an expression. And 
since, conversely, stating a rule is to present it in a form allowing its involvement in 
justification, rule-stating corresponds to the ability to participate in justificatory 
language-games and is hence a predicative ability. By contrast, in lacking the feature 
that enables such participation rule-exemplification must be understood as a 
prepredicative ability. Moreover, this matches up with Heidegger’s view of purposive 
awareness, since grasping what words are for and so in which practical circumstances 
to use them clearly corresponds to the ability to exemplify their use. The above 
conclusion can therefore be restated by saying that justificatory language-games, and 
hence predicative awareness, should always be thought of as founded in language- 
games based on the prepredicative ability of rule-exemplification.
This has three implications of importance here. The first is to make clear that 
practice-inherent rules can be grasped both prepredicatively and predicatively, as 
required to function subinferentially: rule-stating and justificatory language-games 
stand to rule-exemplification and prejustificatory language-games as the predicative 
does to the prepredicative in Heidegger’s terminology. The second implication, 
corresponding to the Heideggerian possibility of prepredicative language use, is that 
not all language-games, and hence not all linguistic competence, can be (let alone 
need be) understood in terms of justificatory or predicative activity. Indeed, as the 
phenomenon of inexplicitness attests, the supposition must be that the ability simply 
to exemplify appropriate use of expressions -  i.e. without being able to elucidate their 
use -  would suffice to participate in many (though of course not all) established 
language-games. Third, the founding of justificatory in prejustificatory, or predicative 
in prepredicative, language-games can be understood as a general point about the 
functional stratification of language-games (end of section 1 above). The point is not 
so much, though allowing this possibility, that justification-free language-games 
might exist empirically without ever being developed into more sophisticated 
practices involving justification. Rather it should be taken as an analysis of the 
praxeological structure of linguistic competence, such that justificatory practices can 
always be understood as implicitly referred to some underlying form of
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prepredicative language-game. This dependence can be pictured in phenomenal terms 
such that any form of practice involving justification can be thought of as being based 
on corresponding, but simpler, justification-free forms of practice -  e.g. in routine 
performances of the rule in question.
At this point it is instructive to contrast this Wittgensteinian view briefly with 
a proposal made by Robert Brandom in Making it Explicit. Describing himself as an 
‘anti-intellectualist about norms’ and an ‘antiformalist about logic’ (1994, 135), in a 
manner reminiscent of Heidegger, Brandom acknowledges the need to found 
semantics in a ‘pragmatics’, i.e. to cash out semantic and logical vocabulary in terms 
of practices, or what we do. The ‘critical criterion of adequacy’ he suggests for a 
foundational pragmatics is ‘that the core linguistic practices it specifies be sufficient 
to confer propositional and other conceptual contents on the expressions, 
performances, and deontic statuses that play appropriate roles in those practices’ 
(Brandom 1994, 159). Brandom makes a generic proposal as to the kind of practice 
fulfilling this task for which two ideas are central. The first, adopted from Wilfrid 
Sellars, is to consider language as a ‘game of giving and asking for reasons’. The 
second, adopted from David Lewis, is to model the way participants keep track of this 
game as a form of ‘scorekeeping’. In broad outline Brandom’s approach is as follows: 
The fundamental kind of move made in such games is the act of asserting some 
proposition. In making an assertion one becomes committed to some content, both 
that expressed and that inferentially linked with this, and undertakes a responsibility, 
if challenged, to show that one is rationally entitled to make the relevant commitment. 
The basis of scorekeeping activities are what Brandom calls ‘deontic statuses’: 
commitment to propositions, the exclusion of propositions on grounds of consistency, 
along with the entitlement to make the claims one is making. ‘Talking and thinking’, 
Brandom (1994, 183) concisely assures us, ‘is keeping score in this sort of game’.
From the perspective developed here several comments on Brandom’s 
proposal are due. First, it seems to me that in presenting ‘scorekeeping’ as some kind 
of pervasive universal language-game it fails the test of phenomenological adequacy. 
On the one hand, it seems implausible to suggest that we are usually aware of keeping 
tabs on other people’s propositional commitments (scorekeeping). On the other hand, 
I suggest, this is not the kind of thing we could do without being aware of it. In 
addition, the scorekeeping model’s assimilation of all language use to (tacit?) ‘giving 
and asking for reasons’ seems to disregard the fact that not all linguistic practices
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involve reason-giving. Admittedly, this kind of objection might be thought 
inconclusive, as there is clearly scope for disagreement about what counts as mere
1AO
description and what counts as (philosophical) interpretation of lived experience.
In fact Brandom himself makes some allowance for the unphenomenological 
character of his foundational pragmatics. At one point he describes the notion of 
commitment on which his idea of deontic statuses and hence scorekeeping depends as 
‘an artificial, scorekeeping device’, adding that language-games also have a ‘material 
aspect’ (Brandom 1994, 183). To understand this material aspect adequately would 
require describing phenomenologically plausible language-games, the characteristics 
and structure of activities or practices in which ‘scorekeeping’ actually takes place. 
Accordingly, deontic statuses and the sense of accountability involved -  what they 
are commitments to do, what it is to be held rationally accountable, and what counts 
as meeting or failing to meet justificatory commitments -  are commitments that can 
be understood in terms of language-games. It seems to me that the very intelligiblity 
of the notion of scorekeeping rests on this possibility of being cashed out in material 
or phenomenal terms. Indeed the whole point of phenomenological (say Heidegger’s) 
antiformalism is that, rather than being thought of as basic, propositional content or 
commitments must be understood in terms of their embedding in underlying 
phenomena. For Brandom, however, propositional content and commitments remain 
fundamental -  as clearly reflected in the criterion of adequacy he identifies and his 
emphasis on the supposed ‘pragmatic priority o f the propositionaV (Brandom 1994, 
79). As a result, despite recognizing the important desideratum of relating formal 
semantics to linguistic practice, it must be doubted that Brandom’s position is really 
an ‘antiformalist’ one. Rather than considering the ‘material aspect’ of such 
phenomena, the scorekeeping model is a rational reconstruction which projects onto 
linguistic phenomena precisely the features required for these to cohere with 
semantics.309 In this sense it is not a phenomenological antidote to formalism, but 
simply a further ramification of a formalist approach. Nonetheless, even if its 
intelligibility is not thought to be threatened, the fact that ‘scorekeeping’ could be 
understood in terms of its material aspect makes it an unnecessary artifice. Why not
308 See page 9 f. above. -  Note, however, that on the Wittgensteinian view suggested here that not all 
language-games involve reason-giving is not simply how it seems, but reflects the fact that, since 
justification is finite and founded in prejustificatory practices, not all linguistic practice can be 
construed in terms o f reason-giving.
309 In this respect it seems to me that Brandom’s (1994, 83) motto ‘semantics must answer to 
pragmatics’ misrepresents his own priorities.
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think of the foundation of semantics directly in praxeological terms -  as the 
foundation of justificatory in prejustificatory language-games -  in the way sketched 
here?
Finally, to appreciate how pragmatic sense heterologously founds predicative 
awareness, it is useful to think of the prepredicative ability to exemplify appropriate
“I t  A
use of linguistic expressions as a linguistic form of knowing-how. As a 
characterization of intelligent or skilled behaviour, Ryle’s classic notion of ‘knowing- 
how’ was intended to contrast with both the mere regularity of habits and the 
propositional competence of ‘knowing-that’. Without wanting to be committed to the 
further details of Ryle’s discussion, the notion of pragmatic sense suggested here can 
be seen to exhibit two features Ryle saw as distinguishing knowing-how from 
knowing-that.311 First, whereas knowing-that is something for which reasons can be 
required, reasons are not involved in knowing-how (Ryle 1949, 28). As has been 
seen, this is paralleled both in Wittgenstein’s view (inexplicitness) that picking up the 
use of expressions does not require familiarity with explicit expressions of rules, and 
in his idea of prejustificatory language-games. Second, whereas knowing-that is 
bivalent (one either does or does not know p), knowing-how comes by degree, as 
something one does more or less well (Ryle 1949, 59). The praxeological view of 
linguistic competence presented here exhibits such graduation in two ways. To begin 
with, insofar as rules are empirical in form, there can varying degrees of conformity 
or nonconformity with normal conditions (which themselves can be more or less 
sharply delimited). In addition, some aspects of the broader conception of 
competence suggested by the language-game analogy are governed by considerations 
of appropriateness, admitting different kinds and degrees of response, rather than the 
polarity of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. These two features indicate that purposive 
awareness -  including that of language -  has a functional topology that is distinct
310 Most o f Ryle’s examples o f knowing-how are nonlinguistic activities, such that ‘doing is an overt 
muscular affair’ and there is a clear sense in which ‘Efficient practice precedes the theory o f it’ (Ryle 
1949, 32, 30). However, it is implicit in the (Heideggerian/Wittgensteinian) view developed here that 
the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that -  corresponding to that between 
prepredicative and predicative, or purposive and propositional awareness -  falls within language use.
11 For detailed discussion o f problems concerning Ryle’s apparent identification o f knowing-how with 
abilities, his regress-based arguments in favour o f the distinction, and its relevance to his argument 
against the ‘intellectualist legend’, see Stanley/Williamson 2001 and Snowdon 2003.
312 Though not impossible, it is plausible to think o f use as governed by bivalent correctness conditions 
only in the limiting case o f strictly regulated language-games such as mathematics.
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from, but the basis of propositional content, thus giving substance to the claim that 
predicative awareness has a heterologous foundation in pragmatic sense.
5. Completing the Heideggerian framework
The importance of this Wittgensteinian explication of pragmatic sense can be made 
clearer by considering how it relates to the Heideggerian framework and the notion of 
presentational sense set out in the previous chapters. To begin with, the view of 
pragmatic sense presented here makes light work of the deficiencies highlighted with 
Merleau-Ponty’s position. As then hinted, explicating the way linguistic regularities 
are linked with practice not only gives a convincing picture of the background of 
established ‘direct’ language use, but clearly brings out the kind of pragmatic, 
practical or vital constraints that necessarily check the unfolding of the expressive 
potential of language. That is, it identifies a counterbalance to expressive openness 
which yields (in Ricoeur’s terms) a polysemy that is regulated. Furthermore, 
Wittgenstein’s critique of the ideal of determinacy and his subsequently reconfigured 
notion of rules make clear how direct sense can be understood without eccentric 
metaphysical assumptions about nonperspectival presentations of intentional objects 
which Merleau-Ponty apparently thought ‘direct’ sense implies.
The attempt to conceive of language without recourse to an ideal of full, 
nontemporal determinacy is an important convergence between Wittgenstein’s and 
Merleau-Ponty’s views. As seen in the previous chapter, Merleau-Ponty’s focus on 
finite embodied agency led him to reject any such ideal of final determinacy and to 
see all meaning, including linguistic meaning, as characterized by constitutively open 
horizons formed in ongoing processes. Wittgenstein arrived at a corresponding 
conclusion, becoming convinced that the commitment to full determinacy implicit in 
his earlier calculus model of language leads to incoherence. But while Merleau- 
Ponty’s response was to emphasize the creative openness of language, Wittgenstein’s, 
as this chapter has attempted to show, was to provide an alternative view -  the 
pragmatization of determinacy -  of what it is for concepts to be determinate. 
Common to both, nonetheless, is the attempt to conceive of language without a 
teleological notion of determinacy, i.e. supposed exactness or objective properties 
towards which intentionality should tend.
As one might expect, given the way I have presented them within the 
Heideggerian framework, there is not just convergence, but also complementarity
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between Wittgenstein’s praxeological conception of language and Merleau-Ponty’s 
view of indirect linguistic expression. To begin with, they each concentrate on a 
different aspect of linguistic signs’ functioning. From one point of view, as just 
mentioned, Wittgenstein’s focus on the pragmatic aspect of language is an important 
counterbalance to the account of creative and expressive aspects of language use on 
which Merleau-Ponty’s view concentrates. But at the same time Wittgenstein’s 
somewhat dismissive approach to the misleading ‘images’ bound up in linguistic 
forms is not altogether satisfactory.313 For this seems to accept that linguistic form 
does have some representational -  or, as I would prefer to say, presentational -  
significance, while treating the proper basis of linguistic meaning as praxeological. 
But if linguistic forms can be misleading, they can presumably also assume a positive 
role in mediating understanding, leading to the question of how misleading and 
illuminating uses of linguistic form are distinguished from one another. In this respect 
the notion of presentational sense developed above, on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
views, can be seen as complementing Wittgenstein’s foundational pragmatism by 
setting out how fine (sublexical) differences can be interpreted as meaningful.314
Another aspect of complementarity concerns the level of linguistic articulation 
on which Merleau-Ponty’s and Wittgenstein’s respective conceptions of language 
concentrate. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s notion of indirect sense is based on the 
differential operation of sublexical elements, the language-game approach operates at 
the level of words. In Saussurean terms, Wittgenstein thus deals with the level of 
constituted signs, of distinct rather than differential features. An important 
consequence of this complementary focus is that it allows one to see how the notion 
of reference can be accommodated within the Heideggerian framework. For a notable 
feature of the language-game conception is that it provides an ‘account o f reference 
that effectively undermines the idea of reference as a basic semantic notion. First, as 
seen in section 1 above, Wittgenstein’s critique of pure referential relations, of simple 
referring or simple referents, leads to the idea of articulate reference, according to 
which what it is to be a referent is a function of the way an entity is referred to in the
313 Cf. PU  §§94, 104, 110-114.
314 Some o f Wittgenstein’s later reflections point in this direction. For example, choosing between 
terms, he says, is like choosing ‘between similar, but not identical pictures’, as if ‘according to fme 
differences in their smell’; words can have a ‘familiar face’, exhibit ‘fine aesthetic difference[s]’, 
leading to the ‘feeling that it has absorbed its meaning’ {PU  §139[a]; P U  II 560 f.). But these 
comments remain characteristically elliptic and metaphorical, and Wittgenstein makes no attempt to 
develop a positive account o f the role o f linguistic form.
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language-game context. Furthermore, what it is to be a referent must be understood as 
corresponding to the kind of rules found in language-games, and hence -  without 
ideal determinacy -  as subject to the pragmatization of determinacy discussed in 
section 2. Hence the upshot of Wittgenstein’s approach is that how and how sharply 
something is picked out as ‘a referent’ is governed by the language-game in 
question.315
In emphasizing the foundational role of practice and in its nonreductive 
approach to semantic questions Wittgenstein’s approach is also clearly similar in 
spirit to Heidegger’s. Both conceive of language in a purposive perspective, such that 
Wittgensteinian language-games comprise the context of Heidegger’s Equipmental 
relations, insofar as the latter involve the use of linguistic signs. Similarly, both treat 
the purposive optic as the context of the articulation or formation of linguistic sense, 
with the intrinsic link Wittgenstein identifies between the use of signs and forms of 
practice corresponding to Heidegger’s view that the significance of words results 
from circumspective Setting-out. Given these similarities, what Wittgenstein’s 
praxeological conception of language adds to the Heideggerian framework are richer, 
phenomenologically sensitive means for envisaging and describing contexts of 
purposive awareness through their varying degrees of organization. That is, whereas 
Heidegger’s talk of what Equipment ‘is for’ (its ‘Wozu’) or Dasein-relative aims (the 
‘Worum-willen’) treats purposive notions as descriptively basic, Wittgenstein’s 
notion of practice-inherent rules provides a means for structurally characterizing 
purposive understanding. Such rules can be seen as both the structure of practices, i.e. 
of purposive contexts, themselves and the role words play in language-games. In the 
latter respect, the notion of rules also provides the means to understand the specific 
level of instrumentality built into Heidegger’s conception of linguistic signs. For, 
despite the multitude of such roles, what a sign does in a particular language-game, 
and hence what it is for signs to be instruments in the sense of having specific 
functions, can generally be thought of in terms of praxeological rules.
Finally, Wittgenstein’s views also complement those of Heidegger by 
elucidating the idea the latter describes as a ‘modification’ of the ‘hermeneutic as’ 
into the ‘apophantic as’, the move from Handiness to Thingness. While Heidegger
315 One might think this an unacceptably antirealist claim, and believe the extension, say, o f ‘natural 
kind’ terms such as ‘gold’ to be determined in a language-game transcendent manner. But the 
stipulation that reference is to be determined by physical properties, characteristic o f scientific 
practices, is itself a language-game-relative determination.
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provides some idea of what kind of move this ‘modification’ involves -  i.e. from 
purposive to objective, properties-based individuation of entities -  the processes or 
phenomena in which this transition is effected remain obscure. Wittgenstein’s views 
suggest, at least in outline, how this ‘as-modification’ can be cashed out in 
phenomenal terms. At a general methodological level he would insist on the need for 
external criteria, and on explicating the difference between prepredicative and 
predicative abilities in terms of corresponding types of language-game. More 
specifically, this difference, and with it Heidegger’s as-modification, can be 
understood in terms of the distinction between prejustificatory and justificatory 
language-games discussed above. Thus on the one hand (hermeneutic-as) are simple, 
ungrounded language-games in which doing things linguistically requires only rule- 
exemplification. On the other hand (apophantic-as) are more complex, founded 
language-games in which doing things linguistically involves rule-stating, 
justification, explanation etc.
At this point it is possible to review the overall view of language that results from 
using the positions of Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein to fill out the Heideggerian 
framework. In general terms, it was suggested, a phenomenological conception of 
language should conceive of language not as having an inside-outside topology, but 
as embedded in or distributed over other aspects of the world, as well as adopting an 
antireductionist and antiformalist attitude towards linguistic phenomena, and treating 
language as a process rather than some static structure. These general features were 
summed up in the claim that language should be understood as language-in-the- 
world. Within this framework the intervening chapters have shown how Wittgenstein 
and Merleau-Ponty furnish a more complete picture of what language is embedded in. 
Whereas the embedding in human practices alluded to in Heidegger’s talk of 
Equipment can be understood more fully using Wittgenstein’s language-game 
analogy, Merleau-Ponty draws attention to two further aspects of the embedding of 
language: first the fact that language use is, as ‘lived sense’, a phenomenon of 
embodied agency, second that language is shaped by the ‘expressive system’ of 
lexical and sublexical differentiation. The resultant overall picture thus sees 
languages as embedded in human practice, in embodiment, and in their own semiotic 
horizon.
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A consequence of this, reflected in Heidegger’s antireductionism and 
antiformalism, is that language should not be conceived of one-sidedly in terms of 
‘representational content’. To be sure, one of the inputs determining the sense bound 
up in language is the way the world is. And since human practices do not take place 
in a vacuum, the ability to act plausibly entails correctly understanding some 
fragment or aspects of the world: Even where successful action does not require the 
ability to formulate that understanding linguistically, it may nonetheless involve 
commitments that can generally be interpreted as embodying ‘implicit’ knowledge of 
various facts. Nonetheless, the role of practical requirements, or the perspective of 
purpose, in shaping linguistic articulation renders unclear the extent to which 
practices can be thought to embody accurate representation of the surrounding world. 
After all, many practices are sustained either without needing to get the world
relevantly right, or without our understanding correctly what it is their practical
1 (\ • • perspective is getting right. In the traditional language of representation, the ‘ideas’
they embody are ‘confused’ rather than ‘clear and distinct’. So although it would be
philosophically convenient to think of linguistic articulation as straightforwardly
encoding features of the world, the idea is phenomenologically unconvincing. A
phenomenological approach must instead view the ‘impurities’ due to its embedding
in the world not as inessential accretions, but as features essential to an understanding
of what language is and does. Accordingly both the process and the product of
linguistic articulation should be seen as the result of a complex structuration
involving both practice and the sedimented semiotic horizon, as well as other
(‘represented’) aspects of the environing world.
This blending of different structural inputs in linguistic articulation is reflected 
at the more specific level of the Heideggerian framework in the dual instrumentality 
of linguistic signs. To recall, Heidegger describes the disclosive function of linguistic 
signs both generically, as enabling agents to noninferentially grasp features of the 
world; and more particularly, as the means for performing certain tasks just as other 
tools. This chapter and the last have shown, based on the views of Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein respectively, how these two aspects of instrumentality can be 
understood using the notions of presentational and pragmatic sense. The
316 Examples o f the former might include cultic, religious, superstitious practices, and fashion. 
Scientific practices would exemplify the latter kind: Even if we think his views are strictly speaking 
false, Newton was getting something significantly right about gravitation.
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presentational sense of expressions, it was suggested, is due to the sublexical-lexical 
structure of an iteratively evolved sign system. As a result of this structure, words are 
characterized by the inchoate rationality and situated interpretability that allow them 
to function -  in the generic instrumental sense -  as a means for making distinctions 
and thus pointing out features of the world. The pragmatic sense of expressions can 
be understood in terms of the structure of language-using practices. For rules or 
regularities exhibited in word usage simultaneously characterize the structure of such 
practices and provide a general means for describing the various tasks played by 
word-instruments. Both these kinds of sense, as previously anticipated, suggest that 
linguistic signs function as instruments in an intrinsic rather than the extrinsic 
Lockean sense. That is, language functions in both cases as an instrument 
essentially involved in meaning constitution: on Merleau-Ponty’s view words are the 
very materials of which thoughts are constructed, whereas for Wittgenstein their use 
in certain ways is constitutive of the corresponding language-games.
The idea of dual instrumentality implies that linguistic signs should be thought 
of as uniting presentational and pragmatic sense. Despite this unity, their distinction 
is motivated in two ways by the requirements of phenomenological accuracy. First, 
each corresponds to a basic phenomenological feature: the idea of pragmatic sense 
does justice to the way linguistic meaning is shaped by human practices (language- 
games); that of presentational sense reflects the fact that sublexical structure is 
integral to the way linguistic signs function. They thus correspond individually to the 
obvious facts that the entities of which languages consist are words and that words 
are used to get things done, and collectively to the fact that words are literally 
involved in the constitution of linguistic meaning. Second, each comes into play in 
different types of situation. In many practical contexts, the kind of expressive 
potential a word might have in virtue of its form will be irrelevant to its functioning. 
Conversely, the way a word’s lexical form encodes associations and ‘imagery’, rather 
than adhering to established use, might be decisive factors in expressive contexts 
where finding the ‘right word’ is important. In the former case one relies on standard 
patterns of use (pragmatic sense), in the latter on how the word presents objects 
(presentational sense).
317 Cf. page 76 above.
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These comments suggest, as hinted above, that the relationship between 
pragmatic and presentational sense should be thought of as one of symbiotic 
complementarity. In connecting the two, a word can be thought of bringing both a 
presentational perspective and a background of use to each situation it is used in. In 
much the same way as the two aspects of a duck-rabbit figure, each comes to the fore 
in different situations in the light of different needs.318 It is by combining these two 
distinct aspects of sense articulation that the dual-instrumentality model of linguistic 
signs provides a basis for explaining the range of phenomena mentioned at the start of 
my Introduction. On the one hand, the notion of pragmatic sense provides a means for 
describing the range of abilities in terms of which practical linguistic competence can 
be gauged, those abilities one must generally possess so as to integrate 
inconspicuously into a ‘language community’ and count as ‘mastering’ a natural 
language. On the other hand, the notion of presentational sense identifies the 
cumulative process and the differential factors that make linguistic expressions 
(re)interpretable for use in both existing and novel ways, and on which one relies in 
careful use or in developing new expressions.
One of the principal theses underlying Heidegger’s position is that all 
disclosure of the world is embedded or founded in prepredicative Equipmental or 
purposive awareness. Furthermore, I suggested, his position allows that some 
language use or some aspects of language are prepredicative in character. The 
intervening chapters have attempted to give this idea plausibility by showing how 
presentational and pragmatic sense are not only themselves phenomenologically 
plausible, but also each capable of being grasped prepredicatively (as well as 
founding predicative abilities). In the case of presentational sense this involves 
grasping the differential force of a word as a means of expression in the context of a 
sign system, in that of pragmatic sense how it maps a pattern of similarities in the 
context of a language-game. Neither of these abilities, it has been argued, entail 
awareness of the expression’s inferential import. The fact that these abilities can exist 
in unison -  as might be expected from the dual-instrumentality idea -  gives rise to the 
idea of a basic linguistic sensitivity in which both are grasped prepredicatively.319
318 A partial analogy to this kind o f dual-functioning is found with many designer or fashionable goods 
-  e.g. clothes, furniture, cars -  which serve both to fulfil some practical need and to present their owner 
in a certain way.
319 Despite obvious proximity, my suggestion here differs in at least two important ways from 
Derrida’s idea o f ‘diff6rance’ as the temporalizing/spatializing (nonconceptual) ‘movement o f play
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Such sensitivity to differences and patterns of similarity would suffice for 
participation in the kind of prejustificatory language-games on which Wittgenstein’s 
view of language is based. And in this way, I suggest, prepredicative language use 
can be understood both as itself sufficing to characterize competence in many 
language-games and as a foundational stratum of language-games on which 
predicative abilities are praxeologically based, constituting -  in Seel’s (2002, 50) apt 
term -  a ‘domain-opening understanding of things’.
[mouvement de jeu ] that “produces’” the differences ‘in the system o f  language [langue]' (Derrida 
1972, 8, 12). Whereas Derrida emphasizes the intractability o f this ‘movement’ and treats it (in all but 
rhetoric) as an ultimate metaphysical principle (archi-ecriture), I am here highlighting that something 
can be said about the underlying structuration o f propositional/conceptual content. Further, whereas 
Derrida (1967, 89) dismisses the ‘concept o f experience’ as ‘highly embarrassing’ due to its supposed 
inseparability from the idea o f full presence he discerns in Husserl, experience seems to me the 
requisite point o f reference for conceiving language. This need is also highlighted by Merleau-Ponty (S 
149), whose emphasis on perception as a paradigm aims to reconceive experience as partial presence.
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C h a pt e r  IV
So m e  Im p l ic a t io n s  o f  a  
P h e n o m e n o l o g ic a l  A p p r o a c h
The preceding chapters have focused primarily on developing a framework found in 
Heidegger’s SZ into a more detailed ‘phenomenological’ conception of language. 
This final chapter will focus on two issues in order to locate that conception in a 
broader philosophical and discursive context and so to provide some indication of 
how it contributes to philosophical understanding of language. The first three sections 
concentrate on the specific aspect of the Heideggerian framework I have developed, 
ascertaining the relevance of this view of linguistic articulation, and in particular its 
emphasis on prepredicative factors, in relation to more mainstream views in 
philosophy of language. The final two sections turn to a more general issue in 
considering whether or not the phenomenological conception of language developed 
here should be thought of as having realist or nonrealist implications.
1. Two approaches to language
In chapter I it was suggested that a distinctive feature of the Heideggerian framework 
is the view that predicative awareness is founded in prepredicative awareness of 
entities. Having there considered what claims this idea of prepredicative foundation 
involves, two kinds of feature have since been discussed about which such claims -  
viz. that they are subpropositional, subinferential and heterologous -  might be made. 
The starting point was the interpretation of Heidegger’s conception of signs as being 
shaped by two kinds of articulatory factor, respectively labelled ‘presentational’ and 
‘pragmatic’ sense, corresponding to the form of linguistic signs and the form of 
practices. The subsequent chapters have drawn on Merleau-Ponty’s and 
Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language to explicate these two notions of sense, 
attempting to show that the results are both phenomenologically plausible and 
identify structural features which can be grasped prepredicatively.
What makes the idea of prepredicative founding particularly interesting, it was 
originally suggested, is that it gives specific focus to the differences between the
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phenomenological conception of language developed here and more common 
philosophical approaches to language. For given Heidegger’s view of the content of 
Statements as predicative content and as a ‘derivative’ mode of Setting-out, this 
foundational claim challenges the primacy of propositional meaning usually assumed 
in post-Fregean philosophy of language. The purpose of this section and the next two 
is to return to this foundational claim and consider in more detail both how it should 
be interpreted and how the phenomenological approach suggested here, along with 
the prepredicative factors it identifies, contributes more generally to an understanding 
of the articulatory feats of language. The remainder of this first section considers how 
the phenomenological approach contrasts with what I previously referred to as the 
semantics approach and several ways of construing Heidegger’s foundational claim. 
The second section investigates further this foundational claim by showing how the 
need for phenomenological founding arises and can be accommodated within the 
semantics approach. This will leave open the possibility that the founding relationship 
is too weak to be of particular interest, so that semantics might claim to provide a 
philosophically adequate conception of language. The third section thus aims to show 
how differences in the functioning of prepredicative factors and semantic properties 
rule this out in favour of a somewhat stronger claim on behalf of the 
phenomenological conception developed here.
As just mentioned, the phenomenological conception of language developed 
here contrasts with what might reasonably be considered the standard approach in 
contemporary philosophy of language. In the following I will take this approach, the 
semantics approach -  or simply semantics, to be characterized by four minimal 
commitments that might be described as the ‘common sense’ of post-Fregean 
philosophy of language. The first of these is its working vocabulary: language is 
conceived of in terms of ‘propositions’ and ‘concepts’, which are ‘expressed’ in 
sentences and words; the workings of language are discussed in terms of ‘reference’ 
and (perhaps) ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’, and distinguished as ‘semantic’ rather than 
‘causal’ in character. The relationship between propositions and concepts is 
characterized, second, by assuming the notion of propositional content -  rather than,
320 In describing this set o f commitments as ‘common sense’ the suggestion is not that anyone defends 
them in this form, but rather that they would generally be considered too obvious and too indistinct to 
require explicit formulation or defence. -  As Dummett (1991, 2 f.) says, ‘analytical philosophy is 
written by people’ who ‘take for granted the principles o f semantic analysis embodied in [the language 
of mathematic logic]’ -  ‘however little many o f them may know o f the technical results or even 
concepts o f modem logical theory’.
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say, word meaning -  to be explanatorily primary; and, third, by thinking of concepts 
(along with singular terms) as the building blocks of which propositions are 
composed. Fourth, the semantic properties of propositions and concepts are assumed 
to be linked in a systematic way, with the functioning of concepts being understood in 
terms of the contribution made to (the explanatorily primary) propositional content. 
In Frege’s view this systematic link is represented by means of a predicate calculus, 
based on the idea that concepts are analogous to mathematical functions which take 
various objects (or other functions) as their ‘arguments’ to make up propositions and 
thus yield a ‘value’ -  according to Frege (1994a), a truth value. Although details of its 
use may vary, it will be assumed in the following that the semantics approach is 
characterized by the assumption that the kind of systematic link holding between 
concepts and propositions can be modelled using some version of a predicate 
calculus.
The semantics approach has obvious and powerful attractions. Above all, by
construing language in an algorithmic manner it seems to hold out the prospect of a
systematic theory of language that will exhibit its pervasively rational internal
workings. With this intimation of systematicity and its close link with formal logic
the semantics approach might seem to fulfil modem philosophy’s craving for a
1mathesis universalis. At the same time, the semantics approach is clearly theory- 
driven: its central notions -  and the systematicity they augur -  are guided not by the 
goal of accurately describing the way language appears to be, but by the availability 
of a certain model and the prospect of revealing an initially nonmanifest (‘deep’) 
structure. In this respect it not only paints a somewhat different picture of language 
from that developed in the preceding chapters, but is precisely the kind of 
‘reconstructive’ approach traditionally opposed (often quite rhetorically) by 
‘phenomenological’ positions. This accentuates the question as to the relationship 
between the semantics approach and the phenomenological approach developed here. 
Although the two are prima facie at odds, this does entail genuine dissent, since not 
only do different ‘approaches’ not necessarily lead to different conceptions, but 
apparently ‘different’ conceptions may not be in genuine conflict. On the one hand, 
that an approach is theory-driven, or ‘reconstructive’, is not in itself an objection, and 
may be fully compatible with phenomenological facts. On the other hand, the
321 That is, in Descartes’ (1996, 378) words, ‘a general science explicating everything that can be 
investigated concerning order and measure without being attributed to any particular material’.
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predominance of the semantic approach’s conceptual idiom cannot count against the 
relevance of phenomenological facts to a philosophically satisfactory conception of 
language. The situation is rather that if a systematic semantic theory is to be possible, 
a condition of its adequacy will be that it should ultimately cohere with a 
phenomenological conception of language. In this light, examining this relationship 
in some detail will be a means of probing the philosophical relevance of both the 
phenomenological approach developed here and the semantic approach with which it 
-  in some sense -  contrasts.
How then do the conceptions of language yielded by the respective 
approaches in fact differ? Both approaches are clearly in some way concerned with
•  • 322the question of what meaning is or what it is for language to be meaningful. 
However, in discussing their responses to this question, and the relationship between 
the two approaches, some terminological distinctions will be convenient. The 
phenomenological approach, I shall say, is concerned with -  presentational and 
pragmatic -  sense; structurally relevant influences on or features of sense will termed 
factors; with the ‘sense’ due to such factors being something that can be grasped 
either prepredicatively or predicatively. Conversely, the semantics approach deals 
with -  propositional and conceptual -  content; features bearing on content will be 
referred to as (semantic) properties. Hence, in a concise formula, the two approaches 
can be said to differ in offering different views of the subpropositional, i.e. of what 
propositional content consists in.
As a first step towards better understanding what underlies these 
terminological differences, two ways in which these approaches differ substantively 
should be distinguished. The first is with regard to the ontological priorities they 
suggest, i.e. which items they posit as central to a philosophical conception of 
language. The phenomenological view developed here has focused on words and acts 
of speech (utterances) as the basic features in terms of which linguistic phenomena
322 Sean Kelly (2001, 4) suggests these questions are distinct, with analytic philosophy o f language 
focusing on what sentences mean ( ‘meaning’) whereas phenomenology considers what it is for a 
sentence to mean what it does (‘meaningfiilness’). The problem with this, otherwise appealing, 
reconciliation is the tacit assumption that these questions can be answered independently. Indeed, it 
seems to presuppose the semantic notion o f content to be satisfactory, whereas the point o f the 
phenomenological approach’s foundational claims is that the notion of propositional/conceptual 
content cannot be made sense of independently (unphenomenologically), so that the phenomenological 
approach is involved in answering ‘what sentences mean’. The thought that the two approaches differ 
in the questions they address therefore cannot form the starting point in considering their relationship 
as I am doing here.
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are to be conceived. In this perspective propositions are derivative entities, or an 
abstraction based on commonalities between sentences, with concepts, as the 
constituents of propositions, a further abstraction. By contrast, the semantic approach 
treats propositions and concepts as fundamental posits, in relation to which sentences 
and words stand in a derivative relation of ‘expression’ (e.g. ‘Snow is white’ and 
‘Schnee ist weiB’ express the same proposition). On this approach there is at least an 
intimation that propositions in some way exist independently of their instantiation or 
expression in sentences. For the assumption is that the way propositions and concepts 
function can be understood or modelled independently of the role of actual words and 
sentences. Thus it seems that, whether or not they do, propositions and concepts 
might exist in some way antecedent to their expression in linguistic acts.
The two approaches further differ in how they see language functioning. On 
the phenomenological approach this is understood with regard to the public 
phenomenology of language use, with the suggestion here being that linguistic signs 
are instruments in a dual sense -  for presenting objects and for specific tasks -  whose 
articulatory feats can be thought of in terms of the structure of the sign-system and 
practices. On the semantics approach the functioning of language is likened to that of 
mathematical functions, the picture being, roughly, one of set-theoretical mappings of 
entities and a hierarchical network of functions onto truth values. The two approaches 
thus provide different general views of the articulatory processes at work in language, 
and so of what Taylor (1985, 256) describes as the ‘speaking activity’ or ‘what is 
going on in language’.
Observing these contrasts succeeds more in raising than solving the question 
of how the phenomenological and semantics approaches are related. However, this 
question is given greater focus by Heidegger’s claim that propositional content is 
founded in prepredicative awareness, which suggests that the idea of ‘founding’ 
should apply to the relationship between the phenomenological and semantics 
approaches. Such a foundational claim can be construed in several ways. Most 
straightforwardly, corresponding to the differences just mentioned, it may be 
construed as either ontological or functional founding: i.e. as viewing propositions 
and concepts either as existing only via sentences and words, or as something whose 
operational logic presupposes prepredicative abilities.
The first thing to be said of the ontological claim is that it is obviously, 
perhaps even trivially, true. For it is clear that the actual presence of language must be
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conceived of in terms of linguistic acts, the sentences uttered in these, and the words 
of which they are composed. So if the obscurities of platonism are to be avoided, the 
ontological priorities at work in language are straightforwardly elicited: If they are to 
be considered part of the ontological picture, propositions must be thought of in terms 
of classes of (synonymous) declarative sentences, and concepts linked with the 
existence of words as their bearers. Moreover, since sentences -  utterances -  are 
transient events, words (and sublexical elements) have a certain claim to primacy as 
more enduring items in a linguistic ontology. These considerations serve as a 
reminder -  paralleling the ontological realizability condition that Heidegger had 
relied on against Husserl -  that the way language is thought to function must be able 
to be instantiated by the entities assumed in a conception of language. In this way 
they provide some justification for thinking both that propositions ought not to form 
the centrepiece of a philosophical conception of language, and that any satisfactory 
conception should reflect how the actual functioning of words is involved in 
linguistic meaning. Even so, it is not clear that the ontological foundation claim 
suffices to establish any tension between the phenomenological and semantics 
approaches. To begin with, as long as word-sentence relationships are thought to 
function in the same way as those between concepts and propositions, such 
foundation can readily be acknowledged by the semantics approach. Nor does it mean 
there is no point in talking of propositions. For it may still be necessary to 
characterize the function of words -  so to speak, teleologically -  in relation to their 
role in propositions, and it is not clear that this requires propositions’ being thought of 
as reified in a platonic manner.
The more interesting and more involved claim is that of functional founding. 
A preliminary difficulty is how to construe such a claim in contemporary terms, given 
that Heidegger’s views are formulated using the traditional idiom of subject-predicate 
logic. Two considerations suggest, however, that this is fairly straightforward. First, 
Heidegger’s antiformalism is presented generically and does not hinge on the details 
of the ‘formalist’ approach he opposes. Second, while providing a framework for a 
contemporary formalism, Frege himself (1994c, 67, 72n) describes functional 
concepts as ‘predicative’ in the general sense of not yielding a value without an 
argument (being ‘unsaturated’), and makes no provision for anything that might be
323 This fact is nicely brought out by Ricoeur (1969a, 93) in highlighting the role of words as ‘as an 
exchanger between the system and the act, between the structure and the event’.
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described as ‘prepredicative’ contributions to or formation of propositional content. 
With these two points in mind it seems natural, in a post-Fregean context, to construe 
Heidegger’s claim simply as being that the notions deployed in the semantic approach 
are functionally founded in those identified by the phenomenological approach.
A further complication concerns the ambitiousness of the functional 
foundation claim. A strong foundational claim would be that semantic properties are 
effectively epiphenomenal, and can be explained (reductively) in terms of 
prepredicative factors. A weak foundational claim would acknowledge that 
prepredicative factors underlie semantic properties, but deny that this in any way 
compromises the explanatory adequacy of the semantics approach. A further 
possibility is a moderate foundational claim that semantic properties presuppose 
prepredicative abilities, while allowing that the two levels function in mutually 
irreducible ways, so that an account of both is required for a satisfactory 
philosophical understanding of linguistic articulation. To assess which claim best 
represents the relationship between the semantic approach’s predicative functioning 
and the prepredicative processes identified by the phenomenological approach here 
two questions are decisive: In what way, if any, does the semantics approach require 
the phenomenological approach and prepredicative abilities? Can prepredicative 
abilities be understood in semantic terms or vice versa? These two questions will 
form the focus of the next two sections.
2. The semantic need for foundation
To show how a need for the phenomenological approach arises from the perspective 
of semantics I want to consider Donald Davidson’s views on language. One reason 
for focusing on Davidson is that, in addition to being highly influential, he typifies 
the semantics approach in seeing predicate calculus as the core of a philosophical 
theory of language. However, rather than concentrating on technical issues involved 
in its development -  such as how best to deal with logically ‘recalcitrant’ terms, or 
even whether truth-conditions provide the best basis for a semantic theory -  I want 
here to take Davidson’s proposal as a programmatic one, as he himself often did (e.g. 
Davidson 2001, 57, 132 f.). In this respect a distinctive feature of Davidson’s work is 
to formulate a proposal as to how semantic theory might be deployed empirically in 
the study of language. After briefly outlining this proposal, I will focus on two issues 
that bring out the need for a phenomenological approach.
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In general terms Davidson’s programme is characterized by its appropriation 
of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth to natural language as ‘the sophisticated and 
powerful foundation of a competent theory of meaning’ (Davidson 2001, 25). This 
programme combines two basic thoughts. The first is that a theory which states the 
truth conditions for any sentence of a language would, at least to a good 
approximation, comprise a theory of meaning for that language. The second is that 
Tarski’s conception of truth for formalized languages can be adapted to meet this 
truth-conditional requirement with regard to natural languages. Tarski (1944) himself 
saw sentences of the form ‘S is true if and only if p’ -  so-called ‘T-sentences’ -  as 
having a role in defining the truth predicate for a formal language. By linking a 
sequence of signs, named or structurally described by S, with its truth conditions, 
stated by p -  as in “‘Snow is white” if and only if snow is white.’ -  such a sentence 
provides a partial definition of truth. The definition of a truth predicate would be 
‘materially adequate’ if it entails a sentence of this form for all (declarative) sentences 
of the language under consideration (Tarski 1944, 341). One further complication is 
that, to avoid inconsistencies due to self-reference, Tarski distinguishes the 
‘metalanguage’ in which T-sentences are formulated from the ‘object language’ to 
which the definition of truth applies. So in a T-sentence p states in the metalanguage 
the truth conditions of the object-language sentence S. Although sensitive to the 
potential difficulties in transferring these ideas to natural language, Davidson 
proposes to exploit Tarski’s method of exhibiting material adequacy while reversing 
the order of explanation: Tarski had assumed that semantic properties of an object 
language could be stated in a metalanguage, and that this allowed truth to be defined. 
Davidson instead assumes that truth is basic -  i.e. that a truth predicate exists and is 
implicitly grasped by speakers -  and that the task is to construct a theory capable of 
stating the semantic properties of an object language, i.e. a theory which produces T- 
sentences as its output. For Davidson T-sentences thus function as criteria of 
adequacy on this type of theory, rather than on a definition of truth as they had for 
Tarski. As Davidson (2001, 60) puts it, he is recommending ‘not a particular theory, 
but a criterion of theories’ intended to give ‘the empirical study of language [...] 
clarity and significance’.
The aspiration to an empirical theory of meaning leads one to expect a view of 
how semantic theory should be calibrated to linguistic phenomena. Davidson’s basic 
suggestion -  that which ‘gives clarity’ to empirical study of language -  is that
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theories can be tested by evidence that T-sentences are true (Davidson 2001, 134). T- 
sentences are thus to serve as criteria on truth theories in the dual sense of both 
specifying the kind of output required and rendering them empirically testable. At one 
point Davidson suggests this would make testing truth theories straightforward: ‘all 
that is needed is the ability to recognize when the required biconditionals are true. 
[...] in principle it is no harder to test the adequacy of a theory of truth than it is for a 
competent speaker of English to decide whether sentences like “‘Snow is white’ is 
true if and only if snow is white” are true’ (Davidson 2001, 62 f.). One procedural 
complication which Davidson does acknowledge is that the sentences a speaker holds 
to be true depend on both the meaning of terms in his language and his beliefs. Given 
this ‘interdependence of meaning and belief, he suggests that in developing a theory 
of truth one could begin by assuming an attitude of ‘holding true’ of sentences on the 
speaker’s part (Davidson 2001, 134 f.). This is intended not to exclude speakers 
taking different attitudes to propositional content, but as a procedural heuristic 
allowing one to work on the assumption that a successful theory would maximize 
agreement between what speakers and interpreters consider to be true about the 
world.324 Against this background Davidson suggests that the procedure in 
developing an empirical theory of truth would be to build up a body of evidence for
325  •the T-sentences that particular speakers hold true at a particular time. The evidence 
gathered by such piecemeal verification of T-sentences could, he continues, be used 
to construct a theory of interpretation for an unknown language in three stages: the 
first ‘identifies predicates, singular terms, quantifiers, connectives, and identity’, the 
second deals with indexicals, the third with sentences on which there is not ‘universal 
agreement’. Davidson (2001, 137) intends this method ‘to solve the problem of the 
interdependence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible 
while solving for meaning’.
Davidson also presents his programme as answering the question ‘What is it 
for words to mean what they do?’, emphasizing that ‘a satisfactory theory of meaning
324 Davidson (2001, 135) claims that holding true ‘is an attitude an interpreter may plausibly be taken 
to be able to identify before he can interpret, since he may know that a person intends to express a truth 
without having any idea what truth’. It seems to me that this ‘plausibility’ is highly questionable. How 
is one to know, prior to interpretation, what attitude a speaker has to a sentence? The general 
assumption o f such an attitude seems to be motivated rather by the fact that it is most congenial to a 
truth-conditional approach.
325 Davidson 2001, 135 f. -  Though there is something o f an apriori tension in gathering empirical data 
for a theory that deals with the contextual variability o f indexicals by being relativized to speakers and 
times (cf. Davidson 2001, 131, 34).
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must give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of 
words’ (Davidson 2001, xv, 17). His focus on the role of words is motivated by the 
requirement to account for the basic fact that languages are leamable: given the 
plausible thought that speakers are able to understand and produce a potentially 
infinite number of sentences, leamability requires ‘the meaning of each sentence’ to 
be ‘a function of a finite number of features of the sentence’ (Davidson 2001, 8). A 
second requirement can be brought out by noting that conceiving a general algorithm 
to produce T-sentences for any declarative sentence is trivial: all that is needed is a 
disquotation function, yielding the right-hand side of a T-sentence by either simply 
removing the quotes around the entire string, or picking out syntactic elements on the 
left and reconstructing them on the right as p. But this clearly makes life too simple. 
For what T-sentences are supposed to do, as outlined above, is correlate descriptions 
of sentences with their truth conditions, i.e. bits of syntax with bits of semantics. 
Accordingly, for Davidson (2001, 130) a ‘satisfactory theory for interpreting the 
utterances of a language’ is subject to the further constraint of revealing ‘significant 
semantic structure’. The means for meeting this dual requirement -  leamability and 
revealing semantic structure -  is a predicate calculus of the Fregean kind, and it is in 
terms of this that Davidson ultimately characterizes the role of words. As he puts it, 
his ‘working assumption’ is that ‘nothing more than standard first-order 
quantification theory is available’, with the aim being a ‘recursive theory of truth’ 
that allows all true expressions to be analysed in terms of a finite number of elements 
and rules for their combination (Davidson 2001, xvii, 57). In Tractarian spirit such a 
recursive theory would ultimately be based on ‘semantical primitives’, the ‘semantic 
properties’ of which are to be ‘givejn] outright’ (Davidson 2001, 9, 70).
How convincing are these two features of Davidson’s programme? First of all, 
to what extent does Davidson’s empiricism clarify the relationship between semantic 
theory and linguistic phenomena? I suggest, not very far. The problem with what 
Davidson (2001, 137) himself terms a ‘free-style appeal to the notion of evidential 
support’ is not its vagueness, but that no empirical method is really identified. This 
can be illustrated by considering the difficulties that would remain for a linguist, say, 
in putting Davidson’s ideas to work. The verification of T-sentences, for example, is 
not as straightforward as it might seem. It is unlikely that most ‘competent speakers’
326 This requirement is clearly brought out by translation cases -  ‘“Schnee ist weifi” iff snow is white’ 
-  where the metalanguage is not contained in the object language.
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of English would see the sentence “‘Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is 
white’ as having any meaning, let alone being true. If speakers do (having been 
introduced to the use-mention distinction) assent to the truth of T-sentences, how is 
one to know that this involves anything more than the ability to recognize a case of
327disquotation, i.e. that they are assenting in the right, semantically revealing, way?
Or again, what is it to ‘hold belief constant’ while ‘solving for meaning’? For this 
imposing mathematical metaphor to make sense, it would have to be cashed out in 
procedural terms. What Davidson means, presumably, is to assume simply that 
speakers believe what their words express, so that we can interpret the meaning of the 
terms they use. But what would the (procedural) difference be in ‘holding constant’ 
meaning while ‘solving for’ beliefs? Presumably there is none, the metaphor has not 
been cashed out.328 What these examples illustrate is that Davidson’s proposal for an 
empirical theory of truth for a language never extends to what one might call the 
‘phenomenology of corroboration’, i.e. a description of what one would in practice do 
to test a truth theory.329 Instead of outlining a genuinely empirical approach, 
Davidson simply identifies desiderata for a method of corroboration from the 
perspective of a theory he would like to work. Far from sufficing to make his 
approach genuinely empirical, hinting at the use of T-sentences as a criterion of 
theoretical adequacy is merely an idea (how to be tested) for an idea (predicate 
calculus approach) for a theory (an empirically testable theory).
What about Davidson’s account of what it is for words to mean what they do? 
A conspicuous feature is that it characterizes their functioning without any specific 
reference to words, such that, for all it tells us, the same function could be performed 
by pictorial or musical elements, or any suitably used physical objects. This makes 
words instruments in the ‘extrinsic’ Lockean sense, rather than the sense advocated 
here which sees them as intrinsically related to linguistic meaning. From my 
phenomenological perspective it is therefore natural to suggest that Davidson’s view 
fails to do justice to either the link between words and practice (pragmatic sense) or
327 This difficulty would be avoided in translation cases -  but would assume bilingualism on the part o f  
agents.
Davidson’s suggestion is in effect that it in an empirical project o f the kind he envisages it would be 
reasonable to assume initially an attitude that does not distinguish between speakers’ beliefs and 
meanings. Fair enough. But this is not holding one constant and solving for the other.
329 By contrast Quine’s (1960, 26-79) discussion o f radical translation clearly meets this requirement. 
Even if one feels the whole scenario is simply an illustration or projection o f his behaviourism, Quine 
offers a fairly detailed sketch o f how the radical translator would proceed in going about his work.
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the basis of their interpretability (presentational sense). In this perspective it provides 
an incomplete picture of words’ functioning in failing to take account of the factors 
that determine both the stability and elasticity of the expressive means of language.
Against this it may be urged that the explanatory strength of Davidson’s 
account lies precisely in this extrinsic character, that what words do must be 
characterized independently of their doing it. But is Davidson’s proposal really 
independent in the required way? Recall its architecture: A truth theory for an object 
language is to be stated in a metalanguage, the latter being used to ‘give outright’ and 
to state rules for the combination of ‘the semantic properties of certain of the basic 
expressions’ (Davidson 2001, 70). Since the object-language semantics are to be 
stated in the metalanguage, the question arises as to what the meaning of terms in the 
metalanguage consists in. This hints at a dilemma, with the choice apparently 
between a potential regress of metalanguages and question-begging by assuming the 
metalanguage to be antecedently interpreted. To avoid this dilemma, Davidson might 
respond that giving semantic properties ‘outright’ means ‘without appeal to any 
semantical concepts beyond the basic “refers to’” (Davidson 2001, 18). But reliance 
on a soi disant ‘basic’ notion of reference is illusory. The fact that one might choose 
to characterize semantic properties in a simple form, suggestive of referents’ being 
given ‘outright’, does not make them ‘basic’. This is the lesson of Wittgenstein’s 
critique of ostensive definition and the assumption of simples: there is no such thing 
as simple referring; what ‘reference’ is (even at the ‘metalanguage’ level) must
331 •ultimately be understood in terms of the roles played in language-games. In this 
sense the interpretedness of the metalanguage is implicitly assumed. Davidson might 
accept this point as part of his approach, but it nonetheless indicates a limitation of 
his extrinsic characterization of what words do. For even if it is allowed that a 
Davidsonian approach maps those properties of words relevant to their contribution to 
propositional content, its account of what it is for words to mean what they do is 
incomplete at best. Its incompleteness illustrates how the semantic approach requires 
the phenomenological approach: For the inadequacy is not simply that of saying too 
little, remaining vague, about what makes words meaningful. Rather it is locating 
meaning in a set of false primitives (reference, truth, satisfaction), the intelligibility of
330 The thought being that instruments are means to independently specifiable ends ( ‘what it is for’: a 
saw is for cutting wood, a pencil for making marks on paper, etc.).
331 Cf. page 145 above.
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which presupposes understanding of how to interpret the metalanguage in practical 
terms.
Davidson’s approach to language thus exhibits two important inadequacies in 
failing to account satisfactorily for either the connection between semantic theory and 
linguistic phenomena or the way words function. All the same, it would be a mistake 
to think these inadequacies are specific to Davidson. Indeed it is a virtue of his 
proposal for an empirical deployment of semantic theory that it develops some 
account of these relationships. The two inadequacies just outlined should instead be 
considered characteristic of semantics more generally, and as thus showing how the 
need arises within the semantics approach for the kind of account the 
phenomenological approach provides.
Once this need is acknowledged, the question is how the phenomenological approach, 
in particular the prepredicative factors it identifies, might be accommodated within 
the semantics approach’s broad framework of commitments. In the latter perspective 
the most natural interpretation of the functional foundation claim would be to see the 
semantics approach and phenomenological approach as complementary. What would 
this involve? A good starting point is the tripartite general architecture proposed by 
Dummett (1976), according to which a theory of meaning should encompass a 
‘theory of reference’, a ‘theory of sense’ and a ‘theory of force’. The core of such a 
theory of meaning is the theory of reference, which aims to characterize the meaning 
of all assertoric sentences of a language in terms of one semantic concept that is 
assumed to be basic. This is the role Davidson’s theory would fulfil within 
Dummett’s architecture. A theory of force is to expand the theory’s account of 
assertoric meaning to cover sentences differing in mood, such as interrogatives, 
imperatives, and optatives. Of particular interest here, however, is the theory of sense. 
This is to ‘lay down in what a speaker’s knowledge of any part of the theory of 
reference is to be taken to consist’, thus relating the theory of reference to ‘the 
speaker’s mastery of his language’, correlating ‘his knowledge of the propositions of 
the theory of truth with practical linguistic abilities which he displays’.332 It would be 
natural to interpret the phenomenological approach developed here as comprising
332 Dummett 1976, 74, 82. Dummett’s interpretation o f such a theory o f speakers’ abilities as 
corresponding to Frege’s notion o f sense is by no means unpresupposing, and might be challenged 
exegetically. However, such concerns can be neglected here.
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such a theory of sense, with the views drawn from Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein 
comprising a phenomenological description of the abilities of speakers in which 
semantic properties are manifested. In saying this, it should be highlighted that 
understanding sense in terms of speakers’ abilities is not to understand it in terms of 
mental or psychological states, or anything else ‘in the head’. Rather 
phenomenological descriptions of abilities linked with presentational and pragmatic 
sense rely only on publicly available features of signs and the practices in which they 
are used. They can thus be considered to explicate how the perspective under which 
objects are linguistically addressed is built up, while accommodating the objective 
perspectival character Frege saw as characterizing sense without appeal to Frege’s 
own obscure platonism.
The simplest way of construing their complementarity in this Dummettian 
framework would be to think of the phenomenological and semantics approaches as 
addressing the same processes in different terms. Their respective conceptions of 
language would then be homologous, i.e. function in the same way, so that the 
semantic properties of expressions correspond 1:1 to their roles as described (or at 
least describable) within a phenomenological perspective. Such homologous 
complementarity could even be construed as a foundational relationship, since it 
allows that semantic properties would not exist but for their phenomenological 
manifestation.
There is, however, a problem with a straightforward appeal to homologous 
complementarity, due to the key feature of the semantics approach, viz. its ability to 
explain how the meaning of sentences might be thought of as composed of the 
meaning of its parts. This is not to presuppose that the semantics approach has the 
right answer to this question. It is an open question whether there has to be, or even 
could be, a unitary notion of sentence meaning, such as predicate calculus assumes, 
that explains the specific feats of sentences satisfactorily. It is also quite possible that 
alternative accounts of how sentence meaning is built up by words could be offered. 
Nor is it beyond question that there is a need for a ‘systematic’ account of this 
relationship between words and sentences. Perhaps this supposed need is bound up 
with the conviction that sentential meaning is primary and the perceived ability of
333 Cf. Frege’s (1994b, 45) analogy with the ‘image in [a] telescope’, which ‘is dependent on its 
location, yet it is objective insofar as it can serve several observers’. -  His platonism is most clearly in 
evidence in Frege 1986.
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predicate calculus to provide such an account. Nonetheless, it is true that the 
semantics approach articulates an answer to the question of how sentence and word 
meaning are related, whereas the phenomenological approach, so far as it has been 
developed here, does not. Hence there is an asymmetry in that the semantics approach 
has a feature to which nothing on the phenomenological approach here corresponds, 
meaning that the complementarity of the two cannot be one of straightforward 
correspondence. This has the consequence of ruling out the strong foundational 
claim: for if nothing in the phenomenological conception corresponds to the 
combination of words in sentences, then there is nothing for a semantic account of the 
relationship between propositions and concepts to supervene on. So while Dummett’s 
notion of sense points in the right direction, the functional foundational claim that can 
be made on behalf of the phenomenological approach must instead be a partial one. 
On the one hand, word meanings should, I suggest, be thought of as presupposing and 
corresponding to the kind of factors -  presentational and pragmatic sense -  identified 
by a phenomenological ‘theory of sense’. However, on the other hand, the specific 
relationship between sentence and word meaning remains an aspect of linguistic 
functioning addressed only by the semantics approach. Even if it is indispensable, the 
phenomenological conception offers only a partial account of the abilities speakers 
have, a necessary part perhaps, but not the whole of a theory of sense.
A second, and somewhat more specific, way of thinking about the 
complementarity between the semantics and phenomenological approaches is 
suggested by John Searle’s idea of ‘Background’ as the foundation for intentional (or 
‘representational’) states. Whereas intentional states are defined in terms of 
satisfaction conditions, Searle explains, ‘Background is a set of nonrepresentational 
mental capacities that enable all representing to take place’; it comprises not 
propositional “‘knowing-that’” , but ‘certain kinds of know-how: I must know how 
things are and I must know how to do things’.334 The principal role of Background, 
which encompasses ‘deep’ human biological and ‘local’ enculturated levels, is to 
provide the operational context for literal or metaphorical propositional content, 
which ‘requires for its understanding more than the semantic content of the 
component expressions and the rules for their combination’.335 The dependency,
334 Searle 1983, 143, of. 154: Background is ‘a set o f skills, stances, preintentional assumptions and 
presuppositions, practices, and habits’.
335 Searle 1983, 146; cf. 143 f., 145-150; also Searle 1979.
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Searle emphasizes, is such that the Background ‘permeates’ intentional states; it is 
‘enabling not determining’, i.e. provides ‘necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
understanding’ (Searle 1983, 151, 158).
Two qualifications should be mentioned. First: Sometimes Searle explains the 
role of background in terms of background assumptions, e.g. those made when 
ordering a meal in a restaurant (cf. Searle 1979, 127; 1992, 180). Presumably to 
accommodate this feature, he came to include in Background ‘unconscious 
intentional’ states, understood to be ‘dispositional states of the brain’ of the right 
form -  i.e. genuinely intentional and with aspectual shape -  ‘to produce conscious
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thoughts and conscious behavior’. Although such states might be ‘background’ in 
the sense of being presupposed or implied by conscious, or occurrent, intentional 
states, their inclusion in it means that not all Background is ‘preintentional’. For my 
purposes here, however, this extension can be disregarded, as the concern will be 
only with Background in the sense of pre- or nonintentional capacities. Second: 
Although Searle (1983, 16) presents his as a ‘non-ontological approach to 
Intentionality’, he nonetheless characterizes the Background as mental. Given 
Heidegger’s rejection of the notion of subjectivity (SZ 46), this might seem to suggest 
incompatibility with a Heideggerian framework. For the present purposes, however, 
this difference can, I suggest, be disregarded, since in describing the functioning of 
language, any relevant Background abilities can be (in Wittgensteinian spirit) thought 
of as characterizable in terms of an impersonal public phenomenology, so that the 
label ‘mental’ entails no obviously problematic assimilation to a mind-based 
ontology.
With these two qualifications, the present suggestion (going beyond Searle) is 
that the Background has a specifically linguistic component. Accordingly, the 
accounts of presentational and pragmatic sense developed here identify -  as a partial 
theory of sense -  Background features that shape and pervade semantic content. This 
suggestion is possible because the prepredicative factors they rely on are presupposed 
in the same ‘preintentional’ way as Searle’s Background. For the abilities to use 
words to mark distinctions or to instantiate correct use in the context of a language- 
game, corresponding to presentational and pragmatic sense respectively, cannot in 
turn require the ability to state in language corresponding conditions of
336 Searle 1992, 160 f.; for this revision to his earlier (1983) view cf. 186-191.
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satisfaction.337 Rather, the intelligibility of propositional content presupposes such 
abilities, as precisely the kinds of knowing how things are and how to do things in 
terms of which Searle defines Background. Moreover, because to exercise these 
abilities requires a grasp of the structure of both a language’s sign system and the 
relevant language-games, the notions of presentational and pragmatic sense can be 
seen to highlight factors that quite literally structure both prepredicative abilities and 
the predicative abilities which build on these. In this respect, although by definition 
the Background is not a fully formed (‘explicit’) anticipation of intentionality, the 
notions of presentational and pragmatic sense tell us something about the way it is 
structured.
Having in previous chapters argued that the notions of presentational and pragmatic 
sense are motivated by considerations of phenomenological adequacy, this section 
has shown how the need arises within the semantics approach for the kind of account 
the phenomenological approach provides, and how the functional foundation claim 
can be accommodated by the semantics approach as a partial theory of sense 
explicating specifically linguistic aspects of Background.
Even if all this is acknowledged, the importance of the phenomenological 
approach and the prepredicative factors on which it focuses might be challenged. 
Searle (1983, 143) himself describes the Background as ‘bedrock’, a Wittgensteinian 
metaphor (PU §217) suggesting that our understanding of what concepts are and how 
they function rests upon an impenetrable basis that imposes a principled limit on such 
enquiry -  i.e. that there is ‘no digging deeper’. This metaphor implies that the 
semantics approach captures everything of philosophical interest about linguistic 
meaning. This thought might be defended in two ways. First by suggesting that the 
semantic approach is functionally autonomous and classifying the role of 
prepredicative factors as ‘causal conditioning’. While allowing that prepredicative 
factors (causally) underlie semantic facts, this assumes that semantic characterizations
337 As reflected in the relationship between rule-exemplification rule-stating discussed above (see 
pages 176 and 183 above). -  Incidentally, on Searle’s account, consciousness o f satisfaction conditions 
does not entail predicative ( ‘explicit’) awareness o f these conditions and can be manifested in 
(‘implicit’) sensitivity to correctness o f use. Perhaps due to his unorthodox use of the term 
‘representation’ -  on which such sensitivity is ‘representational’ in the sense o f having conditions of  
success -  Searle’s claims have been misinterpreted as concerning the phenomenology of action and 
failing to do justice to ‘skilled coping’ (Wakefield/Dreyfus 1991; Dreyfus 1999). He forcefully and 
convincingly clarifies his position in Searle 2000.
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are structurally independent of causal accounts. The second is to claim that 
prepredicative factors can be reduced to semantic terms. Thus if the two approaches 
are homologous, with every feature of prepredicative functioning having a correlate 
in the semantic approach, it would seem reasonable to suggest that the former can be 
understood fully in terms of the latter, so that the semantics approach provides a 
functionally complete picture of language. If either of these defences succeed, what 
was previously described as a weak functional foundational claim would result: while 
acknowledging that prepredicative factors (in some way) underlie semantic 
properties, this denies that the explanatory adequacy of the semantics approach is in 
any way compromised. The suspicion expressed in the bedrock metaphor is thus that, 
even if the weak foundational claim is true, it is too anodyne to be of philosophical 
interest: Background is background, and rightly not the focus of philosophical 
attention.
The next section will argue that the two arguments just mentioned do not 
stand up, and that a stronger claim can be made on behalf of the phenomenological 
approach. However, it is perhaps worth emphasizing that, even if the weak version of 
the functional foundation claim were correct, a phenomenological account of 
Background factors would still -  as outlined in this section -  have a role to play in 
semantics-centred conception of language and would form part of a complete 
(philosophical) understanding of what is involved in intentionality and propositional 
meaning.
3. The claims of prepredicative foundation
A feature distinguishing Heidegger’s view of the prepredicative is the idea of 
heterologous foundation, the founding of predicative judgements in something 
differing in its functional nature and so not to be understood in terms of 
predication. This feature suggests that a somewhat stronger claim should be made 
concerning the foundational role of prepredicative factors in relation to semantic 
properties. The basis of what I shall call a moderate (functional) foundation claim is 
hence that the semantics and phenomenological approaches identify different 
processes -  so to speak, different ‘mechanisms’ -  of conceptual articulation, such that 
an understanding of prepredicative factors is necessarily part of a philosophically
338 Cf. page 48 above.
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adequate conception of language. For this to be the case, two conditions need to be 
fulfilled. First, the prepredicative and semantics approaches must differ in their 
functional topology, i.e. identify factors that function in significantly different ways, 
so that there is no 1:1 mapping between them. Despite this, second, the factors 
identified by the prepredicative approach must be semantically relevant. That is, to 
avoid being dismissed as semantically inert, so that semantic relationships could be 
considered explanatorily closed, prepredicative factors need to be seen to have some 
role in the formation of semantic content. If either of these conditions are not fulfilled 
-  i.e. if either semantic and prepredicative functioning corresponded perfectly, or 
prepredicative factors were not relevant to semantics -  it would be reasonable to think 
of their relationship in terms of weak foundation, so that semantics tells us everything 
a philosopher might want to know about the way language works.
The second condition is, I suggest, straightforwardly met. For in describing 
factors involved in the actual phenomena in which linguistic articulation occurs, 
pragmatic and presentational sense pertain directly to the formation of concepts and 
hence to the meaningful use of language. The basis of this claim (as argued in the 
preceding two chapters) is phenomenological adequacy -  so that these descriptions 
are more reminders than discoveries, acknowledging that the functioning of language 
lies open to inspection. It has also been indicated how both pragmatic and 
presentational sense can be exploited in predicative contexts, and so shape inferential 
properties. In this way they exhibit a key characteristic of Searle’s Background, the 
whole point of which is to allow that nonrepresentational abilities generate 
propositionally expressible commitments. Indeed, an important advantage of 
distinguishing the notions of presentational and pragmatic sense, linked with the form 
of signs and the form of practice respectively, is to reflect the involvement of 
formative processes in semantic content, rather than presenting the latter as a 
functionally independent superstructure.
The key question therefore relates to the first condition: What basis is there for 
thinking that the phenomenological and semantics approaches identify different 
functional topologies? In my initial discussion of how claims about prepredicative
339 As Searle explains, a ‘crucial step in understanding the Background is to see that one can be 
committed to the truth o f a proposition without having any intentional state whatever with that 
proposition as content’. Such commitments are typically practical, such that to deny certain 
propositions (e.g. that objects are solid) would be contradicted by, i.e. inconsistent with, one’s actions 
(Searle 1992, 185).
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factors are to be interpreted it was suggested that one feature distinguishing these 
from propositional truth is that their appropriateness or otherwise need not be thought 
of as functioning in the bivalent manner characteristic of propositional truth.340 I now 
want to expand on this by suggesting three ways in which presentational and 
pragmatic sense, as meanwhile described, differ in their functional topology from 
semantic content.
(a) Basis o f structuration: The first difference lies in the features taken to 
underlie linguistic articulation, which I shall call the basis of structuration. According 
to the views developed here, both presentational and pragmatic sense reflect structural 
influences on language. In the case of pragmatic sense the internal link between 
practice and language highlighted by Wittgenstein means language is structured by 
language-games, the form of which determines both the degree of differentiation 
required and which aspects of the world need to be marked linguistically. In the case 
of presentational sense, the lexical and sublexical structure of language is used to map 
the world in a typological or schematic way. And while the phonetic basis of 
linguistic signs is ultimately arbitrary -  there is no temptation here, as perhaps there is 
with pictures, to suppose natural resemblance -  through iterative use the system of 
signs develops in nonarbitrary ways, acquiring intelligibility as a system of relatively 
motivated features.341 Being simultaneously the result of such processes and an 
operative factor involved in the ongoing evolution of language, the morphological 
array of linguistic signs is part of the basis of language’s structuration. By contrast the 
basis of structuration for the semantics approach lies in the inferential or truth- 
preserving role of words in sentential contexts, which identifies semantic elements 
and rules for their combination. These different bases of structuration -  expressed in 
Heidegger’s talk of a change in ‘as-structure’ -  underlie familiar discrepancies, often 
dealt with, somewhat tendentiously, by distinguishing ‘deep’ semantic from ‘surface’ 
grammatical structure.342 Not only do the words individuated in practice differ from 
the ‘semantic structure’ of a language -  perhaps motivating the thought that real 
languages fail to exhibit their logical form adequately in the way a philosophically 
‘ideal’ language would. Rather, with the involvement of sublexical form, the question
340 Cf. page 49 above.
341 Cf. II.4.(ii) above.
342 In other words, far from being an innovation, this difference in functional topology is the very 
feature sometimes thought to show up the need for semantic analysis to eliminate the supposed 
refractory effect o f language’s syntactic and practical formation.
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of the sign system’s morphological form corresponding to the basic structures 
identified by the semantics approach can hardly arise.
(b) Non-discreteness: The second way the functional topologies differ 
concerns the question of discreteness. A central assumption of the semantics 
approach is its modelling of propositional and conceptual operations as discrete 
functions, usually bivalent ones such as the truth or falsity of propositional contents 
or the satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of predicates. This tidy picture of discrete and 
determinate content ‘valencies’ contrasts with both presentational and pragmatic 
sense. Presentational sense is nondiscrete due to the semantic openness of linguistic 
expressions, i.e. the fact that they are constantly open to extended or new uses. Such 
openness is characterized by continuous variability rather than a fixed number of 
values -  not least because the difference between simply extending the use of term 
and a new use will often be marginal. Similarly with regard to pragmatic sense: 
Drawing on Wittgenstein’s later work, I have here suggested that an ideal-free 
conception of the rules inherent in linguistic practices should be generally understood 
as having the form of empirical or statistical rules, i.e. as characterized by greater or 
lesser variation about a mean. On this picture the notion of falling under, or 
complying with, a rule is itself not sharp: Although there will be clear cases of both 
falling under and not falling under such a rule, there will also be grey areas of 
transition between the two, so that pragmatic sense too is best thought of in terms of 
continuous variability rather than a fixed number of values, as continuously rather 
than discretely articulated.
To some extent the ‘non-discreteness’ of prepredicative sense merely 
corresponds to idea of concepts’ ‘vagueness’. However, non-discreteness should not 
be thought of as a peripheral effect that allows bivalency to be though of as the 
default mode of linguistic meaning’s functioning. For while bivalency is a plausible 
approximation in strictly regulated language-games, the fact that both presentational 
and pragmatic feats of language are characterized by openness and non-discreteness 
suggests that this is the more general topology of linguistic meaning. A second, 
somewhat deeper consideration leads to the same conclusion: Because predicate 
calculus models the functioning of language in terms of determinately falling under a 
predicate, being true or otherwise, to think of bivalency as the basic mode of 
conceptual operation presupposes an idealized fully determinate picture. Yet it is 
relinquishing the idea of full determinacy, which is shown to be inherently unstable
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by Wittgenstein’s critique of the calculus notion of rules, that leads the 
phenomenological approach to its emphasis on the openness and non-discreteness of 
linguistic functioning. Whereas the first consideration of generality suggests that to 
think of language as functioning bivalently would be an approximation at best, the 
second shows that it would be fundamentally misleading. Either way to think of 
conceptual functioning as basically bivalent is to attempt, so to speak, to put round 
pegs into square holes.
(c) Language as acquisitional: The phenomenological approach also differs 
from the semantic approach in recognizing the acquisitional character of language as 
an essential aspect of the way it functions. To talk of language as an acquisition -  as 
Merleau-Ponty, adopting Husserl’s use, characteristically does -  clearly suggests it is 
something built up over time, which humans have come to possess through processes 
of discovery or invention. This is most directly seen in the way meaningful use 
becomes sedimented in the morphology of the system of linguistic signs. The 
phenomenological view accommodates this fact by seeing the presentational sense of 
words -  due to their place in the differential framework of language and the relative 
motivations pervading it -  as inscribed in the forms of the lexical system. This 
acquisitional view not only coheres with both the Wittgensteinian idea of language as 
an institution or custom and Heidegger’s emphasis on the historicity of disclosure, but 
better does justice than either to the temporality of language. For by viewing lexical 
items as type artefacts, characterized by an iteratively evolved situated 
interpretability, this view also explains the ongoing relevance of etymology to word 
meanings.343
The significance of this acquisitional aspect can be brought out by considering 
the obvious objection that at any given time (and perhaps relativized to certain 
speakers) a language is in principle representable as instantiating a synchronous 
system of rules. This objection amounts to the suggestion that language can be 
detemporalized, i.e. considered as functioning in a time-independent manner. This is 
not obviously a coherent suggestion. For it seems to ignore the fundamental fact, 
emphasized by Wittgenstein, that the concept of a rule makes sense only against the 
backdrop of repeated use. Yet, even if coherent, it assumes that the complex means of 
differentiation provided by a lexical system and its established patterns of use are
343 Cf. II.4.(ii) and page 131 f. above.
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independent of their history. This idea no doubt draws plausibility from the fact that 
we often learn and explain the use of linguistic terms without any mention of 
historical facts. It nonetheless fails to take account of the fact that as a whole the 
techniques embodied in language use are the product of a complex evolution and are 
no more possible without a development history than the abilities to travel to the 
moon or build a computer. By contrast, the fact that the functional economy of 
natural language is intrinsically temporal is built into the phenomenological view’s 
acquisitional picture of language. In Heideggerian terminology (cf. SZ 329), this view 
acknowledges that language is temporally ecstatic, standing-out-of-itself in the sense 
of always being having been shaped by its own past and comprising a particular 
present that conditions its future disclosive possibilities.
Both conditions identified above are therefore met: Having previously 
clarified that pragmatic and presentational sense cannot be dismissed as semantically 
irrelevant, the three factors just described show that presentational and pragmatic 
sense function in ways identifiably different from semantic content, so that the 
phenomenological approach does not map straightforwardly (in a 1:1 manner) onto 
the semantics approach. Whereas the first condition prevents thinking of semantics as 
structurally or functionally independent of presentational and pragmatic sense, the 
second blocks the idea that presentational and pragmatic sense can be reduced to 
semantic equivalents. This rules out the weak functional foundation claim, which 
views the semantics approach as capturing everything of philosophical interest about 
the functioning of language. The relationship between the two approaches should 
instead be thought of as heterologous foundation, according to which the 
prepredicative Background of semantic content has structure that is (a) not directly 
accountable for in semantic terms, but which (b) cannot be considered functionally 
irrelevant to meaning, and (c) can be understood in phenomenological terms as 
presentational and pragmatic sense. This amounts to what I have called a moderate 
functional foundation claim, which not only acknowledges that prepredicative factors 
(e.g. causally) underlie the semantics approach, but also recognizes that they add 
something of functional significance to the latter.344
344 And which also differs from the strong foundational claim discussed above in not claiming that the 
semantics approach adds nothing o f importance to the phenomenological approach.
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In claiming to differ in kind from and/or challenge the primacy of propositional or 
conceptual content the conceptions of presentational and pragmatic sense proposed 
here are similar to -  and indeed have already been respectively likened to -  the ideas 
of nonconceptual content and knowing-how. It is common to object to such ideas that 
they fail to identify anything not captured by what I have here called the semantics 
approach, so that in principle they remain reducible to propositional/conceptual 
content. To assess the soundness of the moderate functional foundation claim being 
made here, it therefore seems appropriate to address two kinds of objection made to 
the ideas of nonconceptual content and knowing-how.
The first kind of objection is that the respective notion is conceptually 
dependent on, and hence not genuinely opposed to, those of propositional or 
conceptual content. This charge might be levelled at the idea of ‘nonconceptual 
content’ that is sometimes appealed to in philosophy of mind to make space for the 
claim that a state or action can have content without an agent’s being ‘explicitly’ 
aware of it. Adrian Cussins, for example, distinguishes between conceptual content, 
defined in terms of ‘objects, properties, or situations’ as determinants of truth 
conditions, and nonconceptual content, which is to be ‘canonically specified by 
means of concepts that the subject need not have’.345 The problem with relying on 
‘canonical specification’ in this way is that it prompts the question as to what is 
nonconceptual about the content concerned. Both conceptual and nonconceptual 
content, on this account, are defined conceptually. The difference between the two 
cases turns not on the kind of content involved, but the way content is available to an 
agent’s consciousness. Thus it seems that the content of a nonconceptual state can be 
understood only in conceptual terms, rendering the expression ‘nonconceptual 
content’ oxymoronic and so misleading at the very least. Parallel objections are often 
made to the proposed distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. The 
problem arises because knowing-how must be something cognitive, since knowing 
how to O cannot be equated with actually being able to O -  since, for example, 
someone with a broken leg might know how to, but be unable to swim. And yet it 
seems that whatever it is that a person P knows in knowing how to ® must be statable 
in the form ‘P knows that . . .’. However, this would mean that knowing-how is to be
345 Cussins 2003, 138. The same strategy is endorsed by Peacocke (1992, 61-98) and Crane (1992). As 
an example o f nonconceptual content Cussins (2003, 150) cites skilled performances, such as knowing 
how fast one is riding a motorbike.
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understood, against its original intention, in terms of propositional knowing-that.346 
Hence it seems not only that reductive strategies to the latter are possible, but that the 
only way of specifying what the nonconceptual or nonpropositional amount to is in 
terms of conceptual and propositional content respectively.
It might be thought that the ideas of presentational and pragmatic sense are 
susceptible to the same kind of objection, such that one can only understand what it is 
for these to be about ‘meaning’ via the semantic notion of propositional/conceptual 
content.347 The fact that the ideas of presentational and pragmatic sense can be -  as in 
the preceding chapters -  characterized without the technical terminology of semantics 
already indicates that this is not the case.348 This conclusion is supported by 
reconsidering the conceptual-dependence objection to nonconceptual content and 
knowing-how. In each case the underlying problem is that the feature in question is 
not characterized in a way that makes apparent how it differs structurally from its 
intended conceptual/propositional counterpart. By contrast, the importance of the 
preceding three features is to make clear how presentational and pragmatic sense 
differ in their structure, or functional character, from the notions of 
propositional/conceptual content. These differences in functional topology -  i.e. the 
basis of structuration, (non)discreteness, and acquisitional character -  mean that 
presentational and pragmatic sense cannot be thought of as mapping in a 1:1 manner 
onto propositional/conceptual content.349 It would therefore be mistaken to think of 
the former as reducible to, or even definable in terms of the latter, so that it is difficult 
to see how presentational and pragmatic sense could be thought of as conceptually 
dependent on the notions of propositional/conceptual content.
The second kind of objection to the ideas of nonconceptual content and 
knowing-how is that even supposed structural differences do not suffice to prevent 
their assimilation to propositional/conceptual content. An example of this kind of
346 For a sophisticated defence o f this idea, see Stanley/Williamson 2001. Similarly directed arguments 
against the knowing-how/knowing-that distinction are offered by Snowdon 2003. -  Incidentally, I am 
not suggesting that nonconceptual content stands in the same relation to conceptual content as 
knowing-how does to knowing-that; the thought is merely that the characterizations o f the 
nonconceptual and knowing-how share an analogous lack o f independence.
347 Harrison (1975) argues in this spirit that Husserl’s conception o f prepredicative experience is 
structurally dependent on predicative determinations. Whether or not this applies to Husserl’s 
conception, I argue here that it is not a general problem o f claims about the prepredicative.
348 A somewhat dogmatic response would be that this means one is still ‘owed an account’ o f them in 
semantic terms. However, in revealing antecedent commitment to the semantics approach, this would 
beg the current question o f the relationship between semantic content and prepredicative sense.
349 In the terms used here, the conceptual-dependency objection assumes a relationship of homologous 
foundation, whereas these differences show it to be a heterologous foundation.
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objection is John McDowell’s argument against Gareth Evans’s attribution of a basic 
epistemological role to ‘informational states’ that embody a kind of nonconceptual 
representational content. Central to Evans’s view is the distinction between 
conceptual and nonconceptual content: whereas conceptual content is linked with the 
role of states in judgement, and characterized in terms of reasons and concepts, 
nonconceptual (information) content is to be instantiated by the structure of 
perceptual states and due to causal interaction with the environment (cf. Evans 1982, 
122-9). The two kinds of content are to be linked by the possibility of 
‘conceptualization’ through which nonconceptual content is taken up into conceptual 
content, thus entering into conscious experience and becoming ‘available to’ 
judgement (Evans 1982, 227,157 f.).
Evans’s position is clearly analogous to the functional foundational claim 
under consideration here: the nonconceptual-conceptual distinction parallels the 
prepredicative-predicative distinction, just as the idea of ‘conceptualization’ does 
Heidegger’s talk of a ‘modification’ of the hermeneutic-as of circumspection into the 
apophantic-as of judgement. Particularly relevant is the suggestion that 
nonconceptual content is distinguished from conceptual content by being more fine­
grained. Thus Evans (1982, 229) suggests that subjects are able to discriminate, for 
example, more shades of colour than there are conceptual means to represent such 
discriminations. Such an appeal to ‘fineness of grain’ avoids the underlying problem 
mentioned above by offering a characterization of the structure of nonconceptual 
states that is not only independent of the articulation of conceptual content, but also 
intimates how these structures might differ. The relevance of this proposal here is that 
appealing to fineness of grain to block an assimilation of nonconceptual to conceptual 
content parallels my claim that differences in functional topology -  particularly their 
bases of structuration and (non)discreteness -  prevent presentational and pragmatic 
sense being assimilated to propositional/conceptual content.
McDowell aims to establish, against Evans, that the idea of nonconceptual 
content is chimerical and that all content is conceptual -  or, as he often puts it, is in 
the ‘space of reasons’. To this end he offers an argument intended to show that 
fineness of grain cannot be used to distinguish nonconceptual content, which, if 
successful, might be thought to block the foundation claim being made here based on 
differences in functional topology. Thus in the case of colour sensitivity McDowell 
argues that, if one genuinely has the ability to recognize a certain colour over an
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extended period, ‘the conceptual content of such a recognitional capacity can be made 
explicit with the help of a sample’ and referred to by ‘a phrase like “that shade”, in 
which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample’ (McDowell 1996, 57). 
Generalizing somewhat, the argument is that the use of determinable and 
demonstrative concepts in combination with recognitional capacities suffices to 
ensure that fineness of grain does not succeed in distinguishing something as 
nonconceptual. Rather, according to McDowell, by such means any discernible 
differences are ‘conceptual in the sense that they are rationally integrated into 
spontaneity at large’ (McDowell 1996, 58). The central feature of such integration is 
the availability of the contents of experience for use in judgements: ‘genuinely 
conceptual capacities [...] can also be exploited in active judgements’ such that 
‘appearances can constitute reasons for judgments’ (McDowell 1996, 62).
It should be noted in passing that both McDowell’s and Evans’s interest 
differs from that here in centring on the nature of experience and the psychological or 
mental constitution of subjects, rather than on the structural factors making up public 
linguistic phenomena. The relevance of McDowell’s argument lies in the suggestion 
that context-sensitive conceptual means could be used to map (presumably) any 
manifold onto the conceptual realm and that this suffices to consider those manifolds 
to be conceptually structured. If this line of argument were successful, it would 
suggest that differences in what I have called ‘functional topology’ do not prevent 
presentational and pragmatic sense being understood in the semantics approach’s 
terms, so that the moderate foundational claim would collapse into the weak claim.
The problem with McDowell’s argument, however, is that it is difficult to see 
anything that Evans need disagree with, and hence how it counts against the latter’s 
claims. Evans could no doubt agree with McDowell that any feature of nonconceptual 
content might be ‘exploited in active judgements’. The difference between their 
positions turns on what it is to be available for such exploitation: for Evans this 
requires a ‘conceptualization’ of intrinsically nonconceptual content, whereas for 
McDowell content is intrinsically conceptual. But the scenario McDowell describes 
can equally well be seen as both fully compatible with Evans’s point about fineness 
of grain and as partially explicating the process of conceptualization -  as a process in 
which the use of indexicals and determinable concepts yields ad hoc conceptual 
abilities. Of course it is true that the use of samples could be standardized, perhaps 
genuinely extending the range of established conceptual means -  though in practice it
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is difficult to see this being done without a corresponding notation (think of the 
names on Dulux colour charts) that obviates the need for the use of indexicals. 
However, in the absence of standardized means for referring to fine colour gradations, 
one might plausibly rely on ad hoc solutions of the kind McDowell describes. But, 
rather than establishing that a fine-grained information manifold is intrinsically 
conceptual, this shows merely that the use of relatively coarse, context-dependent 
expressions suffices to introduce any discernible difference into language-games that 
involve the giving and taking of reasons. And this can, in Evans’s spirit, be 
understood as the use of these means to ‘conceptualize’ fine-grained information 
differences.
McDowell’s argument thus neither provides reason to think of fine-structured 
information states as being actually rather than potentially conceptual, nor does 
anything to rule out Evans’s claim that informational states require conceptualization. 
The relevance of this result here is that McDowell’s line of argument fails to establish 
that the use of context-sensitive conceptual means renders whatever they refer to 
conceptual in character. Similarly, the fact that prepredicative factors can be exploited 
in semantically relevant ways cannot be taken to imply that such factors can be 
assimilated, reduced to, or equated with semantic properties.
The two objections just considered -  namely that the concept of prepredicative sense 
is conceptually dependent on propositional/conceptual content, and that differences in 
functional topology would not suffice to rule out assimilation of prepredicative sense 
to propositional/conceptual content -  do not therefore succeed in undermining the 
moderate functional foundation claim. The point of this claim is effectively that to 
explicate the workings of the founding Background is not otiose. To some extent this 
already followed from the weak foundation claim, but there the philosophical interest 
of such explication was simply a matter of completeness, since Background was 
taken to contribute nothing distinctive to linguistic meaning. Against this, the 
message of the moderate foundational claim is that a phenomenological account of 
Background, of the kind offered here, tells us something distinctive about the 
functioning of language that is not covered by the semantics approach. To understand 
the significance of this claim, it will be helpful to consider -  in three steps -  an 
analogy with the change brought to classical physics by the development of atomic 
physics in the course of the 20th century. As the terminology testifies, it was assumed
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in classical physics that elements or atoms were indivisible basic constituents of the 
physical world, in much the same way as the semantics approach often assumes there 
to be basic units of meaning. The realization that the atom could be split, leading to 
the development of complex models of the subatomic, clearly made a great difference 
to our understanding of both physical matter and the status of classical physics’ 
theories. So what, in very general terms, was the nature of this difference? And how 
does this shed light on the relationship between semantics and the prepredicative?
First, it became clear that classical physics could not claim to be a 
comprehensive theory of matter and that an understanding of the subatomic realm 
would be part of any such theory. Similarly, any ambition the semantics approach 
might have to deliver a comprehensive theory of linguistic meaning is undermined by 
the vindication of the moderate functional foundation claim. For this implies that 
understanding how linguistic meaning functions requires an account of the 
prepredicative factors in which semantic properties are founded. To insist otherwise 
would be like suggesting that classical physics had nothing to learn from an 
understanding of the subatomic. This is a significant result. To begin with, it 
highlights that it is misleading to think of semantics as a closed or self-sufficient 
functionality. Semantics is not ‘autonomous’ and such supposed closure cannot 
justify reassuring dualisms -  e.g. language/world, semantics/causal, space of 
reasons/space of nature -  that philosophers of language sometimes rely on to delimit 
their subject matter. Interpretation of the philosophical importance of semantics 
should instead reflect the fact that linguistic meaning is not only ontologically, but 
also functionally embedded in the world. In addition, it highlights that the 
phenomenon of language should not be overrationalized. A characteristic feature of 
the semantics approach is the attempt to model language as a pervasively rational 
phenomenon, as instantiating a system of determinate rules that circumscribe -  as the 
common metaphors have it -  our conceptual ‘mechanisms’ or ‘machinery’. Of 
course, this is simply a contemporary incarnation of the age old belief that language 
use distinguishes humans as rational. But even allowing that language is the vehicle 
of predicative competence, and as such makes rationality of the predicative type 
possible, does not mean that language should or can be thought of as functioning
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homogeneously in a pervasively rational manner.350 In identifying the formative, 
foundational role of prepredicative factors, the phenomenological approach serves as 
a reminder against such convenient oversimplifications. As the preceding discussions 
of presentational and pragmatic sense should have made clear, prepredicative factors 
have a kind of intermediate status between the straightforwardly mechanical-causal 
and full rationality. Although formed by intelligent behaviour, they are not 
assimilable to the semantics approach’s preferred model of what it is to be rational; 
they are instead inchoately rational, rationally ambivalent, or the product of 
unreflective pragmatic agency.351
Faced with these claims, second, a defendant of the semantics approach might 
respond that it is intended in the spirit of a scientific hypothesis, as the best available 
model of, and a good approximation to, how language works. The analogy with 
physics gives this suggestion some plausibility: after all, macroscopic physics did not 
become obsolete with the discovery of subatomic properties; rather it remained useful 
despite being strictly speaking ‘false’. Nonetheless, the suggestion is unsatisfactory. 
Apart from the fact that it seems somewhat inaccurate to describe (philosophical) 
semantics as an empirical field of enquiry, an appeal to the idea of approximation is 
problematic. With scientific theories the claim to be an approximation can be justified 
-  either quantitatively, by being purpose-relative, or both -  and it is usual to consider 
and explicate constraints on a theory’s applicability. It is true that semantics is a good 
approximation in the context of what I have called strictly regulated language-games, 
those in which most word-use patterns are covered by well defined rules. But the 
semantics approach itself is oblivious to -  i.e. does not factor in or explicate -  the 
circumstances that regulate its applicability. This means that to assume that semantics 
generally approximates well to linguistic phenomena lacks justification, resting 
instead on the prejudgement (or ‘intuition’) that language just is rule-governed, 
determinate, and fundamentally bivalent in its operation. Yet this obliviousness 
leaves intact the suspicion that the semantics approach is characterized by omissions
350 As even Leibniz (1982, 8 [§5]), in one o f his more down-to-earth moments, puts it, ‘les hommes en 
tant qu’ils sont empiriques, c ’est k dire dans les trois quarts de leurs actions, n’agissent que comme des 
betes’.
351 This should not, incidentally, be seen as undermining or endangering the notion o f rationality. 
Rather this intermediate status is an indication o f how higher-level rational feats are functionally 
integrated with and properly anchored in the actual world. It is the functional aspect of viewing 
language as embedded in the world.
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that are principled, and which lead it to misrepresent the way linguistic articulation 
actually works.
Despite this, finally, the analogy with physics provides a model for thinking of 
how the phenomenological and semantics approaches are complementary. Classical 
physics does not ‘approximate’ to subatomic physics, but models different aspects of 
the behaviour of matter, behaviour exhibited at a different level, due either to 
statistical aggregation or the fact that atoms, for example, have (emergent) properties 
in virtue of their organization as a whole that might not be predicted on the basis of 
the properties of their parts. So the development of subatomic physics quite literally 
took understanding (of matter) to a new level. It was discovered that the subatomic 
functioned in ways not evident from the top-down macroscopic perspective of 
classical physics, yielding an explanatory gain by explaining and predicting 
phenomena that were beyond the scope of classical physics. At the same time such 
insights did nothing to impair the reliability or validity of most macroscopic theories 
provided their level and range of applicability is respected. I want to suggest that the 
phenomenological and semantics approaches complement each other in an analogous 
way. They do not correspond to one another in a straightforward, homologous 
manner -  so to speak, telling the same story from different perspectives. Rather, due 
to their heterologous relationship, their complementarity is such that they model 
different (mutually irreducible) aspects of the phenomenon of linguistic meaning. A 
phenomenological account of prepredicative factors should accordingly be seen as 
taking understanding of language to a new level, enabling understanding of 
phenomena that are beyond the pale of the semantics approach.
4. Linguistic contact with the world
The principal motivation for philosophical interest in language is no doubt to 
understand its relevance to knowledge, i.e. not simply to articulate what it is to have a 
grasp of language, but also what it is we grasp about the world in using language. The 
following two sections aim to assess whether the phenomenological conception of 
language developed in the previous chapters should be seen as having realist or 
nonrealist implications. This section begins by suggesting how the issue seems to
352 It is, o f course, possible that a later theory might, again as in physics, succeed in unifying two such 
theories. But in the absence o f such an overarching perspective the explanatory value o f each should be 
acknowledged.
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arise. Given my general commitment to a Heideggerian framework, SZ’s nondualist 
treatment of realism and idealism is then reviewed, as a necessary prelude, before 
moving on to address the current position’s implications. Against this background, 
the next section seeks to locate the present view in relation to other realist or 
nonrealist positions, arguing that rather than falling on one side of this familiar 
contrast its virtue is to steer a middle path between the two.
A useful starting point is provided by the position Putnam calls ‘metaphysical 
realism’, characterized by the following three theses: ‘the world consists of some 
fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete 
description of “the way the world is”. Truth involves some sort of correspondence 
relation between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things’ 
(Putnam 1981, 49). Faced with this characterization, there are prima facie grounds for 
supposing the phenomenological conception of language developed here challenges 
realism. To begin with, my emphasis on the ‘involvement’ of words in the formation 
of propositional content seems to challenge the mind-independence, or as I shall put it 
access-independence, of objects. The challenge is not, of course, whether or not 
objects can generally be thought of as existing independently of thought or language. 
Even if one thinks that a basic subject-object dualism allows scepticism about the 
‘external’ physical world’s existence, the latter is presupposed in the public 
phenomenon of language. There are of course, many things that would not exist 
without language -  not just promises, say, but many things produced in language- 
games. Equally, there are many entities that would exist as they do without being 
referred to by language, not just mountains etc., but even words themselves. So to 
claim generally that objects ‘exist’ only as referred to by language would simply be 
confused. The concern is rather with the sense attaching to the word ‘object’ in 
knowledge ‘of objects’, i.e. whether this means objects-as-represented or objects-as- 
they-are-in-themselves, or in Kant’s terms ‘appearances’ or ‘things-in-themselves’. 
The challenge is therefore that emphasizing the involvement of words suggests that 
(at least insofar as knowledge is linked with the representation of thoughts in 
language) objects can be spoken of only as conditioned in the ways described by 
presentational and pragmatic sense -  as objects-for-us or Kantian representations. A 
second challenge is suggested by my rejection of an ideal of final determinacy and 
insistence on the constitutive openness of language’s functioning. For this opposes 
the metaphysical realist’s underlying assumption that the world can be thought of as a
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‘fixed totality of objects’, since if there were some such totality it would presumably 
serve as a standard of ultimate determinacy towards which description of the world 
should tend.
One striking feature of Putnam’s description of metaphysical realism is that 
what ‘words or thought-signs’ are accountable to is characterized in an explicitly 
dualist manner as ‘mind-independent objects’. This naturally evokes the traditionally 
familiar picture -  found, for example, in Descartes, British Empiricism and Kant -  of 
a fundamental subject-object opposition and the corresponding inside-outside 
imagery. Given this basic picture, the poignancy of the realism/idealism issue is 
easily appreciated, since knowledge is then bound to depend on the relationship 
between internal representations and external objects, and the two extremes of 
confinement within representation and cognitively reaching out to external reality. 
One of Heidegger’s principal aims, however, was to overcome this basic picture of 
humans’ epistemological situation. So having likened a phenomenological conception 
of language-in-the-world to Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, a prudent and instructive 
first step in assessing its realist/nonrealist implications will be to consider the 
approach SZ takes to the realism/idealism issue.
By the time Heidegger discusses what he calls the ‘reality problem’ in §43 of 
SZ it comes as little surprise that his treatment of this problem has two distinctive 
features. The first is that he cursorily and polemically dismisses the Cartesian 
questions of whether ‘consciousness-transcendent’ entities exist and whether this can 
be proven as making no sense (being ‘ohne Sinn’) and claims that the real ‘scandal of 
philosophy’ -  borrowing Kant’s phrase -  is that such proofs are demanded (cf. SZ 
202, 205). The argumentative basis of this claim, explored in the preceding sections 
of SZ, is Heidegger’s conviction that the existence of ‘external’ objects is implicit in 
the disclosedness that Dasein is, such that this is a condition of possibility for the 
question of their existence to be asked.353 And although it might be disputed that to 
question the external world’s existence makes no sense, Heidegger’s underlying point 
is that this would require explicit defence of the ontological assumptions -  about what 
it is to be a subject or object -  on which these questions are based. Nevertheless, for
353 SZ 202, 205. -  Indeed Heidegger’s approach in SZ is quite Cartesian, since consideration o f what 
asking philosophical questions presupposes was the starting point (§2) -  the quaeritur in place of  
Descartes’ cogito -  and might be seen as motivating 52Ts ‘preparatory’ analysis o f Dasein.
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the present purposes it suffices to note that rejecting the traditional Cartesian framing 
of the realism/idealism issue is central to Heidegger’s position.
The second distinctive feature of Heidegger’s treatment of the ‘reality 
problem’ is his unorthodox construal of what this problem is. Underlying this is his 
fundamental objection that both realist and idealist strands of modem philosophy lack 
requisite ontological understanding in failing to explicate what it is for the things they 
presuppose to exist. Realism suffers from a Tack of ontological understanding’, 
Heidegger charges, since ‘adequate ontological analysis of reality’ depends on the 
extent to which ‘that from which independence is to exist [bestehen], what is to be 
transcended, is itself clarified with respect to its being\ 354 Similarly, while 
recognizing that ‘reality is possible only in understanding of being’, idealism still 
stands in need of ‘ontological analysis of consciousness itself to understand what it is 
to be real {SZ 207). While these formulations betray Heidegger’s conviction that 
idealism is the philosophically superior position, his objections are intended to apply 
quite generally to setting up philosophical problems via an inside-outside (or subject- 
object) opposition.355 For, as his preceding analytic of Dasein makes clear, Heidegger 
believes that attempting to spell out the ontological assumptions on which such a 
distinction is predicated would reveal the untenability of this basic picture and its
356‘demolition of the original phenomenon of being-in-the-world’.
This is the background for Heidegger’s unorthodox construal of the ‘reality 
problem’. Crucially, Heidegger takes the term ‘reality’ (Realitat) to refer to ‘nothing 
other’ than what he has otherwise called ‘ VorhandenheW -  i.e. Thingness or 
presentness-at-hand. With this stipulation in place, the ‘reality problem’ is no 
longer whether objects exist (whether Things have being), but instead becomes that of 
how Things feature in understanding of Being. And the answer to this problem, 
already provided by Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, is that ‘objective reality’ is 
founded in Handiness, the being of entities in the purposive perspective of Dasein’s 
concerns. Thus, as Heidegger understands it, the ‘reality problem’ is about the 
relationship between entities accessed or individuated in different ways (the
354 SZ 207, 202. -  This charge seems fairly directed at the customary (e.g. Putnam’s) talk o f ‘mind- 
independent objects’.
355 SZ 205. See also both the introduction and I.2.(i) above.
356 SZ 206. See in particular §43b, which takes the resistance of ‘innerworldly’ entities as a 
phenomenon that, when properly understood, leads beyond the picture o f an immanent mind opposed 
by transcendent objects.
357 SZ 209 (i.e. ‘das Sein des innerweltlich vorhandenen Seienden (res)’).
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perspectives of purpose and properties respectively). And this, on his nondualist 
picture, is a relationship between two ways of being in genuine contact with the 
environing world, or two ways of being ‘in the truth’ (SZ 221).
This position aims to reconcile idealist and realist inclinations by allowing to 
idealism that objects of knowing are access-condition relative, while denying -  in 
realist spirit -  that this means any break with how things are ‘in themselves’. This 
attempted reconciliation is expressed, perhaps awkwardly, in Heidegger’s talk of the 
‘dependency of being, [but] not of what is, on understanding of being’, or ‘the 
dependency of reality, [but] not of the real, on Concern’. What this aims to express, 
I suggest, is that while the features of the world we refer to intentionally (at least 
often) exist independently of our referring to them, what it is to be an entity can be 
understood only in relation to some mode of access -  ultimately to a ‘primary kind of 
access’ (cf. SZ 202) -  and a concomitant perspective of as-ness or individuation.
I want here to emphasize two important implications of Heidegger’s treatment 
of the reality problem. The first, just hinted at, is that the dualist distinction of ‘for us’ 
and ‘in themselves’ collapses into an access-condition-relative notion of entities (e.g. 
Handiness, Thingness). This thought, in particular the notion of ‘access’ (Zugang) 
it involves, requires some clarification. To begin with, such talk of ‘access’ is clearly 
not supposed to suggest that Dasein could be altogether out of touch with, or lack 
access to, the surrounding world. Further, part of the point in talking of ‘access’ is to 
avoid reference to a psychological notion of mindedness by generally linking the 
relativeness of entities’ ‘being’ to an ‘understanding of being’. It might, however, be 
wondered how this accommodates natural objects, which are putatively individuated 
in ‘access’-independent, say spatio-temporal, terms: Isn’t one forced to admit that the 
individuation of rocks, atoms etc. is no more ‘access’ dependent than it is ‘mind’ 
dependent? I suggest it is crucial to realize that when Heidegger refers to an 
‘understanding of being’ he means an understanding in which what exists (das 
Seiende) is grasped as comprising distinct entities (Seiendes qua Zuhandenes or 
Vorhandenes), i.e. as having had some kind of ‘as-ness’ imposed on it. Yet, if they 
correspond to the individuation of what exists into distinct entities, Heidegger’s
358 SZ 212, cf. 230, where being [Sein] but not what is [Seiendes] is linked to Dasein’s existence.
359 Cf. the emphasis at SZ 71 that Zuhandenheit, for example, does not simply refer to the way an entity 
is grasped. -  It is true that Heidegger toys with the idea that Handiness [Zuhandenheit] is the ‘in- 
itselfness’ [Ansichsein] o f entities (SZ 75). But, whatever is made of this suggestion, the claim is 
certainly not that it stands in opposition to the idea o f being ‘for us’.
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modes of ‘access’ can be glossed as ‘perspectives of individuation’ or simply 
‘individuation conditions’. Although it might initially appear somewhat generous, this 
construal of Heidegger’s terms can be justified. For to know how something is 
individuated is to know how, at least in principle, to access it; conversely, to know 
how to access something requires knowing, at least in part, how it is individuated. 
This interpretation has no trouble accommodating natural objects, as it requires only 
that these be understood in relation to some (e.g. spatio-temporal) optic of 
individuation. Indeed it has the advantage of making the idea of access-dependence 
compellingly tautological, since all this then means is that the concept of an object is 
necessarily related to some mode of individuation. Accordingly, to deny the 
intelligibility of entities without access conditions, i.e. individuated features of the 
world without individuating conditions, no longer makes any sense.
The second implication of Heidegger’s treatment of the reality problem is that 
in the context of his position it is difficult to see what the realism/idealism issue 
might still be about. Traditionally it has addressed the relationship between subjects 
and objects, or between things-for-us and things-in-themselves, and the general 
constellation of appealing but conflicting intuitions, and their respectively 
problematic consequences, that results from this picture of the epistemological 
situation. However, rejecting the ontological presuppositions on which these contrasts 
rest dissolves questions about their relationship. And while this explains both facets 
of Heidegger’s approach to the ‘reality problem’ -  his rejection of the traditional 
version, and his own unorthodox reinterpretation of it -  the general implication is 
clearly that the realism-idealism contrast is divested of genuine poignancy.
What would it be, against this background, for a phenomenological conception of 
language to have realist or idealist implications? An answer to this should respect its 
emphasis on the embeddedness of language-in-the-world and the concomitant 
rejection of the idea that language has an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. Taking a cue from 
SZ* s treatment of idealism and realism, the question should then not be set up in the 
traditional Cartesian manner, but address the kind of contact we have with objects 
through language. Traditionally the realism-idealism debate has drawn its poignancy 
from the worry that there is something problematic about the subject’s contact with 
the world. On the Cartesian picture, most notably, representations -  the ‘veil of ideas’ 
-  both stand between and link subjects and objects. This picture of representations
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intervening between, i.e. literally coming between, knowing and what is known, 
underlies the thought that the awareness of objects they mediate is somehow indirect 
and potentially refractive or occlusive, even generating the possibility of radical 
deception concerning the existence of external objects. It might therefore be thought 
that to emphasize the involvement of words, via their presentational and pragmatic 
sense, in constituting awareness of the world suggests that language too plays the role 
of intervening representation, thus reintroducing familiar concerns about a potentially 
problematic breach between the way objects are ‘for us’ and how they are ‘in 
themselves’. The resultant task, I suggest, is twofold. On the one hand, we need to 
understand in what sense the use of words is constitutive of the understanding in 
which they are involved. On the other hand, we need to understand how this 
involvement fails to generate the possibility of distorting, refracting, or occluding the 
world in the way intervening representations do. In brief, how can language be 
understood not as standing between us and real objects, but as a way of being in 
contact with them?
The phenomenological conception of language developed here combines two 
ways in which the involvement of words is constitutive of understanding. The first is 
Merleau-Ponty’s view that ‘thought tends towards expression as towards its 
completion’ (PdP 206), which, I suggested, should be interpreted as claiming that 
what a thought is can be understood only in terms of its being expressed. At one level 
this is a causal claim to the effect that words -  as the ontologically enduring linguistic 
entities -  are quite literally the means, the forms or materials, of which we fashion 
thoughts, and in the absence of which it is difficult to see what would count as having 
(many) thoughts. However, its point is primarily criterial in the sense that the only 
general way of understanding and stating what the content of a thought is is in 
relation to its linguistic expression. In this dual causal-criterial sense the involvement 
of words is constitutive for the ‘completion’ of thought in the way Merleau-Ponty 
describes. There is also, second, the Wittgensteinian insight that the use of words in 
certain ways is constitutive of many forms of practice. This kind of constitution, 
corresponding to the use of words as means for specific tasks, is again both causal 
and criterial. For it reflects not only the fact that words are actually used to do these 
things, but also the tautological sense entailed by the internal link between language 
use and practice: to use language in such-and-such a way just is to engage in the
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corresponding language-game, whereas to use language differently would be to act 
differently.
To be ‘constitutive’ in either of these ways thus has a dual aspect. On the one 
hand the claim is to describe the way in which language is actually (causally) 
involved in our interaction with the world. On the other hand, there is a criterial 
aspect in that what it is to be a particular thought or a particular practice involves 
reference to language. Given either of these modes of constitution, it could be said 
that language in some sense ‘makes possible’ the expression of thoughts and content. 
However, I want to emphasize that rather than attributing to language some obscure 
transcendental status, to be ‘constitutive’ in these ways is a prosaic, nuts-and-bolts 
affair, akin to the way that using a hammer is constitutive of hammering a nail into a 
wall. Accordingly, to say language has a constitutive function is a descriptive claim 
rather than some kind of explanation: i.e. it is to describe how language is part of 
certain phenomena, rather than to identify language as a distinguished entity -  so to 
speak semantic aether -  within which meaning arises. This modest sense in which 
language ‘constitutes’ meaning is perhaps best conveyed by talking -  in a way hinted 
at by Merleau-Ponty -  of ‘conditions of actuality’ rather than ‘conditions of 
possibility’ (cf. PdP 48, 74). For these are claims not about what or how linguistic 
meaning has to be, what could be meant, but about how it is and how language is 
actually involved in generating meaning.
Given these two modes of linguistic meaning constitution, presentational and 
pragmatic sense can be thought of as explicating different aspects of how the 
perspective under which objects are linguistically addressed is built up. In view of 
this, the phenomenological conception of language can be summed up as a kind of 
perspectivism, provided that several points are borne in mind. First, to someone 
accustomed to thinking in terms of the distinction between objects-for-us and objects- 
in-themselves, a perspectivist view might look like idealism. However within a 
Heideggerian framework, I have argued, that distinction is inoperative, such that 
linking the concept of an object with access conditions neither entails a loss of 
genuine contact with the world nor has idealist implications. Second, it might be 
thought that to talk of perspectivism involves reference to an agent or group that 
bears such perspectives. While it is, of course, true that linguistic perspectives are 
bome by groups of speakers, the point of presentational and pragmatic sense is to 
identify certain factors that make up such perspectives and their differences or
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similarities. Furthermore, by focusing on features of public phenomenology, rather 
than appealing to cognitive or motivational states of speakers, the pragmatic- 
presentational perspective proposed here respects the need for linguistic sense to be 
impersonal.360 Third, to talk of perspectivism does not imply any kind of constraint or 
limit on knowledge. Not only is expansion or improvement of a linguistic perspective 
possible -  for example, by developing new practices or new means of expression -  
but it is quite plausible that such processes be driven by the epistemic aims of 
acquiring better or more comprehensive knowledge of the world. So to say that a 
phenomenological conception of language is perspectival does not imply that human 
understanding or knowledge is constrained in some principled sense by the ‘limits of 
one’s language’. Rather than identifying some kind of transcendental limit on what 
can be said, observations about the limits of our linguistic perspective are 
straightforwardly technical in character, hinting at what we have yet to learn to say: 
not having a way to talk about ... is a limit just as the fact that no-one has yet built a 
solar powered family car is a ‘limit of mobility’. Finally, acknowledging the 
possibility of improving or expanding perspectives does not entail that such processes 
either have or are guided by the ideal of some final, absolute or unconditioned 
terminus. Rather the pursuit of more expansive and detailed perspectives is better 
thought of as an open process. The reason for this is not simply that no-one has any 
clear conception of what such a terminus might be; nor even that the ideal of full 
determinacy might -  as argued in the preceding discussion of Wittgenstein -  not be a 
coherent ideal. It is simply that nothing in real discourse requires it. To conceive of 
possible improvements to a perspective no more requires directedness towards an 
‘absolute’ conception than aspiring to run 1 0 0 m faster requires an absolute 
conception of speed.362
The second task proposed above is to understand why such perspectival and 
constitutive modes of linguistic contact should not be thought of -  as suggested by
360 A commitment, as has been seen, common to Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Frege (cf. 93, 170, 
and 209 respectively).
361 Our perspective might be expanded in something like the way Nagel thinks o f the pursuit of 
‘objectivity’ as a ‘method o f understanding’ in which ‘we step back from our initial view o f it and 
form a new conception which has that view and its relation to the world as its object’ (Nagel 1986, 4).
362 Williams (1977, 64-68) and Nagel (1986, 5) describe improvements to a perspective as conceiving 
successive higher points o f view that commensurate lower ones, and are tempted by the thought that 
this generates a dialectic tending towards an ‘absolute’ conception or point o f view as a somehow 
implicit norm o f enquiry. Although perhaps naturally tempting, the appeal to an ideal terminus is, as 
indicated above, superfluous.
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the intervening representations model -  as potentially occluding or refracting 
awareness of our surroundings. I want to suggest three reasons for thinking that this is 
not the case. The first is the embeddedness of language in other phenomena, which 
contrasts with the traditional picture of representations’ being, so to speak, 
sandwiched between the thinking subject and external objects. Such embeddedness, 
reflected in my talk of ‘language-in-the-world’, suggests that knowledge of language 
is not sui generis, but is intrinsically bound up with more general awareness of the 
world. On this picture linguistically constituted knowledge cannot be thought to 
consist of knowledge of language and knowledge of the world attained through 
language as two disjunct elements. If any clear sense can be given to this distinction, 
their relationship would be as two aspects of a symbiotic whole.
The second reason for not thinking of language as a refractive medium on the 
model of intervening representations is its artefactual ontological status. If we stood 
to language as we do to natural objects, i.e. as features of the world that exist prior to 
and independently of our awareness of them, then it might be reasonable to wonder 
whether it systematically refracted or put limits on our access to the world. In that 
case language might be presenting the world to us in a way that we are ignorant of. 
So, for example, if my eyes’ lens had always been tainted (rose coloured, say), I 
might remain unaware that colours are always being presented to me in a refractive 
manner. This is clearly how philosophers have often thought of mental 
representations. But that is not how we stand to language. Rather, as something 
produced by human activity, language has never been completely beyond the pale of 
human understanding. Moreover, it is something that has been attuned and refined in 
interaction with the environing world. So although one might be unaware of various 
nuances and implications of the language one uses, it is implausible to think anyone 
could speak a language without being to some extent aware of its relation to other 
aspects of the world. It is therefore difficult to see how language, in contrast to 
natural entities, could stand in an undiscovered, and systematically refractive, relation 
to what we understand in using it.
Finally, it is important to realize that there are other models in terms of which 
linguistic constitution of meaning can be thought of, so that there is no need to 
assimilate it to the picture of intervening representations. To appreciate this, different
363 This point might be made by saying that the appearance-reality distinction does not apply to 
artefacts, such as language, in the way it is sometimes thought to apply to mental representations.
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ways that something might function as an intermediary, or as mediating some effect, 
should be distinguished. To think of representations as intervening in our awareness 
of the world is to think of them as effecting what I shall call material mediation. The 
defining feature of material mediation is that whatever functions as an intermediary 
either forms part of, or leaves some characteristic imprint on the result. 
Understanding either the process or the result of material mediation consequently 
requires some mention of the nature of the material intermediary involved. For 
example, in describing how either a pair of glasses or mental representations affect 
our awareness of the world, it seems necessary to take account of the optical 
properties etc. of the respective material intermediary.364
An alternative picture is provided by the chemical function of catalysts, these 
being substances that play a role in either initiating or facilitating some reactive 
sequence, but which precipitate out to comprise no part of the overall reaction’s end 
product. By definition, a catalyst is something constitutively involved in the 
(chemical) process, but not the product, of what it brings about. Such mediation -  
catalytic mediation -  thus contrasts with material mediation, in which the 
intermediary is implicated in both the process and product. It is important, I 
suggest, to realize that instruments, being typically used to bring about states of the 
world of which they comprise no part, often function in a manner that contrasts in the 
same way with material mediation. To use the customary example, though a hammer 
is used to hammer in nails, the result is (‘hammer-free’) nails in the wall -  the 
hammer is part of the process, but not of its product. In such cases there is surely no 
temptation to think of instruments as standing between us and the world, since in 
using them we are clearly in direct contact with our surroundings. So part of the point 
of emphasizing the instrumental character of linguistic signs, as I have been doing, is 
to suggest both that language is in this kind of direct instrumental contact with the 
world, and that its mode of mediation is catalytic rather than material. That is, to 
think of awareness of the world as linguistically mediated does not mean that this 
awareness remains tacitly dependent on one’s grasp of language as such; instead the
364 This is the kind o f mediation Hegel, for example, attributes to the ‘medium’ or ‘tool’ o f knowledge 
{das Erkenneri) at the start o f the Introduction to the Phenomenology o f  Spirit.
365 In building a house, for example, the water used in mixing the cement is catalytically involved, the 
bricks materially so. What I am calling ‘material mediation’ corresponds to the Aristotelian material 
cause, as ‘that from which a thing is made and continues to be made’ (Aristotle 1996, 39 [194b23]). 
Though, o f course, in another (non-Aristotelian) sense catalysts might be equally well described as 
material causes.
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latter is immaterial to the result, though not the process of arriving at such 
understanding. However, once this mode of mediation is recognized, it is not only 
clear that there is no need to model the constitutive function of language on 
intervening representations. Rather, given the embeddedness and artefactuality of 
language, it is also difficult to see any reason to do so.
5. Between realism and nonrealism
Against this background it is perhaps worth reviewing how the phenomenological 
conception of language developed here relates to other familiar forms of ‘idealist’ or 
‘realist’ position. As it turns out, this conception does not straightforwardly -  i.e. 
point for point -  contrast with the metaphysical realist’s view with which the last 
section began. There is, as originally suggested, some conflict with the metaphysical 
realist’s first commitment to the existence of a ‘fixed totality of mind-independent 
objects’. For it seems reasonable to object, as Heidegger does, that the independence 
of objects cannot be defined privatively in terms of mind-independence, and that a 
positive characterization of such objects in terms of access conditions (construed as 
individuation conditions) would be needed to make metaphysical realism intelligible. 
In itself this is not an obviously insurmountable obstacle, though presumably it would 
push one towards a narrow physicalist construal of ‘reality’ -  based on individuation 
in terms of spatio-temporal coordinates or the influence of particular kinds of force. 
The real conflict arises from the metaphysical realist’s conflation of the issue of 
access-independence with that of what is ‘real’. For it is far from clear that mind- 
independence should determine what ‘really exists’, and less clear still, given that it 
partly constitutes many features of the world, that language-independence could. 
Given its perspectival character, my phenomenological conception of language is also 
at odds with the second metaphysical realist thesis that there is only ‘one true and 
complete description’ of the world. Clearly the vagueness of this suggestion makes it 
difficult to assess -  what, for example, is ‘complete’ description? However, it at least 
intimates a contrast with the idea that a language embodies a certain perspective on 
the world that is subject to change or differences. Yet if the optical metaphor is taken 
seriously, it seems fairly obvious that pictures of the same scene, painted from 
different viewpoints, using different palettes, or under different perspective 
conventions etc. can look quite different without being in any way ‘wrong’. However, 
once this kind of pluralism of approach is acknowledged, then it seems reasonable to
237
think that the -  again, admittedly vague -  idea of correspondence could be invoked to 
describe the correctness of different pictures of the same scene. So, by this analogy, 
there is no obvious reason to suppose that a perspectivist conception of language in 
fact conflicts with the metaphysical realist’s thesis of truth as correspondence.
It is perhaps now unsurprising that the relationship with the ‘internalist’ 
position Putnam sees as improving on the ‘externalist’ perspective of metaphysical 
realism is no more straightforward. This intemalism is again characterized by three 
theses. First, for the internalist 'what objects does the world consist of? is a question 
that it only makes sense to ask within a theory or description’ (Putnam 1981, 49). 
Second, intemalism allows that there might be ‘more than one “true” theory or 
description of the world’ (Putnam 1981, 49). Third, on this perspective, tmth ‘is an 
idealization of rational acceptability’, something justified under ‘epistemically ideal 
conditions’ (Putnam 1981, 55). In some respects the phenomenological position I 
have been developing is closer to this internalist position than to the externalist- 
metaphysical one. In relating objectivity to ‘theory or description’ intemalism clearly 
attempts to meet the requirement I have discussed in terms of access or individuation 
conditions. In acknowledging that there are ‘experiential inputs to knowledge’ 
(Putnam 1981, 54) it also attempts to distinguish the issue of what exists from that of 
access-independence, as surely one should. This, together with the commitment to 
some notion of tmth as a norm of enquiry underlies Putnam’s conviction that the 
internalist perspective can be construed as (internal) realism. At the same time, the 
internalist’s allowance that there might be more than one acceptable description of the 
world seems congenial to the perspectivist view advocated here.
Nonetheless -  disregarding the obscurity of an appeal to ‘epistemically ideal 
conditions’ -  my position is more saliently opposed to Putnam’s so-called internal 
realism, with its invocation of interiority, than it is to metaphysical realism. This 
interiority is defined in relation to conceptual schemes, with internal realism 
accepting that ‘“Objects” do not exist independently of conceptual schemes’ and that 
objectivity is ‘objectivity for us’ (Putnam 1981, 52, 55). However, since they are
366 Indeed Heidegger’s view that language serves to pick out features of the real world seems to require 
some kind of correspondence -  though o f course the difficulty is to state what kind. An interesting 
proposal for the direction to take is Randall’s idea o f ‘functional realism’, which is based not on a 
‘structural correspondence’, but ‘a functional “correspondence” between factors in the instrument and 
in the materials’ which is ‘not discoverable except as the instrument does what it is intended to do’ 
(Randall 1963, 55).
367 Which is duly criticized by, for example, Wright (1992, 44-46).
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supposed to be instantiated in language use, it is difficult to see how the notion of 
conceptual schemes can sustain inside-outside imagery. For the whole point of my 
talk of language as Tanguage-in the world’ is that phenomenological adequacy 
requires conceiving language as ontologically and functionally founded in the wider 
world, so that its use cannot create a schism between objects-in-themselves and 
objects-for-us. Indeed, to describe the way certain linguistic or conceptual means 
determine access to objects in the world in terms of an inside-outside topology seems 
simply to misappropriate the traditional picture of mental representations intervening 
between thinking subjects and the physical world. But despite its plausibility with 
phenomena such as perception, it is -  as the last section argued -  both unnecessary 
and misleading to transfer the intervening representations model to linguistic 
phenomena.
Although Putnam thinks of the internalist perspective as a form of realism, in 
holding that knowledge deals only in ‘objectivity for us’, this position has obvious 
proximity to positions otherwise labelled ‘idealism’. Thus the identification of an 
‘internal’ aspect of representation that conditions and constrains agents’ cognitive 
access to the world is reminiscent not only -  as Putnam (1981, 60-64) himself 
emphasizes -  of Kant’s transcendental idealism, but also of the nonsolipsistic type of 
linguistic idealism sometimes associated with the late Wittgenstein. This line of 
thought arises from Wittgenstein’s evocative talk of the ‘limits of language’ and the 
supposed role of ‘grammatical propositions’ in delimiting sense from nonsense. As 
Bernard Williams (1981, 152 f.) describes it, the basic gambit of such linguistic 
idealism is to treat the ‘fact that our language is such and such’ as a ‘transcendental’ 
fact which issues in a form of idealism insofar as ‘everything can be expressed only 
via human interests and concerns’. Now, while it is plausible that language should 
have such a transcendental status on the calculus view and its supposed autonomy of 
language, it seems to me, as set out above, that in later writings the predominance of 
the language-game analogy led Wittgenstein increasingly to an embedded view of 
language that eroded the supposed categorial difference between grammatical and 
empirical facts, on which a transcendentalist reading of his views relies. Exegetic
368 As Rorty (1989, 13-15) has emphasized, Davidson’s critique o f the idea o f conceptual schemes 
leads by a different route to the same conclusion (cf. Davidson 2001, 198; 1986, 445 f.).
369 Most prominent in the Tractatus (e.g. Introduction, 5.6-5.632), but also at PU  §119.
370 Cf. III.2.(ii) above. Sacks (2000, 198-218) describes Wittgenstein’s position as relying on 
‘transcendental features’, understood as empirically and hence contingently generated features that are
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considerations aside, however, two reminders should suffice to show that the 
phenomenological conception of language advocated here is not to be interpreted as 
linguistic idealism of the kind Williams characterizes. First, the view of linguistic 
constitution outlined in the last section does not attribute language with 
transcendental feats. Rather, as I put it, on the phenomenological view language 
functions as a condition of actuality, not possibility, for meaning. Second, given the 
openness continually to develop or expand the linguistic perspective we have on the 
world, the idea that language ‘limits’ what can be said is unconvincing. Like the 
limits of scientific knowledge, such supposed limits are simply a reflection of what
•  • 0 7 1can be done here and now (i.e. empirically) rather than principled ones.
The fact that my phenomenological conception of language cannot be 
straightforwardly aligned to either of the perspectives Putnam distinguishes, or to 
linguistic idealism, is indicative of a fundamental difference. Both Putnam’s 
alternatives and the idea of linguistic idealism conspicuously operate with the same 
basic coordinates of internal and external, things-for-us and (‘mind independent’)
->77
things-in-themselves, as the Cartesian tradition. Here, however, I have been 
emphasizing that a phenomenologically adequate conception of language should treat 
language as not having an inside-outside topology. The failure to match up with the 
familiar alternatives discussed here is one consequence of this approach. For, just as 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, its rejection of a presupposed basic dualism makes it a 
hybrid seeking to reconcile the desirable aspects of each of the traditionally opposing 
‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ positions. A more profound consequence, as previously 
pointed out, is that without an inside-outside topology the traditional realism-idealism 
contraposition loses its point. It seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn from this 
situation, paralleling Heidegger’s own response, is that to ask of a phenomenological 
conception of language-in-the-world whether it is idealist or realist is simply not an 
illuminating question: it is neither or both, depending on how the question is
treated as having transcendental status. Although exegetically plausible for the PU, it seems to me, as 
Sacks highlights, that this empirical-transcendental hybrid is ill-suited to underwrite genuinely 
transcendental claims. -  Wittgenstein himself seems to have seen debates between idealists and realists 
simply as verbal disagreements, suggesting in one passage that they differ only in their ‘battle cries’ (Z 
§414; cf. P U  §402).
371 That is, I am claiming there are ‘limits of language’ only in what Williams (1981, 151) calls the 
‘tautological’ and ‘empirical’ sense.
372 As a matter o f course Putnam treats the alternative to an ‘external’ perspective as an ‘internal’ one. 
-  Cf. also his suggestion that the main problem o f 20th century analytic philosophy has been to work 
out how language ‘hooks onto the world’ (Putnam 1990, 43) -  a formulation bizarrely suggesting that 
language is not itself part o f the world and could conceivably become ‘unhooked’.
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meant. Or rather, the lesson to be drawn is that commitment to phenomenological 
adequacy issues in a conception of language that is beyond the realism-idealism 
alternative. The implication of a phenomenological approach, in other words, is that 
language is not itself the kind of thing that has realist or nonrealist implications.
373 Another possible response would be to reinterpret certain concerns traditionally linked with the 
realism-idealism independently o f an underlying dualist picture. A prominent suggestion in this spirit 
are the realism-antirealism distinctions proposed by Michael Dummett (1978, 1993), focusing on the 
evidence-independence, logical behaviour, or reducibility o f certain propositions. Although there is no 
direct engagement between my position here, due to its subpropositional focus, and Dummett’s 
concerns, it might be suspected that either my talk o f ‘access conditions’ or the idea that language 
blends practical and cognitive structuration entails a general antirealism. I am inclined to think a 
phenomenological approach would also prove neutral with regard to the realism-antirealism 
distinction, and in particular that Dummettian realism could not entail rejection o f access conditions, in 
the weak tautological sense proposed above, without problematically giving up the idea o f determinate 
states-of-affairs. However, as Dummett’s discussion deals with statements rather than objects, to 
address either this issue or the first -  which would require further development o f my position here to 
establish how words’ pragmatic and predicative sense constrain sentential or propositional content -  
would lead significantly beyond the scope o f the present thesis.
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